Juche

Tower of the Juche Idea in Pyongyang

The Juche Idea, sometimes spelled Chuch'e (Chosŏn'gŭl: 주체; Hancha: 主體; Korean pronunciation: [tɕutɕʰe]), is a political thesis formed by Kim Il-sung that states that the Korean masses are the masters of the country's development. From the 1950s to the 1970s, Kim and other party theorists such as Hwang Jang-yop elaborated the Juche Idea into a set of principles that the government uses to justify its policy decisions. Among these are a strong military posture and reliance on Korean national resources.

The name comes from juche, the Korean translation for the philosophical and Marxist term "subject", also meaning "main body" or "mainstream", and is sometimes translated in North Korean sources as "independent stand" or "spirit of self-reliance". It has also been interpreted as "always putting Korean things first". According to Kim Il-sung, the Juche Idea is based on the belief that "man is the master of everything and decides everything".

Origin

Juche
Chosŏn'gŭl	주체사상
Hancha	主體思想
McCune–Reischauer	Chuch'e sasang
Revised Romanization	Juche sasang

Joseph Stalin's Socialism in One Country theory of self-reliance inspired elites both in China and in North Korea in the 1920s. As more states had begun successful communist revolutions, the Soviet Union put forth a newer idea of the Socialist division of labor, implying the creation of an integrated economy within the Soviet bloc controlled from Moscow.

The two Asian countries resisted this economic order in the 1950s, embracing a Maoist idea called "regeneration through one's own efforts". In Chinese, this idea was called Zili Gengsheng (Chinese: 自力更生; pinyin: Zìlì Gēngshēng; Wade–Giles: Tzu⁴-lee⁴ Keng¹-sheng¹), and the Sino-Korean pronunciation was Charyŏk Kaengsaeng (Chosŏn'gŭl: 자력갱생; Hancha: 自力更生; RR: jaryeok gaengsaeng), although the common name for Zili Gengsheng in North Korea was Juche.

Juche literally means "subject" in opposition to "object" (Chosŏn'gŭl: 객체; Hancha: 物體; MR: kaekche), but in a political context Juche means "self-identity" (with the "self" being the nation). Another antonym of Juche is sadaejuui (Chosŏn'gŭl: 사대주의; Hancha: 事大主義), referencing Sadae, the system of subordination of ancient Korea to ancient China. The second character of Juche, che (traditional Chinese and Hancha: 體; simplified Chinese and Shinjitai: 体), is found in the late-nineteenth century Self-Strengthening Movement of Li Hongzhang's term. Che of Juche is same as ti of ti-yung in Chinese learning and tai of kokutai in Japanese learning.

The first known reference to Juche as a domestic, North Korean ideology was an anti-Soviet speech given by Kim Il-sung on December 28, 1955. Titled "On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work", it was given to promote a political purge similar to the earlier Yan'an Rectification Movement in China. The process for the development of Juche followed a process similar to China's development of Zili Gengsheng, in that both came from a doubt in the benefits of being in the Soviet orbit, and that both ideologies stimulated a turn towards the Third World in foreign policy.

Hwang Jang-yeop, Kim's top adviser on ideology, discovered Kim's 1955 speech at the time when Kim, after having established a cult of personality, sought to develop his own version of Marxism–Leninism into a society-defining credo. North Korean sources began to trace the origins of Juche to a June 30, 1930 speech by Kim Il-sung, who was then 18 years old. The authenticity of these early speeches, however, is disputed.

Ideology

In Kim Il-sung's 1955 speech, the first on Juche, he stated:

“

To make revolution in Korea we must know Korean history and geography as well as the customs of the Korean people. Only then is it possible to educate our people in a way that suits them and to inspire in them an ardent love for their native place and their motherland.

”

Kim focuses on the importance of education and learning Korean history. Through the education of Korean people's own history will it "stimulate their national pride and rouse the broad masses to revolutionary struggle". Kim talks throughout his speech bulleting monumental events of the past and how certain outcomes could have been prevented. He stresses the importance of remembering their struggle, and that not learning their past, or denying it would "mean that our people did nothing."

Kim Il-sung outlined the three fundamental principles of Juche in his April 14, 1965, speech "On Socialist Construction and the South Korean Revolution in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea":

1. Political independence (Chosŏn'gŭl: 자주; Hancha: 自主; MR: chaju; RR: jaju)
2. Economic self-sustenance (Chosŏn'gŭl: 자립; Hancha: 自立; MR: charip; RR: jarip)
3. Self-reliance in defence (Chosŏn'gŭl: 자위; Hancha: 自衛; MR: chawi; RR: jawi)

Former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il officially authored the definitive statement on Juche in a 1982 document titled On the Juche Idea. He had final authority over the interpretation of the state ideology and incorporated the Songun (army-first) policy into it in 1996.

According to Kim Jong-il's On the Juche Idea, the application of Juche in state policy entails the following:

1. The people must have independence (Chosŏn'gŭl: 자주성; Hancha: 自主性; MR: chajusŏng; RR: jajuseong) in thought and politics, economic self-sufficiency, and self-reliance in defense.
2. Policy must reflect the will and aspirations of the masses and employ them fully in revolution and construction.
3. Methods of revolution and construction must be suitable to the situation of the country.
4. The most important work of revolution and construction is molding people ideologically as communists and mobilizing them to constructive action.

The Juche outlook requires absolute loyalty to the revolutionary party and leader. In North Korea, these are the Workers' Party of Korea and the supreme commander, formerly Kim Jong-il.

Amidst the 4th Party Conference held in April 2012, Kim Jong-un further defined Juche as the comprehensive thought of Kim Il-sung, developed and deepened by Kim Jong-il, therefore terming it as "Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism". He said:

“

Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism is an integral system of the idea, theory and method of Juche, and a great revolutionary ideology representative of the Juche era. Guided by Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism, we should conduct Party building and Party activities, so as to sustain the revolutionary character of our Party and advance the revolution and construction in line with the ideas and intentions of the President and the General.

”

Practical application

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In official North Korean histories, one of the first purported applications of Juche was the Five-Year Plan of 1956–1961, also known as the Chollima Movement, which led to the Chongsan-ri Method and the Taean Work System. The Five-Year Plan involved rapid economic development of North Korea, with a focus on heavy industry, to ensure political independence from both the Soviet Union and China.

The Chollima Movement applied the same method of centralized state planning that began with the Soviet First Five-Year Plan in 1928. The campaign also coincided with and was partially based on Mao's First Five-Year Plan and the Great Leap Forward. North Korea was apparently able to avoid the catastrophes of the Great Leap Forward.

Despite its aspirations to self-sufficiency, North Korea has continually relied on economic assistance from other countries. Historically, North Korea received most of its assistance from the USSR until its collapse in 1991. In the period after the Korean War, North Korea relied on economic assistance and loans from "fraternal" countries from 1953 to 1963 and also depended considerably on Soviet industrial aid from 1953 to 1976.

The Juche Idea itself gradually emerged as a systematic ideological doctrine under the political pressures of the Sino-Soviet split. Development of an independent approach to Marxism-Leninism was necessary to remain neutral as the split intensified. The ideology was pushed aside for almost a decade, until it reemerged when Kim spoke of the chuch'e principles to the Korean People's Army in 1963.

Following the fall of the USSR, the North Korean economy went into a crisis, with consequent infrastructural failures contributing to the mass famine of the mid-1990s. After several years of starvation, the People's Republic of China agreed to be a substitute for the Soviet Union as a major aid provider, supplying over US$400 million per year in humanitarian assistance. Since 2007, North Korea also was promised, though did not receive, large supplies of heavy fuel oil and technical assistance as scheduled in the six-party talks framework. North Korea was the second largest recipient of international food aid in 2005, and continues to suffer chronic food shortages.^{[citation needed]}

Relation to Marxism, Stalinism, and Maoism

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In 1972, Juche replaced Marxism-Leninism in the revised North Korean constitution as the official state ideology, this being a response to the Sino-Soviet split. Juche was nonetheless defined as a "creative application of Marxism-Leninism." Kim Il-sung also explained that Juche was not original to North Korea and that in formulating it he only laid stress on a programmatic orientation that is inherent to all Stalinist states.

After the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea’s greatest economic benefactor, all reference to Marxism-Leninism was dropped in the revised 1998 constitution. Some Marxist-Leninist phraseology remained in occasional use, but in 2009, the word 공산주의 ("communism") itself was dropped from the constitution altogether. The establishment of the Songun doctrine in the mid-1990s, however, has formally designated the military, not the proletariat or working class, as the main revolutionary force in North Korea.

Many commentators, journalists, and scholars outside North Korea equate Juche with Stalinism and call North Korea a Stalinist country. Some specialists have argued otherwise and have attempted to characterize the North Korean state as corporatist (Bruce Cumings), race-based nationalist (Brian Myers), guerrillaist (Wada Haruki), monarchist (Dae Sook-suh), and theocratic (Han S. Park, Christopher Hitchens). Those who have made conditional arguments that North Korea is a Stalinist regime include Charles Armstrong, Adrian Buzo, Chong-Sik Lee, and Robert Scalapino.

Kim Il-sung's policy statements and speeches from the 1940s and 1950s confirm that the North Korean government accepted Joseph Stalin's 1924 theory of Socialism in One Country and its model of centralized autarkic economic development. Following Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953, the North Korean leader wrote an emotional obituary in his honor titled "Stalin Is the Inspiration for the Peoples Struggling for Their Freedom and Independence" in a special issue of the WPK newspaper Rodong Sinmun (March 10, 1953).

After Stalin's death, Stalin's cult of personality was denounced at the 1956 Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, North Korean state authorities ended overt adulation of the Soviet leader. But the regime refused to follow the example of Soviet political reform, which it decried as modern revisionism, or join the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), the major international trade organization of Marxist-Leninist states for mutual coordinated economic development, subsidized with cheap oil by the Soviet Union. At present, the North Korean government admits no connection between Juche and the ideas of Stalin, though occasional mention is made of his political merits.

Influence of Maoism

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Political thinking from Maoist China has greatly influenced North Korea, such as the North's Chollima mass mobilization movements, which were based on China's Great Leap Forward. However, the ruling party in Pyongyang strongly denounces any Maoist influences on Juche in an attempt to appear independent. So even though the influence of Mao Zedong is also not formally acknowledged in North Korea, WPK ideologists and speech writers began to openly use Maoist ideas, such as the concept of self-regeneration (Zili Gengsheng), in the 1950s and 1960s.

Maoist theories of art also began to influence North Korean musical theater during this time. These developments occurred as a result of the influence of the Chinese Army's involvement during the Korean War, as well as during the Sino-Soviet split when Kim Il-sung sided with Mao against Soviet de-Stalinization. Kim attended middle school in China, he was conversant in Chinese, and he had been a guerrilla partisan in the Communist Party of China from about 1931-1941.

The postwar Kim Il-sung regime had also emulated Mao’s Great Leap Forward, his theory of the Mass line (qunzhong luxian), and the guerrilla tradition. Juche, however, does not exactly share the Maoist faith in the peasantry over the working class and the village over the city, as it exalts the military.

Effects on the economy

A satellite picture of the Korean peninsula at night, 2012. While lights from South Korean and Chinese cities are visible, North Korea is largely dark.

In 1957–1961, the Five Year Plan prioritized the reconstruction of major industries destroyed by the war, and placed consumer goods at the bottom of the priority list. This bias toward rebuilding major industries, "combined with unprecedentedly large amounts of aid from the Soviet bloc, pushed the economy forward at world-beating growth rates in the 1950s and 1960s".^{[citation needed]} Where everyday consumer items such as pens and watches had been rare in post-war North Korea in 1949, by the mid-1960s North Korea's economy was growing faster than that of South Korea.

Under Juche, North Korea's economic goal became to “build a rich and strong state that can guarantee our nation's chajusong (freedom)”. Kim Il-sung proposed to protect the chajusong of the national economy by relying on domestic resources and seeking independence from foreign resources. In adherence to the Juche principles of chaju (independence in politics) and charip (self-sustenance in the economy) as outlined by Kim Il-sung in 1965, the country isolated itself from rest of the world.^{[citation needed]} North Korea had only minimal diplomatic relationships with other nations until the collapse of the Soviet bloc forced it to create new alliances.

It may be noted that the charip idea of a self-contained economy was unlike other countries that withdrew from the world economy such as Albania under Enver Hoxha and Myanmar (Burma), two countries that "withdrew" to no apparent purpose as their economies idled along or worsened; North Korea did not idle but grew until the 1980s.

In theory, North Korea's withdrawal from the world economy was designed to create self-reliance and independence from other countries. In practice, however, the nation was forced to rely on the USSR, and later China, to sustain its livelihood. One example of the need for foreign aid occurred in 1986, when Kim Il-sung set a production goal of ten million tons of grain. When the plan failed and the country produced only four million tons of grain, it turned to foreign aid to provide an additional two million tons of grain. The six million tons of grain it managed to obtain was the bare minimum needed to feed its population.

1990s onwards

North Korea's economic crisis continued through the 1990s. “Most of the blame was attributed not to North Korea's ponderous socialist system but to ‘the collapse of socialist countries and the socialist market of the world’, which 'shattered' many of Pyongyang's trade partners and agreements.” The fall of the socialist market and trade partners led North Korea into a crisis that was unmanageable within their economic system. As a result, in contradiction to the Juche philosophy of autarky, North Korea established the Najin-Sonbong free economic and trade zone during the mid-1990s.

Investors from firms in Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, South Korea, the United States, and other countries opened manufacturing facilities in the DPRK. The Shell Oil Corporation (in 1995) is one of the large, multinational corporations that invested in the open trade area. Near the parallel, North Korea also opened the city of Kaesong for exports until 2010, when South Korea imposed economic sanctions after the sinking of a South Korean warship.

The Juche principle of chawi (self-defense in national defense) has caused North Korea to spend much of its capital for military purposes, reducing the amount available for economic development. It is estimated that 25 percent of North Korea's annual budget goes to the military. Kim Jong-il explicitly expressed an "army first" policy in the mid-1990s.

Social class

Unlike the Joseon Dynasty where there was a huge gap between the upper and lower classes, North Korea had adopted a unified social mass, also known as the gathered-together "people". Instead of a strict social hierarchy or a class divided society, North Korea had, in theory, divided the union into three classes — peasant, worker, and the samuwon (intellectuals and professionals) where each sect is just as important as the other. The samuwon class consisted of clerks, small traders, bureaucrats, professors, and writers. This was a unique class that was created in order to increase the education and literacy of North Korea.

Normally, Communist nations would value only the farmers or laborers, thus in the USSR intelligentsia was not defined as an independent class of its own, but rather as a "social stratum" that recruited itself from members of almost all classes: proletariat, petite bourgeoisie, and bourgeoisie. However, a "peasant intelligentsia" was never mentioned. Correspondingly, the "proletarian intelligentsia" was exalted for bringing forth progressive scientists and Marxist theoreticians, whereas the "bourgeois intelligentsia" was condemned for producing "bourgeois ideology", which were all non-Marxist worldviews. Language reforms followed revolutions more than once, such as the New Korean Orthography in North Korea (which failed, due to Korean ethnic nationalist fears of precluding Korean unification), or the simplification of Chinese characters under Mao (a consequence of the divergent orthographic choices of Taiwan and the People's Republic of China), or the simplification of the Russian alphabet after the 1917 revolution in Russia and consequent struggle against illiteracy, known in Soviet Russia as Likbez (Likvidaciya Bezgramotnosti, liquidation of illiteracy).

The emphasis on education and literacy stems from the understanding, explained by Lenin, that illiterate workers or peasants can't become subjects of political struggle. It was necessary, as well, to create a class of highly skilled workers, which was impossible without a pool of literate workers to draw from. North Korea, too, believed that promoting the education of the populace was as important as economic growth. These three ideas are cherished, and are symbolized through the symbol or statue of a writing brush across the hammer and sickle. North Korea also adopted a Soviet-style socialism approach.

They believed in the rapid industrialization through labor and believed in subjecting nature to human will. By restructuring the social class into a mass of people who are theoretically all equal, the North Korean government claimed it would be able to attain self-reliance or Juche in the upcoming years. This is questionable, as the country suffers massive food shortages annually and is heavily dependent on foreign aid.

Criticism

Human rights monitoring organizations and political analysts, such as Brian Reynolds Myers, continually report that the actual situation in North Korea bears no resemblance to Juche theory, citing the fact that North Korea's economy has depended heavily on imports and foreign aid, both before and after the collapse of the Communist trading bloc. Critics also claim that the opinions of the people have no actual weight in decision-making. Leading Juche theorist Hwang Jang-yop added his voice to these criticisms after defecting to South Korea, although he maintained faith in the Juche Idea as he understood it.

Political scientist Han S. Park in his book Juche: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom (2002) and theologian Thomas J. Belke in Juche: A Christian Study of North Korea's State Religion (1999) have both likened Juche to a religious movement.

Juche as a false-front ideology for racialist worldview

More recent research based on North Korea’s domestic documents and not propaganda for the international audience, popularized in 2009 by Brian R. Myers and his book The Cleanest Race and later supported by further academics characterizes North Korean ideology as being a racialist focused nationalism, and heavily influenced by the racialist outlook of Japan before the end of the Second World War.

Myers is dismissive of the idea that juche is North Korea's leading ideology, regarding its public exaltation as designed to deceive foreigners. Myers points out that North Korea's latest constitution, of 2009, omits all mention of communism. Myers states that Juche is merely a sham developed to extol Kim Il-sung as a political thinker alongside Mao Zedong.

According to The Cleanest Race, North Korea's government is founded on far-right politics, rather than those of the far left, because of the state's military-first policy, racism, and xenophobia, as evidenced by the attempted lynching of Black Cuban diplomats and forced abortions of North Korean women pregnant with ethnic Chinese children.

Myers rebuts the common assumptions that North Korea's government is based on Marxism-Leninism or Confucianism, arguing instead for a link to Japanese fascism, based on similarities between Hirohito and Kim Il Sung, Mount Fuji to Mount Baekdu, and so forth. According to the race-based ideology, Koreans are more innocent and morally virtuous than foreigners, but not physically superior, requiring guidance and protection from a leader. Such an ideology, according to Myers, helped the government divert agitation away from itself during the North Korean famine and enables the continuation of North Korea's autocratic system without exclusive reliance on repression and surveillance.

According to The Cleanest Race, North Korean propaganda portrays South Korea as a land polluted by foreign domination, and particularly by the presence of American soldiers. Although South Koreans are materially wealthy, they are unhappy not to be unified with the north under the care of the Dear Leader, who maintains the true Korean spirit. Anti-Americanism, Myers writes, is a pillar of the regime's legitimacy.

Juche outside North Korea

During the Cold War, North Korea promoted Juche and the principle of "self-reliance" as a guide for other countries, particularly Third World countries, to develop their economies. Indonesian president Sukarno visited North Korea in 1964 and attempted to implement the North Korean economic program in his country, but it resulted in a military coup. Romanian president Nicolae Ceauşescu was impressed by ideological mobilization in North Korea during his Asia visit in 1971, and began his systematization campaign shortly afterward with those features.

The North Korean government hosted its first international seminar on the Juche Idea in September 1977. The Korean Central News Agency and the Voice of Korea sometimes refer to statements by Juche study groups in other countries. Two of the most prominent of these groups are International Institute of the Juche Idea in Japan and the Korean Friendship Association, an international organisation presided over by Spanish national Alejandro Cao de Benos de Les y Pérez. Other Juche study groups are not publicized outside of North Korean media and the extent of their activity, if any, is therefore unclear. Kim Jong-il emphasized that other countries should not apply Juche formulaically, but should use methods suitable to the situation.

Juche calendar

Main article: North Korean calendar

The North Korean government and associated organizations use a variation of the Gregorian calendar with a Juche year based on April 15, 1912 CE (AD), the date of birth of Kim Il-sung, as year 1. The calendar was introduced in 1997. Months are unchanged from those in the standard Gregorian calendar. In many instances, the Juche year is given after the CE year, for example, 27 June 2007 Juche 96. But in North Korean publications, the Juche year is usually placed before the corresponding CE year, as in Juche 96 (2007).

Calendar schemes based on political era are also found in the Japanese era name (Nengo) system and in the Minguo calendar used in the Republic of China (Taiwan), though these are not based on the birth of an individual as in the Gregorian and Juche calendars. Incidentally, the year numbers of the Juche calendar, Minguo calendar, and Japan's Taishō period correspond to each other even though they were not meant to be related.

In August 1997 the Central People's Committee of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea promulgated regulations regarding use of the Juche Era calendar, according to which for dates occurring before 1912 the Gregorian calendar year is used exclusively, so that there is no "negative" Juche year, or "Before Juche" concept. For example, 1682 is rendered as "1682", while 2013 is rendered as "Juche 102, 2013" or as "Juche 102 (2013)." Critics of Juche charge that the "Juche dating system", as it is based on a person's birth date rather than a political era, reflects a dynastic tradition where era names are specified for ruling Emperors of Japan and China, as well as the Korean Emperors, who also used this system in the past.

See also

• Kim Il-sung bibliography
• Kim Jong-il bibliography
• Arirang Festival
• Juche Tower
• Juchesasangpa, the South Korean representation of Juche as a domestic political movement
• Workers' Party of Korea

General:

• List of Korea-related topics
• Political religion

References

Bibliography

• Baik, Bong. Kim Il Sung: Biography. Tokyo: Miraisha, 1969–1970. 3 vols.
• Belke, Thomas J. Juche: A Christian Study of North Korea's State Religion. Bartlesville, OK: Living Sacrifice Book Company, 1999. ISBN 0-88264-329-0.
• Cheong, Seong-Chang. "Stalinism and Kimilsungism: A Comparative Analysis of Ideology and Power". Asian Perspective 24.1 (2000): pp. 133–161.
• Fendler, Karoly. "Economic Assistance and Loans from Socialist Countries to North Korea in the Postwar Years, 1953–1963". Asien 42 (Jan 1992): pp. 39–51.
• Kang, Kwang-Shick. "Juche Idea and the Alteration Process in Kim Il Sung's Works: A Study on How to Read Kim Il-Sung's Works". Monash University: KSAA Conference 2001. 25 September 2001. pp. 363–374.
• Kiernan, Ben. The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia Under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–79. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002. ISBN 0-300-09649-6.
• Kim, Jong-il. On the Juche Idea. 31 March 1982.
• Christian Kracht, Eva Munz, Lukas Nikol, "The Ministry Of Truth. Kim Jong Ils North Korea", Feral House, Oct 2007, 132 pages, 88 color photographs, ISBN 978-1932595277
• Lankov, Andrei. "The Official Propaganda in the DPRK: Ideas and Methods". North Korean Studies. 2006.
• Lee, Chae-Jin. "China and North Korea: An Uncertain Relationship". North Korea after Kim Il Sung. Eds. Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. pp. 193–209. ISBN 1-55587-763-X.
• MacKerras, Colin. "The Juche Idea and the Thought of Kim Il Sung". Marxism in Asia. Eds. Colin MacKerras and Nick Knight. London: Croom Helm, 1985. ISBN 0-312-51852-8. pp. 151–175.
• "NK 2nd Largest Food Aid Recipient". KBS Global. 21 July 2006.
• Park, Han S. North Korea: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. ISBN 1-58826-050-X.
• Short, Philip. Pol Pot: Anatomy of a Nightmare. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004. ISBN 0-8050-6662-4.
• Tolnay, Adam. "Ceausescu's Journey to the East". Georgetown University. Ceausescu.org.
• Van Ree, Erik. "The Limits of Juche: North Korea's Dependence on Soviet Industrial Aid, 1953–76". Journal of Communist Studies 5 (Mar 1989): pp. 50–73.

External links

• North Korea Uncovered, (North Korea Google Earth) See most of North Korea's monuments, political, cultural, economic and military infrastructure on Google Earth.
• The International Institute of the Juche Idea
• Juche Idea Study Group of England
• Songun Politics Study Group USA
• Revolutionary View of the Leader
• A State of Mind (Documentary about Mass Games in North Korea)
• Communist Red Brigades Organization
• The Juche Idea, Shine All Over The World! (Epitaph enshrined in the Tower of Juche Idea, Pyongyang)
• Juche Party of France (Parti Juche de France)