Foundationalism
Foundationalism is any theory in epistemology (typically, theories of justification, but also of knowledge) that holds that beliefs are justified (known, etc.) based on what are called basic beliefs (also commonly called foundational beliefs). This position is intended to resolve the infinite regress problem in epistemology. Basic beliefs are beliefs that give justificatory support to other beliefs, and more derivative beliefs are based on those more basic beliefs. The basic beliefs are said to enjoy a non-inferential warrant (or justification). This warrant can arise from properties of the belief (such as its being self-evident or self-justifying).
Possible candidates for foundational beliefs are thought to include perceptual and memory beliefs, especially reports of one's own subjective experience; beliefs about the meanings of sentences or words; and a priori intuitions.
Varieties of foundationalism
The chief division within foundationalism is between internalist and externalist varieties. Typically, internalist foundationalists hold that basic beliefs are justified by mental events or states, such as experiences, that do not constitute beliefs (these are called non-doxastic mental states). Alternatively, basic beliefs may be justified by some special property of the belief itself, such as its being self-evident or infallible.
Externalist foundationalists hold that belief might be justified by factors that the believer is unaware of, such as the objective likelihood that the belief is true. Types of externalist foundationalism include reliabilism (although not all reliabilists are foundationalists[1]) and Reformed epistemology. Thomas Reid and the Stoics are often considered to be externalist foundationalists,[2] though this attribution remains controversial.
From the early modern period till the late twentieth century, the two dominant varieties of foundationalist theories were rationalism and empiricism (or British empiricism), both of which are internalist views. Strictly speaking, neither empiricism nor rationalism is necessarily committed to foundationalism (it is possible to be an empiricist coherentist, for example, and that was a common epistemological position in 20th century philosophy).
Rationalism is the general name for epistemological theories that maintain that reason is the source and criterion of knowledge. Rationalists generally hold that so-called truths of reason are the (most important) epistemologically basic propositions. The historical, continental rationalism expounded by René Descartes is often regarded as antithetical to empiricism, while some contemporary rationalists assert that reason is strongest when it is supported by or consistent with empirical evidence and hence relies heavily on empirical science in analyzing justifications for belief. Descartes famously held that some of these truths, namely the cogito, are known innately and therefore constitute basic innate knowledge, a view not always held amongst contemporary rationalists.
Empiricism is the general name for epistemological theories that maintain that sensation reports are the source and criterion of knowledge. Classical empiricists generally held that such reports are indubitable and incorrigible and therefore worthy of serving as epistemologically basic propositions.
Alternatives to foundationalism
Alternatives to foundationalism, usually called anti-foundationalism, include coherentism and foundherentism. See also pragmatism, postfoundationalism, critical rationalism, and contextualism.
Criticisms
Critics of foundationalism often argue that for a belief to be justified it must be supported by other beliefs;[3] in Donald Davidson's phrase, "only a belief can be a reason for another belief". For instance, Wilfrid Sellars argued that non-doxastic mental states cannot be reasons, and so noninferential warrant cannot be derived from them. Similarly, critics of externalist foundationalism argue that only mental states or properties the believer is aware of could make a belief justified.
According to skepticism, there are no beliefs that are so obviously certain that they require support from no other beliefs. Even if one does not accept this very strong claim, foundationalists have a problem with giving an uncontroversial or principled account of which beliefs are self-evident or indubitable.
Postmodernists and Post-Structuralists such as Richard Rorty and Jacques Derrida have attacked foundationalism on the grounds that the truth of statements or discourse is only verifiable in accordance with other statements and discourses. Rorty in particular elaborates further on this, claiming that the individual, the community, the human body as a whole have a 'means by which they know the world' (this entails language, culture, semiotic systems, mathematics, science etc.). Rorty claims in addition to this that the philosopher, in order to verify a particular means, or a particular statement belonging to a certain means (e.g. the propositions of the natural sciences) would have to 'step outside' the means they are judging and critique it neutrally -however, this is quite literally impossible, the only way in which one can know the world is through the means by which they know the world. This argument can be seen as directly related to Wittgenstein's Theory of Language -drawing a parallel between Postmodernism and late Logical Positivism that is united in critique of foundationalism.
See also
Bibliography
Coelho, Ivo. "Foundationalism." ACPI Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Johnson J. Puthenpurackal. Bangalore: ATC, 2010. 1:548-551
References
- ^ Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Foundational Theories of Epistemic Justification". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ^ Greco, John (2000). Putting Skeptics in Their Place. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. p. 264. ISBN 978-0-521-04553-7.
- ^ Fumerton, Richard. "Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 13 December 2011.
