Forward secrecy

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In cryptography, forward secrecy (abbreviation: FS, also known as perfect forward secrecy or PFS[1]) is a property of key-agreement protocols ensuring that a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. The key used to protect transmission of data must not be used to derive any additional keys, and if the key used to protect transmission of data is derived from some other keying material, then that material must not be used to derive any more keys. In this way, compromise of a single key permits access only to data protected by that single key.

History[edit]

Forward secrecy was originally introduced by Whitfield Diffie, Paul van Oorschot, and Michael James Wiener. It used to describe a property of the Station-to-Station protocol (STS), where the long-term secrets are private keys.[2]

Forward secrecy has also been used to describe the analogous property of password-authenticated key agreement protocols where the long-term secret is a (shared) password.[3]

Annex D.5.1 of IEEE 1363-2000 discusses the related one-party and two-party forward secrecy properties of various standard key agreement schemes (for two-party forward secrecy properties compare below 2WIPFS: "2-Way-Instant-Forward-Perfect-Secrecy").

Perfect forward secrecy[edit]

A public-key system demonstrates a property referred to as perfect forward secrecy when it:

  • generates random public keys per session for the purposes of key agreement, and
  • does not use any sort of deterministic algorithm in doing so.

This means that the compromise of one message cannot lead to the compromise of others, and also that there is not a single secret value which can lead to the compromise of multiple messages.

This is not to be confused with the concept of perfect secrecy demonstrated by one-time pads, where the ciphertext reveals no information whatsoever and appears completely random.

Attacks[edit]

Forward secrecy is designed to prevent the compromise of a long-term secret key from affecting the confidentiality of past conversations. However, forward secrecy (including perfect forward secrecy) cannot defend against a successful cryptanalysis of the underlying ciphers being used, since a cryptanalysis consists of finding a way to decrypt an encrypted message without the key, and forward secrecy only protects keys, not the ciphers themselves. A patient attacker can capture a conversation whose confidentiality is protected through the use of public-key cryptography and wait until the underlying cipher is broken (e.g. large quantum computers could be created which allow the discrete logarithm problem to be computed quickly). This would allow the recovery of old plaintexts even in a system employing forward secrecy. It should be noted that such attacks are currently believed to be theoretical.[citation needed]

Protocols[edit]

Use[edit]

Forward secrecy is seen as an important security feature by several large Internet information providers. Since late 2011, Google has provided forward secrecy with TLS by default to users of its Gmail service, along with Google Docs and encrypted search among other services.[5] Since November 2013, Twitter has provided forward secrecy with TLS to users of its service.[7] All wikis hosted by the Wikimedia Foundation use PFS from July 1, 2014.[8] Facebook reported as part of an investigation into email encryption that as of May 2014 74% of hosts that support STARTTLS also provide Perfect Forward Secrecy.[9] As of November 2014, 17.6% of TLS-enabled websites are configured to use cipher suites that provide forward secrecy to web browsers.[10]

Further Development[edit]

The concept of PFS has been further elaborated in the implementation of the GoldBug Instant Messenger (http://goldbug.sf.net). Here the PFS implementation is four steps ahead than the regular concept: The option to

  • edit the end-to-end password is given,
  • second, the password can be generated every second new, that' s why the function is called "Instant Perfect Forward Secrecy": IPFS,
  • third, the end-to-end encryption is possible to be sent through an existing (previous generated) end-to-end encrypted channel, so there is no need to have an asymmetric channel to be used,
  • and fourth, the end-to-end encryption can be generated in a two-way-process: called "2 Way Instant Forward Perfect Secrecy": 2WIPFS.

makes it very difficult for attackers to break the secrecy.

In the 2WIPFS process both partners generate an AES-256 and the initiator sends only his first half of the string, the responder then sends the second path of his AES-256 and both append the strings to one common generated AES-256. This excludes attackers sending old or recorded passwords from third machines in the name of one friend.

The approach has developed from "Perfect Forward Secrecy" (PFS) not only to "Instant Perfect Forward Secrey" (IPFS), but is also a step far ahead in an implementation called "2-Way Instant Perfect Forward Secrecy": 2WIPFS. [11] The GoldBug PFS-Funktion (called "MELODICA") elaborated the PFS standard - based on the used Spot-on (http://spot-on.sf.net) library - quite well and developed it with the process implementation within this Instant Messenger.

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ IEEE 1363-2000: IEEE Standard Specifications For Public Key Cryptography. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2000. http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/
  2. ^ Diffie, Whitfield; van Oorschot, Paul C.; Wiener, Michael J. (June 1992). "Authentication and Authenticated Key Exchanges". Designs, Codes and Cryptography 2 (2): 107–125. doi:10.1007/BF00124891. Retrieved 2013-09-07. 
  3. ^ Jablon, David P. (October 1996). "Strong Password-Only Authenticated Key Exchange". ACM Computer Communication Review 26 (5): 5–26. doi:10.1145/242896.242897. CiteSeerX: 10.1.1.81.2594. 
  4. ^ Discussion on the TLS mailing list in October 2007
  5. ^ a b "Protecting data for the long term with forward secrecy". Retrieved 2012-11-05. 
  6. ^ Vincent Bernat. "SSL/TLS & Perfect Forward Secrecy". Retrieved 2012-11-05. 
  7. ^ Hoffman-Andrews, Jacob. "Forward Secrecy at Twitter". Twitter. Twitter. Retrieved 25 November 2013. 
  8. ^ "Tech/News/2014/27 - Meta". Wikimedia Foundation. 2014-06-30. Retrieved 30 June 2014. 
  9. ^ "The Current State of SMTP STARTTLS Deployment". Retrieved 7 June 2014. 
  10. ^ As of November 6, 2014. "SSL Pulse: Survey of the SSL Implementation of the Most Popular Web Sites". Retrieved 2014-11-11. 
  11. ^ "GoldBug.sf.net Instant Messenger Manual DE". Retrieved 11 November 2014. 

External links[edit]