Heterophenomenology
Heterophenomenology ("phenomenology of another not oneself") is a term coined by Daniel Dennett to describe an explicitly third-person, scientific approach to the study of consciousness and other mental phenomena. It consists of applying the scientific method with an anthropological bent, combining the subject's self-reports with all other available evidence to determine their mental state. The goal is to discover how the subject sees the world him- or herself, without taking the accuracy of the subject's view for granted.
Heterophenomenology is put forth as the alternative to traditional Cartesian phenomenology, which Dennett calls "lone-wolf autophenomenology" to emphasize the fact that it accepts the subject's self-reports as being authoritative. In contrast, heterophenomenology considers the subjects authoritative only about how things seem to them.
It can be refuted if one accepts that the subjective experience of a mental state is the thing-in-itself, disregarding any differential physical phenomena: the objective appearance of a subjective experience has no bearing on the experience if the experience is what is being analysed - it is irrelevant to the agent what a state looks like to an independent observer, only to himself, as the independent observer is not experiencing it (the observer is instead subjectively experiencing the objective appearance of the agent's subjective experience) - unless the objective appearance influences the subjective experience itself.
Most arguments refuting strict behaviourism also refute heterophenomenology, as heterophenomenology is a form of reductionist strict behaviourism.[dubious ][citation needed]
In other words, heterophenomenology requires the researcher to listen to the subjects and take what they say seriously, but to also look at everything else available to us, including the subject's bodily responses and environment, and be ready to conclude that the subject is wrong even about their own mind. For example, we could determine that the subject is hungry even though they don't recognize it.
The key role of heterophenomenology in Dennett's philosophy of consciousness is that it defines all that can or needs to be known about the mind. For any phenomenological question "why do I experience X", there is a corresponding heterophenomenological question "why does the subject say 'I experience X'". To quote Dennett, "The total set of details of heterophenomenology, plus all the data we can gather about concurrent events in the brains of subjects and in the surrounding environment, comprise the total data set for a theory of human consciousness. It leaves out no objective phenomena and no subjective phenomena of consciousness."
Dennett stresses that heterophenomenology does not dismiss the first-person perspective, but rather brackets it so that it can be intersubjectively verified by empirical means, allowing it to be submitted as scientific evidence. This can be seen by how heavily heterophenomenology relies on adopting the intentional stance toward subjects.
Dennett flatly denies the existence of qualia, without proposing a counter-mechanism or counter-proposition, which are posited as inherently subjective mental states which, by definition, could not be detected via heterophenomenology, falling in to the trap of, "If we can not detect and measure a discrete x, x does not exist". Heterophenomenology has sometimes been considered "[a]rguably, a version of analytical or logical behaviorism".[1]
[edit] See also
[edit] References
- Dennett, D. "Heterophenomenology" in Dennett, D. Consciousness Explained, Penguin Press, 1991
- Dennett, D. "Who's On First? Heterophenomenology Explained" Journal of Consciousness Studies, Special Issue: Trusting the Subject? (Part 1), 10, No. 9-10, October 2003, pp. 19–30
[edit] External links
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Wikibooks has a book on the topic of |
- Who’s On First? Heterophenomenology Explained by Daniel Dennett
- Heterophenomenology Reconsidered Dennett revisits/clarifies his position in light of recent criticisms (on-line pre-print)
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