Generations of Chinese leadership
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|Generations of Chinese leadership|
|Literal meaning||Leadership collectives of the Communist Party of China|
Because both the Communist Party of China and the People's Liberation Army promote according to seniority, it is possible to discern distinct generations of Chinese leadership. In official discourse, each group of leadership is identified with a distinct extension of the ideology of the party. Historians have studied various periods in the development of the government of the People's Republic of China by reference to these "generations".
While in English the chronological leadership groups are commonly referred to as "generations of Chinese leadership", there is no exact equivalent expression in Chinese. The usual term in official discourse for such a group is a "leadership collective", which are counted in generations. Thus, for example, the "first generation" of leaders identified below are labelled as "the first generation leadership collective". In official discourse, they are also not viewed as leaders of the state (the People's Republic of China), but rather leaders of the party (the Communist Party of China).
In the Communist Party's official discourse, the "generational" division and identification of the "core leader" for each of the first, second and third generations was set down during the leadership of Jiang Zemin and first publicised in 1999. This division and identification was not uncontroversial at the time, since the party had hitherto regarded his immediate predecessors as the party's general secretary, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, as its leaders, and regarded Deng Xiaoping as the "power behind the throne" rather than a formal leader. The revision of party history into "generations" helped to secure Jiang's position as "core" and anointed heir. Through the invention of the concept of the "core", it also helped to de-legitimise Jiang's deposed predecessors (such as Hu and Zhao), by relegating them from party leader to mere "membership" of a "leadership collective", which also conveniently helped to legitimise their deposition.
Jiang's successors have maintained this generational division, but have retreated from identifying a "core leader" in the fourth generation, and the succeeding general secretary Hu Jintao has never been identified in official announcements as the "core" of the fourth generation.
The "leadership collective" at any one time usually, but not always, correlates with the members of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China, with the leader of the party (the Chairman or, after 1983, the General Secretary) often, but not always, the leader of this leadership collective.
Although the first generation of leaders ruled collectively for only part of the period, and Mao Zedong was to a large extent a paramount, autocratic leader for most of the period, the successive leaders from the founding of the People's Republic in 1949 until Mao's death and the dismantling of the power of his closest deputies in 1976 are now referred to retrospectively as the "first generation" of leaders in official discourse.
Thus, the first generation, from 1949 to 1976, consisted of Mao Zedong as core, along with Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Chen Yun, Peng Dehuai, and later Lin Biao and the Gang of Four (neither Lin nor the Gang are today considered by official discourse to be part of this generation because of political antagonism resulting from the Cultural Revolution). These were the leaders that founded the People's Republic of China after the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War. They were born between 1886 and 1907, although the Gang of Four were a distinct subgroup born 1914 to 1935. Most were born before the demise of the Qing Dynasty (not including the Gang) and thus lived to see both the birth and, on the mainland, the end of the Republic of China. One characteristic of these leaders were that they tended to be both political and military leaders. Most had some education outside China, and their formative experiences included the Long March, the Chinese Civil War, and the Second Sino-Japanese War. The guiding political ideology from the first generations were general principles of Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought.
Of this group, Mao, Zhou, Liu and Zhu were the four original members of the collective leadership from 1949 until the political turmoil of the late 1950s and early 1960s, which resulted in Mao gaining paramount autocratic power. Liu, then the President (or "Chairman of the State"), was removed from his party position in 1966, placed under house arrest in 1967, and died from torture and maltreatment in 1969. Zhu lost his position as Vice President in 1959, and his party position in 1966, after which he was politically sidelined until his death in 1976. Zhou was also attacked during the period, but was able to survive as premier until his death, also in 1976.
With the demise of Liu, Mao promoted Lin Biao as his deputy, and the "Gang of Four" to fill the role of his trusted henchmen. Lin fell out of favour, however, and died in 1971 while attempting to escape to the Soviet Union. The Gang of Four, which consisted of Jiang Qing (Madame Mao), and three other members meteorically promoted in the late 1960s, were the only members of the first generation of leadership to remain after Mao's death in 1976. Their demise came shortly afterwards in a political coup managed by what become the second generation of leaders.
Of the other members identified above, Chen Yun was sidelined from the early 1960s, lost his party position in 1969, but survived to play an influential role in the second generation of leadership. Peng Dehuai was denounced in 1959, made a brief return to government in 1965, but was detained by Red Guards from 1966 and died in prison from torture and maltreatment in 1974. While not named above, Deng Xiaoping, the core of the second generation of leadership, also played a key role in the first generation at various times, mainly as an ally of Zhou and Peng, but was purged from government in 1976 and remained sidelined at the time of Mao's death.
The death of Mao, Zhou and Zhu in 1976, and soon afterwards the coup that resulted in the arrest of the Gang of Four, ushered in the era now identified as the "second generation" of leaders. The era began with Hua Guofeng as the successor to Mao, but his position was soon eclipsed by the ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping as the paramount leader, in which position he remained at least until 1992 when he resigned from his leadership positions.
Thus, in official discourse, the second generation of leadership lasted from 1976 to 1992. The official discourse of the Communist Party today identifies Deng Xiaoping as the "core" of this second generation, but Deng was never formally the leader of the party during this period. Instead, the formal party leaders during this time were, successively, Hua Guofeng, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and Jiang Zemin. Other prominent leaders of this generation were Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, Ye Jianying and Peng Zhen. These leaders were also involved in the Chinese revolution, but with the exception of Deng Xiaoping, served in more junior roles, as they were all born from 1897 to 1921 (that is, some were born after the demise of the Qing Empire in the Xinhai Revolution). Like the first generation, many were educated overseas, particularly in France. Their young formative experiences were similar to the first generation. Most had some position of authority during the Cultural Revolution, although as a rule those that held power after the 1980s were purged during that decade. This generation turned the focus from class struggle and political movements to economic development, pioneering Chinese economic reform.
The dominant political ideology of the era was Deng Xiaoping Theory, which was accepted by the party in 1978, and he served in various leadership positions, although his paramount power was not overtly reflected in his formal titles. (He never served after 1976 as head of the party, state or government.) Instead, the formal leaders of the party were a series of younger leaders promoted (and then demoted) by Deng and other influential elders. The most prominent of these were Hu Yaobang (leader from 1981, demoted 1987, died 1989), and Zhao Ziyang (leader from 1987, demoted and place under house arrest in 1989). They were replaced by Li Peng and Jiang Zemin, who would go on to become prominent members of the third generation of leaders.
Consistently influential behind the scenes during Deng's time as paramount leader were fellow elder statesmen Chen Yun and Li Xiannian. Other prominent elders were Ye Jianying (until his death in 1986), Deng Yingchao (Zhou Enlai's widow, until her death in 1992) and Peng Zhen (who retired in 1988). Yang Shangkun played a brief but important role in the period between 1989 and 1992, when as President he subverted the existing constitutional convention and turned the office of President from a symbolic role into an executive one.
The transition towards the third generation of leadership began with the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. The purges that followed led to the promotion of what became the third generation of leadership. Soon afterwards, Deng resigned his last major party post, as chairman of the central military committee, although he remained influential behind the scenes until his death in 1997.
Between 1989 and 1992, Jiang was believed to be simply a transitional figure to protect the party from a power vacuum (or even an Eastern Bloc style collapse) until a more stable successor government to Deng could be put in place. Because of this, the era of the "third generation" is not regarded to have begun until 1992, with the election of the new Politburo standing committee and Jiang consolidating his power without Deng.
Thus, the "third generation" lasted from 1992 to 2003, with Jiang Zemin as core, and other leaders including Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, Qiao Shi, Li Ruihuan. These leaders were born before the revolution from 1924 to 1934 but were educated afterwards before the Sino-Soviet split. Most of them received education in the Soviet Union as engineers and entered the party initially as factory managers. As a result, many of them did not wield any significant political power prior to the 1980s, spending their time during the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath working for the Civil infrastructure of the state and were protected from the purges, as opposed to their predecessors. Unlike their predecessors, there is a split between the political and military leadership. Their formative experiences included the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Korean War. This generation continued economic development while China saw the emergence of various serious social issues. The political ideological innovation officially associated with this period was Jiang's "Three Represents".
The initial members of the third generation were mostly survivors from before 1989, including Jiang Zemin, Li Peng (who continued as premier), Qiao Shi and Li Ruihuan. Notable changes to the leadership were the elevation of Zhu Rongji in place of Li Peng as premier in 1998 and the elevation of Hu Jintao as vice president. For the first time since 1982, the three centres of power of the presidency, the party general secretaryship and the chairmanship of the central military commission were concentrated in a single person, Jiang Zemin. This enabled him to declare himself the "core" of the third generation of leadership.
During this period, while Deng Xiaoping had retired from all leadership positions, he remained influential. In 1992, Deng's informal intervention ensured that market-orientated reforms were not halted by resurgent conservative elements. Deng also played an important role in nominating Hu Jintao as Jiang's successor as party secretary.
2002 saw the first orderly transition of power in the Communist Party of China in accordance with rules on term limits. The new leaders were elected to the Communist Party's Politburo in 2002, and took up their governmental positions in 2003, while the most prominent of their "third generation" predecessors stepped down at the same time.
Thus, the era of the "fourth generation" is officially regarded to have begun in 2003, and lasted until 2012, when the next election for the party leadership occurred. The prominent leaders included Hu Jintao (as General Secretary), Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Jia Qinglin, Zeng Qinghong and Li Changchun. It is also known as the "republican generation" or the Hu-Wen Administration. These were promoted to top leadership at the 16th Party Congress and remained in power until the 18th Party Congress in 2012. This generation of leaders, born mainly in the World War II years from 1939 to 1944, represented a new technocratic style governance and a less centralized political structure. The majority of this generation of leaders were engineers whose academic lives were disrupted by the Cultural Revolution and, unlike both their predecessors and likely successors, have spent very little time overseas. The dominant political ideology of this era was Hu's Scientific Development Concept and a goal for a Socialist Harmonious Society.
Fifth generation (current)
The fifth generation came to power at the 18th Party Congress in 2012, when Hu Jintao stepped down as Party General Secretary. In the fifth generation, one sees fewer engineers and more management and finance majors, including successful entrepreneurs. Most of the fifth generation of civilian leadership, born in the postwar years 1945 to 1955, were educated at top Chinese universities. Hu Jintao's Communist Youth League faction, and the Crown Prince Party (or "Princelings") are seen to be the two dominant factions within the leadership.
Following his elevation to General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, which oversees the People's Liberation Army, the Princeling and current General Secretary Xi Jinping, succeeded Hu Jintao as the paramount leader of this generation. Premier Li Keqiang took the place of former Premier Wen Jiabao. Other prominent figures that are top figures in the 5th generation as it develops include Congress Chairman Zhang Dejiang, Conference Chairman Yu Zhengsheng, Secretariat Secretary Liu Yunshan, Discipline Secretary Wang Qishan, first Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli and Vice President Li Yuanchao, Vice Premier Wang Yang, and Vice Premier Liu Yandong.
Provided China's power transitions and government institutions remain stable in the next decade, the sixth generation of leaders will come to power at the 20th Party Congress in 2022. Under current unspoken Chinese political conventions the leaders of this generation would be mostly born in the 1960s, and speculated future leaders were born from 1960 to 1967. Current speculation places former Communist Youth League head and current Guangdong Province party chief Hu Chunhua as a possible core figure. Chongqing party chief Sun Zhengcai has also been named. U.S.-based news portal Duowei also listed Fujian Governor Su Shulin, Hunan party chief Zhou Qiang, ACAC consortium CEO Zhang Qingwei, and CYL head Lu Hao as other potential figures in this generation of leadership.
- Paramount leader
- Politics of the People's Republic of China
- Political position ranking of the People's Republic of China
- History of the People's Republic of China
- The landmark study of military generations and factions is William Whitson's The Chinese High Command, Praeger, 1973
- See, e.g. Liao (廖), Xinwen (心文) (2012-02-07). "Formation of the First Generation Central Leadership Collective - and also on how Mao Zedong's core status was determined (第一代中央领导集体形成——兼谈毛泽东核心地位怎样确立)". Communist Party of China News. People.com.cn. Retrieved 12 March 2012.
- Willy Wo-Lap Lam. China's 5th generation comes of age, CNN, January 1, 2003
- Arpi, Claude (October 18, 2010). "Why Beijing seethes over the Nobel for Liu", Sify
- Demick, Barbara (19 October 2010). "Xi Jinping on track to become China's next president". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 19 October 2010.
- "eai.nus.edu". Retrieved 2011-09-28.
- "China: A Rising Party Leader Is Elevated Yet Again". The New York Times. 2012-12-18. Retrieved 2012-12-19.
- "China: The leadership succession battle for 2022 begins | The World | International affairs blog from the FT – FT.com". Blogs.ft.com. 2009-12-01. Retrieved 2011-08-13.
- [dead link]
- Chen, Feng (2011-03-23). "中国政坛"第六代新星"开始崭露头角". Duowei. Retrieved 2011-03-23.