First Battle of Champagne
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The First Battle of Champagne (French: 1ère Bataille de Champagne) was fought from 20 December 1914 – 17 March 1915 in World War I in the Champagne region of France, between the French Fourth Army and the German Third Army. It was the first offensive by the Allies against the Germans since the end of mobile warfare, after the Race to the Sea during the autumn of 1914 and the defensive battles in Flanders at the Battle of the Yser and the First Battle of Ypres in October and November.
By early November the German offensive in Flanders had ended and the French began to consider large offensive operations. An assessment was completed by the Operations Bureau of Grand Quartier Général ("GQG" the French high command) on 15 November. The report noted that the German offensive in the west had ended and four to six corps were being moved to the Eastern Front. An offensive by France would assist the Russian army and force the Germans to keep more forces in the west.
After minor skirmishes the battle began on 20 December 1914 when the XVII and I Colonial Corps attacked and made small gains. On 21 December the XII Corps failed to advance because most of the gaps in the wire were found to be covered by machine-guns, the corps attack was stopped and the infantry began mining operations as the artillery bombarded enemy positions. After several days of attacks, which obtained more small pieces of territory, the main effort was moved by de Langle to the centre near Perthes and added a division between XVII corps and I Colonial Corps. On 27 December Joffre sent the IV Corps to the Fourth Army area, which made it possible for de Langle to add another I Corps division to the front line. On 30 December the French began a new attack as the Germans attacked II Corps on the right flank, took three lines of defence and inflicted many casualties. Next day II Corps retook most of the lost ground but the Germans made four big counter-attacks against the Fourth Army, which disorganised the French offensive. Over the next few days the French used artillery to keep pressure on the Germans. A counter-attack on the night of 7/8 January drove the French out of a salient west of Perthes, until a counter-attack recovered most of the lost ground. French attacks continued for another two weeks, took small amounts of ground and drove off several German counter-attacks but made few gains, by the time that the offensive was suspended on 13 January.
Supporting attacks in Artois and Champagne by the Second Army, Eighth Army and the troops on the coast at Nieuport supported the Tenth Army at Arras in the First Battle of Artois (17 December 1914 –13 January 1915). The Fourth Army attacks were supported by the Army Detachment of the Vosges, which had also had little success. The armies on supporting fronts had far fewer guns and an attack by the XI Corps of the Second Army on 27 December, had no artillery support. In the Vosges, French artillery did not begin to fire until the two attacking divisions began to advance. All of the supporting attacks were costly in casualties.
In mid-January a German attack began to the north of Soissons, on the route to Paris but the attack was made by small numbers of troops, to conserve reserves for operations on the Eastern Front and the French defenders repulsed the attack. In late January a German attack was made against the Third Army, which was defending the heights of Aubréville close to the main railway to Verdun. Having been pushed back the French counter-attacked six times and lost 2,400 casualties. The German attack failed to divert French troops from the flanks of the Noyon Salient.
De Langle wrote a report on the campaign, in which he asserted that the army had followed the principle of avoiding a mass offensive and instead made a series of attacks against points of tactical significance. When such operations succeeded it had become necessary to make similar preparations for a new attack, by digging approach trenches and destroying German field defences with artillery-fire. Obtaining a breakthrough by "continuous battle" was impossible and de Langle claimed that methodical successive attacks, to capture points of tactical importance, would have more effect. Joffre replied that the failure of the offensive, was due to inadequate artillery-support and too few infantry, attacking on narrow fronts of a few hundred metres, despite the attack taking place on a 12 miles (19 km) front, which made the attacking infantry far too vulnerable to massed artillery-fire. De Langle was ordered quickly to make several limited attacks but Joffre told Poincaré the French president, that a war of movement was a long way off.
In 2005 Foley recorded c. 240,000 French casualties in February with c. 45,000 German losses, using data from Der Weltkrieg the German Official History. In 2012 Sheldon recorded 93,432 French casualties and 46,100 German losses.
- Doughty, R. A. (2005). Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. ISBN 0-67401-880-X.
- Foley, R. T. (2005). German Strategy and the Path to Verdun : Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870–1916. Cambridge: CUP. ISBN 978-0-521-04436-3.
- Reichsarchiv (1931 and 1933). Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918: Die Militärischen Operationen zu land (Excerpts from volumes VII, VIII and IX as Germany's Western Front, Wilfrid Laurier University Press 2010 ed.). Berlin: Mittler & Sohn. ISBN 978-1-55458-259-4. Retrieved 12 December 2013.
- Sheldon, J. (2012). The German Army on the Western Front 1915 (1st ed.). Barnsley: Pen and Sword Military. ISBN 978-1-84884-466-7.
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