Korean War

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Korean Conflict Part of the Cold War Clockwise, from top: The US Army at the 38th parallel; F-86 Sabre fighter aeroplane in Korean combat; Incheon harbour, starting point of the Battle of Incheon; Chinese soldiers welcomed home; 1st. Lt. Baldomero Lopez, USMC, over the top of the the Incheon seawall. Date June 25, 1950 (1950-06-25)–27 July 1953 Location Korean Peninsula Result Cease-fire armistice; North Korean invasion of South Korea repelled, US–UN invasion of North Korea repelled; Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) established; little territorial change at the 38th parallel border, essentially uti possidetis; technically, at war. Territorial changes DMZ; both gained little border territory at the 38th parallel. Belligerents  United Nations (UN Resolution 84):  Republic of Korea  United States  United Kingdom  Australia  Belgium  Canada  Colombia Ethiopia France Greece  Luxembourg  Netherlands  New Zealand  Philippines South Africa  Thailand  Turkey Naval Support and Military Servicing/Repairs:  Japan Medical staff:  Denmark  Italy  Norway  India  Sweden North Korea and Allies: Democratic People's Republic of Korea People's Republic of China  Soviet Union Commanders Syngman Rhee Chung Il-kwon Paik Sun-yup Douglas MacArthur Matthew Ridgway Mark Wayne Clark Harry S. Truman Dwight D. Eisenhower Elpidio Quirino Fidel V. Ramos Tahsin Yazıcı Kim Il-sung Choi Yong-kun Kim Chaek Mao Zedong Peng Dehuai Joseph Stalin Georgy Malenkov Strength 590,911 480,000 63,000[1] 26,791[2] 17,000 7,430[3] 5,455[4] 3,972 3,421[5] 2,163 [6] 1,389 1,294 1,271 1,068 900 826 44 Total: 941,356–1,139,518 260,000 926,000 26,000 Total: 1,212,000 Note: The figures vary by source; peak unit-strength varied in e war. Casualties and losses South Korea: 58,127 combat deaths 175,743 wounded 80,000 MIA or POW[7] United States: 36,516 dead (2,830 non-combat) 92,134 wounded 8,176 MIA 7,245 POW[8] United Kingdom: 1,109 dead[9] 2,674 wounded 1,060 MIA or POW[10] Turkey: 721 dead[11] 2,111 wounded 168 MIA 216 POW Canada 516 dead[12] 1,042 wounded Australia 339 dead[13] 1,200 wounded France: 300 KIA or MIA[14] Greece: 194 KIA[15] 459 wounded Philippines: 112 KIA[3] Netherlands; 123 KIA [16] Belgium; 106 KIA [17] Luxembourg; 2 KIA [18] New Zealand: 33 KIA [19] South Africa 28 KIA and 8 MIA[20] Total: Over 474,000 North Korea: 215,000 dead, 303,000 wounded, 120,000 MIA or POW[10] China (Chinese estimate): 114,000 killed in combat 34,000 non-combat deaths 380,000 wounded 21,400 POW[21] (U.S. estimate):[10] 400,000+ dead 486,000 wounded 21,000 POW Soviet Union: 282 dead[22] Total: 1,190,000-1,577,000+ Civilians killed/wounded (total Koreans) = 2 Million (Est.)[23]

v • d • e Korean War North Korea Offensive Ongjin · Uijeongbu · Munsan · 1st Seoul · Chuncheon · Gangneung · Miari · Han River · Jumunjin UN Participation Osan · Donglakri · Danyang · Jincheon · Yihwaryeong · Daejeon · Yeongdeok · Hwaryeongjang · Younggang · Andong · Pusan Perimeter · Incheon · 2nd Seoul · Hill 282 · Wonsan · Yeonghung · Kumchon · Pyongyang · Huichon · Chosan Chinese Intervention Pakchon · Chosin Reservoir · Task Force Faith · 3rd Seoul · Twin Tunnels · Roundup · Killer  · Ripper · 4th Seoul · Courageous  · Tomahawk · Yultong Bridge · Imjin River · Kapyong · Bloody Ridge  · Han River  · Heartbreak Ridge · Maryang San · Sunchon · Hill Eerie · Sui-ho Dam · Old Baldy · Hudson Harbor · White Horse · Triangle Hill · Jackson Heights · The Hook · Pork Chop Hill  · Outpost Harry After Ceasefire Blue House Raid  · Pueblo Incident  · EC-121 Shootdown  · Axe Murder Incident  · Rangoon bombing  · KAL Flight 858  · Gangneung  · Yosu  · 1st Yeonpyeong · 2nd Yeonpyeong

The term Korean War refers to the warfare between North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and South Korea (Republic of Korea) begun 25 June 1950 and paused with an armistice signed 27 July 1953.

The war occurred consequent to both countries aggressively attempting Korean national–peninsular reunification under their respective governments — because they occupied the immediate months before open warfare with escalating armed clashes at the 38th Parallel border, and the failed all-Korea elections. ^[24] The negotiations ceased when North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950. The United States and UN Forces intervened for the South. After a rapid South Korean counter-attack reversing the initial North Korean invasion, the Chinese Army intervened for North Korea — deciding the war towards an armistice that approximately restored the original border between the Koreas. Since then, North Korea unilaterally withdrew from the armistice on 27 May 2009.^[25]

Although referred to as a civil war gone awry, other geopolitical factors counted. Each Korea was sponsored by an external power, thus international political obligations facilitated a civil war’s metamorphosing into an hegemonic proxy war of the Russo–American Cold War (1945–91). The term Korean War also denotes the clashes before and since the war. ^[26]

Contents 1 The names of the war 2 Japanese Imperial rule 3 Korea divided 4 Course 4.1 North Korea invades 4.2 The United States intervenes 4.3 Escalation 4.4 South Korean and allied forces move north 4.5 Invasion of North Korea 4.6 Chinese intervention 5 Aftermath of Chosin Battle-Operation Glory 5.1 Fighting across the 38th Parallel (early 1951) 5.2 Stalemate (July 1951–July 1953) 6 Characteristics 6.1 Armored warfare 6.2 Air warfare 6.3 Bombing Campaigns 6.4 Naval warfare 6.5 Korean atomic warfare 6.6 War crimes 6.6.1 Crimes against civilians 7 Bodo League massacre 7.1 Prisoners of war 8 Legacy 9 Depictions 9.1 Art 9.2 Photography 9.3 Film 10 See also 11 Notes 12 References 13 Further reading 13.1 Combat studies, soldiers 13.2 Origins, politics, diplomacy 13.3 Primary sources 14 External links

[edit] The names of the war

In South Korea, the war is informally called 6·25 and the 6·25 War (Korean: 6·25 전쟁, for the invasion date), and is formally called Hanguk jeonjaeng (“Korean War” Hangul: 한국전쟁; Hanja: 韓國戰爭). In North Korea, “Korean War” is the informal name, and the formal name is Joguk haebang jeonjaeng (Fatherland Liberation War Hangul: 조국해방전쟁; Hanja: 祖國解放戰爭). In China, it is the War to Resist America and Aid Korea (抗美援朝) and the “Korean War” ( 韓國戰爭 Hanguo zhanzheng and 韓戰 Hanzhan; 朝鮮 戰爭 Chaoxian zhanzheng). ^[27]

In the US, the war officially is a police action — Korean Conflict, not Korean War — to avoid the lack of a legitimate declaration of war by the U.S. Congress. Colloquially, it also is called The Forgotten War and the The Unknown War, because it was not a US victory. ^[28] As military science, the Korean War combined First- and Second- world war strategies and tactics — swift infantry attacks followed air bombing raids. Moreover, because neither side occupied the territory conquered, the initial campaign warfare became trench warfare, from January 1951 until the 1953 border stalemate and armistice.

[edit] Japanese Imperial rule

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Upon defeating Qing Dynasty China in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–5), the Empire of Japan then occupied the Korean Empire (1897–1910) of Emperor Gojong, as a strategic element of its sphere of influence. ^[29] A decade later, on defeating Imperial Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5), Japan made Korea its protectorate in 1905, annexing it with the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty on 22 August 1910 after forcing the Korean Emperor’s abdication. ^{[30] [31]} Despite national resistance, life in Japanese Korea was brutal; Koreans were considered sub-human; nationalists and the intelligentsia fled the country; from 1919 to 1925 and onwards, Korean Communists led the internal and external resistance to Imperial Japan. ^{[32] [33]}

Japanese Korea was an industrialised colony; in 1937, the colonial Governor–General, Gen. Minami Jiro, commanded the cultural assimilation of the colony’s 23.5 million people — by banning Korean language, literature, and culture, then replacing them with those of Japan, and the populace were ordered to re-name themselves as Japanese. In 1938, they established labour conscription; by 1939, 2.6 million Koreans worked overseas as forced labourers; by 1942, Korean men were conscripted to the Japanese Army.

Meanwhile, in China, the Nationalist and the Communist Chinese organised the (right wing and left-wing) refugee Korean patriots into army units. The Nationalists, led by Yi Pom-Sok, fought in the Burma Campaign (December 1941–August 1945). The Communists, based at Siking, in north-west China, were led by Kim Il-sung, who became the first post–Second World War political leader of North Korea.

The war worsened Japanese exploitation of Korea — sacking it of food, livestock, and metals for their war-effort — which increased Korean resistance and Japan’s military presence, from 46,000 (1941) to 300,000 (1945) soldiers. Japanese Korea was a slave state with 2.6 million forced labourers controlled with a collaborationist Korean police force composed of specifically-recruited sociopaths; some 723,000 people had been sent to work overseas and in Japan; thousands of Korean women were forced into military prostitution as sexual comfort women for soldiers. By January of 1945, Koreans were 32 per cent of Japan’s labour force; in August of 1945, when the US atomic-bombed Hiroshima, they were about 25 per cent of the people incinerated. ^[34]

The Russo–American division of Korea excluded the Koreans — who were represented by US Army colonels Dean Rusk and Charles Bonesteel. ^[35] Earlier, in November of 1943, at the Cairo Conference, Nationalist China, the UK, and the USA decided that Korea should become independent, “in due course”; Stalin concurred. In February of 1945, at the Yalta Conference, the Allies failed to establish the Korean trusteeship first discussed in 1943 by President F. D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Anthony Eden. Per the Russo–American agreement, the USSR declared war against Japan in 9 August 1945, and, by the 10th, the Red Army occupied the peninsular north via amphibious landings north of the 38th parallel and its Twenty-Fifth Army entering from China. ^{[36] [37]} Weeks later, on 8 September 1945, parting from Okinawa, Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, USA, entered Korea through Incheon to accept the Japanese Imperial surrender south of the 38th parallel. ^[38]

[edit] Korea divided

At the Potsdam Conference (July–August 1945), the Allies unilaterally decided to divide Korea — without consulting the Koreans — in contradiction of the earlier Cairo Conference (November 1943) determinations (by UK PM Winston Churchill, Chinese Gen. Chiang Kai-shek, and US Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt), that Korea would be a free, independent country. ^{[32][38]:24-25 [32][39]:25 [32]:24[40]} Moreover, in the earlier Yalta Conference (February 1945), USSR Premier Joseph Stalin called for European and Asian “buffer zones”, and expected Russian preeminence in China. ^[41] Meanwhile, the USSR agreed to join the US in the Pacific theatre war against Japan “three months after the surrender of Germany.” ^[41] On 6 August 1945, the USSR declared war on Imperial Japan and began liberating the northern Korean peninsula from the Japanese army. As agreed, the Red Army halted at the 38th parallel on 26 August, to await the US arrival in the peninsular south in early September. ^{[32]:25 [32]:24} However, on 3 September 1945, Lt. Gen. Yoshio Kozuki, commander of the Japanese 17th Area Army in Korea, called Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, XXIV Corps commander and the US commander in Korea, telling him that the Russians were south of the 38th parallel — but only in the Kaesong area; Gen. Hodge trusted the Japanese report. ^[38]

On 10 August 1945, with the Japanese surrender nigh, the US Government ignored if the USSR would honour its part of the US-sponsored occupation agreement. A month earlier, Col. Dean Rusk and Col. Charles Bonesteel, divided the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel after deciding (in thirty minutes), that the US occupation zone must minimally include two ports; ^{[38][42][43][44]} Col. Rusk later observed that he was “faced with the scarcity of U.S. forces immediately available, and time and space factors which would make it difficult to reach very far north, before Soviet troops could enter the area.” ^[41] The USSR agreed to the US’s 38th parallel delineation of their occupation zones, partly to improve Soviet eastern European negotiation leverage with the Allies, and that each would there accept Japanese surrender where they stood. ^[32]:25 To establish direct US control of the peninsular south, Gen. Hodge’s first order restored key Japanese colonial administrators and Korean collaborators to power. ^[24] His second policy order was US refusal to recognise existing Korean political organisations. The policy later provoked the insurrections and guerrilla warfare preceding the Korean civil war. ^[30]

In December of 1945, the Americans and the Russians agreed to run Korea via the US–USSR Joint Commission, as termed by the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers. Again excluding the Koreans, the Allies decided that Korea would become independent of them after five years of international oversight. ^[45] Moreover, each Korean Government shared the sponsor’s ideology. ^[32]:25-26 In the South, some of the populace protested and some rose in armed insurrection; ^[30] to contain them, the USAMGIK (1945–48) banned strikes on 8 December 1945, and on 12 December, outlawed the revolutionary government and people’s committees. Said political suppressions later provoked the 8,000-railroad-worker strike on 23 September 1946 in Busan, an action that quickly spread to other cities; the US had lost civil control. On 1 October 1946, police killed three students in the Daegu uprising; the people counter-attacked and killed 38 policemen of the police force that had collaborated with the Japanese colony; in contolling Korea through them, the US discredited itself with most Koreans. Like-wise, on 3 October 1946, some 10,000 people attacked the Yeongcheon police station, killing three policemen and injuring some 40 more; in other attacks, populaces killed some 20 landlords and pro–Japanese Korean officials. ^[39]

In the event, the right-wing Representative Democratic Council appeared to opposed the Russo–American trusteeship of Korea, because the nation already had suffered and endured thirty-five years of Japanese colonial rule; most people opposed another (i.e. Russo–American) foreign rule of Korea; thus the US quit the Soviet-supported Moscow Accords. ^{[46] [47]} Because the Americans wanted a non-Communist government, they convoked country-wide elections, which the Russians opposed, insisting that the US honour its commitment to the Moscow Accords. ^{[32]:26 [48]} The resultant anti-Communist South Korean Government was led by the American-educated strongman Syngman Rhee. ^[49] Like-wise, the Russians established a Communist North Korean Government ^[32]:26 led by Kim Il-sung an astute politician–soldier. ^[26] In the south, Communists were expelled from politics, and hid in the hills to prepare a guerrilla war against the US-sponsored Rhee Government.^[26]

As nationalists, Syngman Rhee and Kim Il-Sung each was intent upon reunifying Korea under his political system. ^[32]:27 Partly because they were better armed, the North Koreans could escalate the continual border clashes and, in time, invade, ^[32]:27 while South Korea, with limited US matériel could not match them. In that time, the US Government mistakenly believed that all Communists, regardless of country, constituted a Communist bloc, thus perceived the civil war between the Koreas, as a Soviet hegemonic manœuver in the Russo–American Cold War.

[edit] Course

[edit] North Korea invades

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In an incident occurred in 1950, before the start of the Korean War, China station CIA officer Douglas Mackiernan had gathered intelligence that predicted the war. Earlier, he had volunteered to stay in China after the diplomats had evacuated the country. He had obtained politico-military intelligence about the intentions of the North Koreans and the Chinese. He and his local CIA-trained security men escaped via a months-long horse trek over the Himalaya mountains. MacKiernan was killed within miles Lhasa city, Tibet, but the team delivered the intelligence to headquarters. The North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel 13 days later. MacKiernan was posthumously awarded the CIA Intelligence Star for valour. ^[50]

Under the guise of a counter-attack, the North Korean Army invaded in the pre-dawn of Sunday, 25 June 1950, crossing the 38th parallel behind artillery cannonades. ^[32]:14 The North claimed that Republic of Korea Army (ROK) troops under the “bandit traitor Syngman Rhee” had crossed the border first, and that Rhee would be arrested and executed. ^[38] In the past year, both armies had been harrassing each other with gunfire, and each also had continually raided across the 38th parallel; some countries consider the 25 June 1950 attack as merely North Korea’s extending its national unification plan, not the direct response to a given South Korean cross-border raid.

The United Nations Security Council convened hours later, and unanimously passed UNSC Resolution 82 condemning the North Korean attack. The resolution was adopted because the USSR, a veto-wielding power, had been boycotting Council meetings since January — protesting that the Republic of China (Taiwan), and not the People’s Republic of China held a permanent seat on the Security Council. ^[51] On 27 June 1950, President Truman ordered US air- and sea-forces to help the South Korean regime of President Syngman Rhee. After debating the war, the Security Council, on 27 June 1950, published Resolution 83 recommending member-state military assistance to the Republic of Korea. Whilst awaiting the Council’s announcement to the UN of its fait accompli resolution, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister accused the US of starting armed intervention in behalf of South Korea. ^[52]

Critics of the UN challenged the legitimacy a UN-approved war, because (i) the ROK Army intelligence upon which Resolution 83 was based came from US Intelligence; (ii) North Korea (DPRK) was not invited as a sitting temporary- member of the United Nations, which violated UN Charter Article 32; and (iii) the the Korean warfare is beyond UN Charter scope, because the initial North–South armed clashes are classified as a civil war. Moreover, the Soviet representative boycotted the UN to prevent Security Council action, in challenging the legality of UN action; legal scholars posited that deciding upon an action required the unanimity of the five permanent members. ^[53][54]

The North Korean Army’s comprehensive invasion with only 231,000 soldiers achieved surprise and successfully captured objectives and territory — among them, Kaesŏng, Chuncheon, Uijeongbu, and Ongjin — achieved with 274 Type 58 tanks, about 150 YAK fighters, 110 attack bombers, 200 artillery pieces, 78 YAK trainer- and 35 reconnaissance- aeroplanes. ^[38] Besides the invasion force, the North Korean military had 114 fighters, 78 bombers, 105 Type 58 tanks, and some 30,000 soldiers stationed in North Korea. ^[38] The invasion's rapid advance was feasible because of its flexible logistics system that transported matériel as the Army advanced. Moreover, and elsewhere, at sea, although comprising only several small warships, the North Korean navy did attack the South Korean Navy.

In contrast, R.E. Applebaum in South to the Naktong — North to the Yalu, reports that at invasion time, the ROK Army comprised 98,000 soldiers, of whom only 65,000 were combat troops. Armour-wise, unlike the North, the South had no tanks, and an air force of only 12 liaison-type- and 10 AT6 advanced-trainer-aeroplanes. No large foreign military garrisons were in-country at invasion time, but there were large US garrisons and air forces in Japan. ^[38]

Within days of the invasion, masses of South Korean soldiers of dubious loyalty to the Syngman Rhee regime, were either retreating southwards or were defecting en masse to the Communist North. ^[32]:23 The North Korean air force continually bombed Kimpo Airport, near the capital city Seoul, which the North Korean Army captured and occupied in the afternoon of 28 June 1950. In supporting the Army, the North Korean air force victoriously fought the ROK Air Force over the capital: 37 South Korean fighters to 9 North Korean fighters. Two days later, the Korean armies fought their largest North–South-only battle: the North destroyed 89 tanks, 76 artillery pieces, 19 bombers, and 21 fighters, killed 7,000 and captured 16,000 ROK soldiers. Despite the immediate success, North Korean expectation of summary surrender by the Government of President Syngman Rhee, and thus the definitive reunification of the Korean peninsula, ended with the US-led UN participation in the war between the Koreas.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] The United States intervenes

Despite the rapid post-war Allied and US demobilisations (a serious logistics problem for US forces in Asia), there were substantial American forces occupying Japan, and, under Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s command, they could fight the North Koreans. ^[32]:42 In that time and place, besides the Americans, only the British Commonwealth could supply sizable military might.

On Saturday 24 June 1950, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson telephonically informed President Harry S. Truman that Communist North Korea had invaded democratic South Korea across the 38th Parallel border. ^[55] Truman and Acheson discussed a US invasion response with defence department principals, who agreed that the United States was obligated to repel military aggression, paralleling it with Adolf Hitler’s 1930s aggressions, and said that the mistake of appeasement must not be repeated. ^[56] President Truman acknowledged that fighting the invasion was pertinent to the American global containment of Communism:

“Communism was acting in Korea, just as Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese had ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threat and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors.” ^[57]

He announced that American intentions were to counter “unprovoked aggression” and “vigorously support the effort of the [UN] security council to terminate this serious breach of peace.” ^[58] In Congress, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Gen. Omar Bradley warned against appeasement — stating that Korea was as good a place as any “for drawing the line” against International Communist expansion. In August of 1950, the President and the Secretary of State easily persuaded Congress — and received $12 billion to pay for the additional Asian military expenses essential to the goals of National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), the global Containment of Communism.^[59]

Per State Secretary Acheson’s recommendation, President Truman ordered Gen. MacArthur to transfer matériel to the Army of the Republic of Korea (ROK Army) while giving air cover to the evacuation of US nationals. Moreover, the President disagreed with his advisors recommending unilateral US bombing of the North Korean forces, but did order the Seventh Fleet to protect Taiwan — Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek’s China — whose Nationalist Government (confined to Formosa island) asked to fight in Korea. The Americans denied the Nationalist Chinese request for combat, lest it provoke a Communist Chinese intervention.^[60]

The Battle of Osan was the first significant American–Korean fighting in the Korean War, by the 540-soldier Task Force Smith, 24th Infantry Division (Japan). ^[32]:45 On 5 July 1950, the US Army fought the North Korean People's Army (KPA) Army at Osan — and was immediately defeated: 1,416 dead and wounded, 785 taken prisoner. ^[32]:45-47 The victorious North Koreans progressed southwards, forcing the 24th Division’s retreat to Taejeon, which the North also captured; ^[32]:48 the Division lost 3,602 dead and wounded and 2,962 GIs taken prisoner — including Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, the Division Commander. ^[32]:48 Overhead, the North Koreans shot down 18 US Air Force fighters and 29 bombers. The USAF shot down 5 North Korean fighters.

By August, the ROK Army and the U.S. Eighth Army, commanded by Gen. Walton Walker, were in a small area around Pusan city, in the southeast corner of the Korean peninsula. ^[32]:53 In their advance, the North Koreans purged South Korea’s intelligentsia, by capturing and killing civil servants and intellectuals. ^[32]:56 On 20 August, Gen. MacArthur warned Kim Il Sung that he would be held responsible for atrocities committed against UN soldiers. ^[32][49]:56 By September, the US-led UN Forces controlled only the area around Pusan — about 10 per cent of the Korean peninsula. Only reinforced and re-equipped, and with naval shelling and air bombing support, could the UN forces hold the line at the Nakdong River. In US military history, this “back-against-the-sea” holding action is known as the “Pusan Perimeter”.

[edit] Escalation

In the desperate Battle of Pusan Perimeter (August–September 1950), the Americans withstood North Korean attacks meant to capture the city; they failed. Soon, the USAF interrupted North Korean logistics; 40 daily ground-support sorties with strategic bombers^{[citation needed]} destroyed 32 bridges, stopping most daytime road and rail traffic. ^[32]:47-48 Hidden in tunnels by day, North Korean military and civil trains travelled only at night. ^[32]:66 To deny matériel to the North Korean forces, the USAF destroyed supply dumps, petroleum refineries, and harbours; the US Navy air forces attacked transport hubs. In consequence, the North Korean Army, over-extended throughout the peninsular south, could not be supplied.^[32]:58

Meanwhile, US garrisons in Japan continually despatched soldiers and matériel to reinforce the Pusan Perimeter. ^[32]:59-60 Tank battalions went to Korea from San Francisco (in the continental US), and, by late August, Pusan was equipped with some 500 medium tanks. ^[32]:61 In early September 1950, UN–ROK forces were prepared, and out-numbered the North Koreans 180,000 to 100,000 soldiers, and then counter-attacked.^[32][38]:61

[edit] South Korean and allied forces move north

In the face of these overwhelming reinforcements, the North Korean forces found themselves undermanned and with weak logistical support.^[32]:61 They also lacked the substantial naval and air support of the Americans.^[32]:58 In order to alleviate pressure on the Pusan Perimeter, General MacArthur, as UN commander-in-chief for Korea, argued for an amphibious landing far behind the North Korean lines at Incheon.^[32]:67

On 06 July, General MacArthur called Major General Hobart Gay, Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division and informed him to plan for the 1st Cavalry Division to make an amphibious landing at Inchon. Between 12 and 14 July, the division loaded on ships in the Yokohama area. Its mission was to reinforce the 24th Infantry Division.[2]

The violent tides and strong enemy presence made this an extremely risky operation.^[32]:66-67 MacArthur had started planning a few days after the war began, but he had been strongly opposed by the Pentagon.^[32]:67 When he finally received permission, MacArthur activated the X Corps under General Edward Almond (comprising 70,000^{[citation needed]} troops of the 1st Marine Division and the Army's 7th Infantry Division and augmented by 8,600 Korean troops) and ordered them to land at Incheon in Operation Chromite.^[32]:68 By the time of the attack on September 15, thanks to reconnaissance by guerrillas, misinformation and extensive shelling prior to the invasion, the North Korean military had few soldiers stationed in Incheon, so the U.S. forces met only light resistance when they landed, though extensive shelling and bombing destroyed much of the city.^[32]:70

The Inchon landing was an immediate success and allowed the 1st Cavalry Division to break out of the perimeter to start fighting north. It was during this massive offensive that the 3rd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, "C" Company and the "I" & "R" Platoon of the 70th Tank Battalion made the historical mission of "Task Force Lynch", the Pusan Perimeter Breakout through 106.4 miles of enemy held territory to link up with the 7th Infantry Division at Osan. [3]

The landing was a decisive victory, as X Corps rolled over the few defenders and threatened to trap the main North Korean army.^[32]:71-72 MacArthur quickly recaptured Seoul.^[32]:77 The North Koreans, almost cut off, rapidly retreated northwards; about 25,000 to 30,000 made it back.^[61][62]

[edit] Invasion of North Korea

The United Nations troops drove the North Koreans back past the 38th parallel.^[32]:79-94

The UN forces crossed into North Korea in early October 1950.^[32]:81 The U.S. X Corps made amphibious landings at Wonsan and Iwon, which had already been captured by South Korean forces advancing by land.^[32]:87-88 The Eighth U.S. Army, along with the South Koreans, drove up the western side of Korea and captured Pyongyang on October 19.^[32]:90 By the end of October, the North Korean Army was rapidly disintegrating, and the UN took 135,000 prisoners.

The UN offensive greatly concerned the Chinese, who worried that the UN forces would not stop at the Yalu River, the border between North Korea and China, and might extend their rollback policy into China.^[32]:83 Many in the West, including General MacArthur, thought that spreading the war to China would be necessary and that since North Korean troops were being supplied by bases in China, those supply depots should be bombed. However, Truman and the other leaders disagreed, and MacArthur was ordered to be very cautious when approaching the Chinese border.^[32]:83

[edit] Chinese intervention

On June 27, 1950, before China entered the conflict, President Truman ordered the 7th Fleet to enter the Taiwan Straits, in order to protect Taiwan from Chinese Communist forces.^[63] The PRC warned American leaders through neutral diplomats that it would intervene to protect its national security.^[32]:83 Truman regarded the warnings as “a bald attempt to blackmail the U.N.” and did not take it seriously.^[64] The PRC Government argued that in making Japan its main war base in the Far East, launching an invasion against Korea and the Chinese province of Taiwan, and carrying out active intervention in other countries in Asia, the United States was building up a military encirclement of China.^[65] The PRC Government reported that prior to China's entry in the Korean conflict, the United States violated Chinese airspace, bombing 'peaceful' towns and villages in North Korea.^[66]

On October 15, 1950, Truman went to Wake Island for a short, highly publicized meeting with MacArthur.^[32]:88 MacArthur, saying he was speculating, saw little risk.^[32]:89 MacArthur explained that the Chinese had lost their window of opportunity to help North Korea's invasion. He estimated the Chinese had 300,000 soldiers in Manchuria, with between 100,000-125,000 men along the Yalu; half could be brought across the Yalu. But the Chinese had no air force; hence, “if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter.”^[61][67]

On 10 October, the 89th Tank Battalion was attached to the 1st Cavalry Division to strengthen the armor support for the Northern offensive. On 15 October, after moderate resistance, the 7th Cavalry Regiment and "C" Company, 70th Tank Battalion secured the city of Namchonjam. On 17 October, they made a flanking movement to the right of the main highway to Pyongyang, with the objective being Hwangju. On 19 October, troopers of the 1st Cavalry Division captured Pyongyang, the capital city of North Korea.

On October 8, 1950, the day after American troops crossed the 38th parallel, Chairman Mao Zedong issued the order to assemble the Chinese People's Volunteer Army. Seventy percent of the members of the PVA were Chinese regulars from the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Mao ordered the army to move to the Yalu River, ready to cross.^{[citation needed]} Mao sought Soviet aid and saw intervention as defensive of the broader revolutionary situation in Asia: “If we allow the United States to occupy all of Korea, Korean revolutionary power will suffer a fundamental defeat, and the American invaders will run more rampant, and have negative effects for the entire Far East.” he told Stalin. Premier Zhou Enlai was sent to Moscow to add force to Mao's cabled arguments. Mao delayed while waiting for substantial Soviet help, postponing the planned attack from October 13 to October 19. However, Soviet assistance was limited to providing air support no nearer than sixty miles (100 km) from the battlefront. The Soviet MiG-15s in PRC colors did pose a serious challenge to UN pilots. In one area, nicknamed “MiG Alley” by UN forces, they held local air superiority against the American-made Lockheed F-80 Shooting Stars until the newer North American F-86 Sabres were deployed. The Chinese were angry at the limited extent of Soviet involvement, having assumed that they had been promised full scale air support.^{[citation needed]}

The Chinese made contact with American troops on November 1, 1950. Thousands of Chinese had attacked from the north, northwest, and west against scattered U.S. and South Korean (Republic of Korea or ROK) units moving deep into North Korea. The Chinese seemed to come out of nowhere as they swarmed around the flanks and over the defensive positions of the surprised United Nations (UN) troops.^[68]

The Chinese march and bivouac discipline also minimized any possible detection.^[32]:102 In a well-documented instance, a Chinese army of three divisions marched on foot from An-tung in Manchuria, on the north side of the Yalu River, 286 miles (460 km) to its assembly area in North Korea, in the combat zone, in a period ranging from 16 to 19 days. One division of this army, marching at night over circuitous mountain roads, averaged 18 miles (29 km) per day for 18 days. The day's march began after dark at 19:00 and ended at 03:00 the next morning. Defense measures against aircraft were to be completed before 05:30. Every man, animal, and piece of equipment were to be concealed and camouflaged. During daylight, bivouac scouting parties moved ahead to select the next day's bivouac area. When Chinese units were compelled for any reason to march by day, they were under standing orders for every man to stop in his tracks and remain motionless if aircraft appeared overhead.^[32]:102 Officers were empowered to shoot any man who violated this order.^[38]

In late November, the Chinese struck in the west, along the Chongchon River, and completely overran several South Korean divisions and successfully landed a heavy blow to the flank of the remaining UN forces.^[32]:98-99 The ensuing defeat of the U.S. Eighth Army resulted in the longest retreat of any American military unit in history.^[69] Mostly because of the successful but very costly rear-guard action by the Turkish Brigade at Kunuri during November 26 to 30th, which slowed the Chinese onslaught by 3–4 days, the U.S. 8th Army escaped complete annihilation by the Chinese. In the east, at the Battle of Chosin Reservoir, a 3,000 man Regimental Combat Team from the U.S. 7th Infantry Division and a 12,000 to 15,000 man division of the U.S. Marine Corps was also unprepared for the Chinese tactics and was soon surrounded, though they eventually managed to escape the encirclement, albeit with over 15,000 casualties from the two units and the other of X Corps units which were providing covering and supporting fire.^[70]

While the Chinese soldiers initially lacked heavy fire support and light infantry weapons, their tactics quickly adapted to this disadvantage, as explained by Bevin Alexander in his book How Wars Are Won:

The usual method was to infiltrate small units, from a platoon of fifty men to a company of 200, split into separate detachments. While one team cut off the escape route of the Americans, the others struck both the front and the flanks in concerted assaults. The attacks continued on all sides until the defenders were destroyed or forced to withdraw. The Chinese then crept forward to the open flank of the next platoon position, and repeated the tactics.

Roy Appleman further clarified the initial Chinese tactics as:

In the First Phase Offensive, highly skilled enemy light infantry troops had carried out the Chinese attacks, generally unaided by any weapons larger than mortars. Their attacks had demonstrated that the Chinese were well-trained disciplined fire fighters, and particularly adept at night fighting. They were masters of the art of camouflage. Their patrols were remarkably successful in locating the positions of the UN forces. They planned their attacks to get in the rear of these forces, cut them off from their escape and supply roads, and then send in frontal and flanking attacks to precipitate the battle. They also employed a tactic which they termed Hachi Shiki, which was a V-formation into which they allowed enemy forces to move; the sides of the V then closed around their enemy while another force moved below the mouth of the V to engage any forces attempting to relieve the trapped unit. Such were the tactics the Chinese used with great success at Onjong, Unsan, and Ch'osan but with only partial success at Pakch'on and the Ch'ongch'on bridgehead.^[38]

The U.S. forces in northeast Korea, who had rushed forward with great speed only a few months earlier, were forced to race southwards with even greater speed and form a defensive perimeter around the port city of Hungnam, where a major evacuation was carried out in late December 1950.^[32]:104-111 Facing complete defeat and surrender, 193 shiploads of American men and material were evacuated from Hungnam Harbor, and about 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies were shipped to Pusan in orderly fashion.^[32]:110 As they left, the American forces blew up large portions of the city to deny use to the communists.^[61][71]

[edit] Aftermath of Chosin Battle-Operation Glory

Following the conflict, the United Nations dead were buried at a temporary gravesite near Hŭngnam. Operation Glory occurred from July to November 1954, during which the dead of each side were exchanged; remains of 4,167 U.S. soldiers and marines were exchanged for 13,528 North Korean and Chinese dead. In addition, 546 civilians who died in United Nations prisoner of war camps were turned over to the South Korean government.^[72] After "Operation Glory" 416 Korean War "unknowns" were buried in the Punchbowl Cemetery. According to a DPMO white paper ^[73] 1,394 names were also transmitted during "Operation Glory" from the Chinese and North Koreans (of which 858 names proved to be correct); of the 4,167 returned remains were found to be 4,219 individuals of whom 2,944 were found to be Americans of whom all but 416 were identified by name. Of 239 Korean War casualties unaccounted for: 186 not associated with Punchbowl unknowns (176 were identified and of the remaining 10 cases 4 were non-Americans of Asiatic descent; one was British; 3 were identified and 2 cases unconfirmed). In 1990-1994 North Korea excavated and returned more than 200 sets of remains-very few have been identified because of co-mingling of remains.^[74] From 1996 to 2006 220 remains were recovered from near the Chinese border. ^[75]

[edit] Fighting across the 38th Parallel (early 1951)

In January 1951, the Chinese and North Korean forces struck again in their 3rd Phase Offensive (also known as the Chinese Winter Offensive). The Chinese repeated their previous tactics of mostly night attacks, with a stealthy approach from positions some distance from the front, followed by a rush with overwhelming numbers, and using trumpets or gongs both for communication and to disorient their foes. Against this the UN forces had no remedy, and their resistance crumbled; they retreated rapidly to the south (referred to by UN forces as the “bug-out”).^[32]:117 Seoul was abandoned and was captured by communist forces on January 4, 1951.

To add to the Eighth Army's difficulties, General Walker was killed in an accident.^[32]:111 He was replaced by a World War II airborne veteran, Lieutenant-General Matthew Ridgway, who took immediate steps to raise the morale and fighting spirit of the battered Eighth Army, which had fallen to low levels during its retreat.^[32]:113 Nevertheless, the situation was so grim that MacArthur mentioned the use of atomic weapons against China, much to the alarm of America's allies.^{[citation needed]}

UN forces continued to retreat until they had reached a line south of Suwon in the west and Wonju in the center, and north of Samchok in the east, where the front stabilized.^[32]:117 The People's Volunteer Army had outrun its supply line and was forced to recoil.^[32]:118 The Chinese could not go beyond Seoul because they were at the end of their logistics supply line^{[citation needed]} — all food and ammunition had to be carried at night on foot or bicycle from the Yalu River.

In late January, finding the lines in front of his forces deserted, Ridgway ordered reconnaissance in force, which developed into a full-scale offensive, Operation Roundup.^[32]:121 The operation was planned to proceed gradually, to make full use of the UN's superiority in firepower on the ground and in the air;^[32]:120 by the time Roundup was completed in early February, UN forces had reached the Han River and re-captured Wonju.^[32]:121

The Chinese struck back in mid-February with their Fourth Phase Offensive, from Hoengsong in the center against IX Corps positions around Chipyong-ni.^[32]:121 A short but desperate siege there fought by units of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division, including the French Battalion, broke up the offensive;^[32]:121 in this action, the UN learned how to deal with Chinese offensive tactics and be able to stand their ground.

Roundup was followed in the last two weeks of February 1951, with Operation Killer, by a revitalized Eighth Army, restored by Ridgway to fighting trim.^[32]:121 This was a full-scale offensive across the front, again staged to maximize firepower and with the aim of destroying as much of the Chinese and North Korean armies as possible.^[32]:121 By the end of Killer, I Corps had re-occupied all territory south of the Han, while IX Corps had captured Hoengsong.^[32]:122

On March 7, 1951, the Eighth Army pushed forward again, in Operation Ripper, and on March 14 they expelled the North Korean and Chinese troops from Seoul, the fourth time in a year the city had changed hands.^[32]:122 Seoul was in utter ruins; its prewar population of 1.5 million had dropped to 200,000, with severe food shortages.^[62]

MacArthur was removed from command by President Truman on April 11, 1951 for insubordination, setting off a firestorm of protest back in the U.S.^[32]:123-127 The new supreme commander was Ridgway, who had managed to regroup UN forces for the series of effective counter-offensives.^[32]:127 Command of Eighth Army passed to General James Van Fleet.^[32]:130

A further series of attacks slowly drove back the communist forces, such as Operations Courageous and Tomahawk, a combined ground- and air-assault to trap communist forces between Kaesong and Seoul. UN forces continued to advance until they reached Line Kansas, some miles north of the 38th parallel.^[32]:131

The Chinese were far from beaten, however; In April 1951 they launched their Fifth Phase Offensive (also called the Chinese Spring Offensive).^[32]:131 This was a major effort, involving three field armies (up to 700,000 men).^[32]:132 The main blow fell on I Corps, but fierce resistance in battles at the Imjin River and Kapyong, blunted its impetus, and the Chinese were halted at a defensive line north of Seoul (referred to as the No-Name Line).^[32]:133-134

A further Communist offensive in the east against ROK and X Corps on May 15 also made initial gains, but by May 20 the attack had ground to a halt.^[32]:136-137 Eighth Army counterattacked and by the end of May had regained Line Kansas.^[32]:137-138

The decision by UN forces to halt at Line Kansas, just north of the 38th Parallel, and not to persist in offensive action into North Korea, ushered in the period of stalemate which typified the remainder of the conflict.

[edit] Stalemate (July 1951–July 1953)

The rest of the war involved little territory change,^[32]:175-177 large-scale bombing of the north,^[32]:175-177 and lengthy peace negotiations, which began on July 10, 1951 at Kaesong.^[32]:145 Even during the peace negotiations, combat continued. For the South Korean and allied forces, the goal was to recapture all of South Korea before an agreement was reached in order to avoid loss of any territory.^[32]:159 The Chinese and North Koreans attempted similar operations, and later in the war they undertook operations designed to test the resolve of the UN to continue the conflict. Principal military engagements in this period included the Battle of Bloody Ridge^[32]:160 and Battle of Heartbreak Ridge^[32]:161-162 in 1951, the Battle of Old Baldy, the Battle of White Horse, the Battle of Triangle Hill and the Battle of Hill Eerie in 1952, the sieges of Outpost Harry, the Battle of the Hook and the battle for Pork Chop Hill in 1953.

The peace negotiations went on for two years,^[32]:144-153 first at Kaesong, and later at Panmunjon.^[32]:147 A major issue of the negotiations was repatriation of POWs.^[32]:187-199 The Communists agreed to voluntary repatriation but only if the majority would return to China or North Korea, something that did not occur.^[32]:189-190 Since many refused to be repatriated to the communist North Korea and China, the war continued until the Communists eventually dropped this issue.^[32]:242-245

In October 1951, U.S. forces performed Operation Hudson Harbor intending to establish the capability to use nuclear weapons. Several B-29s conducted individual simulated bomb runs from Okinawa to North Korea, delivering “dummy” nuclear bombs or heavy conventional bombs; the operation was coordinated from Yokota Air Base in Japan. The battle exercise was intended to test “actual functioning of all activities which would be involved in an atomic strike, including weapons assembly and testing, leading, ground control of bomb aiming,” and so on. The results indicated that nuclear bombs would be less effective than anticipated, because “timely identification of large masses of enemy troops was extremely rare.”^{[76][77][78][79][80]}

On November 29, 1952, U.S. President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower fulfilled a campaign promise by going to Korea to find out what could be done to end the conflict.^[32]:240 With the UN's acceptance of India's proposal for a Korean armistice, a cease-fire was established on July 27, 1953, by which time the front line was back around the proximity of the 38th parallel, and so a demilitarized zone (DMZ) was established around it, presently defended by North Korean troops on one side and by South Korean, American and UN troops on the other. The DMZ runs north of the parallel towards the east, and to the south as it travels west. The site of the peace talks, Kaesong, the old capital of Korea, was part of the South before hostilities broke out but is now part of the North. North Korea and the United States signed the Armistice Agreement, with Syngman Rhee refusing to sign.^[81]

The total numbers of casualties suffered by all parties involved may never be known. Each country's self-reported casualties were largely based upon troop movements, unit rosters, battle casualty reports, and medical records.

The Western numbers of Chinese and/or North Korean casualties are based primarily on battle reports of estimated casualties, interrogation of POWs and captured documents. Most scholars provide a wide range of estimates on the number of death and wounded. A good compilation of these sources is in the democide web site (see Table 10.1).^[82]. US sources state that the number of American Korean area deaths were 36,940 ^[83]. These sources state that Chinese deaths ranged from 100,000 to 1,500,000; most estimates are in the 400,000 range. The North Korean battle dead estimates were 214,000 to 520,000; the most common estimates were in the 500,000 range. South Korean civilian estimated deaths were in the 245,000 to 415,000 dead. Total civilian deaths were in the 1,500,000 to 3,000,000 range with most estimates in the 2,000,000 range.

The Chinese estimation of UN casualties states that the joint declaration of the Chinese People's Volunteers and the Korean People's Army said their forces "eliminated 1.09 million enemy forces, including 390,000 from the United States, 660,000 from South Korean, and 29,000 from other countries." The vague "eliminated" number gave no details to that of dead, wounded and captured. Regarding their own casualties, the same source said that "the Chinese People's Volunteers suffered 148,000 deaths altogether (among which 114,000 died in combat, incidents, and winterkill, 21,000 died after being hospitalized and 13,000 died from diseases); 380,000 were wounded and 29,000 missing, including 21,400 POWs (of whom 14,000 were sent to Taiwan, 7,110 were repatriated)." This same source concluded with these numbers for North Korean casualties, "the Korean People's Army had 290,000 casualties and 90,000 POWs; there was a large number of civilian deaths in the northern part of Korea, but no accurate figures were available."^[84]

The casulties of the various UN forces are listed in the infobox, along with their estimates of Chinese and North Korean casualties.

[edit] Characteristics

[edit] Armored warfare

In the initial invasion stage of the war, North Korean armor was able to establish dominance using their Soviet-supplied Type 58 medium tanks.^[85] The WW2-vintage North Korean tanks were facing a South Korean force with no tanks of their own and few modern anti-tank weapons.^[32]:39

The South Korean army had anti-tank rockets but these were World War II vintage 2.36 inch (60 mm) M9 bazookas. The bazooka rocket could easily penetrate the 45 mm side armor of the Type 58 at any range, but the bazooka was nonetheless found to be ineffective.^{[citation needed]}

As U.S. forces arrived in Korea, they were accompanied only by light M24 Chaffee tanks which had been left in Japan for post-WWII occupation duties (heavier tanks would have torn up Japanese roads).^{[citation needed]} These light tanks were ineffective against the larger North Korean Type 58.^{[citation needed]} U.S. 105 mm howitzers were used on at least one occasion to fire HEAT ammunition over open sights.^{[citation needed]}

As the U.S. buildup continued, shipments of heavier American tanks such as the M4 Sherman, the M26 Pershing, the M46 Patton, and the British Centurion as well as American and Allied ground attack aircraft were able to reverse the Communists' tank advantage.^[32]:182-184

However, in contrast to World War II's heavy emphasis on armor, few open tank battles actually occurred over the course of the Korean War. The country's heavily forested and mountainous terrain, as well as the poor road network, meant that tanks were able to operate only in small groups.

[edit] Air warfare

The Korean War was one of the last major wars where propeller-powered fighters such as the P-51 Mustang, F4U Corsair and aircraft carrier-based Hawker Sea Fury and Supermarine Seafire were used.^[32]:174 Turbojet fighter aircraft such as F-80s and F9F Panthers came to dominate the skies, overwhelming North Korea’s propeller-driven Yakovlev Yak-9s and Lavochkin La-9s.^[32]:182

From 1950, North Koreans began flying the Soviet-made MiG-15 jet fighters, some of which were piloted by experienced Soviet Air Force pilots, a casus belli^[32]:182 deliberately overlooked by the UN allied forces who were reluctant to engage in open war with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. At first, UN jet fighters, which also included Royal Australian Air Force Gloster Meteors, had some success, but the superior quality of the MiGs soon held sway over the first-generation jets used by the UN early in the war.^[86]

In December 1950, the U.S. Air Force began using the F-86 Sabre.^[32]:183 The MiG could fly higher, 50,000 vs. 42,000 feet (12,800 m), offering a distinct advantage at the start of combat. In level flight, their maximum speeds were comparable — about 660 mph (1,060 km/h). The MiG could climb better, while the Sabre could turn and dive better. For weapons, the MiG carried two 23 mm and one 37 mm cannon, compared to the Sabre’s six .50 (12.7 mm) caliber machine guns. The American .50 caliber machine guns, while not packing the same punch, carried many more rounds and were aimed with a superior radar-ranging gunsight. The U.S. pilots also had the advantage of G-suits, which were used for the first time in this war. However, maintenance was an issue with the Sabre, and a large proportion of the UN air strength was grounded because of repairs during the war.^{[citation needed]}

Even after the Air Force introduced the advanced F-86, its pilots often struggled against the jets piloted by Soviet pilots.^{[citation needed]} The UN gradually gained air superiority over most of Korea that lasted until the end of the war — a decisive factor in helping the UN first advance into the north, and then resist the Chinese invasion of South Korea.^[32]:182-184 The Chinese and North Koreans also had jet power, but their training and experience were limited. With the introduction of the F-86F in late 1952, the Soviet and American aircraft had virtually identical performance characteristics.

After the war, the USAF claimed 792 MiG-15s and 108 additional aircraft shot down by Sabres for the loss of 78 Sabres, a ratio in excess of 10:1.^{[citation needed]} Some post-war research has been able to confirm only 379 victories, although the USAF continues to maintain its official credits and the debate is possibly irreconcilable.

The Soviets claimed about 1,100 air-to-air victories and 335 combat MiG losses at that time. China's official losses were 231 planes shot down in air-to-air combat (mostly MiG-15) and 168 other losses. The number of losses of the North Korean Air Force was not revealed. It is estimated that it lost about 200 aircraft in the first stage of the war, and another 70 aircraft after Chinese intervention. Soviet claims of 650 victories over the Sabres, and China's claims of another 211 F-86s, are considered to be exaggerated by the USAF. According to a recent U.S. publication, the number of F-86s ever present in the Korean peninsula during the war totaled only 674^{[citation needed]} and the total F-86 losses from all causes were about 230.^[87]

Direct comparison of Sabre and MiG losses should be tempered by the fact that the primary targets for MiGs were heavy B-29 Superfortress bombers and ground-attack aircraft, while the primary targets for Sabres were MiG-15s.

By early 1951, the battle lines hardened and did not change much for the rest of the conflict. Throughout the summer and early fall of 1951, the outnumbered Sabres (as few as 44 at one point) of the 4th FIW continued to seek battle in MiG Alley near the Yalu against an enemy fielding as many as 500 planes, although only a fraction of these were operational and active. Following Colonel Harrison Thyng's famous message to the Pentagon, the 51st FIW reinforced the beleaguered 4th in December 1951.^[88] For the next year and a half, the combat continued in generally the same fashion.

The Korean war was the first time the helicopter was used extensively in a conflict.^[89] While helicopters such as the YR-4 were used in World War II,^[91] their use was rare, and Jeeps like the Willys MB were the main method of removing an injured soldier. In the Korean war helicopters like the H-19 partially took over in the non combat Medevac area.^[92]

The helicopter proved to be a valuable military asset for the United States in Korea. Improvements made to helicopters since World War II were tested in combat. The need for close air support helicopters was seen, and by the time of the Vietnam conflict gunships like the AH-1 Cobra had been produced. Helicopters like those used in the Korean war for Medevac missions and troop movement were also seen to work well in combat, and designs were also improved upon. This "combat test" for helicopters was important to the development of the military helicopter.^[89]

[edit] Bombing Campaigns

The bombing of cities and villages in North Korea and partially in South Korea was comparable to that having occurred in Germany and Japan during World War 2. Remarkably, napalm was used widely for the first time. On August 12 1950 the US Air Force dropped 625 tons of bombs on North Korea. Two weeks later, the daily load amounted to about 800 tons. 18 of North Korea's cities were more than 50% destroyed. General William Dean, who had been in North Korean captivity, reported that most of the North Korean cities and villages he had seen were in ruins or were simply snow-covered wastelands. ^[93]

[edit] Naval warfare

As North Korea had no significant naval presence, naval battles were infrequent. The only significant "battle" took place on July 2, 1950, between the U.S. cruiser Juneau, the British cruiser Jamaica, and the British frigate Black Swan, against four North Korean torpedo boats and two North Korean mortar gunboats. The torpedo boats attempted to attack but they were quickly destroyed by the Anglo-American fleet. Numerous other communist ships were sunk during the war. Supply and ammunition ships were sunk by U.N. forces, denying use of the sea to the North Koreans. Juneau sunk several ammunition ships that had been present in her previous battle. The last instance of ship-to-ship battle in the war occurred at Inchon a few days before the battle, when the ROK ship PC 703 sank an enemy mine-laying craft and three other vessels in waters off the Yellow Sea port. For the remainder of the war, the role of the navies was to provide shore bombardment.^[94]

[edit] Korean atomic warfare

In The Origins of the Korean War (1981, 1990), US historian Bruce Cumings reports that in a 30 November 1950 press conference, President Truman’s allusions to possibly attacking the invading North Korean forces with atomic bombs “was a threat based on contingency planning to use the bomb, rather than the faux pas so many assumed it to be.” The President sought Gen. MacArthur’s dismissal from Korean war command because his insubordination demonstrated his political unreliablity as a US Army officer: Gen. MacArthur might disobey the the US civil government about using or not using atomic bombs. Also on 30 November 1950, the USAF Strategic Air Command was ordered to “augment its capacities, and that this should include atomic capabilities.” In the Korean War, the US escalated closest to atomic warfare in April 1951, because the Chinese had amassed new armies at the Sino–Korean frontier; thus, at the Kadena USAF Base, Okinawa, the bomb-assembly pits became operational and crews assembled atomic bombs for the Korean War, “lacking only the essential nuclear cores.”

On 5 April 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued orders for retaliatory atomic-bombing of Chinese military bases in Manchuria, if either their armies crossed into Korea or if PRC- or KPA bombers attacked Korea from there. The President had ordered transferred nine Mark-IV nuclear capsules “to the Air Force’s Ninth Bomb Group, the designated carrier of the weapons” and "signed an order to use them against Chinese and Korean targets.” President Truman never transmitted said order, because he had politically out-witted the JCS to agreeing to sack the insubordinate Soldier MacArthur (announced 10 April 1950), and because neither the USSR nor the PRC escalated the war.^{[39][verification needed]}

Moreover (and contradictorily), President Truman then remarked that his government were actively considering using the atomic bomb to end the war in Korea (implying that Gen. MacArthur would control it), but that only he — the US President — commanded atomic bomb use, and that he had not given authorisation. For the matter of atomic warfare was solely a US decision, not the collective decision of the UN. Hence his 4 December 1950 meeting with UK PM Clement Attlee (and Commonwealth spokesman), French Premier René Pleven, and Foreign Minister Robert Schuman to discuss their worries about Korean atomic warfare. The Indian Ambassador, Pannikkar, reports, “that Truman announced that he was thinking of using the atom bomb in Korea. But the Chinese seemed totally unmoved by this threat. . . The propaganda against American aggression was stepped up. The Aid Korea to resist America campaign was made the slogan for increased production, greater national integration, and more rigid control over anti-national activities. One could not help feeling that Truman’s threat came in very useful to the leaders of the Revolution, to enable them to keep up the tempo of their activities.” ^[61][95][96]

Six days later, on 6 December 1950, after the Chinese intervention repelled the US–UN and ROK armies to retreat from northern North Korea, Gen. J. Lawton Collins (Army Chief of Staff), Gen. MacArthur, Admiral C. Turner Joy, and Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, and staff officers Maj. Gen. Doyle Hickey, Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, and Maj. Gen. Edwin K. Wright, met in Tokyo to plan strategy against the Chinese. They composed three atomic warfare hypotheses comprehending the next weeks and the next months.^[61] In the first, if the Chinese continue their full attack — but the UN Command is forbidden from blockading and attacking China by sea and air, and without Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Chinese reinforcements, and no increase to Gen. MacArthur’s US forces ’til April 1951, when four divisions of National Guard soldiers might be sent to him, then atomic weapons might be used in North Korea.^[61] In the second, if the Chinese continue their full attack — but the UN Command has blockaded China and has regular aerial reconnaissance and effectively bombs the Chinese interior, and the Nationalist Chinese soldiers are maximally exploited, and tactical atomic-bombing is to hand, Gen. MacArthur could hold positions in far north Korea. ^[61] In the third, if the Chinese agree not to cross the 38th parallel, Gen. MacArthur recommends that he UN should accept an armistice disallowing Chinese and North Korean troops south of the 38th parallel, and requiring their guerrillas to withdraw north. The US Eighth Army remains protecting the Seoul–Inch’on area, while X Corps retreats to Pusan. A UN commission should supervise implementation of armistice. ^[61]

Although the US planned atomic warfare in the Korean War, President Truman did not immediately threaten it after the Chinese intervention, but 45 days later, he remarked about using the atomic bomb only after the Chinese army had repelled the UN Forces to retreat. Gen. MacArthur et al. did not compose the atomic warfare scenarios until after the President’s remark during the 30 November 1950 press conference. The US decision to forgo atomic warfare was not because of “a disinclination by the USSR and PRC to escalate” the Korean War — but because of UN Ally pressures, notably the UK, the Commonwealth, and France, worried about the geopolitical imbalance wherein NATO would be defenceless whilst the US fought China, who then might persuade the USSR to conquer Western Europe. ^[61][97]

[edit] War crimes

[edit] Crimes against civilians

On conquering a place, North Korean Army political officers then purged South Korean society of its intelligentsia, by assassinating every educated person — academic, governmental, religious — who might lead resistance against the North; the purges continued during NPA retreat. ^[98] Like-wise, in combating enemy infiltration — immediately after the invasion in June of 1950 — the South Korean Government ordered the nation-wide “pre-emptive apprehension” of politically-suspect (disloyal) citizens. In the event, the military police and Right-wing paramilitary (civilian) armies — abetted by the US — summarily executed thousands of Left-wing and Communist political prisoners at Daejeon Prison and in the Cheju Uprising (1948–49).^[99] US diplomat Gregory Henderson, then in Korea, calculates some 100,000 pro–North political prisoners were killed and buried in mass graves. Contemporarily, the South Korean Truth and Reconciliation Commission received reports of some 7,800 civilian killings, in 150 places, occurred before and during the war.

Besides uniformed campaign combat, North Korean soldiers also fought the US–UN forces by tactically infiltrating guerrillas among refugees — who (usually) could approach soldiers for food and help in a battlefield; for a time, US troops fought under a “shoot-first-ask-questions-later” policy against every civilian-refugee approaching US battlefield positions; an unwise tactical carte blanche that led combat-weary US soldiers to indiscriminately kill some 400 civilians at No Gun Ri (26–29 July 1950), in central Korea. ^[100][101]

The warfare of the Korean armies included forcibly conscripting the available civil men and women to their war efforts. In Statistics of Democide (1997), Prof. R. J. Rummel reports that the North Korean Army conscripted some 400,000 South Korean citizens. ^[98] The South Korean Government reported that before the US re-captured Seoul, in September 1950, the North abducted some 83,000 citizens; the North says they defected. ^{[102] [103]}

[edit] Bodo League massacre

South Korea massacred civilians who were suspected as members of the Bodo League. The casualties were from 10,000 to 100,000 (see Wiki Link on Bodo League massacre), other estimates say the casualties were 200,000 to 1,200,000.^[104]

At least 100,000 people were hastily shot by the South Korean authorities and dumped into makeshift trenches, abandoned mines or the sea before and after North Korea invaded the south in June 1950. Declassified records show U.S. officers were present at one of these sites and that at least one U.S. officer sanctioned another mass political execution if prisoners otherwise would be freed by the North Koreans. Uncounted hundreds were subsequently killed, witnesses reported. Some mass killings were carried out before the war; many came in the first weeks after the June 25, 1950, invasion, and others occurred later in 1950 when U.S. and South Korean forces recaptured Seoul and the southerners rounded up and shot alleged northern collaborators.^[105]

The South Korean Truth and Reconciliation Commission^[106] says petitions relating to executions of leftists outnumber by 6-to-1 those dealing with right-wingers' deaths. It should be noted that this figure reflects the absence of North Korean participation in the Commission. Survivor Kim Jong-chol, 71, reported his experience in Namyangju as follows;

“	When the people from the other side (North Korea) came here, they didn't kill many people," he said, contrasting that with "indiscriminate" killing by southern authorities.	”
	— Kim Jong-chol [105]

The AP has reported that declassified U.S. military documents show U.S. Army officers took photos of the assembly line-style executions outside the central city of Daejeon, where the commission believes between 3,000 and 7,000 people were shot and dumped into mass graves in early July 1950. Other once-secret files show that a U.S. Army lieutenant colonel reported giving approval to the killing of 3,500 political prisoners by a South Korean army unit he was advising in Busan, if the North Koreans approached that southern port city, formerly spelled Pusan.^[105] The files show the U.S. command was aware in other ways as well of the organized bloodbaths.^{[citation needed]} Although at the time U.S. diplomats reported confidentially they had urged restraint on the South Koreans, there was no sign the U.S. military, with formal command over the southerners, tried to halt the mass executions.^[105]

[edit] Prisoners of war

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As with the ideological raisons d'etre fueling the Korean War, the combatants — North Korea, South Korea, the US–UN — each treated prisoners of war (PoWs) differently; notwithstanding the Geneva Convention. To wit, the US reported that North Korea mistreated prisoners of war: soldiers were beaten, starved, put to forced labor, marched to death, and summarily executed;^{[107] [108]} PoWs were killed at the battles at Hill 312, Hill 303, Pusan Perimeter, Daejeon — discovered during early US–UN and ROK after-battle “mop-up” actions. Later, a US Congress war crimes investigation, the United States Senate Subcommittee on Korean War Atrocities of the Permanent Subcommittee of the Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations reported that “. . . two-thirds of all American prisoners of war in Korea died as a result of war crimes”.^{[109] [110][111]}

The North Korean Government reported some 70,000 ROK Army PoWs; 8,000 were repatriated. South Korea repatriated 76,000 Korean People's Army (KPA) PoWs. ^[112] Besides the 12,000 US–UN Forces PoWs dead in captivity, the KPA might have press-ganged some 50,000 ROK PoWs into the North Korean military. ^[98] Per the South Korean Ministry of Defense, by 2008 there yet were some 560 Korean War POWs detained in North Korea; from 1994 ’til 2003, some 30 ROK PoWs escaped the North. ^[113] The North Korean Government denied having PoWs from the Korean War, and, via the Korean Central News Agency, reported that the US–UN allies killed some 33,600 KPA PoWs; that on 19 July 1951, in PoW Camp No. 62, some 100 PoWs were killed as machine-gunnery targets; that on 27 May 1952, in the 77th Camp, Koje Island, with flamethrowers, the ROK killed some 800 KPA PoWs who rejected “voluntary repatriation” South, and instead demanded repatriation North; and that some 1,400 PKA PoWs were secretly sent to the US States to be atomic-weapon experimental subjects. ^[114][115]

[edit] Legacy

The Korean War (1950–53) was the first proxy war in the global Russo–American Cold War (1945–91). It became the standard proxy-war model for the next sphere-of-influence wars against International Sino–Soviet Communism (e.g. 1945 Viet Nam). As such, it established proxy war as how the US and the USSR nuclear superpowers, would indirectly fight each other in a third country (Asian, Latin American, African) — per the NSC68 Containment Policy extending the Cold War from the Allied-occupied Europe of 1945 to the revolutionary, post–colonial Asia of 1950. The warfare ended at the 38th parallel, now the Korean Demilitarized Zone — 248 x 4km. (155 x 2.5mi.) — (DMZ) peninsular demarcation between the countries. Moreover, the Korean War benefited the other participant combatants, Turkey entered NATO. ^[116]

Each country’s post-war recovery was different; South Korea stagnated in the first post-war decade, only later industrialising and modernising. The North Korean economy recovered quickly, and, until around 1975, it surpassed South Korea’s economy.^{[citation needed]} The contemporary North Korea is spartan, while South Korea is a consumer society. The CIA World Factbook estimates North Korea’s GDP (PPP) is $40 billion, which is 3.0 per cent of South Korea’s $1.196 trillion GDP (PPP). North Korean personal income is $1,800 per capitum, which is 7.0 percent of the South Korean $24,500 per capitum income.

Anti-Communism remains in Southern politics, however, the Uri Party practiced a “Sunshine Policy” towards North Korea. The US often disagreed with the Uri Party and (former) ROK Pres. Roh about relations between the Koreas. The Grand National Party (GNP), the Uri Party’s principal opponent, is anti-North Korea. In the US, National Public Radio, on 7 September 2007, reported that US President George W. Bush offered a possible Korean War peace treaty with North Korea only when they ceased developing nuclear power (and weapons). ^[117] The President said, “We look forward to the day when we can end the Korean War. That will end — will happen when Kim verifiably gets rid of his weapons programs and his weapons.” ^[118] US conservatives criticised Pres. Bush’s declaration as reversing his earlier policy of régime change in North Korea. ^[119] In October, 2007, at the second Inter-Korean Summit, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean Leader Kim Jong-Il signed a joint declaration of intent for peace treaty talks to formally end the Korean War. ^[120] On 27 May 2009, North Korea withdrew from the 1953 armistice, because South Korea has violated its terms; ^[121][122] although South Korea had not been a signator.^[123]

[edit] Depictions

[edit] Art

Artist Pablo Picasso's painting Massacre in Korea (1951) depicted violence against civilians during the Korean War. By some accounts, killing of civilians by U.S. forces in Shinchun, Hwanghae Province was the motive of the painting.^{[citation needed]} Ha Jin's War Trash contains a vivid description of the beginning of the war from the point of view of a Chinese soldier and of the fear of retribution Chinese POWs felt from other Chinese prisoners if they were suspected of being unsympathetic to communism or to the war.

[edit] Photography

The wreckage of a bridge and North Korean tank south of Suwon, Korea. The tank was caught on a bridge and put out of action by the U.S. Air Force. October 7, 1950.	Scene of war damage in residential section of Seoul, Korea. The capitol building can be seen in the background (right). October 18, 1950. Sfc. Cecil Riley. (U.S. Army)	An aged Korean woman pauses in her search for salvageable materials among the ruins of Seoul, Korea. November 1, 1950. Capt. C. W. Huff. (U.S. Army)	Korean women and children search the rubble of Seoul for anything that can be used or burned as fuel. November 1, 1950. Capt. F. L. Scheiber. (U.S. Army)
A small South Korean child sits alone in the street, after elements of the U.S. 1st Marine Div. and South Korean Marines invaded the city of Inchon, in an offensive launched against the North Korean forces in that area. September 16, 1950. Pfc. Ronald L. Hancock. (U.S. Army)	Long trek southward: Seemingly endless file of Korean refugees slogs through snow outside of Kangnung, blocking withdrawal of ROK I Corps. January 8, 1951. Cpl. Walter Calmus. (U.S. Army)	Marilyn Monroe, motion picture actress, appearing with the USO, poses for pictures after a performance at the 3rd U.S. Inf. Div. area. February 17, 1954. Cpl. Welshman. (Army)	Lt. R. P. Yeatman, from the USS Bon Homme Richard, is shown rocketing and bombing Korean bridge. November 1952. (U.S. Navy)
Bob Hope sits with men of U.S. X Corps, as members of his troupe entertain at Womsan, Korea. October 26, 1950. (U.S. Army)

[edit] Film

Unlike World War II, there are relatively few Western feature films depicting the Korean War.

• The Steel Helmet (1951) is a war film directed by Samuel Fuller and produced by Lippert Studios during the Korean War. It was the first studio film about the war, and the first of several war films by producer-director-writer Fuller.
• Battle Hymn (1957) stars Rock Hudson as Colonel Dean Hess, who became a preacher after bombing a German orphanage during World War II. He later volunteered as a USAF fighter pilot instructor in Korea.
• The Bridges at Toko-Ri (1955) stars William Holden as a Naval Aviator assigned to destroy the bridges at Toko Ri, while battling doubts; it is based on an eponymous James Michener novel.
• The Forgotten (Korean War Movie) (2004) features a decimated tank unit, lost behind enemy lines, battling the vicissitudes of the war, as well as their own demons.
• The Hunters (1958), adapted from the novel The Hunters by James Salter, stars Robert Mitchum and Robert Wagner as two very different United States Air Force fighter pilots in the midst of the Korean War.
• The Hook (1963), starring Kirk Douglas, portrays the dilemma of three American soldiers on board a ship who are ordered to kill a Korean Prisoner of War.
• Inchon (1982) portrays the Battle of Inchon, a turning point in the war. Controversially, the film was partially financed by Sun Myung Moon's Unification Movement. It became a notorious financial and critical failure, losing an estimated $40 million of its $46 million budget, and remains the last mainstream Hollywood film to use the war as its backdrop. The film was directed by Terence Young, and starred an elderly Laurence Olivier as General Douglas MacArthur. According to press materials from the film, psychics hired by Moon's church contacted MacArthur in heaven and secured his posthumous approval of the casting.
• The Manchurian Candidate, a 1959 thriller novel, was cinematically adapted to The Manchurian Candidate (1962), directed by John Frankenheimer, and featuring Frank Sinatra and Angela Lansbury. It is about brainwashed POWs of the U.S. Army, and an officer's investigation to learn what happened to him and his platoon in the war.
• MASH: A Novel About Three Army Doctors, by Richard Hooker (pseudonym for H. Richard Hornberger), was later adapted into a successful film and a television series; the TV series had a total of 251 episodes, lasted 11 years, and won awards, and its final episode was the most-watched program in television history.^[124] Yet the sensibilities they presented were more of the 1970s than of the 1950s; the Korean War setting was an oblique and uncontroversial treatment of the then-current American war in Vietnam.^[125]
• Pork Chop Hill (1959) is a Lewis Milestone-directed film with Gregory Peck as an infantry lieutenant fighting the bitterly fierce first Battle of Pork Chop Hill, between the U.S. Army's 7th Infantry Division, and Chicom (Chinese Communist) forces at war's end in April 1953. The movie is lampooned by the Firesign Theatre album Don't Crush That Dwarf, Hand Me the Pliers in the story of Lieutenant Tirebiter.

There were several South Korean films, including:

• Tae Guk Gi: The Brotherhood of War (2004), directed by Kang Je-gyu, became extremely popular in South Korea and at the 50th Asia Pacific Film Festival, Taegukgi won the "Best Film", while Kang Je-gyu was awarded the "Best Director". Taegukgi saw a limited release in the United States.
• Welcome to Dongmakgol (2005) shows the effect of the warring sides on a remote village. The titular village soon becomes home to surviving North Korean and South Korean soldiers, who in time lose their suspicion and hatred for each other and work together to help save the village after the Americans mistakenly identify it as an enemy camp.

North Korea has made many films about the war, mostly by the government supporting forceful, armed reunification of the North and South of Korea.^{[citation needed]} These have portrayed war crimes by American or South Korean soldiers while glorifying members of the North Korean military as well as North Korean ideals.^{[126][verification needed]}

Battle on Shangganling Mountain (Shanggan Ling, Chinese: 上甘岭) is a depiction of the Korean War from the Chinese point of view, made in 1956. The movie is about a group of Chinese soldiers blocked in Triangle Hill area for several days and survive until they are relieved.

[edit] See also

• Joint Advisory Commission, Korea
• List of wars extended by diplomatic irregularity
• UNCMAC - the UN Command Military Armistice Commission operating from 1953 to the present
• UNCOK - the 1950 United Nations Commission on Korea
• UNCURK - the 1951 UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
• Pyongyang Sally
• Vietnam War
• M*A*S*H

[edit] Notes

[edit] References

[edit] Further reading

[edit] Combat studies, soldiers

• Appleman, Roy E. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (1961), Official U.S. Army history covers the Eighth Army and X Corps from June to November 1950
• Appleman, Roy E.. East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea (1987); Escaping the Trap: The U.S. Army in Northeast Korea, 1950 (1987); Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur (1989); Ridgway Duels for Korea (1990).
• Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953 (1987), revisionist study that attacks senior American officials
• Field Jr., James A. History of United States Naval Operations: Korea, University Press of the Pacific, 2001, ISBN 0-89875-675-8. official U.S. Navy history
• Farrar-Hockley, General Sir Anthony. The British Part in the Korean War, HMSO, 1995, hardcover 528 pages, ISBN 0-11-630962-8
• Futrell, Robert F. The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953, rev. ed. (Office of the Chief of Air Force History, 1983), official U.S. Air Force history
• Halberstam, David. The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War, Hyperion, 2007, ISBN 1401300529.
• Hallion, Richard P. The Naval Air War in Korea (1986).
• Hamburger, Kenneth E. Leadership in the Crucible: The Korean War Battles of Twin Tunnels and Chipyong-Ni. Texas A. & M. U. Press, 2003. 257 pp.
• Hastings, Max. The Korean War (1987). British perspective
• James, D. Clayton The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964 (1985)
• James, D. Clayton with Anne Sharp Wells, Refighting the Last War: Command and Crises in Korea, 1950-1953 (1993)
• Johnston, William. A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea. U. of British Columbia Press, 2003. 426 pp.
• Kindsvatter, Peter S. American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam. U. Press of Kansas, 2003. 472 pp.
• Millett, Allan R. Their War for Korea: American, Asian, and European Combatants and Civilians, 1945–1953. Brassey's, 2003. 310 pp.
• Montross, Lynn et al., History of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953, 5 vols. (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1954–72),
• Mossman, Billy. Ebb and Flow (1990), Official U.S. Army history covers November 1950 to July 1951.
• Russ, Martin. Breakout: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, Korea 1950, , Penguin, 2000, 464 pages, ISBN 0-14-029259-4
• Toland, John. In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953 (1991)
• Varhola, Michael J. Fire and Ice: The Korean War, 1950-1953 (2000)
• Watson, Brent Byron. Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian Infantry in Korea, 1950–1953. 2002. 256 pp.

[edit] Origins, politics, diplomacy

• Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (Columbia University Press, 1994),
• Cumings, Bruce. Origins of the Korean War (two volumes), Princeton University Press, 1981, 1990
• Goncharov, Sergei N., John W. Lewis; and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War, Stanford University Press, 1993, ISBN 0-8047-2521-7, diplomatic
• Kaufman, Burton I. The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command. Temple University Press, 1986), focus is on Washington
• Matray, James. "Truman's Plan for Victory: National Self Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in Korea," Journal of American History 66 (September, 1979), 314–33. Online at JSTOR
• Millett, Allan R. The War for Korea, 1945–1950: A House Burning vol 1 (2005)ISBN 0-7006-1393-5, origins
• Schnabel, James F. United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972). Official U.S. Army history; full text online
• Spanier, John W. The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (1959).
• Stueck, William. Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History. Princeton U. Press, 2002. 285 pp.
• Stueck, Jr., William J. The Korean War: An International History (Princeton University Press, 1995), diplomatic
• Zhang Shu-gang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953 (University Press of Kansas, 1995)

[edit] Primary sources

• Bassett, Richard M. And the Wind Blew Cold: The Story of an American POW in North Korea. Kent State U. Press, 2002. 117 pp.
• Bin Yu and Xiaobing Li, eds Mao's Generals Remember Korea, University Press of Kansas, 2001, hardcover 328 pages, ISBN 0-7006-1095-2
• S.L.A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet (1953) on combat
• Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (1967).

[edit] External links

• U.S. Army Korea Media Center official Korean War online video archive
• Korea Defense Veterans of America
• Korean War Ex-POW Association
• Korean War Veterans Associtaion
• The Center for the Study of the Korean War
• Korean War Documentary
• Korean Children's War Memorial
• Calvin College on the Impact of the War on the Korean People
• Facts and texts on the War
• BBC: American Military Conduct in the Korean War
• Atrocities against Americans in the Korean War
• Atrocities by Americans in the Korean War
• Quicktime sequence of 27 maps adapted from the West Point Atlas of American Wars showing the dynamics of the front.
• Animation for operations in 1950
• Animation for operations in 1951
• POW films, brainwashing and the Korean War
• CBC Digital Archives - Forgotten Heroes: Canada and the Korean War
• Chinese 50th Anniversary Korean War Memorial
• North Korea International Documentation Project
• Collection of videos on Korean War
• Documents on the Korean Conflict at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library
• U.S. Army Korea Media Center official Korean War online image archive
• Grand Valley State University Veteran's History Project digital collection

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