|Founded||Washington, D.C., U.S. (March 3, 1982 )|
|Founder(s)||William Anthony Hamilton|
|Products||CJIS, MODULAW, PROMIS|
Inslaw, Inc. is a small, Washington, D.C.-based, information technology company. In the mid-1970s, Inslaw developed for the United States Department of Justice a highly efficient, people-tracking, computer program known as Prosecutor's Management Information System (Promis). Inslaw's principal owners, William Anthony Hamilton and his wife, Nancy Burke Hamilton, later sued the United States Government (acting as principal to the Department of Justice) for not complying with the terms of the Promis contract and for refusing to pay for an enhanced version of Promis once delivered. This allegation of software piracy led to three trials in separate federal courts and two congressional hearings.
During ensuing investigations, the Department of Justice was accused of deliberately attempting to drive Inslaw into Chapter 7 liquidation; and of distributing and selling stolen software for covert intelligence operations of foreign governments such as Canada, Israel, Singapore, Iraq, Egypt, and Jordan; and of becoming directly involved in murder.
Later developments implied that derivative versions of Enhanced Promis sold on the black market may have become the high-tech tools of worldwide terrorists such as Osama Bin Laden and international money launderers and thieves.
Inslaw, once called the Institute for Law and Social Research, was a non-profit business created in 1974 by William Anthony Hamilton, "a former analyst with the National Security Agency and onetime contract employee of the CIA." Inslaw's original software product, Promis, was a database designed to handle papers and documents generated by law enforcement agencies and courts. Promis was a people-tracking program which had the power to integrate innumerable databases regardless of their languages, or regardless of their operating platforms. "Every use of Promis in the court system is tracking people," explained Hamilton. "You can rotate the file by case, defendant, arresting officer, judge, defense lawyer, and it's tracking all the names of all the people in all the cases."
Promis was funded almost entirely by government funds; therefore versions created prior to January 1978 were in the public domain. On January 1, 1978, amendments to the Copyright Act of 1976 took effect, automatically conferring upon Inslaw as the author of Promis five exclusive software copyright rights, none of which could be waived except by explicit, written waiver. The federal government negotiated licenses to use but not to modify or to distribute outside the federal government some but not all versions of Promis created after the January 1978 effective-date of the copyright amendments. In 1981, after Congress liquidated the Justice Department's Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) (which had been the primary source of funds for Inslaw's development of Promis), the company became known as Inslaw, Inc., a for-profit corporation created to further develop and market Promis and other Promis-derivative software product(s).
The newly created corporation made significant improvements to the original software. The resulting product came to be known alternately as Promis '82 or Enhanced Promis, a 32-bit architecture VAX 11/780 version.
Enhanced Promis contract 
In 1981, Edwin Meese, then an advisor to President Ronald Reagan, announced an $800 million budget in an effort to overhaul the computer systems of the Justice Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other law enforcement agencies. The following year, the Department of Justice awarded Inslaw a $9.6 million, three-year, cost-plus-incentive-fee contract to implement a pilot program in 22 of the largest Offices of the United States Attorneys using the older 16-bit architecture Prime version (as in Wang, or IBM), which the government had a license to use.
While Promis could have gone a long way toward correcting the Department's longstanding need for a standardized case-management system, the contract between Inslaw and Justice quickly became embroiled for over two decades in bitter controversy. The conflict centered on whether or not the Justice Department owed Inslaw license fees for the new, 32-bit architecture VAX version if the government substituted that version for the older 16-bit Prime version which had been the subject of the original contract.
In February 1983, an Israeli government official scheduled a meeting with Inslaw through the Justice Department's contract agent, Peter Videnieks.[nb 1] The purpose of that meeting was for a Promis briefing and demonstration; the Israeli Ministry of Justice intended to computerize its own prosecution offices. Although it was believed that the Israeli government official was a prosecuting attorney, it was later discovered upon closer examination that the official was really Rafi Eitan, "Director of LAKAM, a super-secret agency [within] the Israeli Ministry of Defense responsible for collecting scientific and technical intelligence information from other countries through espionage." Herein is where Inslaw's case becomes convoluted.[nb 2]
Following the Israeli meeting, the Justice Department obtained Inslaw's new, 32-bit, Enhanced Promis from Inslaw at the start of the second year of their Implementation Contract by modifying that contract and by promising to negotiate the payment of license fees. One month later, the U.S. government began to find fault with some of Inslaw's services, and with negotiated billing rates. The government then began to withhold unilaterally each month increasing amounts of payments due Inslaw for implementation services. The Justice Department agent responsible for making payments was a former, fired Inslaw employee, C. Madison Brewer. Brewer would later claim in federal court that everything he did regarding Inslaw was approved by Deputy Attorney General D. Lowell Jensen.[nb 3] "Brewer was aided in his new DoJ job by Peter Videnieks," wrote Wired (magazine), "Videnieks was fresh from the Customs Service where he oversaw contracts between that agency and Hadron, Inc., a company controlled by [Edwin] Meese and Reagan-crony Earl Brian. Hadron, a closely held government systems consulting firm, was to figure prominently in the forthcoming scandal." Both Brewer and Videnieks had obtained their positions under suspicious circumstances, according to the Chicago-based weekly, In These Times.[nb 4] Furthermore, "Before moving over to the Justice Department and taking charge of the Promis program in September 1981," wrote In These Times, "Videnieks had administered three contracts between the Customs Service and Hadron...[Hadron] was in the business of integrating information-managing systems such as Promis into federal agencies."[nb 5]
Simultaneously with the withholding of payments in the 1983 Modification 12 agreement, the government then substituted the enhanced VAX version of Promis for the old Prime version originally specified in the contract. However, the government failed to negotiate the payment of license fees as promised, claiming that Inslaw had failed to prove to the government's satisfaction that Inslaw had developed the enhanced version with private, non-government funds and that the enhanced version was not otherwise required to be delivered to the government under any of its contracts with Inslaw—that is, Inslaw had provided it voluntarily.
Yet beneath the surface of this background was a belief that the primary focus of certain top-level individuals within the DoJ was to perpetuate international, covert intelligence operations—for example, to enable Israeli signal intelligence to "surreptitiously access the computerized Jordanian dossiers on Palestinians."
Enhanced Promis was eventually installed in a total of forty-four federal prosecutors' offices following the Modification 12 agreement.[nb 6]
According to affidavits filed by William Hamilton, as the contract details were modified, Hamilton then received a phone call from Dominic Laiti, chief executive of Hadron. Laiti wanted to buy Inslaw. Hamilton refused. According to Hamilton's affidavits, Laiti then warned him that Hadron had friends in government and if Inslaw did not want to sell willingly, Inslaw could be coerced.
By February 1985, the government had withheld payment of almost $1.8 million for Inslaw's implementation services, plus millions of dollars in Old Promis license fees. Inslaw filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Meanwhile, the government began highly suspicious activities to force Inslaw into Chapter 7 liquidation.
Federal investigations into allegations of theft 
Two different federal bankruptcy courts made fully litigated findings of fact in the late-eighties, ruling that the Justice Department "took, converted, and stole"[nb 7] the Promis installed in U.S. Attorneys' Offices "through trickery, fraud, and deceit,"[nb 8] and then attempted "unlawfully and without justification"[nb 9] to force Inslaw out of business so that it would be unable to seek restitution through the courts.
Three months after the initial verdict, George F. Bason, Jr., the federal judge presiding over the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia, was denied reappointment to a new 14-year term on the bench by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the appointing authority.[nb 10] His replacement, S. Martin Teel, took over shortly after Judge Bason announced his oral findings of malfeasance against Inslaw by the Justice Department; Teel had been the Justice Department Tax Division attorney who had argued unsuccessfully before Judge Bason for the forced liquidation of Inslaw. Leigh Ratiner (of Dickstein, Shapiro and Morin, which was the 10th largest firm in Washington at the time) was fired in October 1986; he had been the lead counsel for Inslaw and had filed the suit against the Justice Department in federal bankruptcy court. His firing came reportedly amidst "back channel" discussions involving the DoJ, his law firm's senior partner, and the Government of Israel; moreover, there were rumors that the Mossad had arranged a payment of $600,000 to Ratiner's former firm as a separation settlement. [nb 11]
Then, in September 1991, the House Judiciary Committee issued the result of a three-year investigation. House Report 102-857 Inslaw: Investigative Report confirmed the Justice Department's theft of Promis. The report was issued after the Justice Department convinced the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals on a jurisdictional technicality to set aside the decisions of the first two federal bankruptcy courts.[nb 12] The House Committee also reported investigative leads indicating that friends of the Reagan White House had been allowed to sell and to distribute Enhanced Promis both domestically and overseas for their personal financial gain and in support of the intelligence and foreign policy objectives of the United States. The report even went so far as to recommend specifically further investigations of both former Attorney General Edwin Meese and businessman Earl Brian for their possible involvement in illegally providing or selling Promis "to foreign governments including Canada, Israel, Singapore, Iraq, Egypt, and Jordan." The Democratic majority called upon Attorney General Dick Thornburgh to compensate Inslaw immediately for the harm that the government had "egregiously" inflicted on Inslaw. The Republican minority dissented. The committee was divided along party lines 21–13. Attorney General Thornburgh ignored the recommendations, and reneged on agreements made with the committee.
Inslaw Affair divides into two separate issues 
On November 13, 1991, newly appointed, Attorney General William Barr, appointed a retired federal judge, Nicholas J. Bua, as Special Counsel to advise him on the allegations that high-ranking officials had acted improperly for personal gain to bankrupt Inslaw.
By June 1993, a 267-page Bua Report was released, clearing Justice officials of any impropriety. Inslaw's attorney, Elliot Richardson immediately wrote Inslaw's 130-page Rebuttal with evidence suggesting Bua's report was riddled with errors and falsehoods. On September 27, 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno released a 187-page review concluding "that there is no credible evidence that Department officials conspired to steal computer software developed by Inslaw, Inc. or that the company is entitled to additional government payments."  Yet, according to Wired (magazine), "Reno's report was released the same day [that] the House Judiciary Committee passed HR 4862, a bill which would have bound the U.S. Court of Federal Claims legally to independently investigate the Inslaw case—thus circumventing the Department of Justice's claims of innocence;" however, HR 4862 was defeated by a partisan committee-vote later that night before it was set to go before the full House.
The following May, the United States Senate asked the U.S. Court of Federal Claims [nb 13] to determine if the United States owed Inslaw compensation for the government's use of Promis. On July 31, 1997, Judge Christine Miller, the hearing officer for the U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled that all of the versions of Promis were in the public domain and that the government had therefore always been free to do whatever it wished with Promis. The following year, the appellate authority, a three-judge Review Panel of the same court, upheld Miller's ruling; yet, it also determined that Inslaw had never granted the government a license to "modify Promis to create derivative software" although Inslaw was automatically vested with the exclusive copyright rights to Promis. The Review Panel then held that the United States would be liable to Inslaw for copyright infringement damages if the government had created any unauthorized derivatives from Promis, but noted that Inslaw "had failed to prove in court that the government had done so;" moreover, the Board held that the issue of "derivative works" was "of no consequence."[nb 14] Inslaw challenged this interpretation but the Review Panel refused Inslaw's request to reopen discovery. In August 1998, Chief Judge Lorin Smith of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims sent an Advisory Report to the Senate, noting that the court had not found that the United States owes Inslaw compensation for the government's use of Promis, and enclosing the decision of the hearing officer and the decision of the Review Panel.
On the other hand, according to William Hamilton, the government flatly denied during all court proceedings what it later admitted, i.e. that agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other U.S. intelligence agencies used a Promis-derivative to keep track of their classified information.
Later developments 
In early 1999, the British journalist and author, Gordon Thomas, published an authorized history of the Israeli Mossad titled Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad. The book quotes detailed admissions by the former long-time deputy-director of the Mossad, Rafi Eitan, about the partnership between Israeli and U.S. intelligence in selling to foreign intelligence agencies in excess of $500 million worth of licenses to a trojan horse version of Promis, in order to spy on them.
In 2001, the Washington Times and Fox News each quoted federal law enforcement officials familiar with debriefing former FBI Agent Robert Hanssen as claiming that the convicted spy had stolen copies of a Promis-derivative for his Soviet KGB handlers.
They further alleged that the software was used within the FBI and other U.S. intelligence agencies to track internal intelligence, and was used by intelligence operatives to track international interbank transactions. These reports further stated that Osama bin Laden later bought copies of the same Promis-derivative on the Russian black market (blat) for $2 million. It was believed then that al Qaeda used the software to penetrate database systems to move funds throughout the banking system, and to evade detection by U.S. law enforcement. 
FBI, ACS, and FOIMS 
In May 2006, a former aide in the Office of the Vice President of the United States pleaded guilty to passing top-secret classified information to plotters trying to overthrow the president of the Philippines. Leandro Aragoncillo, an FBI intelligence analyst at the time of his arrest, was believed to have operated his deception using archaic database software manipulated by the FBI in order to evade the 1995 finding of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims with regard to Inslaw's rights to derivative works.   Additionally:
The 9-11 Commission called attention to the fact that the FBI did not install the current version of its case management software, called the ACS (Automated Case Support) system, until October 1995 and [to the fact that ACS was obsolete from the time the FBI developed it in the mid-1990s because it was based on "1980s technology". Although the 9-11 Commission offered no explanation for why the FBI used obsolete technology to develop its ACS case management software in 1995, the apparent explanation is that the FBI simply renamed its 1980s technology case management software, which was called FOIMS and was based on PROMIS, and translated it in October 1995 into a different computer programming language in order to obstruct a court hearing that the U.S. Senate had ordered earlier that year. The Senate had ordered the court in May 1995 to determine whether the United States owes Inslaw compensation for the government's use of PROMIS, and the court, in turn, ordered outside software experts to compare the FBI's software with PROMIS, but the FBI modified its software and told the court that it no longer retained the unmodified first 11 years (1985 through 1995) of its own case management software.] —boxed information added by David Dastych
In 2006, there were further allegations of the misuse of Promis. Writing in the Canada Free Press, the former Polish CIA operative and now international journalist, David Dastych alleged that "Chinese Military Intelligence (PLA-2) organized their own hackers department, which [exploited] Promis [database systems] [in the] Los Alamos and Sandia national laboratories to steal U.S. nuclear secrets"; however, the prima facie value of that allegation was lost in a realization that the U.S. Government could not convict the suspected 2001 spy.
The U.S. Government has never paid Inslaw Inc. for any of these unauthorized uses of Promis.
"Inslaw deserves to be compensated," wrote nationally syndicated columnist, Michelle Malkin, in The Washington Times. "More importantly, the American people deserve to know the truth: Did government greed and bureaucratic hubris lead to a wholesale sellout of our national security?"
While investigating elements of this story, journalist Danny Casolaro died in what was twice ruled a suicide. Prior to his death, Casolaro had warned friends if they were ever told he had committed suicide not to believe it, and to know he had been murdered. Many have argued that his death was suspicious, deserving closer scrutiny; some have argued further, believing his death was a murder, committed to hide whatever Casolaro had uncovered. "I believe he was murdered," wrote former Attorney General Elliot Richardson in the New York Times, "but even if that is no more than a possibility, it is a possibility with such sinister implications as to demand a serious effort to discover the truth." Kenn Thomas and Jim Keith discuss this in their book, The Octopus: Secret Government and the Death of Danny Casolaro[nb 15] Writing on behalf of a majority opinion in House Report 102-857, Committee Chairman, Jack Brooks (D-TX) wrote, "As long as the possibility exists that Danny Casolaro died as a result of his investigation into the INSLAW matter, it is imperative that further investigation be conducted."
- Peter Videnieks was the Contract Officer who oversaw the Promis contract for the Department of Justice Management Division.
- For a complete discussion of details surrounding Israel's involvement in Inslaw's affairs see: William Hamilton's "Addendum to the Bua Rebuttal:Executive Summary"; James Ridgeway's "Software to Die For:", paragraph 21 (The British and U.S. navies needed a software...); Wikipedia's Jonathan Pollard; and Ari Ben Menashe's "Profits of War".
- At the time of its inception, Promis was the most powerful program of its type. But a similar program, Dalite, was developed under another LEAA grant by D. Lowell Jensen, [an] Alameda County (Calif.) District Attorney at the time. In the mid-seventies, the two programs vied for a lucrative Los Angeles County contract and Inslaw won out. (Early in his career, Ed Meese [had] worked under Jensen at the Alameda County District Attorney's office. Jensen was later appointed to Meese's Justice Department during the Reagan presidency.) Both Jensen and Meese became serious targets for congressional investigators.
- According to a December 1989 affidavit filed by William Hamilton, the stage was set for Inslaw's takeover in the summer of 1981 when the Justice Department removed two key department officials involved in the Promis procurement: Patricia Goodrich, then project manager at the Justice Department for Promis, and Betty Thomas, then contracting officer in charge of purchasing the Promis software and administering the resulting contract. Goodrich's position was filled by C. Madison Brewer; and Thomas was told to step aside or be charged with "non-feasance". She was then replaced by Peter Videnieks, formerly with the US Customs Service.
- Originally incorporated in 1964 under the name Bio-Rad, Hadron had evolved from the "ashes of Xonics", a medical devices company whose directors by 1975 had run afoul of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission's trading rules. Hadron was located in Vienna, Virginia, and was known not only as a laser maker manufacturer but also as a company which "specialized in litigation support for government". Hadron was owned in part by venture-capitalists Earl Brian (7.7%), Dominic Laiti, and 13 other unknown (currently) partners. Hadron eventually evolved into present-day, Analex Corporation, a "leading provider of mission-critical professional services to federal government clients." In January 2007, Analex North America was sold to QinetiQ, an international defense technology company with headquarters in UK, North America, and Australia.
- The federal bankruptcy court in January 1988 asserts that the number of U.S. Attorneys Offices that received the 32-bit architecture version of Promis was forty-four. This finding was confirmed by the federal district court in November 1989. There were a total of 93 or 94 U.S. Attorneys Offices which received Enhanced Promis but the litigation (Inslaw v. United States Government) concerned only a subset of 44.
- Judge George F. Bason; INSLAW Inc. v. United States, Ch 11. Case No. 85 00070, Adv. No. 86-00069, transcript of oral decision, p.9 (Bankruptcy. District of Columbia. September 28, 1987). ["took, converted and stole"]
- INSLAW Inc, v. United States, 83 B.R., 89 (Bankruptcy. District of Columbia. 1988), p.158. ["trickery, fraud and deceit."]
- Judge William B. Bryant; INSLAW Inc. v. United States, opinion of U.S. District Court Judge William Bryant, November 1989, at p. 52A. ["acted willfully and fraudulently"]
- Out of 136 federal judges due for reappointment, Mr. Bason became one of four not reappointed.
- See subsection "Who Fired Inslaw's Lawyer?" The INSLAW Octopus, Wired magazine. 1993. p. 8 See also: Rebuttal to the Bua Report: Executive Summary
- On May 7, 1989, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the lower courts' rulings, finding that the bankruptcy courts lacked the jurisdiction to try copyright infringements. However, the appellate court left the findings of fact undisturbed. 
- The U.S. Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over copyright infringement claims against the U. S. Government.
- See: Inslaw v. The United States, No. 95-338X, 48 C.F.R. § 3.101-1 (aka the three-judge Review Panel), section III. "Plaintiffs' Exceptions to the Hearing Officer's Report", B. "Inslaw's Rights in the Various Versions of PROMIS Software", para 9-10.
- The Octopus was the name that Casolaro had intended to title his book. (See also: Alfred W. McCoy and Claire Sterling.)
- Hamilton, William A.; Brosi, K.B. (1976). "NCJRS Abstract 042881". National Criminal Justice Reference Service. p. 34. Retrieved 2009-03-05.
- Ridgeway, James (1991-09-24). "Software to Die For: Inslaw Lawyer Elliot Richardson Talks About Murder and the CIA". Village Voice. Retrieved 2009-02-08.
- Fricker, Richard L. (1993). "The INSLAW Octopus". Wired magazine. pp. ppg.1–8. Retrieved 2008-08-28.
- three-judge Review Panel (1998-05-11). "INSLAW v. THE UNITED STATES, No. 95-338X, 48 C.F.R. § 3.101-1" (PDF). Court of Federal Claims. Retrieved 2008-09-13.
- Ochs, Steven (1991-10-31). "A Parallax View". The Daily Pennsylvanian. Retrieved 2009-01-24.
- Committee on the Judiciary (1992-09-10). "House Report 102-857:THE INSLAW AFFAIR, Investigative Report". Retrieved 2008-08-22.
- Hamilton, William A. (1994). "Addendum to the "Bua Rebuttal": Executive Summary". Inslaw, Inc. Retrieved 2009-01-08.
- Menashe, Ari Ben (1992-01-01). Profits of War. Sheridan Square Press. p. 394. ISBN 978-1-879823-01-3. Retrieved 2009-01-10.
- Hamilton, William A. (2006-11-17). "FBI's Incapacitating Cover-Up". Nachrichten von Heute. Retrieved 2008-08-28.
- "(Internet excerpt only; complete title momentarily unknown)". In These Times. 1991-05-29. pp. (fee–based retrieval). Retrieved 2009-01-13.
- Mahar, Maggie (1988-04-04). "Beneath Contempt (part 1) and Rogue Justice (part 2)". Barron's National Business and Financial Weekly. p. 6. Retrieved 2008-10-25. ( mirrored, better text reprint)
- Mamis, Robert; Currier, Susan E. (1982-03-01). "R&D Partnerships Come Of Age". Inc. Magazine. Retrieved 2009-02-05.
- Tucker, Elizabeth (1988-11-28). "Hadron Inc.: Stumbling Along". Washington Post. p. F36. (fee-based retrieval)
- "Qinetiq buys US defence firm Analex". Independent, The (London). 2007-01-22.[dead link]
- Richardson, Elliot L. (1991-10-21). "A High-Tech Watergate". New York Times. Retrieved 2008-09-05.
- 87 N.Y.2d 46,660 N.E.2d 1126, 637 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1995-11-29). "Earl W. Brian, M.D., Appellant, v. Elliot L. Richardson, Respondent.". Cornell University Law School. Retrieved 2008-10-24.
- May, Patrick (1985-02-16). "Computer Firm Hired By Courts Has Money Woes". Miami Herald. pp. 2BR. ($fee)
- "Inslaw's lawyer slams Justice investigation". The Washington Times. 1993-06-21. Retrieved 2008-09-11.
- Richardson, Elliot (2001-07-24). "The Bua Rebuttal". Washington-weekly.com (a ZoomInfo cached page). Retrieved 2008-09-11. (mirrored version no. 2)
- Potts, Mark (1991-05-08). "Justice Department Wins Appeal in Inslaw Case". The Washington Post. pp. C8. Retrieved 2008-09-05. ($fee)
- Pease, Linda. Inslaw/PROMIS "Real History Archives Inslaw/PROMIS collection". Retrieved 2008-09-10.
- O'Meara, Kelly Patricia (2001-01-29). "Nothing is Secret, Part I". Insight magazine. Retrieved 2008-08-27.—The Plot Thickens in PROMIS Affair(Part II) — PROMIS Trail Leads to Justice, (Part III) — PROMIS Spins Web of Intrigue, (Part IV)
- Thomas, Gordon (1999). Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad. New York: St. Martin's Press. ISBN 0-312-25284-6.
- Opinion (1991-12-07). "Justice in the Inslaw Case". New York Times. Retrieved 2008-09-11.
- staff reporter (1993-06-18). "Justice Dept. Inquiry Rejects Inslaw Charges Computer Firm's Allegations Called Unfounded". The Washington Post.
- Lane, Ambrose I. (1995). Return of the Buffalo: The Story Behind America's Indian Gaming Explosion. Greenwood Publishing Group. pp. 1 74. ISBN 0-89789-433-2.
- Office of Public Affairs, press release #555 (1994-09-27). "New Report finds no credible basis for Inslaw claims". U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved 2009-01-23.
- 103 Congress, 2nd Session (1994-10-07). "HR 4862: A Bill for the Relief of Inslaw" (PDF). GPO. p. 5. Retrieved 2009-02-30.
- Kimery, Anthony (1994-04-09). The Inslaw Octopus Lives On (3.04). Wired magazine. Retrieved 2009-01-23.
- Office of Public Affairs, press release #323 (1997-08-04). "Justice Department Successful Against Inslaw Claims in Federal Claims Court". U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved 2008-09-11.
- Katz-Stone, Adam (1997-09-17). "Judge says Justice Dept. didn't steal from Inslaw". Washington Business Journal. Retrieved 2008-09-11.
- Seper, Jerry (2001-06-14). "Software likely in hands of terrorist, FBI's Hanssen seen as provider". The Washington Times. Retrieved 2008-09-08. ($fee) (lead paragraph mirrored here)
- Ruppert, Michael C. (2001-11-16). "Bin Laden's Magic Carpet - Secret U.S. PROMIS Software". From The Wilderness (website). Retrieved 2008-08-28.
- Cameron, Carl (2001-10-16). "Excerpt of Fox News Special Report with Brit Hume of October 16, 2001". Fox News. Retrieved 2008-09-08.
- Smothers, Ronald (2006-05-05). "Former Marine Admits Passing Secret Documents". New York Times. Retrieved 2008-09-09.
- Dastych, David (2006-01-31). "Promisgate: World's longest spy scandal still glossed over". Canada Free Press (CFP). Retrieved 2008-08-28.
- Purdy, Matthew (2001-02-05). "The Making of a suspect: The Case of Wo Ho Lee". The New York Times. pp. (Part 1). Retrieved 2008-09-12. —"Prosecution Unravels"— (Part 2)
- Washington Times Web Archive (Registration Required)
- Lewis, Neil A. (1991-08-17). "Reporter Is Buried Amid Questions Over His Pursuit of Conspiracy Idea". New York Times. pp. 1–2. Retrieved 2008-08-27.
Further reading 
- The Octopus: Secret Government and the Death of Danny Casolaro by Kenn Thomas and Jim Keith (Feral House, US, 2005, paperback ISBN 0-922915-91-1)
- The Attorney General's refusal to provide congressional access to "privileged" INSLAW documents : hearing before the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, second session, December 5, 1990. Washington : U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., Congressional Sales Office, U.S. G.P.O, 1990. Superintendent of Documents Number Y 4.J 89/1:101/114
- PROMIS : briefing series. Washington, D.C. : Institute for Law and Social Research, 1974-1977. "[A] series of 21 Briefing Papers for PROMIS (Prosecutor's Management Information System), this publication was prepared by the Institute for Law and Social Research (INSLAW), Washington, D.C., under a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), which has designated PROMIS as an Exemplary Project." OCLC Number 5882076