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== Ideology ==
== Ideology ==
[[File:Kurdistan Workers Party flag (former).gif|thumb|Former flag displaying the [[soviet]] [[hammer and sickle]]]]
[[File:Kurdistan Workers Party flag (former).gif|thumb|Former flag displaying the [[soviet]] [[hammer and sickle]]]]
The organization originated in the 1970s from the radical left and drew its leaders, members from other existing leftist groups, mainly Dev-Genç.<ref name="joost"/>{{rp|127}} The organization initially presented itself as part of the [[communist revolution]]. The organization's aims and objectives have evolved over time towards the goal of national independence .
The terrorist organization originated in the 1970s from the radical left and drew its leaders, members from other existing leftist groups, mainly Dev-Genç.<ref name="joost"/>{{rp|127}} The organization initially presented itself as part of the [[communist revolution]]. The organization's aims and objectives have evolved over time towards the goal of national independence .


During 1980s, the organization was a secular insurgent political movement.<ref name=joost/>{{rp|127}} During 1980s the movement included and cooperated with other ethnic groups, including ethnic Turks, who were following the radical left. Following the collapse of the USSR, the communist roots were largely abandoned in an attempt to better accommodate nationalistic views and Islamic beliefs.
During 1980s, the organization was a secular insurgent political movement.<ref name=joost/>{{rp|127}} During 1980s the movement included and cooperated with other ethnic groups, including ethnic Turks, who were following the radical left. Following the collapse of the USSR, the communist roots were largely abandoned in an attempt to better accommodate nationalistic views and Islamic beliefs.

Revision as of 03:40, 31 July 2009

Kurdistan Workers' Party
Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, (PKK)
LeaderThe current official leader is Murat Karayilan. Abdullah Öcalan (also known as "Apo") was one of the founders.[1][2][3]
Dates of operation1978-present
MotivesThe creation of an independent socialist state of Kurdistan in parts of present Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Cultural and political rights for the Kurdish population in Turkey.[4]
Active regionsTurkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria
IdeologyKurdish nationalism,
socialism
StatusDesignated as Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US State Department[5][6]
Designated as Proscribed Group by the UK Home Office
Designated as terrorist group by EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.[7]
SizeAs high as 90,000 in the early 1990s. Currently estimated at 3,000[8][9]-6,000[10]
Annual revenue500 million Euros[11] donations (50-60m)[11]

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or پارتی کار که‌رانی کوردستان Parti Karkerani Kurdistan), best known as PKK (Kurdish language:په‌ که ‌که‌ and also called KADEK, Kongra-Gel, and KGK[6]), is a national independence movement militant and human rights organization that is recognized as a terrorist group by the EU, US and Turkey. The group was founded in the late 1970s and led by Abdullah Öcalan. The PKK's ideology is founded on revolutionary socialism and Kurdish nationalism which mostly started in the beginning of the 20th century following the oppression the Kurds received from the Atatürk government after the Treaty of Lausanne (see Kurdish rebellions and Peshmerga ). The PKK's goal has been to create an independent, socialist Kurdish state in Kurdistan, a geographical region that comprises parts of southeastern Turkey, northeastern Iraq, northeastern Syria and northwestern Iran, where the Kurdish population is the majority. This goal has now been moderated by some Kurds to claiming cultural and political rights for the ethnic Kurdish population in Turkey.[1] although those rights are still denied by Turkey ( Human rights in Turkey ) ,Since 1978, the PKK has been engaged in armed conflict with the Turkish state.

The PKK is listed as a terrorist organization internationally by a number of states and organizations, including the United States,[6] United Nations,[12] NATO[12] and the European Union.[12][13] The organization is listed as one of the 12 active terrorist organizations in Turkey as of 2007 according to the Counter-Terrorism and Operations Department of the Turkish police.[14] Turkey labeled the organization as an ethnic secessionist organization that uses terrorism and the threat of force against both civilian[13][15] and military targets for the purpose of achieving its political goal.

Kurdish politician Abdülmelik Fırat claims that Democratic Society Party (DTP) was founded by PKK, and that 80 percent of Kurds do not vote for this party.[16] However, senior DTP leaders maintain that they support a unified Turkey within a democratic framework. Aysel Tuğluk published an article in Radikal in May 2007 as the co-president of DTP, to prove that claim.[17]

Name

Despite the organization's self-declared name changes, names used by its branches, names of its front groups, and names used by vassal structures, the group is commonly referred as the PKK.

Late 1970s, the organization first deciphered by the intelligence community as "Apocus." Since then, the organization declared name changes without changing organizational structure, such as Kurdistan Workers' Party (Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK); Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan (Kurdish: Kongreya Azadî û Demokrasiya Kurdistanê, KADEK); Halu Meşru Savunma Kuvveti (HSK). Organization established front groups including the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (Turkish: Kürdistan Özgürlük Şahinleri), and (Kurdish: Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan, TAK).

On 25 October 1987, the organization created the Youth Council of Kurdistan (YCK) to organize and recruit the young more systematically. This structure extended to branches: Free Youth Movement of Kurdistan (Kurdish: Tevgera Cîwanên Azad a Kurdistan, TECAK), the Independent Youth Movement in Turkey (Turkish: Bağımsız Gençlik Hareketi, BAGEH), Democratic Youth Movement in Iran, Independent Youth Movement in Iraq (TCM), Free Youth Movement in Syria (TCA), the Free Youth Movement (Turkish: Özgür Gençlik Hareketi, ÖGH) in Europe and in the Commonwealth of Independent States.[18]

During this period, the organization used the front groups to claim responsibility for attacks against civilians who collaborated with the Turkish state. The organization adapted a decentralized structure to improve effectiveness and these branches adapted different names. [19] The armed wing active in south-east Turkey; the People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan (Kurdish: Arteshen Rizgariya Gelli Kurdistan, ARGK), the People's Defence Forces (Kurdish: Hêzên Parastina Gel, HPG). The organization held a vassal or tenant to the major control over structures such as the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress, the Kurdistan People's Congress (KHK), and the People's Congress of Kurdistan. As of 30 April 2007, all the social arrangements, all the activities declared, using the listed names are classified as originating from the same organization (commonly known as the PKK) by the U.S. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism as published in Country Reports on Terrorism.[6]

History

October 22 2007, demonstration against the PKK in Kadıköy, Istanbul.
February 15, 2003, PKK supporters at the anti-war protest for the imminent invasion of Iraq in London.
Main article: History of the Kurdistan Workers Party

In the early 1970s, the organization's core group was made up largely of students led by Abdullah Öcalan (nicknamed "Apo") in Ankara. The group soon moved its focus to large Kurdish population in south-east Turkey. On November 27, 1978, the group adapted the name "Kurdistan Workers Party." The organization took part in the conflict with right-wing entities with its communist ideology. In 1979, the organization as a propaganda of the deed attempted to assassinate Kurdish tribal leader Mehmet Celal Bucak who they claimed exploited the peasants, and collaborated with Turkey. This marked a period of intense urban warfare between other radical political elements. The 1980 Turkish coup d'état dictatorship pushed the movement to another stage with the members doing jail time, being subject to capital punishment, or fleeing to Syria. On November 10, 1980, the Turkish Consulate in Strasbourg, France was bombed in a joint operation by the ASALA and they claimed this was the start of a "fruitful collaboration."[20]

Starting in 1984, the organization transformed itself into a paramilitary organization using the training camps located in Syria and launched military attacks as well as continuing with the bombings against governmental installations, military and Turkish civilian targets, many of whom were connected to the Southeastern Anatolia Project. The organization moved to a less centralized form, taking up operations in a variety of European and Middle Eastern countries and became a trans-nationalized organization. Following the collapse of the USSR, the organization largely abandoned its Communist roots, attempting to better accommodate nationalistic views and Islamic beliefs.

Beginning with the mid 1990s, the organization lost the upper hand in its operations as a consequence of the declined state support in the post-Cold War shifts. In the mid 1990s, it also began to shift from conventional bombing to suicide bombing and launched 15 attacks which 11 were performed by a female. In the late 1990s, Turkey increased the pressure and the undeclared war between Turkey-Syria ended the Syrian open support [21]. In 1999, Öcalan was captured, prosecuted and sentenced to death, but later commuted to life imprisonment as part of European Union membership.[22] With downgraded security concerns, the Turkish parliament began a controlled process of dismantling the legal control, using the term "normalization" or "rapprochement" depending on the sides of the issue. The ban on broadcasting was lifted in 2000s, which the publishing side of this 1983 ban on use of Kurdish language was already lifted in 1991.[23] but true educational and cultural rights for Kurds remained elusive in Turkey. At the sometime, the organization blacklisted in many countries. On April 2, 2004, the Council of the European Union added the organization to its list of terrorist organisations. Later that year, the US Treasury moved to freeze assets of branches of the organization. The organization went through a series of changes and unilateral truce declared by the organization ended in 2003.[24]

Since Post-invasion Iraq, 2003–present, according to Turkey, Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish region in northern Iraq, and US forces have not done much to combat with the organization and "secure" the Iraqi-Turkish border despite the Turkish military and diplomatic pressures following the failed Turkish invasion in North Iraq in February 2008, causing tensions between the Iraqi and Turkish governments.[25][26] PKK Guerilla army

Ideology

File:Kurdistan Workers Party flag (former).gif
Former flag displaying the soviet hammer and sickle

The terrorist organization originated in the 1970s from the radical left and drew its leaders, members from other existing leftist groups, mainly Dev-Genç.[19]: 127  The organization initially presented itself as part of the communist revolution. The organization's aims and objectives have evolved over time towards the goal of national independence .

During 1980s, the organization was a secular insurgent political movement.[19]: 127  During 1980s the movement included and cooperated with other ethnic groups, including ethnic Turks, who were following the radical left. Following the collapse of the USSR, the communist roots were largely abandoned in an attempt to better accommodate nationalistic views and Islamic beliefs.

The movement emerged from the Workers Party of "Kurdistan" heritage. Initially the group aimed to establish a Kurdish nation separate from Turkey. Later this goal extended to Syria, Iraq and Iran. In recent years, organization fundamentally transformed from a party of Kurdistan to a party of Turkey.[19]: 129  The profound shift implied a recognition of national sovereignty of "Republic of Turkey," within which the claim is made for regional autonomy, rather than a fight for national independence.[19]: 129  This positional change was criticized as a method change rather than a real ideological change by some Turks.

In 1999, following the capture of Ocalan, organization announced a "peace initiative," and spoken more often about cultural or linguistic rights[6]. The group's hard-line militant wing took control and renounced the self-imposed cease-fire with the turn of 2004.[6] Besides the activities towards Turkey, on 17 July 2005, one of the chief executive Hasan Özen was murdered in Austria. Hasan Özen wanted to leave the organization. In Diyarbakir, on 6 July 2005, the organization killed Hikmet Fidan former founder of the legal branch the People’s Democratic Party (HADEP). Hikmet Fidan tried to formed an alternative organization called PWD with Osman Ocalan.

Currently, it is labeled as an ethnic secessionist organization by the Turkish government.

Organization

The PKK has multiple heads in various West European countries.[27] However, Abdullah Öcalan (1984-1999) was unchallenged leader of the organization. After the capture of Öcalan, authorities induced him to publicly plead for a ceasefire and for his own life at the court, which diminished his stature and credibility.[28] Though serving life imprisonment, Öcalan is still considered the honorary leader and figure-head of the organization. He still influences a portion of the PKK from his prison cell, through his lawyer.[29]

Murat Karayilan has the control of the organization in practice, although undergone numerous conflicts between Cemil Bayik. Cemil Bayik beside Abdullah Ocalan, Kesire Yildirim Ocalan, and Hakki Karaer was one of the core leaders. Cemil Bayik’s military skills and leadership were criticized by Abdullah Ocalan during his 1999 trial. The organization appointed "Doctor Bahoz," the nom de guerre of Fehman Huseyin, a Syrian Kurd, in charge of the movement's military operations signifying as the Turks say "a long-standing alliance" between the organization and Damascus.[30] Without the PKK ever targeting Israel as the Syrians do ,meanwhile Kurd human rights are also suppressed in Syria.

Training camps

File:PKK Militant.jpg
A PKK militant patrols the border.

The first training camp was established in Syrian controlled Bekaa Valley in 1982, with the support of the Palestine Liberation Organization , Bulgaria and Syria [31][32] ,Syria wanted to pressure Turkey over the Hatay-Iskenderun region subject but the Kurds never adapted antiwest or non nationalistic goals(especially after the 2003 US led invasion to Iraq which increased dramatically the Kurdish independence in North Iraq ). This main camp moved to north Iraq in 1998, under intensive Turkish pressure, after the Syria expelled Ocalan and shut down all camps established in the region.[32] The organization moved its training camps to North Iraq where there was a vacuum of control after the Operation Provide Comfort. Instead one big training camp which could be easily destroyed, organization established many small camps. During this period organization set up a fully functioning enclave with training camps, storage facilities, and reconnaissance and communications centers.

In 2007 the movement is believed to have a number of camps strung out through the mountains that straddle the border between Turkey and Iraq, including in Sinaht, Haftanin, Kanimasi and Zap.[33] The movement has two types of camps, the border camps that were used as forward bases from which PKK guerillas infiltrate into Turkey. The units deployed there are highly mobile and the camps have only the minimum infrastructure.[33] The camps in the Qandil Mountains have a more developed infrastructure—including a field hospital, electricity generators and a large proportion of the PKK's lethal and non-lethal supplies.[33]

There are also training camps in other countries, the organization's training camp which was deep in the woods and indiscernible was dismantled near Eindhoven in the Netherlands and following raids resulted arrests and seize of materials in The Hague, Rotterdam, Eindhoven and Capelle aan den IJssel[34] following the murder of Theo van Gogh by a Dutch–Moroccan , some 40,000 to 100,000 ethnic Kurds live and work in the Netherlands .There was another training camp at Belgium, which the movement uses for political and ideological training.[35]

Political representation

The movement had sympathizer parties in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey beginning in early 1990s. The establishment of direct links to the organization has been a question. In sequence HEP/DEP/HADEP/DEHAP and the latest Democratic Society Party (DTP) have been accused by Turkish politicians of sympathizing with the PKK, since they have refused to brand it as a terrorist group. As of June 2007 report by the European Union Institute for Security Studies stated that "It is an obvious secret that DTP is connected to PKK in a way and PKK is a terrorist group."[36]

Political organizations established in Turkey are banned from propagating or supporting "separatism" -autonomy . Several political parties supporting Kurdish rights have been banned on this pretext. The constitutional court claimed to find direct links between the HEP/DEP/HADEP and the PKK. IN 2008 the DTP-party was prosecuted by the constitutional court.

Several parliamentarians and other elected representatives have been jailed for speaking in Kurdish, carrying Kurdish colors or otherwise "promoting separatism", most famous among them being Leyla Zana.[37] Further proofing the fuct that in Turkey basic human rights of minorities are actively suppressed.

Activities

Activities of the Kurdistan Workers Party by Region[38][39]
Target Activity Category Turkey Northern
Iraq 		Western
Europe
Government Demonstrations/Protests[38] Yes Yes Yes
Riots[38] Yes Yes
Kidnapping[38] Yes Yes
Assassination[38] Yes Yes
Sabotage[38] Yes
Chemical warfare[notes 1] Yes
Bombing
Attacks[38] 		Post/Train/Power Yes
Police Yes
Outposts Yes
Armed
Attacks[38] 		Military Yes Yes
Police Yes
Village Guards Yes
Civilian Kidnapping[38] Yes
Assassination[38] Yes Yes
Bombing
Attacks 		Villages Yes Yes
Touristic Facilities[38] Yes
Commercial Units[38] Yes
Organized Crime Extortion[40] Yes Yes
Drug Trafficking[41] Transit Transit Destination
Human Trafficking[41] Origin Origin

During its establishment in the mid 1970s, amid violent clashes in the whole of Turkey, organization used classic terrorism methods, such as failed assassination of Mehmet Celal Bucak as a propaganda-of-the-deed.[19] After the 1980 military coup the organization developed into a paramilitary organization using resources it acquired in Bekaa valley in part of ex-Syrian-controlled Lebanon. After 1984, PKK began to use Maoist theory of people's war.[42][43] There are three phases in this theory. The militant base during the initial years was coming from different sources, so the first two phases were diffused to each other.

1978-1984

In the first phase (1978-1984), the PKK tried to gain the support of the Kurdish population. It attacked the machinery of government and distributed propaganda in the region. PKK tactics were based on ambush, sabotage, riots, protests, and demonstrations against the Turkish government. PKK has also been accused of violent attacks on individual civilians or residential areas (Kurds and non-Kurds alike), who refused to co-operate with the PKK or were suspected of collaborating with the Turkish authorities (less effective of course than the attacks the Turkish government had made against Kurds who collaborated with the PKK and the removal of entire village populations from villages in order not to collaborate with the PKK). During these years, the PKK fought a turf war against other predominantly Kurdish organisations in Turkey. The PKK effectively used the prison force to gain appeal among the population but not as effectively as the Turkish state had done.[44][45] In the whole Turkey, this period was characterized by violent clashes which culminated in the 1980 military coup.

During this time, the organization argued that its violent actions were explained by the need to defend Kurds in the context of what it considered as the massive cultural suppression of Kurdish identity (including the 1983 Turkish Language Act Ban) and cultural rights carried out by other governments of the region.

1984-1999

In the second phase (1984-1999), which followed the return of civilian rule in 1983, escalating attacks were made on the government's military and vital institutions all over the country. The objective was to destabilise Turkish authority through a long, low-intensity confrontation. In addition to skirmishing with Turkish military and police forces and local village guards, the PKK has conducted suicide bombing on government and police installations, as well as at local tourist sites. Kidnapping and assassination against government officials and Kurdish tribal leaders who were named as puppets of the state were performed as well. Widespread sabotages were continued from the first stage. PKK performed kidnapping western tourists, primarily in Istanbul but also at different resorts ( some attacks were blamed on the PKK by the Turkish authorities but PKK denied officially any connection ). Its actions have taken place mainly in Turkey and against Turkish targets in other countries, although it has on occasions co-operated with other Kurdish nationalist paramilitary groups in neighboring states, such as Iraq and Iran.[46] PKK has also attacked Turkish diplomatic and commercial facilities across Western Europe. In effect, the Turkish state has led a series of counter-insurgency operations against the PKK, accompanied by political measures, starting with an explicit denunciation of separatism in the 1982 Constitution, and including proclamation of the state of emergency in various PKK-controlled territories starting in 1983 (when the military relinquished political control to the civilians). This series of administrative reforms against terrorism included in 1985 the creation of village guard system by the then prime minister Turgut Özal who is of partial Kurdish descent.The guard system is widely accused of corruption today.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, in an effort to win increased support from the Kurdish peasantry, the PKK altered its leftist secular ideology to better accommodate and accept Islamic beliefs. The group also abandoned its previous strategy of attacking Kurdish civilians, focusing instead on government and tourist targets.[47] In its campaign, the organization has been accused of carrying out atrocities against both Turkish and Kurdish civilians and its actions have been criticised by human rights groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Actions of the Turkish state in the past have also been criticised by these same groups.

All in all, this low intensity conflict which has lasted more than thirty years has had a number of effects in the Turkish territory.

1999-current

In the third phase (1999-current), after capture of Öcalan, according to Maoist theory of people's war claims that the conventional fighting should be established to seize cities, overthrow the government and take control of the country. This stage has never achieved. In effect, after the capture of Öcalan, activities of the organization never reached to previous levels.

Since the 1999, the organization begin to use improvised explosive devices rather than direct confrontation , with many exceptions as in the failed attack of the Turkish army against the PKK in North Iraq in 2008 and a number of attacks against military installations inside Turkey.

Tactics

The areas in which the group operates are generally mountainous rural areas and dense urban areas. The mountainous terrain offers an advantage to members of the PKK by allowing them to hide in a network of caves and making military air operations, especially helicopter use, hazardous for the Turkish Armed Forces. While in urban areas, PKK members are often able to blend in with the local population.

Recruiting

Organization with its Marxist ideology claim to generate equality of gender. At its establishment, included a small number of female militants, over time, however, this number has increased significantly and the early 1990s, 30 percent of its 17,000 armed militants were women.[48] The Civil Code in Turkey, established as Ataturk's reforms, has accepted men and women as equals since 1926, it was not possible to accomplish this ideal in practice for Kurdish rural areas where tribal structure and a male-dominant oppressive environment that considered women as second-class citizens. The organization increased its number of members through the recruitment of women from different social structures and environments, such as women from families that migrated to several European countries after 1960 as guest workers(German: Gastarbeiter).[48] It was reported that 88% of the subjects claimed that equality was a key objective, there was no equality within the organization.[49] In 2007, approximately 1,100 of 4,500-5,000 total members were women.[48]

The organization used children within its militant force.[50] 86% percent of who had joined the organization was to bolster their families incomes following offers that it would provide for their families in return.[49] All of the new recruites reported that these offers were not fulfilled.[49] 80% of those surveyed also reported that they had actively stopped other family members—usually younger brothers—from joining the organization too.[49] 60% of those surveyed had an education level below high school level.[49] althought the average education level in the region is also generally low. Arshem Kurman of PKK said "The young female PKK guerrillas feel that their lives, in which they carry weapons alongside men in a struggle for Kurdish identity, are still vastly superior to what they would have lived had they stayed in their villages" while the PKK commander Sozdar Serbiliz said : "We are not just an example for the women of the Middle East but for women the world over,"[51]

When asked why they stayed in the organization, two thirds stated that they were afraid of being caught as reprisals are not just limited to physical harm towards the militant; their families would be at risk as well.[49] Five percent said that it was from fear of punishment by the Republic of Turkey[49] according to Turkish sources

Instruments

In July 2007, the weapons captured between 1984-2007 from the PKK operatives and their origins published by the Turkish General Staff indicates that the operatives delete some of the serial numbers from their weapons. The total number of weapons and the origins for traceable ones were:[52]

The choice & origin of the traceable weapons (July 2007)[52]
Type Quantity Sources
AK-47 Kalashnikovs 4,500 71.6% from the USSR, 14.7% from China, 3.6% from Hungary, 3.6% from Bulgaria
Rifles[notes 2] 5,713 of (959 traceable) 45.2% from Russia, 13.2% from United Kingdom, and 9.4% from United States.
rocket launchers 1,610 (313 traceable) 85% from Russia, 5.4% from Iraq, and 2.5% from China in origin.
pistol 2,885 (2,208 traceable) 21.9% from Czechoslovakia, 20.2% from Spain, 19.8% from Italy
grenade 3,490 (136 traceable) 72% from Russia, 19.8% from United States, 8% from Germany,
mines 11,568 (8,015 traceable) 60.8% from Italy, 28.3% from Russia, 6.2% from Germany

Four members of the organization, who handed themselves over to authorities after escaping from camps in northern Iraq, claimed they had seen two U.S. armored vehicles deliver weapons, which was widely reported and further stoked suspicions about U.S. policy in Iraq.[53] US envoy denied these claims.[54] The arms were claimed to be part of Blackwater Worldwide arms smuggling allegations. The probe of organization's weapons and the investigation of Blackwater employees were connected.[55]

The organization has been using mines.[56] Use of these mines has led to civilian deaths, in part due to accidental triggering by civilian trucks and buses rather than the intended military armoured vehicles[56] , also many civilian deaths were caused by the mines which the Turkish Army planted in the Kurdish areas.

Resources

Funding

The organization's annual budget has been estimated at $500 million Euros (which is only a fraction of the Turkish army annual budget of 5 billion Euros).The PKK receives its funding in the form of private donations, from both organisations and individuals from around the world. Some of these supporters are Kurdish businessmen in south-eastern Turkey, sympathisers in Syria and Iran, and Europe. Parties and concerts are organized by branch groups.[57] Additionally, it is believed that the PKK earns money through the sale of various publications, as well as receiving revenues from legitimate businesses owned by the organization.[58] Besides affiliate organizations, there are sympathizer organizations such as the Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe (KON-KURD, headquartered in Brussels) and the International Kurdish Businessmen Union (KAR-SAZ, in Rotterdam) which constantly exchanges information and perform legitimate or semi-legitimate commercial activities and donations.

Human

During its highest point in the early 1990s the militant membership was around 17000. After the capture of Öcalan this number drastically decreased. The membership increased from 3,000 to more than 7,000 since 2003 invasion of Iraq. In 2008, according to information provided by the Intelligence Resource Program of the Federation of American Scientists the strength of the organization in terms of human resources consists of approximately 4,000 to 5,000 militants of whom 3,000 to 3,500 are located in northern Iraq.[59]

A study carried out by the Counter-Terrorism and Operations Department of Directorate General for Security over a sample of files about people convicted of being a terrorist under Turkish laws including 262 militants from the organization has found that 54% of the members are aged 14 to 25, 34% 26 to 37 and 12% 38 to 58. University graduates make up 11% of the members, high school graduates 16%, secondary school graduates 13%, primary school graduates 39%, literate non-graduates 12% and illiterates 9%.[60]

International

At the height of its campaign, the organization received support from many countries. The level of support given has changed throughout this period.

Support of Syria,[57][61] From early 1979 to 1999 Syria had provided valuable safe havens to PKK in the region of Beqaa Valley. After the undeclared war between Turkey and Syria, Syria placed restrictions on PKK activity on its soil. Turkey is expecting positive developments in its cooperation with Syria in the long term, but even during the course of 2005, there were PKK operatives of Syrian nationality operating in Turkey.

Support of Iran;[62][page needed] Iran listed PKK as a terrorist organization after Iran's supply of resources to the PKK began to be used on its own soil. Iran provided PKK with supplies in the form of weapons and funds.This contradicts the fact of the suppression of the Kurd language in Iran and assimilation campaign Iran maintains towards the Kurds of Iran.

Support of Greece; retired Greek L.T. General Dimitris Matafias and retired Greek Navy Admiral Antonis Neksasis had visited organization's Mahsun Korkmaz base camp in Bakaa valley in October 1988 along with parliamentarians from the panhellenic Socialist movement (PASOK).[63] At the time it was reported(but never proven) that the general has assumed responsibility for training. Greeks also dispatched arms through Greek Cypriot administration.[63] In December 1993, Greek European affairs minister Theodore Pangaios was quoted saying "we must be supportive of the Kurdish people to be free"expressing the sympathy of the majority of the Greeks at the time.[64] Greece declined to join Germany and France and the eleven other members at the EU to ban the organization.[64] During the 1990s, Greece supplied the rebels.[65]

Support from the Republic of Cyprus was brought in question when Abdullah Öcalan was caught with a Cypriot passport to the name of Mavros Lazaros, a nationalist reporter.

The support of paramilitary groups; The organization developed links with paramilitary groups among other ethnic groups which has harboured historic grievances against Turkey such as the ethnic Armenian ASALA,[66] as well as groups which shared its left-wing nationalist ideology such as the Palestine Liberation Organisation, ETA, and, to a lesser degree, the Provisional Irish Republican Army.[66] Through the large Kurdish immigration in Germany, it has also formed close contacts with violent left-wing political groups in that country.

Support of the Soviet Union;[67] According to the former KGB-FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko, who was poisoned in 2006, PKK's leader Abdullah Ocalan was trained by KGB-FSB.[68] As of 2008, Russia still is not among the states that list PKK as a terrorist group despite intense Turkish pressures.

Support of the United Kingdom; TV broadcast for five years in UK, until its licence was revoked by the regulators Independent Television Commission (ITC) in 1999 due to a breach of ITC guidelines and perceived pro-PKK bias. In December 2008, the United Kingdom detained members of the PKK and seized the assets of the PKK's man in Britain, Selman Bozkur, alias “Dr. Hüseyin”. The detainees are being questioned.[69]

Support of various Europe states; Despite Brussels designation of the organization as a terrorist organization, the EU continues to permit the broadcasting of organization's networks on the Hot Bird 3 satellite owned by the French company Eutelsat. MEDYA TV started transmissions from studios in Belgium via a satellite uplink from France. MEDYA TV's licence was revoked by the French authorities. A few weeks later Roj TV began transmissions from Denmark. It has also been argued that the Netherlands and Belgium have supported the PKK by allowing its training camps to function in their respective territories. On November 22 1998, Hanover's criminal police reported that three children had been trained by the PKK for guerrilla warfare in camps in the Netherlands and Belgium.[70] After the death of Theo van Gogh, with increasing attention on domestic security concerns, the Dutch police raided the 'PKK paramilitary camp' in the Dutch town of Liempde and arrested 29 people in November 2004.[71] Denmark allows Kurdish satellite television stations (such as ROJ-TV), which Turkey claims has links with the PKK, to operate in Denmark and broadcast into Turkey.[72] while the call by Turkish PM Erdoğan towards Denmark to stop the broadcasting of this station (Roj TV)was turned down by Danish PM at the NATO summit at April 2009

Various PKK leaders, including Hidir Yalcin, Riza Altun, Zubeyir Aydar, and Ali Haydar Kaytan all lived in Europe and moved freely. The free movement was archived by the strong ties with influential persons. Danielle Mitterrand, the wife of the former President of France, had active connections during the 90s with elements of the movement's leadership that force a down graded relationships between these states.[73] Ali Rıza Altun, a suspected key figure with an Interpol arrest warrant in his name, after harboring him for some time Austria arranged a flight to Iraq.. Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gül summoned the Austrian ambassador and condemned Austria's action.[74] On September 30 1995, While Öcalan was at Syria, Damascus opened contact with high ranking German CDU MP Heinrich Lummer and German intelligence officials.

The Chief of the Turkish General Staff during 2007, General Yaşar Büyükanıt, stated that even though the international struggle had been discussed on every platform (due to Turkish pressures)and even though organizations such as the UN, NATO, EU make statements of serious commitment, to this day the necessary measures (to fight the PKK) had not been taken(to the displease of Turkey).[75] According to Büyükanıt; "this conduct on one side has encouraged the terrorists, on the other side it assisted in widening their [the terrorists] activities. The most distressful part of it is that many of the European countries being a member of NATO, an organization that had announced that terrorism was the greatest threat to itself.[75]" Sedat Laçiner, of the Turkish think tank ISRO, says that US support of the PKK undermines the US War on Terrorism.[76] Seymour Hersh claimed that the U.S. supported PEJAK, the Iranian branch of the PKK.[77] The head of the PKK's militant arm, Murat Karayilan, claimed that Iran attempted to recruit the PKK to attack coalition forces, adding that Kurdish guerrillas have launched a clandestine war in north-western Iran, ambushing Iranian troops.[78]

Effects

Main article: Effects of the Kurdistan Workers Party

As a self-proclaimed Kurdish liberation organization, the PKK has cited "mass violence by the Turkish state on the Kurd identity" to justify its activities.[citation needed] The main goal of its activities was to alienate the people from the state by pushing security forces into more and more overt and repressive counter-measures(counter measures that acted destructively against the Kurdish area's economy). The Political-Justice section extends the results of this ideology and methods of the democratic processes and the justice system in Turkey. In a democratic system,(such as Turkey where the military plays a major controlling role) an ideology that questions the state's legitimacy, will of its population and its security apparatus was difficult to be accepted as a political view, which was shaped under HEP/DEP/HADEP story. Turkish government authorities did not negotiate with the organization, so regional NGOs there were no communication channels between the sides. The ill-formed language ban of 1983 and Terrorism Act of 1991 were significant events. Also, amnesties were interesting events during the conflict time, as each amnesty gave more human resources to the organization. The prison as a rehabilitation concept was a failure. The people who were jailed for non-violent activities were becoming militants during their jail time. Government's military operations against the prisons were the highest point in this governmental failure.

As a revolutionary left-wing organization, the PKK perceived Turkish society as one that was deformed by capitalism and imperialism. The PKK unleashed its aggression on enemies spanning all classes (farmers, business, etc.) and those that it considered puppets of the state. The cost of the PKK's actions are significant perhaps even reaching the level of devastation the Turkish Army caused. PKK had drastic effects on regional economy, as targeted infrastructure of the region. Regions' inability to join the economical activities were associated with the work force, costs (insurance premiums, facility costs, loss of trained personnel etc.), and productivity (loss of work time, travel restrictions, inability to move rapidly etc). The region has had a very high historical tourism potential and it has been dormant because of the terrorism threat and state oppression for many years.

The integration into social and economical activities are developed within the education system. Educational activities were targeted by the PKK (also the Turk government refused the education in the Kurdish language). Because the majority of the people are very resilient to the effects of political violence, young people form a high risk group because of their undeveloped personalities. The effects of political violence on the newer generations is an important issue because, at the moment, the new generation in areas affected by the conflict have no experience living under what would be considered normal conditions.

This conflict became part with the negotiations between Turkey and the European Union (EU) about its eventual integration to the EU.

Toll

Further information: [[:Turkey–Kurdistan Workers Party conflict]]

More than 37,000 people have died since the beginning of the PKK's armed struggle in 1984.[79] According to Denise Natali, the Turkish Armed Forces have destroyed some 8000 Kurdish communities and created 3 to 4 million refugees in the process.[80]

According to Chief of the Turkish General Staff, until September 2008:[10]

  • 32,000 PKK members have been killed and 14,000 have been captured alive.
  • 6,482 Turkish soldiers and security officials have been killed.
  • 5,560 civilians have been killed.

According to Kendal Nezan's article published in July 1998 in Le Monde diplomatique, the conflict has weighed heavily on the Turkish state's budget.[81] In 1993, a sum of $70m was allocated from the prime minister’s secret funds. According to government inspector Kutlu Savaş, this sum was used mainly for procuring weapons and anti-terrorist equipment from Israel and for external operations. Irregular units in the conflictual zones have had to find ways to finance themselves, including racketeering and secret funding. The details of state-sanctioned criminal activities were revealed in the wake of the Susurluk scandal indicating the level of corruption within the Turkish state . Sedat Bucak has been alleged by Kendal Nezan to have 20,000 men under his command, while the village guards, pro-government Kurdish militias created in the mid-1980s, are estimated to number some 64,000.[81]

Footnotes

  1. ^ Two decoded cases: 1) August 27, 1996 mustard/sarin 2) (50 mg/l) of cyanide to three water tanks used by the Air Force.
  2. ^ Kannas, PKC automatic rifle, Dragunov Sniper Rifle, Arbiki, Heckler & Koch G3, M16 rifle, Heckler & Koch PSG1 (G-1), Mauser

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External links

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