Legitimacy of NATO bombing of Yugoslavia
|The Kosovo War|
|Before March 1999|
Kosovo Liberation Army
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The legitimacy of the NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been subject to question by individuals such as Nebojša Malić and Noam Chomsky. The key basis governing the legality of any act of war is international law. In this particular case, a course of action is also bound by other foundations such as the NATO charter and the UN charter, both of which were drafted in accordance with preexisting international regulation. As such, the issue has been shady at times with proponents of both viewpoints citing particular legislation that substantiate their claims on whether the war was or was not legal.
Supporters of the campaign have argued that the action brought to an end the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo's Albanian population, and that the bombing campaign hastened (or caused) the downfall of Slobodan Milošević's government, which they saw as responsible for the international isolation of Yugoslavia, many war crimes, and gross human rights violations. Others view the action as controversial. Noam Chomsky condemned NATO's military campaign in Yugoslavia, particularly its aerial bombing which included the bombing of electricity and water supplies and television stations as well as military targets.
- 1 Humanitarian arguments
- 2 Legal arguments
- 3 Alternative explanations of the motivation behind the bombing campaign
- 4 International acceptance of NATO actions
- 5 References
- 6 External links
NATO's argument for the bombing's legitimacy
- NATO described the conditions in Kosovo as posing a risk to regional stability. As such, NATO and certain governments asserted they had a legitimate interest in developments in Kosovo, due to their impact on the stability of the whole region which is of concern to the Alliance.
The UN Charter
The prohibition against the use of force in the UN Charter can be found in article 2(4) with two specific exceptions against this prohibition provided for in the Charter. The first is in Chapter VII, where the Security Council has been given power in order to fulfill its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 42 states that should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
The second specific exception is found in article 51, regarding the right to self-defence. The article states that nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
While NATO did not have the backing of the United Nations Security Council to use force in Yugoslavia, nor claims an armed attack occurred against another state, its advocates contend that its actions were consistent with the United Nations Charter, claiming that the UN Charter prohibits unprovoked attacks only by individual states but condones unprovoked attacks by military coalitions of several states, such as NATO. The principal issue remains whether the member states of NATO, the U.S. and the European powers, violated the UN Charter by attacking a fellow UN member state in the absence of an attack or a threat of imminent attack on them and in the absence of UN Security Council authorization.
The United Nations considers NATO to be a "regional arrangement" under UN Article 52, which allows them to deal matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. However, the UN policy on military intervention by regional arrangements in UN Article 53 states the Security Council can, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. However, no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.
NATO had justified the actions in Kosovo under Article 4 of its charter, which allows involved parties to consult together whenever political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened. Because the NATO actions in Kosovo were taken after consultation with all members, were approved by a NATO vote, and were undertaken by several NATO members, NATO contends that its actions were in accordance with its charter. Some however argue that Article 5 of NATO's charter restricts NATO's use of force to situations where a NATO member has been attacked. It has been argued however that NATO's actions were in violation of the charter of NATO itself. Critics of this theory argue that the purpose of Article 5 is to require all NATO members to respond when any NATO member is attacked, not to restrict the circumstances under which NATO will choose to use force.
Opponents[who?] of NATO's involvement also argued that the situation in Serbia and Yugoslavia posed no threat to any of the NATO members.
The Vienna Convention
Interpretation Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in the signing of the Rambouillet Agreement by Serbia may conclude that the agreement is void due to the threat or use of force. Since many treaties are signed while the use (or threat) of force is in effect, most scholars[who?] agree that Article 52 refers only to force that is in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Therefore, the question of whether the treaties are void depends on the question of whether NATO's use of force was in violation of the principles of the United Nations.
Alternative explanations of the motivation behind the bombing campaign
China and Russia, both of which are permanent members of the Security Council, vetoed the resolution on the UN Security Council. Even one veto from a permanent member is enough to quash a resolution. US President Bill Clinton then spearheaded the use of force by NATO against the Milošević government.
Some opponents of the NATO intervention cited the timing of the same, coming as it did on the heels of the Monica Lewinsky scandal as an indication that the conflict was merely a "little victorious war" intended for political gain rather than for any humanitarian purpose. Some support for this hypothesis may be found in the fact that coverage of the bombing directly replaced coverage of the Monica Lewinsky scandal in American news cycles.[unreliable source?]
International acceptance of NATO actions
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was critical of the intervention, and of the indecision by the United Nations. Italy, itself a NATO member, was reluctant to agree to the NATO operations due to the tens of thousands of refugees that conflict would bring to Italy. Other NATO members were reluctant too, and especially uncomfortable were new members, Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic. Other countries which condemned the bombing were Russia, China, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Algeria. Iran also condemned the bombing by calling the campaign 'illegal'.
However, a Resolution proposed by Russia condemning the bombing was defeated in the Security Council 12-3, with only Russia, China, and Namibia voting in favor while Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia, and Slovenia, along with NATO members the US, Britain, France, Canada, and Netherlands voted against it.
- Coleman, Katharina Pichler (2007). International Organisations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of International Legitimacy. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-87019-1.
- Erlanger, Steven (2000-06-08). "Rights Group Says NATO Bombing in Yugoslavia Violated Law". The New York Times. Retrieved 2008-11-13.
- Chomsky, Noam (1999). The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo. Pluto Press. ISBN 978-0-7453-1633-8.
- Loeb, Vernon (1999-04-24). "Bit Players Become 'Frontline' States". The Washington Post. Retrieved 2008-11-13.
- "NATO On-line library: Briefing: Bringing peace and stability to the Balkans". Retrieved 30 January 2012.
- "Digital History". Retrieved 30 January 2012.
- Pugh, Michael Charles; Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (2003). The United Nations & Regional Security: Europe and Beyond. Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN 1-58826-232-4.
- Kaplan, William; Donald Malcolm McRae, Maxwell Cohen (1993). Law, Policy and International Justice: Essays in Honour of Maxwell Cohen. McGill-Queen's Press. ISBN 978-0-7735-1114-9.
- Boggs, Carl (2001). The End of Politics: Corporate Power and the Decline of the Public Sphere. Guilford Press. p. 322. ISBN 978-1-57230-504-5.
- Thomas, George (1999-05-15). "NATO and international law". On Line Opinion. Retrieved 2008-11-13.
- , From Watergate to Monicagate: ten controversies in modern journalism and media By Herbert N. Foerstel, pg 131-135.
- Fischer, Horst; Avril McDonald (2000). Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law: 2000. Cambridge University Press. p. 27.
- Williams, Ian (1999-04-19). "Balkan Crisis Report - The UN's Surprising Support". Institute for War & Peace Reporting. Retrieved 2008-11-13.
- Denitch, Bogdan; Ian Williams (1999-04-08). "The Case Against Inaction". The Nation. Retrieved 2008-11-13.[dead link]