||This article reads more like a story than an encyclopedia entry. (August 2012)|
The Kornilov Affair, or the Kornilov Putsch (Kornilov Coup) as it is sometimes referred to, was an (allegedly) attempted coup d'état by the then Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, General Lavr Kornilov, in August 1917 against the Russian Provisional Government headed by Alexander Kerensky.
Following the revolution of February 1917, the Russian monarchy fell from power, replaced by a Provisional Government whose members came from various liberal and left-wing political parties, some previously represented in the Duma, and others in the Petrograd Soviet. After the autocratic and oppressive rule of the Tsars, the Russian people hoped the Government would introduce the liberal reforms for which they had long hoped. In the weeks that immediately followed the February Revolution it appeared that this would happen, with the Government passing legislation that led even Lenin, one of its harshest critics, to declare Russia "the freest of all the belligerent countries". However, the initial wave of support for the Provisional Government amongst the Russian people soon subsided and unrest grew, a result mainly of Russia's continued participation in the First World War and of the economic ramifications which the fighting had for Russian society. The demonstrations during the "July Days" sparked calls for a need for more discipline and for a stronger government - a resurgence occurred in right-wing feeling amongst sections of Russian society. Officers of the Russian Army, Kornilov amongst them, led these calls. The officers feared that ill-discipline amongst their troops accounted for the continued poor performance of the Russian army during the First World War. They demanded the reintroduction of the death penalty at the front line as well as the abolition of the various soldiers committees that had sprung up in the months following February. Unease also escalated amongst Russia's businessmen and industrialists, whilst even amongst the politicians who formed the Provisional Government support for the restoration of order was strong.
|This section does not cite any references or sources. (August 2012)|
It has been thought[according to whom?] that after Kerensky had heard reports that a Bolshevik coup was being planned (which he knew to be false) that he could use this as an excuse to get rid of Kornilov who he saw as a threat, he ordered Kornilov to send the Third Cavalry Corps to Petrograd to deal with the 'threat'. This action is what Kerensky claimed as an attempt to 'Overthrow the Government.'
Believing he would gain the support of the dissenting army chiefs, Alexander Kerensky, the head of the Government, yielded to their demands and reintroduced the death penalty at the front line on July 12, 1917. A week later, in an attempt to further appease the growing conservative element within Russian society, he appointed Lavr Kornilov Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army. Kornilov's first act in his new position was to issue a list of demands to the Provisional Government, including the request that Kerensky be removed from the control of the government so that he was essentially accountable only to himself. Though these requests were denied, they set the tone for the strained relationship that Kornilov and the Provisional Government were to enjoin in in the weeks that followed. Russia's continued participation in the First World War had resulted in continued social unrest and this in turn increased calls for restoration of order from the right wing and intensified their fears of another revolution. It was this fear, as Kornilov later confided to his second in command, which led Kornilov to order troops of the Caucasian Native Division to advance to a position closer to Petrograd on July 7. This order was given without either the knowledge or consent of the Provisional Government and it was not until August 23, following an increased amount of industrial unrest, that Kerensky sent word to Kornilov that this troop movement had government approval.
On August 24 Vladimir Lvov, the former Procurator of the Holy Synod, arrived at Kornilov's headquarters claiming that he had been sent by Kerensky to gauge Kornilov's response to Kerensky's three proposed strategies to strengthen the government.
- A dictatorship under Kerensky
- An authoritarian government, in which Kornilov would be prominent
- A military dictatorship under Kornilov
It is unclear whether Lvov was truly sent by Kerensky or if he was operating under the instructions of others. What is clear however, is that on his return to Petrograd on August 26, Lvov informed Kerensky and the Provisional Government that of the three proposed strategies Kornilov had responded most favourably to the idea of a military dictatorship with himself at the helm. That evening Kerensky, alarmed at the thought of a coup being directed at him, attempted to gain confirmation from Kornilov of his intentions. In a rather confused teleprinter conversation, in which Kerensky impersonated Lvov as well as conversing as himself, Kerensky interpreted Kornilov's responses to his questioning as confirmation of his intention to seize power by force. In response, Kerensky dismissed Kornilov from his position as Commander-in-Chief but with no apparent willing successor available he was reinstated within hours. Kerensky backed out of their deal.
When the telegram to dismiss Kornilov arrived, Kornilov - believing that Kerensky was acting under intense pressure from the Soviets (and consequently, the Bolsheviks) - ordered the aforementioned Third Cavalry Corps to move swiftly (or swifter) to Petrograd to put down what he assumed to be a Bolshevik uprising. At this point Kornilov, outraged by printed accusations that he demanded full civil and military power, asked the Russian people for help in overthrowing the Provisional Government. Kerensky by his actions provoked Kornilov to rebel—Kornilov rebelled only after having been charged with rebelling.
To secure his position, Kerensky had to ask for Bolshevik assistance. Kerensky actually rearmed the Bolsheviks he had 'outlawed' after the July Days, allowing them to rebuild support. He also sought help from the Petrograd Soviet, which called upon armed Red Guards to "defend the revolution". The Kornilov Affair failed largely due to the efforts of the Bolsheviks, whose influence over railroad and telegraph workers proved vital in stopping the movement of troops.
Following the failed coup, Kornilov was removed from his position as Commander-in-Chief and incarcerated in the Bykhov Fortress alongside 30 other army officers accused of involvement in the conspiracy. Shortly after the Bolshevik revolution of October 1917, Kornilov managed to escape from Bykhov and went to establish the Volunteer Army, which fought the Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War. He was killed in battle against Bolshevik forces in the town of Ekaterinodar in April 1918.
Perhaps the biggest beneficiaries of the Kornilov Affair were the Bolshevik Party, who enjoyed a revival in support and strength in the wake of the attempted coup. Kerensky released Bolsheviks who had been arrested a few months earlier, when Vladimir Lenin was accused of being in the pay of the Germans and subsequently fled to Finland, and his plea to the Petrograd Soviet for support had resulted the rearmament of the Bolshevik Military Organization and the release of Bolshevik political prisoners, including Leon Trotsky. Though these weapons were not needed to fight off Kornilov's advancing troops in August, they were kept by the Bolsheviks and used in their own successful armed insurrection of October 1917. Bolshevik support amongst the Russian public also increased following the Kornilov affair, a consequence of dissatisfaction with the Provisional Government and their handling of the affair.
Another important consequence of the Kornilov Affair is that it severed the tie between Kerensky and the military. For although the officer corps, confused about the issues and unwilling to defy the government openly, refused to join in Kornilov's mutiny, it despised Kerensky for his treatment of their commander, the arrest of many prominent generals and his pandering to the left. When the Bolsheviks staged their revolution in October 1917 Kerensky appealed to the military to help defend the government from the insurrection but his appeal fell on deaf ears.
Several schools of thought surrounding the Kornilov Affair offer contrasting interpretations and have provoked debate among historians. One take on the Kornilov Affair was put forward by Aleksandr Kerensky himself, the main target of the coup. In the years after the event, Kerensky described the affair as a right wing conspiracy that "...developed slowly, systematically, with cool calculation of all the factors involved affecting its possible success or failure." Kornilov, argued Kerensky, was drawn into this conspiracy long after the preparatory work had been completed. In a 1966 interview with Soviet journalist Genrikh Borovik, Kerensky expressed the view that Winston Churchill had played a central role in the conspiracy.
In his 1970 work, The Kornilov Affair: A Reinterpretation, Harvey Asher suggests that Kerensky and Kornilov had an agreement to use the military to restore order within Russia. Asher then goes onto argue that, upon learning that Kornilov favoured the idea of a military dictatorship from Lvov, Kerensky reneged on their agreement for fear that he might be removed from power. Another interpretation of the Kornilov affair is that it was the result of a misunderstanding between Kerensky and Kornilov, caused by the interference of Vladimir Lvov.
The American historian Richard Pipes put forward another interpretation of the event in his work The Russian Revolution: 1899-1919. Pipes argued that far from there being a Kornilov plot there was in fact a "'Kerensky plot' engineered to discredit the general as the ringleader of an imaginary but widely anticipated counter revolution, the suppression of which would elevate the Prime Minister to a position of unrivalled popularity and power, enabling him to meet the growing threat from the Bolsheviks."
- A. Wood – The Russian Revolution 1861-1917, 2nd ed (1993) Routledge, New York p. 42.
- Pipes, Richard (1990). The Russian Revolution. New York: Vintage Books. p. 460.
- R. Pipes – The Russian Revolution 1899-1919 (1990) Collins Harvill, London, p. 467.
- A.F. Kerensky – The Catastrophe (1977) Milwood, p. 288
- "Радио ЭХО Москвы :: Наше все, 23.12.2007 17:08 Александр Керенский: Генрих Боровик". Echo.msk.ru. 2007-12-23. Retrieved 2014-04-30.
- R. Pipes – The Russian Revolution 1899-1919 (1990) Collins Harvill, London, p. 463.
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to Lavr Georgevich Kornilov.|
- H. Asher – The Kornilov Affair: A Reinterpretation (1970) Russian Review XXIX
- O. Figes – A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891 -1924 (1996) Random House
- A.F. Kerensky – The Catastrophe (1977) Milwood
- R. Kowalski – The Russian Revolution 1917-1921 (1997) Routledge
- J.L. Munck – The Kornilov Revolt: A Critical Examination of Sources and Research (1987) Aarhus University Press
- R. Pipes- The Russian Revolution 1899-1919 (1990) Collins Harvill
- J.N. Westwood – Endurance and Endeavour: Russian History 1812-1992 (1993) Oxford University Press
- A. Wood – The Russian Revolution 1861-1917,(1993) Routledge, New York
- G. Katkov – Russia 1917: The Kornilov Affair, (1980) Longman Group, United Kingdom