|Date||22 September 1934|
|Location||Gresford near Wrexham, Wales|
|Verdict||underground explosion (exact cause not determined)|
The Gresford Disaster occurred on 22 September 1934 at Gresford Colliery, Gresford near Wrexham, in north-east Wales when an explosion killed 266 men and boys. The cause was never proved but an inquiry found that a number of factors such as failures in safety procedures and poor mine management contributed to the disaster. Gresford remains one of Britain's worst coal mining disasters and mining accidents. Only eleven bodies were ever recovered. The remains of the other victims were left entombed within the colliery's permanently-sealed damaged districts.
The Westminster and United Collieries Group began to sink the pit at Gresford in 1908. Two shafts were sunk 50 yards (46 m) apart: the Dennis (named after the industrialist Dennis family of Ruabon who were the pit owners) and the Martin. Work was completed in 1911. The mine was one of the deepest in the Denbighshire Coalfield: the Dennis shaft reached depths of about 2,264 feet (690 m) and the Martin shaft about 2,252 feet (686 m).
- Crank (Martin), a 3 ft (0.91 m) seam producing high-quality household coal. No firedamp.
- Brassey (Martin, part Dennis), a 4 ft (1.2 m) to 12 ft (3.7 m) seam delivering harder 'steam' coal for commercial use. No firedamp.
- Main (Dennis), a 7 ft (2.1 m) seam that produced softer industrial coal. But very prevalent to firedamp.
The explosion occurred within the Main seam of Dennis. This section, which began more than 1.3 miles (2.1 km) from the shaft bottom, was mined down a shallow gradient. Dennis was divided into six "districts": 20's, 61's, 109's, 14's and 29's. The sixth district was a very deep area known collectively as the "95's and 24's". All the districts in Dennis were worked by the longwall system where the coal face was mined in single blocks. Most districts in the Dennis section were mechanised except 20's and 61's, which were still worked by hand, because they were furthest from the main shaft (approx 2.75 miles (4.43 km)).
Conditions in the mine prior to the explosion were presented into evidence at the inquiry into the disaster. Firstly underground mine ventilation in some districts of Dennis was probably inadequate; in particular, the 14's and 29's districts were notorious for poor air quality. The main return airway for the 109's, 14's and 29's districts was said to be 4 feet (1.2 m) by 4 feet (1.2 m) and far too small to provide adequate ventilation. Secondly working conditions in the 2,600 feet (790 m) deep 95's and 24's district were always uncomfortably hot. Thirdly there were also numerous breaches of safety regulations such as the firing of explosive charges in 14's district and the failure to take dust samples.
The disaster inquiry was told that one of the pit deputies (whose job was in theory to oversee the safety of the workings) admitted that he also carried out shotfiring during his shifts, in addition to his other duties. It was revealed that he fired more charges during his shift than a full-time shotfirer could have safely carried out. Furthermore the colliery had made an operating loss in 1933, and the pit manager, William Bonsall, had been under pressure from the Dennis family to increase profitability. He admitted he had spent little time in the Dennis section of the pit in the months before the disaster, as he was overseeing the installation of new machinery in the "Slant", an area in the south-eastern part of the mine's Martin section.
On Saturday 22 September 1934 at 2:08 a.m. a violent explosion ripped through the Dennis section of the Gresford colliery coalfield. The explosion, which happened more than 1.3 miles (2.1 km) away from the bottom of the Dennis' main shaft, started fires and blocked the main access road to all the other districts in the section. At the time up to 500 men were working underground on the night shift with more than half in the affected areas. The rest were in the Martin section about 2 miles (3.2 km) from the explosion; many there were unaware for some time afterwards that a disaster had occurred.
In Dennis the night overman, Fred Davies, who was on duty at the bottom of the main shaft immediately telephoned the surface. Bonsall, the manager, went into the mine to try to establish what had occurred. At approximately 3.30am, the under-manager and overman from Martin, Benjamin Edwards, reported that parts of the Dennis main road were on fire beyond the Clutch (a point where the main line took a 60° left deviation) and that a large number of miners were trapped beyond the blaze. Meanwhile the shift that was working the Slant in Martin was ordered to the pit bottom and told to get out of the mine.:p4
Only six men escaped from the inferno that engulfed the Dennis section. The group, named as Robert (Ted) Andrews, Cyril Challoner, Thomas Fisher, David Jones, Albert (Bert) Samuels, and Jack Samuels, was sitting taking a mid-shift break about 300 yards (270 m) north of the Clutch when the initial explosion happened. A colleague advised them to leave the district via the "wind road" which was the 29's air return drift. Around 30 men working in the 29's district were also told to follow them. But as the six-man lead group went ahead attempting to fan the air to mitigate the effects of the deadly afterdamp, they soon realised the other miners had not followed them. After a long and difficult escape up 1:3 gradients, several ladders, and past rockfalls, the six miners eventually rejoined the Dennis main road and met Andrew Williams, the under-manager, who along with Bonsall had immediately descended the Dennis main shaft on being notified of the explosion.
However three members of Llay No. 1 rescue team, the first group to enter the mine after the explosion, were asphyxiated by afterdamp after being ordered to proceed up the mile-long return airway of the 20's district. The route, which would have taken them around the fire in the Clutch, would have eventually reached the workings of the 61's. John Charles Williams, the Llay team's leader, after the airway ahead narrowed to 3 feet (0.91 m) by 3 feet (0.91 m) and less, tried dragging another team member for over 40 yards (37 m) towards safety before being overcome himself by poisonous gases. Williams would be the only survivor; he was said by his family to be the man who later wrote the anonymous broadside ballad "The Gresford Disaster", which was highly critical of the mine's management.
As the Llay team's attempt to gain access via the 20's return airway had proved fatal and the previous escape route from 29's was also found to be full of afterdamp, rescue efforts became focused on trying to fight the fire in the main road of the Dennis section. However their efforts were hindered by the heat and flames in the main road and a lack of water and fire-fighting equipment. Rockfalls at the entrance to the 29's soon made it clear there was little chance of escape for the men trapped in the affected districts.:pp8-9 Besides the miners trapped in the most northerly districts, the 20's and 61's, would have been more than a 1 mile (1.6 km) on the wrong side of the fire.
By early Saturday morning large crowds of concerned relatives and off-duty miners had gathered silently at the pit head awaiting news. Hopes were raised in the evening when rumours began circulating that the fire in the Dennis main road was being brought under control; families waiting at the surface were told rescue teams would soon be able to reach the miners in the 29's, the nearest district beyond the Clutch.:pp8-9
However, by Sunday evening it became clear conditions in the pit had become extremely hazardous. Rescue teams were withdrawn as further explosions happened on the far side of the fire. Relatives were told the shafts into the Dennis section would be capped because no one could have survived and it was far too dangerous to try to recover any further bodies.
More explosions continued to occur within the pit over next few days. On 25 September, a rescuer named George Brown became the disaster's final victim when he was killed by flying debris after one blast blew the cap off the Dennis shaft.
In total, only 11 bodies were ever recovered from the mine. Inquests recorded the cause of death as carbon monoxide poisoning. The mine shafts remained sealed for six months. Gradually unaffected districts were re-entered although the Dennis section was sealed and never reopened. None of the bodies of the remaining 254 victims of the disaster were ever recovered from the sealed districts.
By the end of September 1934, 1,100 Gresford miners had signed on the unemployment register. Relief funds were set up by the Mayor of Wrexham, the Lord Lieutenant of Denbighshire, and the Lord Mayor of London. Their efforts raised a total of more than £500,000 for the dependants of the victims (£28.1 million in 2010).
On 25 October 1934 the official inquiry opened at Church House on Regent Street in Wrexham. It was chaired by Sir Henry Walker, His Majesty's Chief Inspector of Mines. The miners were represented by Sir Stafford Cripps; the mine owners, mindful of the fact they could face criminal charges, hired a formidable team of barristers including Hartley Shawcross. Two mining assessors, one approved by the miners and the other by the colliery management, were also appointed to assist Walker and the inquiry.
The miners' legal representatives presented theories at the inquiry as to cause of the explosion. Cripps said he believed an explosion was triggered down near the 95's by shotfiring near a main airway. The blast had ignited a pocket of firedamp which had accumulated in the drift because of inadequate ventilation and the lax attitude of the mine owners to monitor gas levels contrary to section 29 of The Coal Mines Act 1911. The assessor approved by the miners also theorised that a large quantity of methane gas, which had accumulated at the coal face in the 14's district, may have been ignited through an accident with a safety lamp or from a spark from a mechanised coalcutter.
Although recovery teams wearing self-contained breathing apparatus had re-entered the sealed pit in May 1935 (for purposes of the inquiry), officials from the Westminster and United Collieries Group would not allow any attempts to be made to access the Dennis section. The company cited the dangerous conditions and remains of the victims as the reason. As such, no examination or inspection of the deeper parts of Dennis were ever undertaken.
This decision was widely perceived as a deliberate attempt by the mine owners to cover up any evidence of their culpability in the cause of the explosion. As there were no other reports concerning the deeper parts of the section, the inquiry considered the explanation presented by the legal representatives of the pit's management. They countered the miners' theories suggesting firedamp had actually accumulated further up the Dennis main road just beyond the Clutch (at a drift named the "142 Deep"; this was part of the main road where the underground haulage machinery was located). The gas was ignited at the Clutch when a telephone was used to warn miners of the influx of firedamp. The assessor chosen by the mine owners also stated the explosion could have originated higher up the Dennis Main Road just beyond the Clutch.
A year before the inquiry published its conclusion coal production resumed at Gresford from the South-East Martin section in January 1936.
In 1937 the inquiry published its findings. Despite considering management failures, a lack of safety measures, bad working practices and poor ventilation in the pit, Walker drew very cautious conclusions in his final verdict about the cause. This was largely because the two assessors chosen by the miners and by the pit's management, and the barristers representing them, had given widely different suggestions as to the source of the explosion. With the absence of any proof, the inquiry could not attribute any outright blame or definitive cause for the disaster. This uncertainty also meant the Dennis districts would remain sealed.
But in a debate in the House of Commons in February 1937 following the release of Walker's report, the politician David Grenfell condemned the management of the colliery because the miners' testimonies had told:
...of lamps having been extinguished by gas, blowing the gas about with a banjack, of protests and quarrels about firing shots in the presence of gas. There is no language in which one can describe the inferno of 14's. There were men working almost stark naked, clogs with holes bored through the bottom to let the sweat run out, 100 shots a day fired on a face less than 200 yards wide, the air thick with fumes and dust from blasting, the banjack hissing to waft the gas out of the face into the unpacked waste, a space 200 yards long and 100 yards wide above the wind road full of inflammable gas and impenetrable for that reason.
Later in 1937, legal proceedings were started in Wrexham's petty sessions court against the pit manager, the under-manager and United & Westminster Collieries Limited, the owners of the mine. Aside from the evidence of poor working practices, it was discovered that Bonsall had after the accident instructed an assistant surveyor, William Cuffin, to falsify records of dust samples when none had actually been taken. However the court dismissed most of the charges without the mine owners ever being called to give evidence. The only conviction against the management at Gresford Colliery was for inadequate record-keeping, for which Bonsall was fined £150 plus costs.
Bonsall was portrayed by Cripps and others as a ruthless and cynical manager, but researchers now think that he is more likely to have been a "weak man driven beyond his capabilities",:p100 whose public demeanour was reduced by the extreme exhaustion and stress of enduring over 20 hours of cross-examination at the inquiry. In contrast Williams, the under-manager, was singled out for praise because he was found to have made genuine attempts, unlike other bosses, to improve working conditions for the miners since taking the job at Gresford Colliery.
Cripps used the evidence obtained at the inquiry to call for nationalisation of the coal industry. This eventually occurred in 1947 when the pit, and others like it, were taken over by the National Coal Board. As part of the takeover agreement, nearly all the operating records and correspondence relating to the private management of Gresford Colliery were deliberately destroyed.
Gresford Colliery finally closed on economic grounds in November 1973. In the 1980s the site was redeveloped as an industrial estate. In 1982 a memorial to the victims of the disaster was erected nearby; it was constructed using a wheel from the old pit-head winding gear.
The Gresford Disaster
- You've heard of the Gresford Disaster,
- Of the terrible price that was paid;
- Two hundred and sixty-three colliers were lost,
- And three men of the rescue brigade.
- It occurred in the month of September
- At three in the morning the pit
- Was racked by a violent explosion
- In the Dennis where gas lay so thick.
- Now the gas in the Dennis deep section
- Was packed there like snow in a drift,
- And many a man had to leave the coal-face
- Before he had worked out his shift.
- Now a fortnight before the explosion,
- To the shotfirer Tomlinson cried,
- "If you fire that shot we'll be all blown to hell!"
- And no one can say that he lied.
- Now the fireman's reports they are missing
- The records of forty-two days;
- The colliery manager had them destroyed
- To cover his criminal ways.
- Down there in the dark they are lying.
- They died for nine shillings a day;
- They have worked out their shift and now they must lie
- In the darkness until Judgement Day.
- Now the Lord Mayor of London's collecting
- To help out the children and wives;
- The owners have sent some white lilies
- To pay for the poor colliers' lives.
- Farewell, all our dear wives and our children
- Farewell, all our comrades as well,
- Don't send your sons down the dark dreary mine
- They'll be doomed like the sinners in hell.
The disaster is also commemorated in the hymn tune "Gresford", which is also known as "The Miners' Hymn", written by Robert Saint of Hebburn, himself also a miner. This tune has been played regularly by many colliery brass bands over the years and is found on a number of recordings, and is also played at the annual Miners Picnics around the North of England, especially at the Durham Miners' Gala.
- Senghenydd Colliery Disaster, a firedamp explosion at the pit near Caerphilly, Glamorgan killed 439 miners and one rescuer on 14 October 1913. It remains the worst mining disaster in Britain.
- Gresford Colliery Explosion, Hansard, House of Commons, 23 February 1937
- Report by Sir Henry Walker, March 1937, in Colliery Engineering at Durham Mining Museum
- "Gresford colliery". WelshCoalMines.co.uk. Retrieved 20 September 2009.
- Inquiry Failed to Heal the Wounds, Wrexham Chronicle, 30 September 2004
- Williamson, S. Gresford: Anatomy of a Disaster, Liverpool University Press, 1999
- Riley, Bill Gresford Disaster, Pitwork website at Durham Mining Museum
- The life and times of Grandad Jack, Chester Evening Leader, 17-06-08[dead link]
- "Crowds gather at Gresford Colliery for news (image)". All Saints Church, Gresford. Retrieved 20 November 2012.
- "Purchasing Power of British Pounds from 1245 to Present". MeasuringWorth.com. Retrieved 19 November 2012.
- "Gresford Colliery Explosion, 22nd September 1934 Plan 1". flickr.com. Retrieved 19 November 2012.
- "Pitmen's anthems still so popular". Evening Chronicle. Retrieved 2009-05-02.[dead link]
- Lerry, G.G., 1968, Collieries of Denbighshire, W. Williams, 2nd (revised) edition, ISBN 0901600008, ISBN 978-0901600004.
- Underground Plan of the Dennis Section, Gresford Colliery, September 1934
- Virtual Book of Remembrance
- Memorial Gallery
- Gathering The Jewels
- Welsh Coal Mines website - details on Gresford and all the other pits in Wales