Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
The Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 is the official name of the inquiry conducted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence into the activities of the U.S. Intelligence Community in connection with the September 11, 2001 attacks. The investigation began in February 2002 and the final report was released in December 2002.
Calls for inquiry
In the months following the attacks, the White House, Sen Graham and Rep. Goss had rebuffed calls for an inquiry in the weeks immediately following September 11. In mid-December resolutions in the Senate called for the establishment of an independent bipartisan commission; the White House preferred a joint inquiry by the Congressional Intelligence Committees if there were to be any investigation at all. On January 29, Vice President Dick Cheney called Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle arguing that no investigation should take place, as it would divert resources from the "War on Terrorism".
Daschle instead agreed to limit the investigation to the joint inquiry, which was announced February 14, 2002 after consultations with Cheney and Condoleezza Rice. Goss and Graham made it clear that their goal was not to identify specific wrongdoing: Graham said the inquiry would not play "the blame game about what went wrong from an intelligence perspective,", and Goss said, "This is not a who-shall-we-hang type of investigation. It is about where are the gaps in America's defense and what do we do about it type of investigation."
The Washington Post reported statements made by Goss of May 17, 2002. Goss said he was looking for "solutions, not scapegoats." He called the uproar over the President's Daily Brief from August 6, 2001 entitled Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US "a lot of nonsense." He also said, "None of this is news, but it's all part of the finger-pointing. It's foolishness." The Post also reported that Goss refused to blame an "intelligence failure" for September 11, preferring to praise the agency's "fine work." (Washington Post, 18 May 2002, "A Cloak But No Dagger; An Ex-Spy Says He Seeks Solutions, Not Scapegoats for 9/11").
In June 2002, after Vice President Dick Cheney called Goss and Graham to chastise them for a media leak from the inquiry, they asked Attorney General John Ashcroft to investigate the leak. Sen. John McCain (R-Az.) noted the absurdity of having the FBI investigate legislators who are investigating the FBI.
The joint inquiry released their findings in December 2002. The report (available as both S. Rept. 107-351 and H. Rept. 107-792) consists of 832 pages that presents the joint inquiry’s findings and conclusions, an accompanying narrative, and a series of recommendations. Sen. Bob Graham (D-Fl.) and Rep, Porter J. Goss (R-Fl.), accompanied by their respective ranking minority members, Republican Sen. Richard C. Shelby and Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), led the joint inquiry, with L. Britt Snider, the former inspector general of the CIA appointed by George Tenet, as staff director.
The commission accepted the White House's refusal to give them any information on what President Bush had been told before September 11 ostensibly because it was classified. The final report therefore included none of that information, including the aforementioned brief.
28 pages of the 800-page report (about 7200 words) were omitted from the final report. Reps. Walter Jones (R-NC) and Stephen Lynch (D-Mass.) read the redacted section after a letter-writing campaign, and say that this section details high-level involvement by the Saudi Arabian embassy in receiving the hijackers on US soil, arranging for visas and other paperwork. 
In Los Angeles, a reception committee welcomed two of the hijackers. In San Diego they were provided rooms, rent and phones. In Washington, then-Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar and his wife sent checks totaling some $130,000 to Osama Bassnan, a Saudi agent. American al Qaeda cleric Anwar al-Awlaki met them in Falls Church, Virginia and helped them acquire apartments and IDs before they attacked the Pentagon. In Sarasota, FL., 9/11 ringleader Mohamed Atta and other hijackers visited a home owned by Esam Ghazzawi, a Saudi adviser to the nephew of King Fahd. The home was later abandoned.
Also in late 2002, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, an independent bipartisan commission popularly known as the 9/11 Commission, was eventually established with a broader mission "to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances" surrounding the attacks. Its report was released in July 2004.
- Patrick Martin (6 March 2002). "Further delay in US congressional investigation into September 11 attacks". World Socialist Web Site. Retrieved 10 August 2010.
- "Congressional Reports: Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001". Retrieved 10 August 2010.
- Inside the Saudi 9/11 coverup NY Post