Folk psychology

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In philosophy of mind and cognitive science, folk psychology, or commonsense psychology is an inborn human capacity to explain and predict the behavior and mental state of other people.[1] Processes and items encountered in daily life such as pain, pleasure, excitement and anxiety use common linguistic terms as opposed to technical or scientific jargon.[2]

Folk psychology and analogy are linked.[3] The easiest way to describe something is through references to familiar items. In this way, the union between analogy and folk psychology was inevitable.

Traditionally, the study of folk psychology has focused on how everyday people—those without formal training in the various academic fields of science—go about attributing mental states. This domain has primarily been centred on intentional states reflective of an individual's beliefs and desires; each described in terms of everyday language and concepts such as "beliefs", "desires", "fear", and "hope".[4]

Key folk-concepts[edit]

Intentionality[edit]

When perceiving, explaining, or criticizing human behaviour, people distinguish between intentional and unintentional actions.[5] An evaluation of an action as stemming from purposeful action or accidental circumstances is the key determinant in social interaction. For example, a critical remark that is judged to be intentional on the part of the receiver of the message can be viewed as a hurtful insult. Conversely, if considered unintentional, the same remark may be dismissed and forgiven.

This folk concept of intentionality is used to distinguish between intentional and unintentional behaviour in sports where intentional fouls are punished more harshly than ones deemed to be unintentional. It is also applied in the legal system in terms of criminal law distinguishing between murder and manslaughter.

The importance of this concept transcends almost all aspects of everyday life: with empirical studies in social and developmental psychology exploring perceived intentionality's role as a mediator for aggression, relationship conflict, judgments of responsibility blame or punishment.[6][7]

Recent empirical literature on folk psychology has shown that people's theories regarding intentional actions involve four distinct factors: beliefs, desires, causal histories, and enabling factors.[8] Here, beliefs and desires represent the central variables responsible for the folk theories of intention.

Desires embody outcomes that an individual seeks, including those that are impossible to achieve.[9] The key difference between desires and intentions is that desires can be purely hypothetical, whereas intentions specify an outcome that the individual is actually trying to bring to fruition.[9]

In terms of beliefs, there are several types that are relevant to intentions—outcome beliefs and ability beliefs. Outcome beliefs are beliefs as to whether a given action will fulfill an intention, as in "purchasing a new watch will impress my friends".[5] Ability consists of an actor's conviction regarding his or her ability to perform an action, as in " I really can afford the new watch". In light of this, Heider postulated that ability beliefs could be attributed with causing individuals to form goals that would not otherwise have been entertained.[10]

Comprehension and prediction[edit]

The Context Model[edit]

Folk psychology is crucial to evaluating and ultimately understanding novel concepts and items. Developed by Medin, Altom, and Murphy, the Context Model[11] hypothesizes that as a result of mental models in the form of prototype and exemplar representations, individuals are able to more accurately represent and comprehend the environment around them.

According to the model, the overall similarity between the prototype and a given instance of a category is evaluated based on multiple dimensions (e.g., shape, size, color). A multiplicative function modeled after this phenomenon was created.

s(P,E_i)=\prod_ks(P,E_{ik})

Here, S(P,Ei) represents the similarity between the prototype and the ith exemplar, k is the subscript for the dimensions (k = 1…k), and S(P,Eik) is the similarity between the prototype and the ith exemplar on the kth dimension.

Explanation[edit]

Hilton's (1990) Conversational Model[edit]

Given that folk psychology represents causal knowledge associated with the mind's categorization processes,[citation needed] it follows that folk psychology is actively employed in aiding the explanation of everyday actions. Hilton's (1990) Conversational Model was created with this causal explanation in mind, with the model having the ability to generate specific predictions. Hilton coined his model the 'conversational' model because he argued that as a social activity, unlike prediction, explanation requires an audience: to whom the individual explains the event or action.[12] According to the model, causal explanations follow two particular conversational maxims from Grice's (1975) models of conversation—the manner maxim and the quantity maxim. Grice indicated that the content of a conversation should be relevant, informative, and fitting of the audience's gap in knowledge.[13] Cognizant of this, the Conversational Model indicates that the explainer, upon evaluation of his audience, will modify his explanation to cater their needs. In essence, demonstrating the inherent need for mental comparison and in subsequent modification of behaviour in everyday explanations.

Application and functioning[edit]

Belief-desire model[edit]

The belief-desire model of psychology illustrates one method in which Folk Psychology is utilized in everyday life. According to this model, people perform an action if they want an outcome and believe that it can be obtained by performing the action. However, beliefs and desires are not responsible for immediate action; intention acts as a mediator of in this relationship belief-desire and action.[9] In other words, a person who wants to achieve a goal, "G", and believes action "A" will aid in attaining "G"; this leads to an intention to perform "A", which is then carried out to produce action "A".

Figure 2 - A schematic representation of folk psychology of belief, desire, intention, and action.

Schank & Asbelson (1977) described this inclusion of typical beliefs, desires, and intentions underlying an action as akin to a "script" whereby an individual is merely following an unconscious framework that leads to the ultimate decision of whether an action will be performed.[14] Similarly, Barsalou (1985) described the category of the mind as an "ideal" whereby if a desire, a belief, and an intention were all present, they would "rationally" lead to a given action. They coined this phenomenon the Ideal of Rational Action.[15]

Goal-intentional action model[edit]

Existing literature has widely corroborated the fact that social behavior is greatly affected by the causes to which people attribute actions.[10] In particular, it has been shown that an individual's interpretation of the causes of behaviour reflects their pre-existing beliefs regarding the actor's mental state and motivation behind his or her actions.[16] It follows that they draw on the assumed intentions of actors to guide their own responses to punish or reward the actor. This concept is extended to cover instances in which behavioural evidence is lacking. Under these circumstances, it has been shown that the individual will again draw on assumed intentions in order to predict the actions of the third party.[10]

Although the two components are often used interchangeably in common parlance, there is an important distinction between the goals and intentions. This discrepancy lies in the fact that individuals with an intention to perform an action also foster the belief that it will be achieved, whereas the same person with a goal may not necessarily believe that the action is able to be performed in spite of having a strong desire to do so.

Predicting goals and actions, much like the Belief-Desire Model, involves moderating variables that determine whether an action will be performed. In the Goal-Intentional Action Model, the predictors of goals and actions are: the actors' beliefs about his or her abilities and their actual possession of preconditions required to actually carry out the action.[17] Additionally, preconditions consist of the various conditions necessary in order for realization of intentions. This includes abilities and skills in addition to environmental variables that may come into play. Schank & Abelson raises the example of going to a restaurant, where the preconditions include the ability to afford the bill and get to the correct venue, in addition to the fact that the restaurant must be open for business.[14] Traditionally, people prefer to allude to preconditions to explain actions that have a high probability of being unattainable, whereas goals tend to be described as a wide range of common actions.

Model of everyday inferences[edit]

Models of everyday inferences capture Folk Psychology of human informal reasoning. Many models of this nature have been developed. They express and refine our folk psychological ways of understanding of how one makes inferences.

For example, one model [18] describes human everyday reasoning as combinations of simple, direct rules and similarity-based processes. From the interaction of these simple mechanisms, seemingly complex patterns of reasoning emerge. The model has been used to account for a variety of reasoning data.

Contention[edit]

Folk psychology remains the subject of much contention in academic circles with respect to its scope, method and the significance of its contributions to the scientific community.[19][not in citation given] A large part of this criticisms stems from the prevailing impression that folk psychology is a primitive practice reserved for the uneducated and non-academics in discussing their everyday lives.[20]

There is significant debate over whether folk psychology is useful for academic purposes; specifically whether it can be relevant with regards to the scientific psychology domain. It has been argued that a mechanism used for laypeople's understanding, predicting, and explaining each other's actions is inapplicable with regards to the requirements of the Scientific Method.[20] Conversely, opponents have called for patience, seeing the mechanism employed by laypeople for understanding each other's actions as important in their formation of bases for future action when encountering similar situations. Malle & Knobe hailed this systematization of people's everyday understanding of the mind as an inevitable progression towards a more comprehensive field of psychology.[5] Medin et al. provide another advantage of conceptualizing folk psychology with their Mixture Model of Categorization:[21] it is advantageous due its facilitation of action prediction.

References[edit]

  1. ^ "Folk Psychology as a Theory (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)". Plato.stanford.edu. Retrieved 2013-02-01. 
  2. ^ Wellman, H (1990). Children's theories of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
  3. ^ Bach, T. R. "Folk-psychology and analogy". Dissertation Abstracts International Section A: Humanities and Social Sciences. 
  4. ^ Arico, Adam (2010). "Folk psychology, consciousness, and context effects". Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3): 317–393. doi:10.1007/s13164-010-0029-9. Retrieved 10 March 2012. 
  5. ^ a b c Malle, Betram F; Knobe, Joshua (Mar 1997). "The folk concept of intentionality". Journal of experimental social psychology 33 (2): 101–121. doi:10.1006/jesp.1996.1314. 
  6. ^ Karniol, Rachel (Jan 1978). "Children's use of intention cues in evaluating behaviour". Psychological Bulletin 85 (1): 76–85. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.85.1.76. 
  7. ^ Piaget, Oxford (1932). The Language and Thought of the Child, 1926; Judgment and Reasoning in the Child, 1928; The Child's Conception of the World, 1929; The Child's Conception of Physical Causality, 1930; The Moral Judgment of the Child, 1932.. Oxford, England: Harcourt, Brace. pp. 54–93. 
  8. ^ Malle, Betram F; Knobe (Mar 1997). "The folk concept of intentionality". Journal of experimental social psychology 33 (2): 101–121. doi:10.1006/jesp.1996.1314. Retrieved 10 April 2012. 
  9. ^ a b c Kashima, Yoshihisa; McKintyre, Allison; Clifford, Paul (1 April 2000). "The category of the mind: Folk psychology of belief, desire, and intention. Author". Asian Journal of Social Psychology. 1 1 (3): 289–313. doi:10.1111/1467-839X.00019. Retrieved 21 February 2012. 
  10. ^ a b c Heider, F (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley. 
  11. ^ Medin, D.L.; Altom, M. W. & Murphy, T.D. (1984). "Given versus induced category representations: Use of prototype and exemplar information in classification.". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 10 (333): 352. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.10.3.333. 
  12. ^ Hilton, Denis J. (Jan 1990). "Conversational processes and causal explanation". Psychological Bulletin 107 (1): 65–81. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.107.1.65. 
  13. ^ Grice, H Paul (1979). "Logic and Conversation". Communications 30: 7–72. doi:10.3406/comm.1979.1446. 
  14. ^ a b Schank, R.C. (1977). Scripts, plans, goals and understanding. New Jersey: Eribaum. 
  15. ^ Barsalou, Lawrence W. (Oct 1985). "Ideals, central tendency, and frequency of instantiation as determinants of graded structure in categories.". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 11 (4). doi:10.1037/0278-7393.11.1-4.629. 
  16. ^ Weiner, B. (1986). An attributional theory of motivation and emotion. New York: Springer. 
  17. ^ Boonzaier, A.; McClure, J. & Sutton, R. M. (2005). [doi:10.1002/ejsp.280 "Distinguishing the effects of beliefs and preconditions: The folk psychology of goals and actions"]. European Journal of Social Psychology 35 (6): 725–740. doi:10.1002/ejsp.280. 
  18. ^ Sun, R. (1994). Integrating Rules and Connectionism for Robust Commonsense Reasoning. New York: Wiley. 
  19. ^ Goldenweiser, A. A. (1912). "Folk-psychology". Psychological Bulletin 9 (10): 373–380. doi:10.1037/h0074365. 
  20. ^ a b Fletcher, G. (1995). The scientific credibility of folk psychology. Hilsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc. ISBN 0805815708. OCLC 476199418. 
  21. ^ Medin, D. L.; Altom, M. W.; Murphy, T.D. (1984). "Given versus induced category representations: Use of prototype and exemplar information in classification". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 10: 333–352. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.10.3.333.