Impenetrability

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In metaphysics, impenetrability is the name given to that quality of matter whereby two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time. The philosopher John Toland argued that impenetrability and extension were sufficient to define matter, a contention strongly disputed by Gottfried Wilhelm Von Leibnez.

Locke considered impenetrability to be "more a consequence of solidity, than solidity itself."[2]

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. This article incorporates text from the public domain 1907 edition of The Nuttall Encyclopædia.
  2. Locke on Materialism
  3. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (by Locke)
  4. Heinemann, F. H. "Toland and Leibniz." The Philosophical Review, Vol. 54, No. 5. (Sep., 1945), pp. 437-457.
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