Battle of Kasserine Pass

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Battle of Kasserine Pass
Part of the Tunisia Campaign of World War II
Kasserine Pass.jpg
The 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment of the United States Army marches through the Kasserine Pass and on to Kasserine and Farriana, Tunisia February 26, 1943
Date February 19–24, 1943
Location Kasserine Pass, Tunisia
Result Axis tactical victory
 United States
 United Kingdom
 Free France
Commanders and leaders
United States Lloyd Fredendall
United Kingdom Kenneth Anderson
Nazi Germany Erwin Rommel
30,000[1] 22,000[1]
Casualties and losses
Including Sidi Bou Zid:
10,000 (including 6,500 Americans)[1]
183 tanks[1][2][3]
Including Sidi Bou Zid:
34 tanks[1]

The Battle of Kasserine Pass took place during the Tunisia Campaign of World War II in February 1943. Kasserine Pass is a 2 mi (3.2 km) wide gap in the Grand Dorsal chain of the Atlas Mountains in west central Tunisia. The Axis forces led by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, were primarily from the Afrika Korps Assault Group, elements of the Italian Centauro Armoured Division and two Panzer divisions detached from the 5th Panzer Army against Allied forces of the U.S Army II Corps (Major General Lloyd Fredendall) and the British 6th Armoured Division (Major-General Charles Keightley), parts of the British First Army (Lieutenant-General Kenneth Anderson).

The battle was the first big engagement between American and German forces in World War II; the inexperienced and poorly led American troops suffered heavy casualties and were quickly pushed back over 50 mi (80 km) from their positions west of Faid Pass. After the early defeat, elements of the US II Corps, reinforced by British reserves, rallied and held the exits through mountain passes in western Tunisia, defeating the Axis offensive. The U.S. Army instituted sweeping changes from unit-level organization to the replacing of commanders. When the same combatants next met, in some cases only weeks later, the U.S. forces had recovered and were considerably more effective.


Sketch map of Tunisia during the 1942–43 campaign

American and British forces landed at several points along the coast of French Morocco and Algeria on November 8, 1942, during Operation Torch. This came only days after General Bernard Montgomery's breakout in the east following the Second Battle of El Alamein. In response, German and Italian troops were ferried in from Sicily to occupy Tunisia, one of the few easily defended areas of North Africa, and only one night's sail from bases in Sicily. This short passage made it very difficult for Allied naval vessels to intercept Axis transports, while air interdiction proved equally difficult as the nearest Allied airbase to Tunisia, at Malta, was over 200 mi (320 km) distant.[citation needed]

The Run for Tunis in November and December 1942, was an attempt to reach Tunis before German and Italian reinforcements arrived. Because of the poor road and rail communications, only a small, divisional sized Allied force could be supplied and in excellent defensive terrain, small numbers of German and Italian troops were sufficient to defeat the attempt. The Allied build-up continued, more aircraft became available and new airfields in eastern Algeria and Tunisia became operational, resulting in greater success in stopping the flow from Europe of Axis men and equipment into Tunis and Bizerta but a sizeable force had already come ashore.[citation needed]

On January 23, 1943, the Eighth Army took Tripoli, Rommel's main supply base. Rommel had planned for this, switching his line of supply to Tunis and intending to block the southern approach to Tunisia from Tripoli, by occupying an extensive set of defensive works known as the Mareth Line, which the French had built to protect against an Italian attack from Libya. With their lines steadied by the Atlas Mountains on the west and Gulf of Sidra on the east. Rommel expected even relatively small numbers of German/Italian troops would be able to hold off the Eighth Army.[citation needed] Allied troops had already crossed the Atlas Mountains and had set up a forward base at Faïd, in the foothills on the eastern arm of the mountains, an excellent position to thrust east to the coast, split the Axis forces in southern Tunisia from the forces further north, and cut the line of supply to Tunis.[4]


Faïd Pass[edit]

Tunisia, 30 January – 10 April 1943

Elements of the 5th Panzer Army (Hans-Jürgen von Arnim) reached the Allied positions on the eastern foot of the Atlas Mountains on January 30. The 21st Panzer Division met French troops at Faïd and despite excellent use of the French 75 mm (2.95 in) guns, which caused heavy casualties among the German infantry, the defenders were easily forced back.[nb 1] U.S. artillery and tanks of the 1st Armored Division then entered the battle, destroying some enemy tanks and forcing the remainder into what appeared to be a headlong retreat.[6]

The 1st Armoured Division fell for a ruse which had been successful against British forces and when the panzers reached their old positions, with U.S. armor in hot pursuit, a screen of German anti-tank guns opened fire, destroying nearly all the American tanks. A U.S. forward artillery observer whose radio and landlines had been cut by shellfire recalled,

It was murder. They rolled right into the muzzles of the concealed eighty-eights and all I could do was stand by and watch tank after tank blown to bits or burst into flames or just stop, wrecked. Those in the rear tried to turn back but the eighty-eights seemed to be everywhere.

—Westrate, 1944[6]

The 21st Panzer Division resumed its advance towards Faïd, American infantry casualties were exacerbated by the practice of digging shallow slit trenches instead of foxholes, as German tank drivers could easily crush a man inside a trench by driving into it and simultaneously making a half-turn.[6] Several attempts were made by the 1st Armored Division to stop the German advance, but all three combat commands found that each defensive position they tried to occupy had already been overrun and they were attacked by German troops with heavy losses.[6] After three days, the U.S. II Corps was compelled to withdraw into the foothills.[citation needed] The Germans captured most of Tunisia and the entrances into the coastal lowlands were blocked. The Allies held the interior of the roughly triangular Atlas range but with the exits blocked this was of little advantage to the Allies. For the next two weeks, Rommel and the Axis commanders further north debated what to do next.[citation needed]

Sidi Bou Zid[edit]

Rommel did not consider the Eighth Army posed a serious threat, since until Tripoli was open Montgomery could maintain only a small force in the south of Tunisia. Ships commenced unloading on February 9 but the port was not fully operational until the end of February.[7] Rommel made a proposal in early February to Comando Supremo, to attack with two battlegroups, including detachments from the 5th Panzer Army, toward two U.S. supply bases just to the west of the western arm of the mountains in Algeria. A quick thrust could capture the supplies and disrupt a U.S. attempt to concentrate forces near Tebessa. Arnim objected and the attack was delayed for a week to agree toOperation Frühlingswind a thrust by 5th Panzer Army through the US communications and supply center of Sidi Bou Zid. Rommel's forces, 60 miles (97 km) to the south-west, would conduct Operation Morgenluft to capture Gafsa and advance on Tozeur.[8] On February 14, the 10th and 21st Panzer divisions began the Battle of Sidi Bou Zid, about 10 mi (16 km) west of Faïd, in the interior plain of the Atlas Mountains.[9]

The U.S. tanks were defeated and the infantry, poorly sited on three hills and unable to give mutual support, was isolated. A counter-attack the next day was easily repulsed and on February 16, the Germans advanced towards Sbeitla.[citation needed] After the success at Sidi Bou Zid, Rommel ordered the Afrika Korps Assault Group to attack Gafsa on February 15 but on the night before, Anderson ordered the defenders evacuated Gafsa and made the main defence line on the hills around Feriana and that Gafsa should not be defended against a big attack.[10] Next day, because of the threat to the southern flank, Anderson obtained Eisenhower's agreement and ordered a withdrawal from the Eastern Dorsale, to the line of the Western Dorsale from Feriana northwards.[11] Early on February 17, Fredendall ordered a withdrawal from Sbeitla and Feriana.[12] The US II Corps was able to concentrate at the Kasserine and Sbiba Passes, on the western arm of the mountains. U.S. casualties were 2,546 men, 103 tanks, 280 vehicles, 18 field guns, three anti-tank guns and an anti-aircraft battery.[13]

Axis plan of attack[edit]

At this point, there was some argument in the Axis camp about what to do next; all of Tunisia was under Axis control and there was little to do until the Eighth Army arrived at Mareth. Rommel decided to attack through the Kasserine Pass into the main force of the U.S. II Corps at Tébessa to capture U.S. supplied on the Algerian side of the western arm of the mountains, eliminate the Allied ability to attack the coastal corridor linking Mareth and Tunis and threaten the southern flank of the First Army. On February 18, Rommel submitted his proposals to Albert Kesselring, who forwarded them with his blessing to the Comando Supremo (Italian High Command) in Rome.[14]

At 13:30 on February 19, Rommel received the Comando Supremo's agreement to a revised plan. He was to have 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions transferred from von Arnim’s 5th Panzer Army to his command and attack through the Kasserine and Sbiba passes toward Thala and Le Kef to the north, clearing the Western Dorsale and threatening the 1st Army's flank.[15][nb 2] Rommel was appalled, the plan dispersed Axis forces and through the passes, would expose their flanks. A concentrated attack on Tébessa, while entailing some risk, could yield badly needed supplies, destroy Allied potential for operations into central Tunisia and capture the airfield at Youks-les-Bains, west of Tébessa.[17]


Battle of Kasserine Pass

In the early hours of February 19, Rommel ordered the Afrika Korps Assault Group from Feriana to attack the Kasserine Pass. The 21st Panzer Division at Sbeitla was ordered to attack northward through the pass east of Kasserine which led to Sbiba and Ksour. The Kampfgruppe von Broich, the battlegroup released by von Arnim from 10th Panzer Division, was ordered to concentrate at Sbeitla, where it would be ready to exploit success in either pass.[18]


In the Sbiba area facing the German armored advance was the British 6th Armoured Division (less its 26th Armoured Brigade which except for the tanks of the 16/5th Lancers had been sent to Thala). Also in the line was the 18th Regimental Combat Team from the US 1st Infantry Division; and three battalions of infantry from US 34th Infantry Division. There were also three US Field Artillery battalions, elements of two British anti-tank regiments and some French detachments,[19] 21st Panzer Division made little progress against the combined firepower of the defending force which had also laid minefields. 21st Panzer was checked and then driven back by February 20.[20]


An M3 Grant tank of US 1st Armored Division advancing to support American forces during the battle at Kasserine Pass

Defending the pass was a force consisting of the 1st Battalion, US 26th Regimental Combat Team, the US 19th Combat Engineer Regiment, the US 6th Field Artillery Battalion, a tank destroyer battalion and a battery of French artillery. On the hills to their west was French General Welvert's Task Force Welvert comprising a US Ranger and infantry battalion, three French infantry battalions, two US field artillery battalions, four French artillery batteries and engineer and anti-aircraft detachments. Furthest west was Task Force Bowen (consisting of the 3rd Battalion of the US 26th Regimental Combat Team), blocking the track from Feriana towards Tebessa. Between Task Force Bowen and Tebessa to the north was the regrouping US 1st Armored Division although only Combat Command B were fit for combat.[12] The positions in the pass had been placed under Colonel Alexander Stark, commander of the 26th RCT, on the night of February 18 and the command named Stark Force.[19]

An attempt to surprise the Kasserine defenses by the 33rd Reconnaissance Unit into the pass failed and a battalion of panzer grenadiers was ordered into the floor of the pass and another onto Djebel Semmama, the hill on its eastern flank and slow progress was made against artillery fire. The tanks of 1/8th Panzer Regiment were committed at noon but little further progress resulted against stubborn defense.[21] Rommel decided to commit his units from the 10th Panzer to the Kasserine Pass the next morning in a co-ordinated attack with the Afrika Korps Assault Group, which was to be joined by elements of the Italian 131st Armored Division Centauro.[22] British reinforcements from the 26th Armoured Brigade (6th Armoured Division) had been assembling at Thala and Brigadier Dunphie, making forward reconnaissance, decided to intervene. The First Army headquarters restricted him to sending Gore Force, a small combined-arms group of a company of infantry, a squadron of 11 tanks, an artillery battery and an anti-tank troop.[23] Brigadier Cameron Nicholson (6th Armoured Division) was given command of Nickforce, all units north-west of the pass.[24]

US troops taken prisoner during the battle march through a Tunisian village

During the night, the American positions on the two shoulders overlooking the pass were overrun and at 8:30 am German panzer grenadiers and Italian Bersaglieri resumed the attack. At 10.00am Dunphie judged that Stark Force was about to give way and ordered Gore Force to the Thala side of the pass as elements of the Centauro Division launched their attack towards Tebessa and continued it during the afternoon.[25] At 1:00 pm Rommel committed two battalions from 10th Panzer which overcame the defence.[23] Tanks and Bersaglieri from the Centauro Division advanced along Highway 13 and overran the 19th Combat Engineer Regiment.[26][27] The US survivors made a disorganised retreat up the western exit from the pass to Djebel el Hamra, where 1st Armored Division's Combat Command B was arriving. On the exit to Thala, Gore Force slowly leapfrogged back, losing all its tanks in the process, to rejoin the 26th Armoured Brigade some 10 miles (16 km) further back.[23]

Djebel el Hamra[edit]

The Afrika Korps Assault Group began moving along the Hatab River valley towards Haidra and Tebessa in the early afternoon of February 21 and advanced until they met defenders consisting of the US 1st Infantry Division's 16th Infantry Regiment and Combat Command B of the US 1st Armored Division at Djebel el Hamra. The German-Italian force was halted and despite heavy pressure, including air attacks, failed to dislodge the American defenders.[28] Having brought the Axis drive towards Tebessa to a halt Generals Robinett and Allen now turned their attention to planning a counterattack that was to take place the next day, February 22. Plans made by both sides were upset by the ongoing battle, and the Axis forces launched another assault on the US position on the morning of the 22nd. Although the American defenders were pressed hard, the line held, and by mid-afternoon, the US infantry and tanks launched a counterattack that broke the German and Italian force. More than 400 Axis prisoners were taken as the counterattack was pressed into the Afrika Korps position.[29]


British troops establishing positions on difficult terrain at Thala, 24 February 1943

Rommel had stayed with the main group of the 10th Panzer Division on the route toward Thala, where the 26th Armoured Brigade and remnants of the US 26th Infantry Regiment had dug in on ridges leading to Thala. Throughout February 21, the 10th Panzer Division pressed north towards Thala. If the town fell and the southern of two roads from Thala to Tebessa was cut, the U.S. 9th Infantry Division to the north would be cut off and Combat Command B of the 1st Armored Division would be trapped between the 10th Panzer Division and its supporting units moving north along the second road to Tebessa. The combined force fought a costly delaying action in front of Thala, retreating ridge by ridge to the north until by dark, the force held the German attacks just south of the town.[citation needed]

The divisional artillery of 48 guns of the U.S. 9th Infantry Division and 37mm Anti-Tank gun platoons, that had started moving on February 17 from Morocco, 800 mi (1,300 km) west was dug in that night. When the battle reopened the next day, the front line was held predominantly by British infantry, with exceptionally strong backing by U.S. and British artillery, under the unified command of Brigadier General Stafford LeRoy Irwin, the US artillery commander. The British had 36 guns, supported by the Derbyshire Yeomanry and the 17th/21st Lancers.[30][31] Anderson ordered the 9th Division and its artillery support to Le Kef to meet an expected German attack but U.S. Major General Ernest N. Harmon, who had been sent by Eisenhower to report on the battle and the Allied command, instructed the 9th divisional artillery to stay behind.[32] On the morning of February 22, an intense artillery barrage from the massed Allied guns forestalled the resumption of the 10th Panzer Division attack, destroying armour and vehicles and disrupting communications. Von Broich, the battle group's commander, decided to pause and regroup but Allied reinforcements continued to arrive.[33][34] Under constant fire, 10th Panzer waited until dark to retire from the battlefield.[34]


Overextended, available supplies now dwindling, pinned down by the Allied artillery in the pass in front of Thala and now facing US counterattacks along the Hatab River, Rommel realized his attack had been stopped. At Sbiba, along the Hatab River and now at Thala, the efforts of the German and Italian forces had failed to make a decisive break in the Allied line. With little prospect of further success, Rommel judged that it would be wiser to break off to concentrate in South Tunisia and strike a blow at 8th Army, catching them off balance while still assembling its forces. He at least had the consolations that he had inflicted heavy losses on his enemy and that the Allied concentrations in the Gafsa – Sbeitla area had been destroyed.[35] At a meeting at Rommel's Kasserine HQ on February 23, Kesselring and his Chief of Staff Siegfried Westphal tried to change Rommel's mind, arguing that there were still possibilities for success. Rommel was adamant; Kesselring finally agreed and formal orders from the Comando Supremo in Rome were issued that evening calling off the offensive and directing all Axis units to return to their start positions.[36] On February 23 a massive U.S. air attack on the pass hastened the German retreat and by late on February 24, the pass had been reoccupied, Feriana was in Allied hands; Sidi Bou Zid and Sbeitla followed soon after.[37]



Rommel in Tunisia speaking with troops riding a captured American built M3 half-track.

Rommel had hoped to take advantage of the inexperience of the new Allied commanders but was opposed by Von Arnim, who wanted to conserve strength in his sector, ignored Kesselring's orders and withheld the attached heavy tank unit of 10th Panzer.[38] Rommel felt that most U.S. units and commanders showed their inexperience, losing sight of the broader picture.[39] Rommel was unable to exploit Allied failings due to a lack of forces and freedom of maneuver and the opportunity was missed but praised the 2nd Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment of the 1st Armored Division in the defense of Sbeitla for being "clever and well fought".[40][page needed] Rommel was later impressed with how quickly US commanders came to understand and implement mobile warfare and also praised U.S. equipment, "British experience has been put to good use in American equipment".[38] Of particular interest to the Germans was the sturdy M3 armoured half track and for some time after the battle, German units deployed large numbers of captured U.S. vehicles.[citation needed]

The Allies studied the results equally seriously. Positioned by senior commanders who had not personally reconnoitred the ground, U.S. forces were often located too far from each other for mutual support. It was also noted that American soldiers tended to become careless about digging in, exposing their positions, bunching in groups when in open view of enemy artillery observers, and positioning units on topographic crests, where their silhouettes made them perfect targets. Too many soldiers, exasperated by the rocky soil of Tunisia, were still digging shallow slit trenches instead of deep foxholes.[41] The 1st Armored Division had also apparently not learned lessons from British forces on the receiving end of German anti-tank and screening tactics, though others in the U.S. Army were well aware of the deception.[42] The Allies were also unable to prevent the Germans from attaining air superiority over the battlefield, limiting effective Allied air reconnaissance and allowing relentless German bombing and strafing attacks that disrupted Allied attempts at deployment and organization. Attacks by the Luftwaffe in close support of German ground offensives often neutralized American attempts to organize effective defensive artillery fire.[citation needed]

General Dwight D. Eisenhower began restructuring the Allied command, creating the 18th Army Group (General Sir Harold Alexander), to tighten the operational control of the three Allied nations involved and improve their coordination.[citation needed] Lloyd Fredendall was relieved by Eisenhower and sent home. The custom amongst theater commanders of transferring senior commanders who had failed in battle to training commands at home, did not improve the reputation or morale of the latter. Home commands were saddled disgraced commanders reluctant to advocate radical improvements in training programmes, which like the commanders had contributed to U.S. Army reverses in North Africa.[43] Eisenhower found through Major General Omar N. Bradley and others that Fredendall's subordinates had lost confidence in him and Alexander told U.S. commanders, "I'm sure you must have better men than that".[44][45]

Fredendall took the blame but Anderson, the First Army commander was at fault for the failure to concentrate Allied armored units and integrate forces, had disintegrated into disjointed units.[46] When Fredendall disclaimed all responsibility for the poorly equipped French XIX Corps and denied French requests for support, notably when under pressure at Faïd, Anderson allowed the request to go unfulfilled. Anderson was also blamed for dispersing the three combat commands of U.S. 1st Armored Division, despite the objections of Orlando Ward the divisional commander.[47][nb 3] Irwin became a successful divisional commander and went on to higher command, as did Cameron Nicholson of Nickforce. Allied commanders were given greater latitude to use their initiative, to make decisions and to keep forces concentrated. They were also urged to lead their units from the front, and to keep command posts well forward, unlike Fredendall who had rarely visited the front line; Patton eventually relieved Ward, who had become cautious after Kasserine.[citation needed]

On March 6, Major General George S. Patton was temporarily removed from planning for the Allied invasion of Sicily to command II Corps. Bradley was appointed assistant Corps Commander and moved up to command of II Corps when Patton returned to planning for Sicily. Fredendall was reassigned to the United States and several other commanders were removed or promoted out of the way. Patton was a "hands-on" general not known for hesitancy and did not bother to request permission, when taking action to support his command or other units requesting assistance. During the advance from Gafsa, General Alexander had given detailed orders to Patton, afterwards changing II Corps' mission not once, but several times. Once beyond Maknassy, Alexander again gave orders Patton considered excessively detailed. From then on, Patton simply ignored those parts of mission orders he considered ill-advised on grounds of military expediency and/or a rapidly evolving tactical situation.[48]

Efforts were made to improve massed, immediate, artillery and air support, which had been poorly coordinated. While U.S. artillery response times improved dramatically, coordinating close air support was not achieved until Operation Overlord over a year later.[citation needed] American anti-aircraft artillery began reforms, having learned that, while Stuka dive bombers were vulnerable to .50 in (12.7 mm) anti-aircraft machine gun fire, field units and field artillery needed protection from aerial attack: in one division, 95 percent of air attacks were concentrated on its artillery.[49] Emphasis was also placed on keeping units concentrated and II Corps began to use divisions as divisions and by the invasion of Sicily, their forces were considerably stronger.[citation needed]

See also[edit]



  1. ^ Poorly equipped and supplied with World War I era light artillery and ammunition, including outmoded shrapnel rounds, the French were nonetheless expert artillerymen and occasionally hammered German patrols and infantry attempting to negotiating the narrow passes.[5]
  2. ^ Arnim only released a battlegroup under Felix von Broich.[16]
  3. ^ Harmon reported that Ward was "hopping mad" at Anderson for dispersing his division and at Fredendall for allowing it.[43]


  1. ^ a b c d e Rottmann, p. 74.
  2. ^ Heller, Charles. America's First Battles, 1776–1965. 1986. University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0-7006-0277-1. p. 261.
  3. ^ "Historia de las Fuerzas Armadas alemanas. Kasserine 1943". Portal Militar y Panzertruppen (in Spanish). Columbia. Archived from the original on February 12, 2008. Retrieved January 19, 2008. 
  4. ^ Watson (2007), p.73
  5. ^ Westrate (1944), pp. 38–39
  6. ^ a b c d Westrate (1944), pp. 109–17
  7. ^ Watson (2007), p.72
  8. ^ Watson (2007). pp.73–74
  9. ^ Playfair, p. 287
  10. ^ Playfair, p. 287
  11. ^ Playfair, p. 292
  12. ^ a b Playfair, p. 294
  13. ^ Anderson, p. 16.
  14. ^ Watson (2007), p. 80
  15. ^ Watson (2007), pp. 80–81
  16. ^ Watson (2007), p. 90)
  17. ^ Watson (2007), p. 81
  18. ^ Playfair, p. 295
  19. ^ a b Playfair, p. 296
  20. ^ Rutherford (1970) p. 111
  21. ^ Playfair, p. 296 & 297
  22. ^ Watson (2007), p. 90
  23. ^ a b c Playfair, p. 297
  24. ^ Playfair, p. 298
  25. ^ Walker 2006, p.?.
  26. ^ Tucker 2012, p. 1575.
  27. ^ Atkinson 2002, p. 372.
  28. ^ Rutherford (1970) p. 124
  29. ^ Kelly (2002) p. 244
  30. ^ Watson (2007), p. 104
  31. ^ Playfair, p. 300
  32. ^ Murray, Brian J., Facing The Fox, America in World War II, (April 2006), pp. 28–35
  33. ^ Watson (2007), pp. 104 & 105
  34. ^ a b Murray, pp. 28–35
  35. ^ Playfair, p. 301
  36. ^ Watson (2007), pp. 109–110.
  37. ^ Rutherford (1970), p. 147
  38. ^ a b Lewin p. 205
  39. ^ Lewin p. 202
  40. ^ Zaloga (2005),[page needed]
  41. ^ Westrate (1944), pp. 91–92
  42. ^ Westrate (1944), p. 110
  43. ^ a b Ossad, Steven L., Command Failures: Lessons Learned from Lloyd R. Fredendall, Army Magazine, March 2003
  44. ^ D'Este, Carlo, Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life, Orion Publishing Group Ltd. (2003), ISBN 0-304-36658-7, ISBN 0-304-36658-7
  45. ^ Murray, Brian J. Facing The Fox, America in World War II, (April 2006)
  46. ^ Calhoun (2003), pp. 27, 69–70, 83–85
  47. ^ Calhoun (2003), pp. 73–75
  48. ^ Atkinson (2002), p. 435
  49. ^ Hamilton (2005), p. 42


External links[edit]

Coordinates: 35°15′35″N 8°44′33″E / 35.2596°N 8.7424°E / 35.2596; 8.7424