History of Tibet (1950–present)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
Part of a series on the
History of Tibet
Potala Palace
Neolithic Tibet
Pre-Imperial Tibet
Tibetan Empire
Era of Fragmentation
Mongol Empire
Phagmodrupa Dynasty
Tsangpa Dynasty
Rise of the Gelupga
Manchu Empire
(European exploration)
Kingdom of Tibet
PRC Tibet (Gov't-in-exile)
See also
Timeline
Historical money
List of rulers
Portal icon Tibet portal

The history of Tibet from 1950 to the present started with the Chinese People's Liberation Army invading Tibet in 1950–51. Before then, Tibet had declared independence from China in 1913, after which the 13th Dalai Lama continued to act as both the religious head of Tibetan’s Buddhist populace and as the political head of Tibet at that time. In 1959 the 14th Dalai Lama fled Tibet to northern India where he established the Central Tibetan Administration. Though there have been some benefits, such as economic development, legal advancement and peasant emancipation, Communist Chinese rule of Tibet has been overwhewlmingly oppressive[1]—even more than in other parts of China.

1950–1955: Traditional systems[edit]

In 1949, seeing that the Communists were gaining control of China, the Kashag expelled all Chinese connected with the Chinese government, over the protests of both the Kuomintang and the Communists.[2] Both the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China have maintained China's claim to sovereignty over Tibet, even though it is merely a relic of the Chinese Empire.

The Chinese Communist government led by Mao Zedong, which came to power in October, lost little time in asserting a new Chinese presence in Tibet. In June 1950 the UK Government in the House of Commons stated that His Majesty's Government "have always been prepared to recognise Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, but only on the understanding that Tibet is regarded as autonomous"[3] On 7 October 1950,[4] The People's Liberation Army invaded the Tibetan area of Chamdo. The large number of units of the PLA quickly surrounded the outnumbered Tibetan forces, and by October 19, 1950, 5,000 Tibetan troops had surrendered.[4] In 1951, representatives of Tibetan authority, with the Dalai Lama's authorization,[5] participated in negotiations with the Chinese government in Beijing. This resulted in a Seventeen Point Agreement which established China's sovereignty over Tibet. The agreement was ratified in Lhasa a few months later.[6] According to the Tibetan government-in-exile, some members of the Tibetan Cabinet (Kashag), for example, Tibetan Prime Minister Lukhangwa, never accepted the agreement.[7] But the National Assembly of Tibet, "while recognizing the extenuating circumstances under which the delegates had to sign the 'agreement', asked the government to accept the 'agreement'...the Kashag told Zhang Jingwu that it would radio its acceptance of the 'agreement'."[8] Tibetan exile sources generally consider it invalid, as having been reluctantly or unwillingly signed under duress.[9] On the path that was leading him into exile in India, the 14th Dalai Lama arrived March 26, 1959 at Lhuntse Dzong where he repudiated the "17-point Agreement" as having been "thrust upon Tibetan Government and people by the threat of arms."[8] and reaffirmed his government as the only legitimate representative of Tibet.[10][11] According to this agreement between the Tibetan and Chinese central governments, the Dalai Lama-ruled Tibetan area was supposed to be a highly autonomous area of China.

From the beginning, it was obvious that incorporating Tibet into Communist China would bring two opposite social systems face-to-face.[12] In western Tibet, however, the Chinese Communists opted not to make social reform an immediate priority. On the contrary, from 1951 to 1959, traditional Tibetan society with its lords and manorial estates continued to function unchanged.[12] Despite the presence of twenty thousand PLA troops in Central Tibet, the Dalai Lama's government was permitted to maintain important symbols from its de facto independence period.[12]

Tibetan areas in Qinghai, which were outside the authority of the Dalai Lama's government, did not enjoy this same autonomy and had land redistribution implemented in full. Most lands were taken away from noblemen and monasteries and re-distributed to serfs. The Tibetan region of Eastern Kham, previously Xikang province, was incorporated into the province of Sichuan. Western Kham was put under the Chamdo Military Committee. In these areas, land reform was implemented. This involved communist agitators designating "landlords"—sometimes arbitrarily chosen—for public humiliation in so-called "struggle sessions",[13] torture, maiming, and even death.[14][15] It was only after 1959 that China brought the same practices to Central Tibet.[16][17]

The Chinese built highways that reached Lhasa, and then extended them to the Indian, Nepalese and Pakistani borders. The traditional Tibetan aristocracy and government remained in place and were subsidized by the Chinese government.[12] The first national census in all of the People's Republic of China was held in 1954, counting 2,770,000 ethnic Tibetans in China, including 1,270,000 in the Tibet Autonomous Region.[18]

1956–1958: Trials and incremental reform[edit]

By 1956 there was unrest in eastern Kham and Amdo, where land reform had been implemented in full. Rebellions erupted and eventually spread into western Kham and Ü-Tsang. In some parts of the country Chinese Communists tried to establish rural communes, as they were in the whole of China.[citation needed]

A rebellion against the Chinese occupation was led by noblemen and monasteries and broke out in Amdo and eastern Kham in June 1956. The insurrection, supported by the American CIA,[19] eventually spread to Lhasa.

The Tibetan resistance movement began with isolated resistance to PRC control in 1956. Initially there was considerable success and with CIA support and aid much of southern Tibet fell into Tibetan guerilla fighters hands. During this campaign, tens of thousands of Tibetans were killed.[20]

In 1959, China's socialist land reforms and military crackdown on rebels in Kham and Amdo led to the "1959 Tibetan uprising." In an operation launched in the wake of the National Uprising of 10 March 1959 in Lhasa, 10,000 to 15,000 Tibetans were killed within three days.[21] Resistance spread throughout Tibet. Fearing capture of the Dalai Lama, unarmed Tibetans surrounded his residence, at which point the Dalai Lama fled[22] with the help of the CIA to India.[23] On 28 March,[24] the Chinese set the Panchen Lama (who was virtually their prisoner[25]) as a figurehead in Lhasa, claiming that he headed the legitimate Government of Tibet in the absence of the Dalai Lama, the traditional ruler of Tibet.[26]

After this, resistance forces operated from Nepal. Operations continued from the semi-independent Kingdom of Mustang with a force of 2000 rebels; many of them trained at Camp Hale near Leadville, Colorado, USA[27] Guerrilla warfare continued in other parts of the country for several years.

In 1969, on the eve of Kissinger's overtures to China, American support was withdrawn and the Nepalese government dismantled the operation.

1959–1976: Uprising and upheaval[edit]

Mao's Great Leap Forward (1959–1962) led to famine in Tibet. "In many parts of Tibet people have starved to death.. . . In some places, whole families have perished and the death rate is very high. This is very abnormal, horrible and grave," according to a confidential report by the Panchen Lama sent to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1962.[28] "In the past Tibet lived in a dark barbaric feudalism but there was never such a shortage of food, especially after Buddhism had spread....In Tibet from 1959 to 1961, for two years almost all animal husbandry and farming stopped. The nomads have no grain to eat and the farmers have no meat, butter or salt," the report continued.[28] Panchen Lama makes it clear that these deaths were a result of official policies, not of any natural disasters, as Mao was claiming to his foreign visitors, a claim still accepted by some western sinologists.[29] Panchen Lama also states the uniqueness of the famine that Tibet suffered from, "There was never such an event in the history of Tibet. People could not even imagine such horrible starvation in their dreams. In some areas if one person catches a cold, then it spreads to hundreds and large numbers simply die."[29] The destruction of most of Tibet's more than 6,000 monasteries happened between 1959 and 1961.[30] Of the 6,259 monasteries in Tibet before the Chinese occupation, only eight remained in 1976.[31]

According to Barry Sautman from Hong Kong University of Science & Technology, P.R. China, called an advocate of the PRC line on Tibet by exile Tibetan writer Jamyang Norbu,[32] the 10th panchen-lama is purported to have visited three counties before writing his report: the xian of Ping’an, the Hui autonomous xian of Hualong and the Salar autonomous xian of Xunhua. His description of a famine concerns only Xunhua, his native region. All three xians are in the Haidong prefecture, a part of the Qinghai province whose population is 90% non-Tibetan and does not belong to “cultural Tibet”.

Sautman also stated that the claim that Tibet was the region most hit by China’s famine of 1959-1962 is based not on statistics gathered in Tibetan areas, but on anonymous refugee reports lacking in numerical specificity ».[33] Sautman's conclusions recently subjected to criticism.[34]

In 1960 the western-based nongovernmental International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) gave a report titled Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic to the United Nations. The report was prepared by the ICJ's Legal Inquiry Committee, composed of eleven international lawyers from around the world. This report accused the Chinese of the crime of genocide in Tibet, after nine years of full occupation, six years before the devastation of the cultural revolution began.[35] The ICJ also documented accounts of massacres, tortures and killings, bombardment of monasteries, and extermination of whole nomad camps[21] Declassified Soviet archives provides data that Chinese communists, who received a great assistance in military equipment from the USSR, broadly used Soviet aircraft for bombing monasteries and other punitive operations in Tibet.[36]

The ICJ examined evidence relating to human rights within the structure of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as announced by the General Assembly of the United Nations. After taking into account the human, economic and social rights, they found that the Chinese communist authorities had violated Article 3, 5, 9, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26 and 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Tibet.[35]

The Tibetans were not allowed to participate in the cultural life of their own community, a culture which the Chinese have set out to destroy, according to the ICJ. The ICJ discovered that Chinese allegations that the Tibetans enjoyed no human rights before the entry of the Chinese were based on distorted and exaggerated accounts of life in Tibet. Accusations against the Tibetan "rebels" of rape, plunder and torture were found in cases of plunder to have been deliberately fabricated and in other cases unworthy of belief for this and other reasons.[35]

Under the Seventeen Point Agreement the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic gave a number of undertakings, among them: promises to maintain the existing political system of Tibet, to maintain the status and functions of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, to protect freedom of religion and the monasteries and to refrain from compulsion in the matter of reforms in Tibet. The ICJ found that these and other undertakings had been violated by the Chinese People's Republic, and that the Government of Tibet was entitled to repudiate the Agreement as it did on March 11, 1959.[35]

According to various authors, the 1959 and 1960 ICJ reports date back to a time when that organization was funded by the CIA. A. Tom Grunfeld asserts that the United States took advantage of the Dalai Lama's leaving Tibet by prodding its clandestinely funded Cold War International Commission of Jurists to prepare propagandistic reports attacking China.[37] In his 1994 book The International Commission of Jurists, Global Advocates for Human Rights,[38] Howard B. Tolley Jr. explains how the ICJ was created and bankrolled by the CIA from 1952 to 1967 as an instrument of the Cold War without most ICJ officers and members knowing about it.[39] The connection between the CIA and the early ICJ is also mentioned by Dorothy Stein in her book People Who Count. Population and Politics, Women and Children, published in 1995. She accuses the Commission of growing out of a group created by American intelligence agents whose purpose was dissiminating anti-communist propaganda.[40] This contrasts with the official overview of the International Commission of Jurists, which is "dedicated to the primacy, coherence and implementation of international law and principles that advance human rights" and the "impartial, objective and authoritative legal approach to the protection and promotion of human rights through the rule of law" while providing "legal expertise at both the international and national levels to ensure that developments in international law adhere to human rights principles and that international standards are implemented at the national level."[41]

Warren W. Smith, a broadcaster of Radio Free Asia (which was established by the US government), extrapolated a death figure of 400,000 from his calculation of census reports of Tibet which show 200,000 "missing" people.[42][43] The Central Tibetan Administration claimed that the number that have died of starvation, violence, or other indirect causes since 1950 is approximately 1.2 million.[44] According to Patrick French, the former director of the London-based Free Tibet Campaign and a supporter of the Tibetan cause who was able to view the data and calculations, the estimate is not reliable because the Tibetans were not able to process the data well enough to produce a credible total. French says this total was based on refugee interviews, but prevented outsider access to the data. French, who did gain access, found no names, but "the insertion of seemingly random figures into each section, and constant, unchecked duplication."[45] Furthermore, he found that of the 1.1 million dead listed, only 23,364 were female (implying that 1.07 million of the total Tibetan male population of 1.25 million had died).[45] Tibetologist Tom Grunfeld also finds that the figure is "without documentary evidence."[46] There were, however, many casualties, perhaps as many as 400,000.[47] Smith, calculating from census reports of Tibet, shows 144,000 to 160,000 "missing" from Tibet".[48] Courtois et al. forward a figure of 800,000 deaths and allege that as many as 10% of the Tibetan populace were interned, with few survivors.[49] Chinese demographers have estimated that 90,000 of the 300,000 "missing" Tibetans fled the region.[50] The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) denies this. Its official toll of deaths recorded for the whole of China for the years of the Great Leap Forward is 14 million, but scholars have estimated the number of the famine victims to be between 20 and 43 million.[51]

The Government of Tibet in Exile quotes an issue of People's Daily published in 1959 to claim that the Tibetan population has dropped significantly since 1959, counting the population of the Tibet Autonomous region but Qinghai, Gansu, and other regions inhabited by Tibetans, as the "Tibetan population". Compared as a whole to the 2000 numbers, the population in these regions has decreased, it says.[52] These findings are in conflict with a 1954 Chinese census report that counted ethnic Tibetans.[53] This is because in all of these provinces, Tibetans were not the only traditional ethnic group. This is held to be so especially in Qinghai, which has a historical mixture of different groups of ethnics. In 1949, Han Chinese made up 48.3% of the population, the rest of the ethnic groups make up 51.7% of the 1.5 million total population.[54] As of today, Han Chinese account for 54% of the total population of Qinghai, which is slightly higher than in 1949. Tibetans make up around 20% of the population of Qinghai.[citation needed] Detailed analysis of statistical data from Chinese and Tibetan emigrant sources revealed errors in estimates of Tibetan population by regions. Although it may contain errors, data from the Government of Tibet in Exile was found to be in better correspondence with the known facts than any other existing estimates. With respect to total population of the whole Tibet in 1953 and 1959, the Tibetan side appears to provide numbers that are too high, while the Chinese side provides numbers that are too low.[55]

On June 20, 1959 in Mussoorie during a press conference, the Dalai Lama stated: "The ultimate Chinese aim with regard to Tibet, as far as I can make out, seems to attempt the extermination of religion and culture and even the absorption of the Tibetan race...Besides the civilian and military personnel already in Tibet, five million Chinese settlers have arrived in eastern and north-eastern Tso, in addition to which four million Chinese settlers are planned to be sent to U and Sung provinces of Central Tibet. Many Tibetans have been deported, thereby resulting in the complete absorption of these Tibetans as a race, which is being undertaken by the Chinese." [56]

Reprisals for the 1959 Tibetan uprising involved the killing of 87,000 Tibetans by the Chinese count, according to a Radio Lhasa broadcast of 1 October 1960, although Tibetan exiles claim that 430,000 died during the Uprising and the subsequent 15 years of guerrilla warfare, which continued until the US withdrew support.[57]

In spite of claims by the Chinese that most of the damage to Tibet's institutions occurred subsequently during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), it is well established that the destruction of most of Tibet's more than 6,000 monasteries happened between 1959 and 1961.[30] During the mid-1960s, the monastic estates were broken up and secular education introduced. During the Cultural Revolution, Red Guards, which included Tibetan members,[58] inflicted a campaign of organized vandalism against cultural sites in the entire PRC, including Buddhist sites in Tibet.[59] According to at least one Chinese source, only a handful of the most important monasteries remained without major damage.[60]

In 1965, the area that had been under the control of the Dalai Lama's government from 1951 to 1959 (Ü-Tsang and western Kham) was renamed the Tibet Autonomous Region or TAR. Autonomy provided that head of government would be an ethnic Tibetan; however, the TAR head is always subordinate to the First Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Regional Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, who was not a Tibetan.[61] The role of ethnic Tibetans in the higher levels of the TAR Communist Party was very limited.[62]

The Cultural Revolution launched in 1966 was a catastrophe for Tibet, as it was for the rest of the PRC. Large numbers of Tibetans died violent deaths due to it, and the number of intact monasteries in Tibet was reduced from thousands to less than ten. Tibetan resentment towards the Chinese deepened.[63] Tibetans participated in the destruction, but it is not clear how many of them actually embraced the Communist ideology and how many participated out of fear of becoming targets themselves.[64] Resistors against the Cultural Revolution included Thrinley Chodron, a nun from Nyemo, who led an armed rebellion that spread through eighteen xians (counties) of the TAR, targeting Chinese Party officials and Tibetan collaborators, that was ultimately suppressed by the PLA. Citing Tibetan Buddhist symbols which the rebels invoked, Shakya calls this 1969 revolt "a millenarian uprising, an insurgency characterized by a passionate desire to be rid of the oppressor."[65]

1976–1987: Rapprochement and internationalization[edit]

Tibetans Detained by Chinese Security Forces (4806637668).jpg

Following Mao's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping launched initiatives of rapprochement with the exiled Tibetan leaders, hoping to persuade them to come to live in China. Ren Rong, who was Communist Party Secretary in Tibet, thought that Tibetans in Tibet were happy under Chinese Communist rule and that they shared the Chinese Communist views of the pre-Communist Tibetan rulers as oppressive despots. So, when delegations from the Tibetan government in exile visited Tibet in 1979-80, Chinese officials expected to impress the Tibetan exiles with the progress that had occurred since 1950 and with the contentment of the Tibetan populace. Ren even organized meetings in Lhasa to urge Tibetans to restrain their animosity towards the coming representatives of an old, oppressive regime. The Chinese, then, were astonished and embarrassed at the massive, tearful expressions of devotion which Tibetans made to the visiting Tibetan exiles. Thousands of Tibetans cried, prostrated, offered scarves to the visitors, and strove for a chance to touch the Dalai Lama's brother.[66]

These events also prompted Party Secretary Hu Yaobang and Vice Premier Wan Li to visit Tibet, where they were dismayed by the conditions they found. Hu announced a reform program intended to improve economic standards for Tibetans and to foster some freedom for Tibetans to practice ethnic and cultural traditions. In some ways, this was a return from the hard line authoritarianism and assimilation policies of the 1960s to Mao's more ethnically accommodating policies of the 1950s, with the major difference that there would be no separate Tibetan government as there had been in the 1950s.[67] Hu ordered a change in policy, calling for the revitalization of Tibetan culture, religion, and language, the building of more universities and colleges in Tibet, and an increase in the number of ethnic Tibetans in the local government.[68] Concurrent liberalizations in economics and internal migration have also resulted in Tibet seeing more Han Chinese migrant workers, though the actual number of this floating population remains disputed.

New meetings between Chinese officials and exiled leaders took place in 1981–1984, but no agreements could be reached.[69]

In 1986–1987, the Tibetan government in exile in Dharamshala launched a new drive to win international support for their cause as a human rights issue. In response, the United States House of Representatives in June 1987 passed a resolution in support of Tibetan human rights.[70] Between September 1987 and March 1989, four major demonstrations occurred in Lhasa against Chinese rule.[71] American Tibetologist Melvyn Goldstein considered the riots to be spontaneous mass expressions of Tibetan resentment, sparked in part by hope that the United States would soon provide support or pressure enabling Tibet to become independent.[72] In 1987, the Panchen Lama delivered a speech estimating the number of prison deaths in Qinghai at approximately 5 percent of the total population in the area.[73] The United States passed a 1988–1989 Foreign Relations Act which expressed support for Tibetan human rights.[70] The riots ironically discredited Hu's more liberal Tibetan policies and brought about a return to hard-line policies; Beijing even imposed martial law in Tibet in 1989. Emphasis on economic development brought increasing numbers of non-Tibetans to Lhasa, and the economy in Tibet became increasingly dominated by Han. Lhasa became a city where non-Tibetans equalled or outnumbered Tibetans.[74]

When the 10th Panchen Lama addressed the Tibet Autonomous Region Standing Committee Meeting of the National People’s Congress in 1987, he detailed mass imprisonment and killings of Tibetans in Amdo (Qinghai): "there were between three to four thousand villages and towns, each having between three to four thousand families with four to five thousand people. From each town and village, about 800 to 1,000 people were imprisoned. Out of this, at least 300 to 400 people of them died in prison...In Golok area, many people were killed and their dead bodies were rolled down the hill into a big ditch. The soldiers told the family members and relatives of the dead people that they should all celebrate since the rebels had been wiped out. They were even forced to dance on the dead bodies. Soon after, they were also massacred with machine guns. They were all buried there"[75]

1988–present[edit]

A rail attendant for the service from Xining to Lhasa

Hu Jintao became the Party Chief of the Tibet Autonomous Region in 1988. In 1989, the 10th Panchen Lama died. Many Tibetans believe that Hu was involved in his unexpected death.[76] A few months later, according to Tang Daxian, a dissident journalist, the police in Lhasa received orders from General Li Lianxiu to provoke an incident. Peaceful demonstrations lead to the death of 450 Tibetans that year.[77] The fourth national census was conducted in 1990, finding 4,590,000 ethnic Tibetans in China, including 2,090,000 in the TAR. The Chinese government compares these numbers to the first national census to conclude that the Tibetan population has doubled since 1951.[18]

In 1995, the Dalai Lama named 6 year old Gedhun Choekyi Nyima as the 11th Panchen Lama without the approval of the government of China, while the PRC named another child, Gyaincain Norbu in conflict with the Dalai Lama's choice. Gyaincain Norbu was raised in Tibet and Beijing and makes frequent public appearances in religion and politics. The PRC-selected Panchen Lama is rejected by exiled Tibetans who commonly refer to him as the "Panchen Zuma" (literally "fake Panchen Lama").[78] Gedhun Choekyi Nyima and his family are missing: kidnapped, says Amnesty International, or living under a secret identity for protection and privacy, says Beijing.[78]

Economic development[edit]

In 2000, the Chinese government launched its Western Development Strategy aimed at boosting the economies of its poorer western regions. The strategy has featured a strong bias for large-scale, capital-intensive projects such as the Qinghai-Tibet Railway. Such projects however, have roused fears of facilitating military mobilisation and Han migration.[79] Robert Barnett reports that the economic stimulus was used by hardliners to stimulate Han migration to Tibet as a control mechanism, and that 66% of official posts in Tibet are held by Han.[80] There is still an ethnic imbalance in appointments and promotions to the civil and judicial services in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, with disproportionately few ethnic Tibetans appointed to these posts.[81]

The PRC government claims that its rule over Tibet has provided economic development to Tibetan people, and that the Western Development Strategy plan is a benevolent and patriotic undertaking by the wealthier east coast to help the western parts of China catch up in terms of prosperity and living standards. On the other hand, the government maintains that the Tibetan Government did almost nothing to improve the Tibetans' material standard of life during its rule from 1913–59, and that they opposed any reforms proposed by the Chinese government. According to the Chinese government, this is the reason for the tension that grew between some central government officials and the local Tibetan government in 1959.[82]

These claims are, however, disputed by many Tibetans. In 1989, the Panchen Lama, finally allowed to return to Shigatse, addressed a crowd of 30,000 and described what he saw as the suffering of Tibet and the harm being done to his country in the name of socialist reform under the rule of the PRC in terms reminiscent of the petition he had presented to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1962.[83]

The government, in turn, rejects claims that the lives of Tibetans have deteriorated, and states that the lives of Tibetans have been improved immensely compared to self-rule before 1950.[84] This contrasts with reports by Human Rights Watch, which document widespread abuses committed by Chinese security forces[85] and torture by Chinese police and security forced.[86]

Despite China's claims that the lives of Tibetans have improved immensely, some 3,000 Tibetans brave hardship and danger to flee into exile every year.[87]

The PRC claims that: From 1951 to 2007, the Tibetan population in Lhasa administered Tibet has increased from 1.2 million to almost 3 million. The GDP of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) today is thirty times that of before 1950. Workers in Tibet have the second highest wages in China.[88] The TAR has 22,500 km of highways, as opposed to none in 1950. All secular education in the TAR was created after the revolution. The TAR now has 25 scientific research institutes as opposed to none in 1950. Infant mortality has dropped from 43% in 1950 to 0.661% in 2000.[89] (The United Nations reports an infant mortality rate of 3.53% in 2000, fallen from 43.0% in 1951.[90]) Life expectancy has risen from 35.5 years in 1950 to 67 in 2000. It points to the collection and publishing of the traditional Epic of King Gesar, which is the longest epic poem in the world and had only been handed down orally before. (However, corresponding Tibetan texts exist from the 18th century, and in the late 19th and early 20th centuries a woodblock edition of the story was compiled by a scholar-monk from Ling-tsang (a small kingdom north-east of sDe-dge) with inspiration from the prolific Tibetan philosopher Jamgon Ju Mipham Gyatso) It also highlights the allocation of 300 million Renminbi since the 1980s for the maintenance and protection of Tibetan monasteries.[89] The Cultural Revolution and the cultural damage it wrought upon the entire PRC is generally condemned as a nationwide catastrophe, whose main instigators, in the PRC's view, the Gang of Four, have been brought to justice. The China Western Development plan is viewed by the PRC as a massive, benevolent, and patriotic undertaking by the wealthier eastern coast to help the western parts of China, including Tibet, catch up in prosperity and living standards.[citation needed]

In 2008 the Chinese government "launched a 570-million-yuan (81.43 million U.S. dollars) project to preserve 22 historical and cultural heritage sites in Tibet, including the Zhaxi Lhunbo Lamasery, the Jokhang, Ramogia, Sanyai and Samgya-Goutog monasteries."[91]

Tibetan language[edit]

According to Barry Sautman, 92–94% of ethnic Tibetans speak Tibetan. Those that don't are small Tibetan minorities in areas such as Qinghai. Instruction in primary school is pretty universally in Tibetan. Chinese is bilingual from secondary school onward. Since Mandarin Chinese, the official language of China, is the language of government and many of the businesses, Tibetans who do not speak it are finding it increasingly difficult to compete in the market place.

Tibetologist Elliot Sperling has also noted that "within certain limits the PRC does make efforts to accommodate Tibetan cultural expression (and) the cultural activity taking place all over the Tibetan plateau cannot be ignored".[92] Currently, "cultural Tibet" boasts three Tibetan-language television channels, one for each of the three main dialects spoken in China's Tibetan areas. The Tibet Autonomous Region possesses a 24-hour Central Tibetan-language TV channel (launched in 1999).[93] For speakers of Amdo Tibetan, there is an Amdo Tibetan-language TV channel in Qinghai[94] and for speakers of Khams Tibetan a recently launched TV satellite channel in Chengdu, the provincial capital of Sichuan.[95] In October 2010, Tibetan students protested after the Chinese government published rules supporting the use of Mandarin Chinese in lessons and textbooks by 2015, with the exception of Tibetan language and English classes.[96]

Human Rights in Tibet[edit]

Main article: Human rights in Tibet
"Police Attention: No distributing any unhealthy thoughts or objects." A trilingual (Tibetan–Chinese–English) sign above the entrance to a small cafe in Nyalam Town, Tibet, 1993

After the 2008 unrest, Tibetan-populated areas of China remained tightly sealed off from outside scrutiny, according to Amnesty International. While Chinese authorities announced after the protests that over 1,000 individuals detained had been released, overseas Tibetan organizations claimed that at least several hundred remained in detention by the start of 2009. Following the detentions were reports of torture and other ill-treatment in detention, some cases resulting in death.[97] Religious repression included locking down major monasteries and nunneries, and a propaganda campaign where local authorities renewed “Patriotic Education,” which required Tibetans to participate in criticism sessions of the Dalai Lama and sign written denunciations of him, according to Amnesty's 2009 China report. Tibetan members of the Chinese Communist Party were also targeted, including being made to remove their children from Tibet exile community schools where they would have received a religious education.[97] According to former political prisoners Tibet is virtually a big prison.[98]

2008 unrest[edit]

Main article: 2008 Tibetan unrest

Protests in March, 2008 developed into riots in which Tibetan mobs attacked Han and Hui people in Lhasa. The Chinese government reacted curtly, imposing curfews and pressuring journalists in Lhasa to leave the region.[99] The international response was measured, with a number of leaders expressing concern. Some people protested in large European and North American cities and chanted slogans, with some supporting China's actions and some supporting the protesters in Tibet.

For a time after the 2008 unrest, Tibetan-populated areas of China remained off-limits to journalists, and major monasteries and nunneries were locked down, according to Amnesty International. While Chinese authorities announced after the unrest that over 1,000 individuals detained had been released, Tibetan exile organizations claimed that at least several hundred remained in detention by the start of 2009. Tibetan members of the Chinese Communist Party were told to remove their children from Tibet exile community schools.[97]

Ethnic composition[edit]

The issue of the proportion of the Han Chinese population in Tibet is a politically sensitive one and is disputed, involving the Government of Tibet in Exile, the PRC, and the Tibetan independence movement.

The Government of Tibet in Exile has said that government policies are sinicizing Tibet by encouraging the migration of non-ethnic Tibetans, especially Han and Hui Chinese, so that they outnumber ethnic Tibetans in the Tibetan region.[100] The PRC gives the number of Tibetans in the Tibet Autonomous Region as 2.4 million, as opposed to 190,000 non-Tibetans, and the number of Tibetans in all Tibetan autonomous entities combined (slightly smaller than the Greater Tibet claimed by exiled Tibetans) as 5.0 million, as opposed to 2.3 million non-Tibetans. In the TAR itself, much of the Han population is to be found in Lhasa.[101]

This statistic is in dispute primarily based on the distinction between Greater Tibet, in which ethnic Tibetans are not a majority, and the Tibet Autonomous Region, in which ethnic Tibetans are a majority.[100] Referencing the population figures of Lhasa, the Dalai Lama has recently accused China of "demographic aggression" while stating that the Tibetans had been reduced to a minority "in his homeland".[102] Exiled Tibetans have also expressed concern that the Qinghai-Tibet Railway (Xining to Lhasa) is intended to further facilitate the influx of Chinese migrants.[103] The PRC does not recognize Greater Tibet as claimed by the government of Tibet in Exile.[104] The PRC government claims that the ethnically Tibetan areas outside the TAR were not controlled by the Tibetan government before 1959 in the first place, having been administered instead by other surrounding provinces for centuries. It further alleges that the idea of "Greater Tibet" was originally engineered by foreign imperialists in order to divide China amongst themselves (Mongolia being a striking precedent, gaining independence with Soviet backing and subsequently aligning itself with the Soviet Union).[105]

The Government of Tibet in Exile disputes most demographic statistics released by the PRC government since they do not include members of the People's Liberation Army garrisoned in Tibet, or the floating population of unregistered migrants, and states that China is attempting to assimilate Tibet and further diminishing any chances of Tibetan political independence.[100] CCP member Jampa Phuntsok, chairman of the TAR, has said that the central government has no policy of migration into Tibet due to its harsh high-altitude conditions, that the 6% Han in the TAR is a very fluid group mainly doing business or working, and that there is no immigration problem. (This report includes both permanent and temporary residences in Tibet, but excludes Tibetans studying or working outside of the TAR).[106] By 2006, 3% of the permanent residences in Tibet were of Han ethnicity, according to National Bureau of Statistics of China.[101] The TAR has the lowest population density among China's province-level administrative regions, mostly due to its mountainous and harsh geographical features. As of 2000, 92.8% of the population were ethnic Tibetans, while Han Chinese comprised 6.1% of the population. In Lhasa, the capital of TAR, Hans made up 17%, far less than what many activists have claimed. Population control policies like the one-child policy apply only to Han Chinese, not to minorities such as Tibetans.[107]

Traditional Kham houses

Barry Sautman accused pro-independence forces of wanting the Tibetan areas cleansed of Han and the Dalai Lama of consistently misrepresenting the present situation as one of a Han majority. The Tibetan countryside, where three-fourths of the population lives, has very few non-Tibetans.[108]

Sautman also stated:

[The settlers] are not personally subsidized by the state; although like urban Tibetans, they are indirectly subsidized by infrastructure development that favors the towns. Some 85% of Han who migrate to Tibet to establish businesses fail; they generally leave within two to three years. Those who survive economically offer competition to local Tibetan business people, but a comprehensive study in Lhasa has shown that non-Tibetans have pioneered small and medium enterprise sectors that some Tibetans have later entered and made use of their local knowledge to prosper.

Tibetans are not simply an underclass; there is a substantial Tibetan middle class, based in government service, tourism, commerce, and small-scale manufacturing/ transportation. There are also many unemployed or under-employed Tibetans, but almost no unemployed or underemployed Han because those who cannot find work leave.

In a Writenet paper written for the UNHCR, professor Mackerras (using PRC censuses) expresses the view that claims such as that the Chinese are swamping Tibetans in their own country and that 1.2 million Tibetans have died due to Chinese occupation "should be treated with the deepest scepticism":[109]

The figures show that since the early 1960s, the Tibetan population has been increasing, probably for the first time for centuries. What seems to follow from this is that the TGIE’s allegations of population reduction due to Chinese rule probably have some validity for the 1950s but are greatly exaggerated. However, since the 1960s, Chinese rule has had the effect of increasing the population of the Tibetans, not decreasing it, largely due to a modernization process that has improved the standard of living and lowered infant, maternity and other mortality rates.

Statistics according to the National Bureau of Statistics of China[edit]

Major ethnic groups in Greater Tibet by region, 2000 census.
Total Tibetans Han Chinese others
Tibet Autonomous Region: 2,616,329 2,427,168 92.8% 158,570 6.1% 30,591 1.2%
Lhasa PLC 474,499 387,124 81.6% 80,584 17.0% 6,791 1.4%
Qamdo Prefecture 586,152 563,831 96.2% 19,673 3.4% 2,648 0.5%
Shannan Prefecture 318,106 305,709 96.1% 10,968 3.4% 1,429 0.4%
Xigazê Prefecture 634,962 618,270 97.4% 12,500 2.0% 4,192 0.7%
Nagqu Prefecture 366,710 357,673 97.5% 7,510 2.0% 1,527 0.4%
Ngari Prefecture 77,253 73,111 94.6% 3,543 4.6% 599 0.8%
Nyingchi Prefecture 158,647 121,450 76.6% 23,792 15.0% 13,405 8.4%
Qinghai Province: 4,822,963 1,086,592 22.5% 2,606,050 54.0% 1,130,321 23.4%
Xining PLC 1,849,713 96,091 5.2% 1,375,013 74.3% 378,609 20.5%
Haidong Prefecture 1,391,565 128,025 9.2% 783,893 56.3% 479,647 34.5%
Haibei AP 258,922 62,520 24.1% 94,841 36.6% 101,561 39.2%
Huangnan AP 214,642 142,360 66.3% 16,194 7.5% 56,088 26.1%
Hainan AP 375,426 235,663 62.8% 105,337 28.1% 34,426 9.2%
Golog AP 137,940 126,395 91.6% 9,096 6.6% 2,449 1.8%
Gyêgu AP 262,661 255,167 97.1% 5,970 2.3% 1,524 0.6%
Haixi AP 332,094 40,371 12.2% 215,706 65.0% 76,017 22.9%
Tibetan areas in Sichuan province
Ngawa AP 847,468 455,238 53.7% 209,270 24.7% 182,960 21.6%
Garzê AP 897,239 703,168 78.4% 163,648 18.2% 30,423 3.4%
Muli AC 124,462 60,679 48.8% 27,199 21.9% 36,584 29.4%
Tibetan areas in Yunnan province
Dêqên AP 353,518 117,099 33.1% 57,928 16.4% 178,491 50.5%
Tibetan areas in Gansu province
Gannan AP 640,106 329,278 51.4% 267,260 41.8% 43,568 6.8%
Tianzhu AC 221,347 66,125 29.9% 139,190 62.9% 16,032 7.2%
Total for Greater Tibet:
With Xining and Haidong 10,523,432 5,245,347 49.8% 3,629,115 34.5% 1,648,970 15.7%
Without Xining and Haidong 7,282,154 5,021,231 69.0% 1,470,209 20.2% 790,714 10.9%

This table[110] includes all Tibetan autonomous entities in the People's Republic of China, plus Xining PLC and Haidong P. The latter two are included to complete the figures for Qinghai province, and also because they are claimed as parts of Greater Tibet by the Government of Tibet in exile.

P = Prefecture; AP = Autonomous prefecture; PLC = Prefecture-level city; AC = Autonomous county.

Excludes members of the People's Liberation Army in active service.

Han settlers in the cities have steadily increased since then. But a preliminary analysis of the 2005 mini-census shows only a modest increase in Han population in the TAR from 2000–2005 and little change in eastern Tibet.

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-16689779.  Missing or empty |title= (help)
  2. ^ Shakya 1999, pp. 7–8
  3. ^ TIBET (AUTONOMY) HC Deb 21 June 1950 vol 476 c1267
  4. ^ a b Laird 2006, p. 301
  5. ^ Goldstein 2007, p96
  6. ^ Goldstein 1989, pp. 812–813
  7. ^ In 1952 Lukhangwa told Chinese Representative Zhang Jingwu "It was absurd to refer to the terms of the Seventeen-Point Agreement. Our people did not accept the agreement and the Chinese themselves had repeatedly broken the terms of it. Their army was still in occupation of eastern Tibet; the area had not been returned to the government of Tibet, as it should have been." My Land and My People, Dalai Lama, New York, 1992, p.95
  8. ^ a b "The 17-Point Agreement" The full story as revealed by the Tibetans and Chinese who were involved
  9. ^ Powers 2004, pp. 116–7
  10. ^ Michel Peissel, "The Cavaliers of Kham, the secret war in Tibet" London: Heinemann 1972, and Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1973
  11. ^ Dalai Lama, Freedom in Exile Harper San Francisco, 1991
  12. ^ a b c d Goldstein 2007, p541
  13. ^ thamzing, Wylie: ‘thab-‘dzing, Lhasa dialect IPA: [[tʰʌ́msiŋ]]
  14. ^ Craig (1992), pp. 76–78, 120–123.
  15. ^ Shakya (1999), pp. 245–249, 296, 322–323.
  16. ^ Laird 2006, p. 318
  17. ^ Guangming Daily. "Unforgettable History—Old Tibet Serfdom System" (in Chinese). Retrieved 2008-04-29. 
  18. ^ a b Population of Tibet 1950–1990 (Chinese)
  19. ^ Wonacott, Peter (2008-08-30). "Revolt of the Monks: How a Secret CIA Campaign Against China 50 Years Ago Continues to Fester; A Role for Dalai Lama's Brother". Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 2008-08-30. 
  20. ^ Laird 2006, pp. 320–328
  21. ^ a b http://www.friendsoftibet.org/main/concerns.html
  22. ^ "Witness: Reporting on the Dalai Lama's escape to India." Peter Jackson. Reuters. Feb 27, 2009.[1]
  23. ^ The CIA's secret war in Tibet, Seattle Times, January 26, 1997, Paul Salopek Ihttp://www.timbomb.net/buddha/archive/msg00087.html
  24. ^ Wong, Edward (20 January 2009). "Holiday for Tibet Is a Swipe at the Dalai Lama". The New York Times. p. 13. Retrieved 28 March 2011. 
  25. ^ Shakya (1999), p. 193.
  26. ^ Shakya (1999), p. 128.
  27. ^ Air America, Corgi Books. Tim Robbins. 1988.
  28. ^ a b "Secret Report by the Panchen Lama Criticises China"
  29. ^ a b http://www.subliminal.org/tibet/testimony/1962-panchen.html
  30. ^ a b Craig (1992), p. 125.
  31. ^ http://www.cosmicharmony.com/Tibet/TibetBefore.htm
  32. ^ Jamyang Norbu. Running-Dog Propagandists. – http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=21945&t=1
  33. ^ Barry Sautman, "Demographic Annihilation" and Tibet, pp. 230–257, in Barry Sautman, June Teufel Dreyer (eds), Contemporary Tibet: politics, development, and society in a disputed region, M. E. Sharpe, 2006, 360 p.
  34. ^ Kuzmin, S.L. Hidden Tibet: History of Independence and Occupation. Dharamsala, LTWA, 2011, pp. 340–341
  35. ^ a b c d http://www.tibetjustice.org/materials/govngo/govngo2.html
  36. ^ Kuzmin, S.L. Hidden Tibet: History of Independence and Occupation. Dharamsala, LTWA, 2011
  37. ^ A. Tom Grunfeld, Tibet and the United States, in Barry Sautman and June Teufel Dreyer (eds), Contemporary Tibet: politics, development, and society in a disputed region, M. E. Sharpe, 2006, 360 p., pp. 319–349, p. 329:

    The United States also took advantage of the Dalai Lama's having left Tibet by having the CIA revive its Cold War propaganda machine, creating supposedly popular organizations such as the American Emergency Committee for Tibetan Refugees, prodding its clandestinely funded Cold War human rights organizations such as the International Commission of Jurists to prepare propagandistic reports attacking China

    .
  38. ^ Howard B. Tolley Jr., The International Commission of Jurists, Global Advocates for Human Rights, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944, XVII p. + 344 p.
  39. ^ Richard Pierre Claude, review of Howard B. Tolley Jr., The International Commission of Jurists: Global Advocates for Humam Rights, in Human Rights Quarterly, August 1994:

    Based on the documentation and named respondents, the authors present the tale of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in secretly bankrolling the formation of the ICJ as an instrument of the cold war. (...) Tolley shows that the tainted source of funding was unknown to most ICJ officers and members

    .
  40. ^ Dorothy Stein, People Who Count. Population and Politics, Women and Children, Earthscan Publications, London, 1995, XI + 239 p., pp. 193–104, note 27:

    The ICJ itself grew out of a group created by American intelligence agents whose purpose was disseminating anti-communist propaganda. It too has received funds from the CIA, which is not a notable rights organization, nor, which is more to the point, particularly noted for its interest in truth. The 1960 LIC report, Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic (ICJ, Geneva: 1990), shows strong signs of bias in accepting or rejecting the testimonies cited

    .
  41. ^ http://www.icj.org/default.asp?nodeID=441&langage=1&myPage=Overview
  42. ^ Tibet, Tibet ISBN 1-4000-4100-7, pp. 278–82
  43. ^ Smith 1997, p. 600
  44. ^ 'Tibet: Proving Truth from Facts', The Department of Information and International Relations: Central Tibetan Administration, 1996. p. 53
  45. ^ a b Barry Sautman, June Teufel Dreyer, Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development, And Society In A Disputed Region pp. 239
  46. ^ Grunfeld 1996, p. 247.
  47. ^ French 2003, pp. 278–82
  48. ^ Smith 1997, p. 600–1 n. 8
  49. ^ Courtois 1997, p. 545–6, (cites Kewly, Tibet p. 255)
  50. ^ Yan Hao, 'Tibetan Population in China: Myths and Facts Re-examined', Asian Ethnicity, Volume 1, No. 1, March 2000, p.24
  51. ^ Peng Xizhe (彭希哲), "Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's Provinces," Population and Development Review 13, no. 4 (1987), 639–70.
    For a summary of other estimates, please refer to this link
  52. ^ People's Daily, Beijing, 10 November 1959, in Population transfer and control
  53. ^ 1954 Chinese Census Report (Chinese)
  54. ^ (Chinese) Qinghai Population [2]
  55. ^ Kuzmin, S.L. Hidden Tibet: History of Independence and Occupation. Dharamsala, LTWA, 2011, pp. 334–340
  56. ^ http://www.tibetjustice.org/materials/govngo/govngo1.html
  57. ^ http://www.tibet.org/Why/occupation.html
  58. ^ Shakya (1999), p. 320.
  59. ^ Shakya (1999), pp. 314–347.
  60. ^ Wang 2001, pp. 212–214
  61. ^ Dodin (2008), pp. 205.
  62. ^ Dodin (2008), pp. 195–196.
  63. ^ Powers 2004, pp. 141–2
  64. ^ Powers 2004, pg. 185
  65. ^ "Blood in the Snows(Reply to Wang Lixiong)". Retrieved 2009-03-02. 
  66. ^ Goldstein 1997, pp. 61–3
  67. ^ Goldstein 1997, pp. 63–66
  68. ^ http://cc.purdue.edu/~wtv/tibet/article/art4.html Tibet, China and the United States: Reflections on the Tibet Question,by Melvyn C. Goldstein
  69. ^ Goldstein 1997, pp. 67–74
  70. ^ a b Goldstein 1997, pp. 75–78
  71. ^ Goldstein 1997, pp. 79–83
  72. ^ Goldstein 1997, pp. 83–87
  73. ^ Barnett, Robert, in: Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China's 100 Questions, edited by Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille. (2008), pp. 89–90. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-24464-1 (cloth); ISBN 978-0-520-24928-8 (pbk).
  74. ^ Goldstein 1997, pp. 87–99
  75. ^ "Acme of Obscenity". Retrieved 2010-03-28. 
  76. ^ BBC NEWS | Asia-Pacific | Profile: Hu Jintao
  77. ^ Chinese Said to Kill 450 Tibetans in 1989
  78. ^ a b http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA170071996 'Tibet: 6-year old boy missing and over 50 detained in Panchen Lama dispute', Amnesty International, 18 January 1996
  79. ^ Train heads for Tibet, carrying fears of change
  80. ^ Robert Barnett's passages extracted from Steve Lehman, The Tibetans: Struggle to Survive, Umbrage Editions, New York, 1998., [3]
  81. ^ Personnel Changes in Lhasa Reveal Preference for Chinese Over Tibetans, Says TIN Report
  82. ^ Jiawei, Wang, "The Historical Status of China's Tibet", 2000, pp 194–7
  83. ^ The petition of 10th Panchen Lama in 1962
  84. ^ Peter Hessler, 'Tibet Through Chinese Eyes', The Atlantic Monthly, Feb. 1999
  85. ^ http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/09/24/statement-tibet-human-rights-council
  86. ^ http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/01/10/beijings-broken-promises-human-rights-0
  87. ^ Powers 2004, pg. 143
  88. ^ 'High wages in Tibet benefit the privileged', Asian Labour News, 21 February 2005,
  89. ^ a b 'Tibet's March Toward Modernization, section II The Rapid Social Development in Tibet', Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, November 2001
  90. ^ "Tibet: Basic Data". United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. Retrieved 2008-04-22. 
  91. ^ [4] Xinhua on-line news on Tibet
  92. ^ Elliot Sperling, Exile and Dissent: The Historical and Cultural Context, in TIBET SINCE 1950: SILENCE, PRISON, OR EXILE 31-36 (Melissa Harris & Sydney Jones eds., 2000), see The Historical and Cultural Context by Elliot Sperling
  93. ^ China launches Tibetan channel for India, Nepal, PTI, rediff NEWS, October 1, 2007: "China launched the first-ever 24-hour Tibetan language television channel on Monday to mark its 58th National Day (...). The channel only broadcast 11 hours a day when it was opened in 1999."
  94. ^ The wishes of a Tibetan, China Digital Times, March 27, 2009: "At present, the two most popular television channels in the Tibetan areas are the Qinghai Tibetan language channel and the Tibet Tibetan language channel"
  95. ^ Zhang Mingyu, Cheer up for opening khampa Tibetan TV Channel, tibet.new.cn, January 17, 2010.
  96. ^ Tibetan student protests spread to Beijing, The Guardian, 22 October 2010
  97. ^ a b c Amnesty International, State of the World's Human Rights: China, 2009, accessed 16 March 2010
  98. ^ http://www.thetibetpost.com/en/news/exile/3487-tibet-is-virtually-a-big-prison-former-political-prisoners
  99. ^ "China's Forbidden Zones". pp. 32–33. Retrieved 2010-03-11. 
  100. ^ a b c http://www.tibet.com/HumanRights/poptrans.html
  101. ^ a b National Bureau of Statistics of China (Chinese)
  102. ^ Dalai Lama accuses China of 'demographic aggression'
  103. ^ "Hu opens world's highest railway". BBC News. 2006-07-01. Retrieved 2010-05-25. 
  104. ^ In aninterview May 31, 2008, the Dalai Lama declared: « "Greater Tibet", now, this very word comes from the Chinese government side. We never state the greater Tibet » His Holiness the Dalai Lama discusses the recent unrest inside Tibet with the editors of the Financial Times (FT).
  105. ^ Xinhua News report (Chinese)
  106. ^ SINA News report (Chinese)
  107. ^ The law of birth control, The People's Republic of China
  108. ^ Protests in Tibet and Separatism: the Olympics and Beyond
  109. ^ People’s Republic of China: Background paper on the situation of the Tibetan population, A Writenet Report by Professor Colin P. Mackerras, p. 19–20.
  110. ^ Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics of China (国家统计局人口和社会科技统计司) and Department of Economic Development of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission of China (国家民族事务委员会经济发展司), eds. Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China (《2000年人口普查中国民族人口资料》). 2 vols. Beijing: Nationalities Publishing House (民族出版社), 2003 (ISBN 7-105-05425-5).

References[edit]

  • Craig, Mary. Tears of Blood: A Cry for Tibet (1992) INDUS an imprint of HarperCollins Publishers. Calcutta. Second impression, 1993. ISBN 0-00-627500-1
  • Goldstein, Melvyn C. A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State (1989) University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-06140-8
  • Goldstein, Melvyn C. The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama (1997) University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-21951-1
  • Goldstein, Melvyn C. A History of Modern Tibet, Volume 2: The Calm Before the Storm: 1951–1955 (2007) University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-24941-7
  • Kuzmin, Sergius. Hidden Tibet: History of Independence and Occupation (2011). Library of Tibetan Works & Archives. ISBN 978-93-80358-47-2
  • Laird, Thomas. The Story of Tibet: Conversations with the Dalai Lama (2006) Grove Press. ISBN 0-8021-1827-5
  • Powers, John. History as Propaganda: Tibetan Exiles versus the People's Republic of China (2004) Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-517426-7
  • Shakya, Tsering. The Dragon In The Land Of Snows (1999) Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-11814-7
  • Smith, Warren W., Jr. Tibetan Nation: A History Of Tibetan Nationalism And Sino-Tibetan Relations (1997) Westview press. ISBN 978-0-8133-3280-2