Korean nationalism

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Korean nationalism
Korean name
Chosŏn'gŭl
Hancha
North Korean name
Hangul
Hanja

Korean nationalism refers to nationalism among the Korean people. In the Korean context, this encompasses various of movements throughout history to maintain the Korean cultural identity, history, and ethnicity.

History[edit]

Historically, the central objectives of Korea's nationalist movement were the advancement and protection of Korea's ancient culture and national identity from foreign influence, and the fostering of the independence movement during Colonial Korea.[1] In order to obtain political and cultural autonomy, it first had to promote Korea's cultural dependency. For this reason, the nationalist movement demanded the restoration and preservation of Korea's traditional culture. The Donghak (Eastern Learning) peasant movement, also known as the Donghak Peasant Revolution, that began in the 1870s, could be seen as an early form of what would become the Korean nationalist resistance movement against foreign influences. It was succeeded by the Righteous Army movement and later a series of Korean resistance movements that led, in part, to the current status of the two Korean nations.

The National Resistance Movements[edit]

Nationalism in late 19th century Korea was a form of resistance movements, but with significant differences between the north and south. Since the intrusion by foreign powers in the late 19th century, Koreans have had to construct their identity in ways that pitted them against foreigners. They have witnessed and participated in a wide range of nationalist actions over the past century, but all of them have been some form of resistance against foreign influences. During the colonial period, the Korean nationalists carried on the struggle for independence, fighting against Imperial Japan in Korea, China particularly Manchuria and China Proper and Far East Russia. They formed 'governments in exile', armies, and secret groups to fight the imperial Japanese wherever they are.

Partition of Korea[edit]

Korea was divided at the 38th parallel between north and south by the Allied powers in 1945 as part of the disarmament of Imperial Japan, and the division persists to this day. The split is perpetuated by rival regimes, opposing ideologies, and global politics; it is further deepened by a differing sense of national identity derived from the unique histories, polities, class systems, and gender roles experienced by Koreans on different sides of the border. As a result, Korean nationalism in the late 20th century has been permeated by the split between North and South. Each regime espouses its own distinctive form of nationalism, different from the opposing side's, that nonetheless seeks to encompass the entire Korean Peninsula in its scope.

Korean Reunification[edit]

Main article: Korean reunification

With regard to Korean nationalism, the reunification of the two Koreas is a highly related issue. Ethnic nationalism that is prevalent in Korean society is likely to play a significant role in the unification process, if it does occur. As Gi-Wook Shin claims, “Ethnic consciousness would not only legitimize the drive for unification but also could be common ground, especially in the early stage of the unification process, that is needed to facilitate a smooth integration of the two systems.”[2]

Korean reunification (Korean: 남북통일) refers to the hypothetical future reunification of North Korea and South Korea under a single government. South Korea had adopted a sunshine policy towards the North that was based on the hope that one day, the two countries would be re-united in the 1990s. The process towards this was started by the historic June 15th North–South Joint Declaration in August 2000, where the two countries agreed to work towards a peaceful reunification in the future. However, there are a number of hurdles in this process due to the large political and economic differences between the two countries and other state actors such as China, Russia, and the United States. Short-term problems such as a large number of refugees from the North migrating into the South and initial economic and political instability would need to be overcome.

State-aligned nationalism[edit]

North Korea[edit]

Main article: Juche

In North Korea, nationalism is incorporated as part of the state-sponsored ideology of Juche. The Juche Idea (Korean pronunciation: [tɕutɕʰe] approximately "joo-cheh") teaches that "man is the master of everything and decides everything," and that the Korean people are the masters of Korea's revolution. Juche is a component of North Korea's political system. The word literally means "main body" or "subject"; it has also been translated in North Korean sources as "independent stand" and the "spirit of self-reliance".

The Juche Idea gradually emerged as a systematic ideological doctrine in the 1960s. Kim Il-sung outlined the three fundamental principles of Juche as being:

  1. "independence in politics" (chaju)
  2. "self-sustenance in the economy" (charip)
  3. "self-defense in national defense" (chawi).

South Korea[edit]

While nationalistic theory and practice during the colonial era and the First Republic of South Korea were class-based and movement specific forces, in the South Korea of recent times (1990s onward) a more broad-based (including middle-income classes) sentiment has developed in the national ethos, the so-called "New Nationalism." Two ideologies drive the new nationalism: the old national liberation movement logic of anti-imperialism on the one hand, and a state-worshipping ideology introduced by the Park Jung-Hee regime and embodied in its pledge of National Allegiance (국민교육헌장), on the other hand.

The "New" South Korean nationalism drives public policy and has been a powerful controlling force upon the Korean polity since 2004. It has had a coercive power to raise national consensus on such divisive issues as the South Korea's participation in the War on Iraq, strengthened gestures for sovereignty in the face of a unilateral military alliance with the United States, modern confrontations with China and Japan over territorial issues, and so forth.

Particular issues[edit]

Anti-Japanese sentiment[edit]

The legacy of the colonial period of Korean history continues to fuel recriminations and demands for restitution in both Koreas. North and South Korea have both lodged severe protests against visits by Japanese officials to the Yasukuni Shrine, which is seen as glorifying the Class A war criminals whose remains are held there. Some Koreans claim that a number of Korean women who worked near Japanese military bases as comfort women were forced to serve as sex slaves against their will for Japanese soldiers during World War II which is a persistent thorn in the side of Japan-Korea relations since the 1990s. Disagreements over demands for reparations and a formal apology still remain unresolved despite the previous agreement and compensation in 1965, Koreans started peaceful vigils in 1992 held by survivors on a weekly basis. For about two decades, these sex abuse survivors have held vigil every Wednesday in front of embassy of Japan in Seoul and 1000th vigil was held in December 2011. Recent Japanese history textbook controversies have emerged as a result of what some see as an attempt at historical revisionism with the aim of whitewashing or ignoring Japan's war crimes during World War II. These issues continue to separate the two countries diplomatically, and provide fuel for nationalism in both Koreas as well as anti-Japanese sentiment.

Liancourt Rocks dispute[edit]

The Liancourt Rocks dispute has been ongoing since the end of World War II after the United States rejected Korea's claim to give sovereignty of the Liancourt Rocks islands, known as Dokdo or Tokto (독도/獨島, literally "solitary island") in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese, to Korea in the 1951 as the island had never belonged to Korea before San Francisco Peace Treaty.

Since 1954, the South Koreans have administered the islands but bickering on both sides involving nationalism and lingering historical acrimony has led to the current impasse. Adding to this problem is political pressure from conservative politicians and nationalist groups in both South Korea and Japan to have more assertive territorial policies.

With the introduction of the 1994 UN Law of the Sea Convention, South Korea and Japan began to set their new maritime boundaries, particularly in overlapping terrain in the Sea of Japan (East Sea), where some exclusive economic zone (EEZ) borders was less than 400 nautical miles (700 km) apart.[3] Tensions escalated in 1996 when both governments declared a 200-nautical-mile (400 km) EEZ that encompassed the island, which brought Japan-South Korean relations to an all-time low.

This has not only complicated bilateral relations but heightened nationalist sentiments on both sides. In spite of generational change and the passage of time, the institutionalization of Korean collective memory is causing young Koreans to be as anti-Japanese, if not more so, than the older generation.[4][verification needed] For Koreans, "historical memory and feelings of han (resentment) run deeply and can influence Korea's relations with its neighbors, allies, and enemies in ways not easily predicted by models of policy-making predicated on realpolitik or other geo-strategic or economic concerns."[5][verification needed]

Due to Korea’s colonial past, safeguarding the island has become equivalent to safeguarding the nation-state and its national identity. A territory’s value and importance is not limited to its physical dimensions but also the psychological value it holds as a source of sovereignty and identity.[6] Triggered by strong feelings of injustice and humiliation, Korean nationalistic sentiment has become involved in the dispute. The island itself has become to symbolize Korean national identity and pride, making it an issue even more difficult to resolve.[7] South Korea’s claim to the island holds emotional content that goes beyond material significance, and giving way on the island issue to Japan would be seen as compromising the sovereignty of the entire peninsula.

The South Korean government has also played a role in fanning nationalism in this dispute. President Roh Moo-hyun began a speech on Korea-Japan relations in April 2006 by bluntly stating, “The island is our land” and “for Koreans, the island is a symbol of the complete recovery of sovereignty.”[8] The issue of the island is clearly tied to the protection of the nation-state that was once taken away by Japan. President Roh emphasizes this point again by saying:

“Dokdo for us is not merely a matter pertaining to territorial rights over tiny islets but is emblematic of bringing closure to an unjust chapter in our history with Japan and of the full consolidation of Korea’s sovereignty.”[8]

Later on in his speech Roh also mentions the Yasukuni Shrine and Japanese history textbook controversy, saying that they will be dealt with together.[9] Having placed the Liancourt Rocks issue "in the context of rectifying the historical record between Korea and Japan" and "the safeguarding of [Korea's] sovereignty", compromise becomes impossible.[10] As the French theorist Ernest Renan said, "Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort."[11]

The Liancourt Rocks dispute has affected the Korean and Japanese perceptions of each other. According to a recent survey by Gallup Korea and the Japan Research Center, 20% of Koreans had friendly feelings towards Japan and 36% of Japanese the same towards Korea. When asked for the reason of their antipathy, most Koreans mentioned the territorial dispute over the island, and the Japanese the anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea. This is in contrast to a 2002 survey (post 2002 FIFA World Cup) conducted by the Chosun Ilbo and Mainichi Shimbun, where 35% of Koreans and 69% of Japanese had friendly views of the other country.[12]

Anti-American sentiment[edit]

Anti-Americanism in Korea began with the earliest contact between the two nations and continued after the division of Korea. In both North Korea and South Korea, anti-Americanism after the Korean War has focused on the presence and behavior of American military personnel (USFK), aggravated especially by high-profile accidents or crimes by U.S. servicemembers, with various crimes including rape and assault, among others.

The 2002 Yangju highway incident especially ignited Anti-American passions.[13] The on-going U.S. military presence in South Korea, especially at the Yongsan Garrison (on a base previously used by the Imperial Japanese Army during Colonial Korea) in central Seoul, remains a contentious issue. While protests have arisen over specific incidents, they are often reflective of deeper historical resentments. Robert Hathaway, director of the Wilson Center's Asia program, suggests: "the growth of anti-American sentiment in both Japan and South Korea must be seen not simply as a response to American policies and actions, but as reflective of deeper domestic trends and developments within these Asian countries."[14]

Korean anti-Americanism after the war was fueled by American occupation of USFK troops and support for the authoritarian rule of Park Chung-hee, and what was perceived as an American endorsement of the brutal tactics used in the Gwangju massacre.[15] Speaking to the Wilson Center, Katherine Moon was noted by Hathaway as suggesting that "anti-Americanism also represents the collective venting of accumulated grievances that in many instances have lain hidden for decades", but that despite the "very public demonstrations of anger toward the United States [...] the majority of Koreans of all age groups supports the continuation of the American alliance."[16]

Ethnic nationalism[edit]

Ethnic nationalism emphasizes descent and race. Among some Koreans, ethnicity is interpreted with blood being the key determinant in defining "Koreanness".[5][verification needed] A survey conducted around 2006 showed that 68.2% of respondents considered "blood" the most important criterion of defining the Korean nation, and 74.9% agreed that "Koreans are all brothers and sisters regardless of residence and ideology."[5][verification needed] This viewpoint implies that North Koreans and overseas Koreans are to be included in this "Korean" group.

Importance of blood[edit]

The term "pure blood" refers to the notion that Korean people are a pure race descended from a single ancestor. First invoked during the period of resistance to colonial rule, the idea of having pure blood gave Koreans an impetus for developing a sense of ethnic homogeneity and national pride, as well as a potential catalyst for racial discrimination and prejudice.[17] As a way of resisting colonial rule, Shin Chaeho published his book Joseon Sanggosa in the 1920s, proclaiming that Korean descent is based on the Goguryeo kingdom, formed from the intermingling of the descendants of Dangun Joseon with the Buyeo kingdom. This raised a sense of ethnic homogeneity which persists as a major element in Korea's politics and foreign relations.[18] A survey in 2006 showed that 68.2% of respondents considered "blood" the most important criterion of defining the Korean nation, and 74.9% agreed that "Koreans are all brothers and sisters regardless of residence and ideology."[5][verification needed]

Brian Myers argues in his book The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters that the North Korean ideology of purest race arose from Japanese fascism. Japanese collaborators are said to have introduced the notion of racial unity in an effort to assert that Japanese and Koreans came from the same racial stock. After Japan left, Myers argues, the theory was adjusted to promote the idea of a pure Korean race.[19]

Nationalist historiography[edit]

Shin Chaeho(1880–1936) founder of Korea's nationalist historiography.

Shin Chaeho was the first historian to focus on the Korean minjok (or ethnicity), and narrated Korean history in terms of its minjok history. For Shin, minjok and history were mutually defining and as he says in the preface of the Doksa Sillon, “if one dismisses the minjok, there is no history.” Shin emphasized the ancientness of the Korean minjok history, elevated the status of the semi-legendary figure, Dangun, as the primordial ancestor of the Korean people and located the host minjok, Puyo.[20] Shin launched a vision of the Korean nation as a historically defined minjok or ethnicity entity.[21] In an attempt to counter China's controversial Northeast Project and Goguryeo controversies that ensued, the South Korean government in 2007 incorporated the founding of Gojoseon of the year 2333 BCE into its textbooks.[22] In 2006, the South Korean government incorporated the founding of Gojoseon of the year 2333 BCE into its textbooks.[23]

2002 FIFA World Cup[edit]

Main article: 2002 FIFA World Cup

In a Cinderella story, after five consecutive World Cups without a single win, the South Korean national soccer team made it to the semifinals with an improbable series of triumphs in 2002. The 2002 World Cup, hosted in South Korea and Japan, saw the South Korean team claim victory over such traditional soccer powerhouses as Portugal, Italy, and Spain, before finally succumbing to Germany in the semifinals. As the team continued to advance, their success was heralded by fervent displays of Korean pride; as many as seven million South Korean fans poured out onto the streets to watch the games on outdoor television screens.[24] The unity among these fans was not simply about soccer; it was also wrapped up in a sense of national pride, identity, and confidence.[25][page needed] After South Korea defeated Spain in the quarterfinals, South Korean President and Nobel Prize winner Kim Dae Jung stated that it was Korea’s happiest day since Dangun, the legendary founder of Korea.[25][page needed] Soccer-inspired nationalism even resulted in tragedy when a man lit himself on fire to become the team’s twelfth man.[26]

The nationalistic fervor was not confined to the Korean Peninsula, but also extended to South Korean expatriate communities all around the world. On June 11, over 20,000 Korean-Americans filled the Staples Center in Los Angeles, California at 4:30 a.m. to cheer and support their team in unison.[25][page needed] In the words of Kwon Pyonghyon, chairman of the Overseas Koreans Foundation, "One of the most important impacts of the World Cup on the 5.6 million overseas Koreans was to arouse their pride in being [ethnic] Korean and to bond with one another beyond differences."[25][page needed] Indeed, South Korea's success led to a rare conciliatory statement from North Korea. Tensions between the two nations had been high following a recent naval battle which led to the sinking of a South Korean patrol boat, killing four and injuring 19. In spite of these recent events, the chief of North Korea’s Football Association, Ri Gwan Gun, nonetheless sent a congratulatory letter to Chung Mong Joon, the President of South Korea’s Korea Football Association.[27]

Virginia Tech massacre[edit]

Ethnic nationalism is often cited as a reason why the Virginia Tech massacre of 2007 elicited a strong response in South Korea as well as from the South Korean expatriate community in the United States. "In Korea, one can argue that nationalism based on common blood and shared ancestry has functioned as a key mechanism to establish collectivism or a strong sense of oneness."[25][page needed] Although Seung-Hui Cho was a 1.5 generation immigrant who came to the U.S. as a third grader and was a permanent resident alien of the U.S., he was still a "Korean" due to his ancestry and thus caused South Koreans to collectively mourn and feel guilt.[28]

There was an outpouring of grief among South Koreans as they grappled to understand how a "Korean" could have committed such a massacre. South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun issued several official apologies and condolences, and candlelight vigils were held at the American embassy in Seoul. A South Korean professor criticized this behavior, saying that South Koreans "need to stop going on about bloodlines and how great the 'Korean race' is while getting so excited with joy or sorrow at the successes and failures of overseas Koreans."[29]

Greater Korea[edit]

The term Greater Korea[30][31][32] is a pan-nationalist and irredentist concept of lands that are considered to form the national homeland by most Koreans. Beside Korea, it includes Gando and neighboring parts of Russia where about three million ethnic Koreans live.[31] Sometimes it includes Daemado an ethnically Japanese area, but geographically closer to Korea. The term is also used for referring economic ties between the relevant regions.

Manchuria and Gando Disputes[edit]

Korean nationalist historians have sometimes claimed that Manchuria (Northeast China) as well as Gando, a region bordering China, North Korea, and Russia, should be part of Korea, based on prior Koguryo control of the area.[33] The claim for Gando (known in China as Jiandao) is said to be stronger than the claim for the whole of Manchuria, due to later Paekche presence in Gando after the fall of the Koguryo kingdom, the current area population's consisting of 1/3 ethnic Koreans,[34] and the circumstances of the 1909 Gando Convention that relegated the area to Chinese control.[35] While the Manchurian claims have not received official attention in South Korea, claims for Gando were the subject of a bill introduced in 2004, at a time when China had been claiming that Paekche and Koguryo had been "minority states" within China and the resulting controversy was at its height.[36] The legislation proposed by 59 South Korean lawmakers would have declared the Gando Convention signed under Japanese rule to be "null and void".[37] Later that year, the two countries reached an understanding that their governments would refrain from further involvement in the historical controversy.[38]

See also[edit]

Bibliography[edit]

Journals
News
Academic/Educational
Books

References[edit]

  1. ^ Ryu Tongshik (1999) - While Japanese scholars were pursuing colonialist aims in research on Korea culture, Korean scholars on the other hand began their own research in order to discover in the traditional culture the spiritual basis for the independence movement against Japan.
  2. ^ Shin, Gi-Wook (2006). Ethnic Nationalism in Korea. California: Stanford University Press. p. 203. ISBN 0-8047-5407-1. 
  3. ^ Min Gyo Koo. Following the introduction of the UN Law of the Sea in 1994, South Korea and Japan both began proceeding to set their new maritime boundaries, particularly in overlapping terrain in the East Sea/Sea of Japan, where the distance between some EEZ baselines was less than 400nm.
  4. ^ Berger (2005 paper)
  5. ^ a b c d Larsen, Kirk (2006 talk)
  6. ^ Wang (2003), page 391.
  7. ^ Min Gyo Koo. In addition, the symbolic attachment of territory to national identity and pride has made the island dispute all the more intractable and difficult to resolve.
  8. ^ a b Speech by Roh Moo-hyun (April 2006)
  9. ^ Speech by Roh Moo-hyun (April 2006) - The government will revisit the entirety of our response with regard to the matter of Dokdo. Together with the distortion of Japanese history textbooks and visits to the Yasukuni shrine, the matter of Dokdo will be dealt with head on. It will be reviewed in the context of rectifying the historical record between Korea and Japan and historical awareness building, our history of self-reliance and independence, and the safeguarding of our sovereignty.
  10. ^ Speech by Roh Moo-hyun (April 2006) For this is a matter where no compromise or surrender is possible, whatever the costs and sacrifices may be.
  11. ^ Ernest Renan (October 17, 2010) [1882]. "The Nationalism Project - Ernest Renan Defining the Nation".  - Delivered as a lecture at the Sorbonne in 1882.
  12. ^ "Friendliness Between Japan and Korea Withering.". Chosun Ilbo. May 17, 2007. Archived from the original on March 31, 2008. 
  13. ^ Don Kirk (2002) for the International Herald Tribune. "Basically, the entire country is galvanized behind this incident," said a U.S. official in Seoul, speaking anonymously. "It will be forever brought up in news articles that we callously ran over these two girls. I don't think we are going to recover from this." .
  14. ^ Wilson Center
  15. ^ Kristof (1987), for the New York Times
  16. ^ Wilson Center. This is Hathaway's summary; it does not appear to be a direct quote from Moon
  17. ^ Gi-wook Shin (2006 op-ed). The principle of bloodline or "jus sanguinis" still defines the notion of Korean nationhood and citizenship, which are often inseparable in the mind of Koreans. In its formative years Koreans developed the ethnic base of nation without a corresponding attention to the political notion of citizenship. also see The Korean nationality law is still based on jus sanguinis and legitimizes, consciously or unconsciously, ethnic discrimination against foreign migrant workers.
  18. ^ Gi-wook Shin (2006 op-ed). According to him, the Korean people were descendants of Dangun Joseon, who merged with Buyo of Manchuria to form the Goguryeo people. This original blend, Shin contended, remained the ethnic or racial core of the Korean nation and also see Even today, Koreans maintain a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity based on shared blood and ancestry, and nationalism continues to function as a key resource in Korean politics and foreign relations.
  19. ^ Cockrell (2010). But in the early 20th century the Japanese annexed Korea and launched a campaign to persuade the peninsula's people that they were of the same pure racial stock as the Japanese themselves, said Myers. Then, when Japan left Korea at the end of WWII, pro-Japanese collaborators Koreanized the notion of a pure blood line, promoting pride in a morally superior Korean race.
  20. ^ Schmid (1997)
  21. ^ Chang (1986)
  22. ^ Kim (2007). The move is apparently a response to recent efforts by Chinese scholars to strengthen their claim over the heritage of Kojoson and other kingdoms such as Koguryo (37 B.C. - A.D. 668), which Korea states are part of its national history.; see also The new history books write that Kojoson was set up in 2333 B.C. and adds that "it is recorded by Samgukyusa and Tongguktonggam that Kojoson was established by Tangun."
  23. ^ Kim (2007) The move is apparently a response to recent efforts by Chinese scholars to strengthen their claim over the heritage of Kojoson and other kingdoms such as Koguryo (37 B.C. - A.D. 668), which Korea states are part of its national history.; see also The new history books write that Kojoson was set up in 2333 B.C. and adds that "it is recorded by Samgukyusa and Tongguktonggam that Kojoson was established by Tangun."
  24. ^ Brodkin (2002), for the Guardian.
  25. ^ a b c d e Gi-Wook Shin (2006 book)
  26. ^ Reuters (June 2002)
  27. ^ Reuters (July 2002)
  28. ^ Kim, Sae-jung (2007 opinion piece) for OhMyNews International. Koreans have a strong bond to people of Korean ethnic origin even when, as in the case of the gunman, a large proportion of their upbringing took place in a different culture. That's why there is widespread mourning and collective guilt over the gunman's behavior and its consequences.
  29. ^ Choe Hyun (2007 editorial) for the Hankyoreh
  30. ^ David I Steinberg, Korea's Changing Roles in Southeast Asia: Expanding Influence and Relations, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010, p. 41
  31. ^ a b John O'Shaughnessy, Clifford J. Shultz, Anthony Pecotich, Handbook of Markets and Economies: East Asia, Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand, M.E. Sharpe, 2005, p. 363
  32. ^ Ian Jeffries, North Korea: A Guide to Economic and Political Developments, Routledge, 2013, p. 71
  33. ^ Lankov, Andrei (2006) for the Asia Times Online. Since long ago, the more radical Korean nationalist historians have paid much attention to the "Manchurian question", insisting that the vast lands of China's northeast, which once were realms of the Koguryo rulers, should be returned to the "lawful owner" - that is, to the present-day Korean state.
  34. ^ Lankov, Andrei (2006) for the Asia Times Online. It does not help that the claimed territory already has a large Korean presence, with ethnic Koreans constituting about a third of all Kando residents. At this stage it seems that their loyalties overwhelmingly remain with Beijing, but the Korean activity in the area is unnerving for Chinese policy planners.
  35. ^ Lankov, Andrei (2006) for the Asia Times Online. In 1909, the Japanese, acting "on behalf" of the Koreans, agreed to complete Chinese sovereignty over the area. In recent years it became clear that a large number of Koreans were demanding the revision of the 1909 treaty.
  36. ^ Lankov, Andrei (2006) for the Asia Times Online. in 2004, the Koreans discovered that both Koguryo and its quasi-successor state of Parhae are presented in the new Chinese-language books as parts of China, as "minority states" that existed within the supposedly single Chinese nation. Statements to this effect even appeared on the Chinese Foreign Ministry website.
  37. ^ Lankov, Andrei (2006) for the Asia Times Online. In late 2004, when the first round of the "history war" reached its height, a group of 59 South Korean lawmakers even introduced a bill that declared the 1909 Sino-Japanese treaty "null and void" and demanded recognition of Korean territorial rights over Kando.
  38. ^ Lankov, Andrei (2006) for the Asia Times Online. Finally, in August 2004, the sides reached an agreement: the bureaucracies promised to refrain from waging "history wars", leaving arguments to the historians.

External links[edit]