First Moroccan Crisis
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The First Moroccan Crisis (also known as the Tangier Crisis) was the international crisis over the international status of Morocco between March 1905 and May 1906. Germany resented France's increasing dominance of Morocco, and insisted on an open door policy that would allow German business access to its market. Kaiser Wilhelm II set his eyes on Morocco as it was a weak independent country, but it was in the French orbit. The Kaiser went to Tangier and made a speech in favor of Moroccan independence. Isolated diplomatically, Germany called on U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt to mediate. An international conference met at Algeciras, where 13 countries backed France and only Austria-Hungary backed Germany. Spain decided to establish international control over the police forces in the major ports of Morocco, a compromise solution that ended the crisis. Germany's reputation appeared as aggressive and dangerous to diplomats in Paris and London.
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[edit] Background
German Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow was worried about the recently signed Entente Cordiale between Britain and France seeing it as an alliance that potentially threatened Germany. The British and French had until recently been involved in imperial rivalries in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. Von Bülow calculated that Germany could provoke a minor crisis which would reveal the weakness of ties between the two powers and that Britain would not be prepared to offer strong support to France in a situation where war would be in sight.
The French government was at the time trying to establish a protectorate over Morocco, and had managed to sign two bilateral secret[1] agreements with Britain (8 April 1904) and Spain (7 October 1904), which guaranteed the support of the powers in question in this endeavour. A previous agreement with Italy had yet been signed (14–16 December 1900).[2]
[edit] Timeline of events
[edit] The Kaiser's visit
On one side, Germany condemned French attempts to gain Morocco, while on the other France was supported by Britain. The French advances were met with the hostility of Germany, which had been kept in the dark. Germany took immediate diplomatic action to block the new accord from going into effect, including the dramatic visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II to Tangier, Morocco on March 31, 1905. Wilhelm tried to get Morocco's support if they went to war with France or Britain, but his sudden appearance angered many of the people. The Kaiser gave a speech in favour of Moroccan independence, which amounted to a provocative challenge to French influence in Morocco.
[edit] Mobilization for war
Germany sought a multilateral conference where the French could be called to account before other European powers. French premier Maurice Rouvier, initially interested in a compromise solution, refused as French public opinion turned against Germany and the British lent their support to the French position. The French foreign minister, Théophile Delcassé, took a defiant line. The crisis peaked in mid-June, when Delcassé was forced out of the ministry by the more conciliation-minded Rouvier; the French cancelled all military leaves (June 15) and Germany threatened to sign a defensive alliance with the Sultan (June 22). On July 1, France, with strong British backing, agreed to attend the conference, as it was apparent that Germany was becoming diplomatically isolated.
The crisis continued to the eve of the conference at Algeciras, with Germany calling up reserve units (December 30) and France moving troops to the German border (January 3).
[edit] The Algeciras Conference
The Algeciras Conference was called to settle the dispute, lasting from January 16 to April 7, 1906. Of the 13 nations present, the German representatives found that their only supporter was Austria-Hungary. A German attempt at compromise was rejected by all but Austria-Hungary. France had firm support from Britain, Russia, Italy, Spain, and the United States. The Germans decided to accept a face-saving compromise agreement on March 31, 1906 that was signed on May 31, 1906. France agreed to yield control of the Moroccan police, but otherwise retained effective control of Moroccan political and financial affairs.
[edit] Aftermath
Although the Algeciras Conference temporarily solved the First Moroccan Crisis, it only worsened the tensions between the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente that ultimately led to the first world war.[3]
The First Moroccan Crisis also showed that the Entente Cordiale was strong as Britain had defended France in the crisis. The crisis can be seen as a reason for the Anglo-Russian Entente being signed the following year since both countries backed France. Kaiser Wilhelm II was angry at being humiliated and was determined not to back down again, which led to the German involvement in the Second Moroccan Crisis.
[edit] Further reading
- Esthus, Raymond A. Theodore Roosevelt and the International Rivalries (1970) pp 66–111.
- Gifford, Prosser, and Alison Smith, eds. Britain and Germany in Africa: imperial rivalry and colonial rule (1967) ch 7
[edit] See also
- Agadir Crisis (Second Moroccan Crisis)
- Tangier Garrison
- Perdicaris incident
[edit] References
- ^ See Morocco in Diplomacy by E. D. Morel
- ^ This secret agreement between France and Italy provided for the formal mutual recognition by the two side of their interests respectively about Morocco and Libya. See Gianpaolo Ferraioli, Politica e diplomazia in Italia tra il XIX e XX secolo, Rubbettino, Catanzaro, 2007 ISBN 88-498-1697-9.
- ^ Marina Soroka, Britain, Russia and the Road to the First World War (2011) p 114
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