|55th Governor of Rio de Janeiro|
March 15, 1991 – April 1, 1994
|Vice Governor||Nilo Batista|
|Preceded by||Moreira Franco|
|Succeeded by||Nilo Batista|
|53rd Governor of Rio de Janeiro|
March 15, 1983 – March 15, 1987
|Vice Governor||Darcy Ribeiro|
|Preceded by||Chagas Freitas|
|Succeeded by||Moreira Franco|
|Member of the Chamber of Deputies|
May 14, 1963 – April 9, 1964
|23rd Governor of Rio Grande do Sul|
March 29, 1959 – March 25, 1963
|Preceded by||Ildo Meneghetti|
|Succeeded by||Ildo Meneghetti|
|23rd Mayor of Porto Alegre|
January 1, 1956 – December 29, 1958
|Preceded by||Martin Aranha|
|Succeeded by||Tristão Sucupira Viana|
|Born||Leonel de Moura Brizola
January 22, 1922
Carazinho, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil
|Died||June 21, 2004
Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
|Political party||Democratic Labour Party|
|Brazilian Labour Party|
|Spouse(s)||Neusa Goulart Brizola|
|Relations||João Goulart (brother-in-law)|
|Children||Neusinha, José Vicente, and João Otávio|
Leonel de Moura Brizola (January 22, 1922 – June 21, 2004) was a Brazilian politician. Launched in politics by Getúlio Vargas, Brizola was the only politician to serve as governor of two different states in Brazil. In 1959 he was elected governor of Rio Grande do Sul, and in 1982 and 1990 he was elected governor of Rio de Janeiro. He was also vice-president of the Socialist International, as well as Honorary President of that organization from October 2003 until his death in June 2004. Brizola and his party (the Democratic Labour Party) practiced a kind of social democratic left-wing politics.
Early life and rise to prominence (1922–1964)
Brizola was the son of a small farmer who was killed when fighting as a volunteer in the 1923 local civil war for the rebel leader Assis Brasil against Rio Grande's dictator, Borges de Medeiros. Brizola was christened Itagiba, but early in life adopted the alias of Leonel, from the rebel warlord Leonel Rocha, known as "The Muleteer of Freedom". He left his mother's house at eleven, working in Porto Alegre as a paperboy, shoeshiner and other occasional jobs until completing high school and entering college. He graduated with a degree in engineering, a trade in which he never worked, as he entered professional politics in his early twenties, having been elected to the Rio Grande State Assembly in 1946. Brizola married Neusa Goulart, João Goulart's sister, and had former President Getúlio Vargas as his best man. Through this marriage, Brizola became not only a wealthy landowner, but also a regional leader of the Brazilian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro or PTB). After Vargas's death, he inherited the undisputed regional leadership of his party, while his brother-in-law ruled the PTB national caucus. Both perpetuated Vargas' populist tradition, especially, in Brizola's case, the practice of a direct personal link between charismatic leader and the broad masses. During the presidency of Goulart (1961–1964) Brizola was an important supporter of his brother-in-law, first as governor and later as a deputy in the National Congress of Brazil.
As governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Brizola raised himself to preeminence for his social policies, expressed in the speedy building of public schools in poor neighborhoods across the state (brizoletas). He also supported policies directed towards the improvement of the condition of small autonomous farmers and landless rural workers, sponsoring the creation of the corporation MASTER (Rio Grande Landless Rural Workers Movement).
Brizola gained nationwide visibility mostly by acting in defense of democracy and Goulart's rights as president. When Jânio Quadros resigned from the presidency in August 1961, the Brazilian military ministers in the Cabinet attempted to prevent Vice-President Goulart from becoming president on the grounds of his alleged ties with the Communist movement. After winning support from the local army commander, General Machado Lopes, Brizola forged the so-called "cadeia da legalidade" (legality broadcast) from a pool of radio stations in Rio Grande do Sul, which issued a nationwide call from Palácio Piratini denouncing the intentions behind the Cabinet ministers' actions and encouraging common citizens to go into the streets to protest. Brizola surrendered the State Police Force to the regional army command and began organizing paramilitary Committees of Democratic Resistance, and considered handing out firearms to civilians. After twelve days of impending civil war, the attempted coup failed, and Goulart was inaugurated as president.
What offered him international highlights, however, were his nationalist policies: having a blueprint as governor for speedy industrialization of the state, Brizola developed a program for the constitution of a wide basis of state-owned industrial utilities, that led him eventually to the nationalization of American public utilities trusts' assets in Rio Grande, such as ITT and Electric Bond & Share (local branch of American & Foreign Power Company, itself owned by the holding Electric Bond and Share Company ). These nationalizations made their way towards American press headlines when the John F. Kennedy administration was trying to counter what it saw as "Communist infiltration" in Brazil by striking a deal with Goulart - which included hefty US financial aid to the Brazilian federal government. In such a context, Brizola's actions made for a major diplomatic embarrassment, which promptly turned Brizola's State government into one of the intended targets of the Hickenlooper Amendment. As Goulart eventually caved in to American pressure on the issue, accepting to pay what was seem by many on the Left as excessive compensations to both ITT & Amforp in exchange for finantial aid, Brizola could -and did - present his in-law as a defector from the nationalist cause.
Through his initiatives, in both domestic and foreign politics, Brizola had become a major player on the national Brazilian plane, eventually developing presidential aspirations of his own, which he could not legally fulfill at the time, as Brazilian law didn't allow close relatives of the acting President to present themselves as candidates for the following term of office. Between 1961 and 1964, Brizola acted as the radical wing of the independent left, where he pressured the office for an agenda of radical social and political reforms in general, as well as for a specific change in the electoral legislation that allowed for his presidential candidacy in 1965. Seen as personally authoritarian and quarrelsome, and not above dealing with his enemies by means of physical aggression, as in a famous case when he hit the rightwing journalist David Nasser in the middle of the Rio de Janeiro airport, Brizola acted in the political game around the Goulart government as a freebooter, being feared and hated by both the political moderate Left and the Right. This role was especially visible when Brizola moved his constituency from Rio Grande do Sul to a national political center, winning a landslide victory (269,384 ballots or a quarter of the State's electorate) in the 1962 election to Congress as a representative for the State of Guanabara- i.e., the Rio de Janeiro municipality, reorganized as a city-state after the national capital had been moved to Brasilia. A layer of lore quickly developed around Brizola's efforts to supposedly "steal" his brother-in-law's Goulart "political thunder".
In early 1963, Brizola took control of a radio broadcast in Rio, Rádio Mayrink Veiga, which he used as a means to propagate his fiery rhetoric, and toyed with constituting a grassroots network of political cells composed of small groups of armed men, the so-called "elevensome" (Grupos de Onze, paramilitary parties modeled on a soccer team).
Brizola's insurrectional posturing and rhetoric seemed to justify the classification developed at the time by Goulart's Foreign Minister and leader of the moderate left, San Tiago Dantas: Brizola was the paragon of a "negative left" which, in its uncompromising, ideological defense of social reform, forsook any compromise with democratic institutions. Brizola, however, was personally neither an ideologue nor a doctrinnaire. Generally, he stood, on a purely empirical basis, for an extreme Left Nationalism (land reform, extension of the franchise for illiterates and NCOs) and for tight controls over foreign investment, something that earned him the dislike of the American ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, who went so far as to compare Brizola's propaganda techniques with those of Joseph Goebbels, a mood mirrored by most of contemporary American media.
In late 1963, after a conservative plan of economic adjustment (Plano Trienal), devised by the Ministry of Planning Celso Furtado, had failed, Brizola involved himself in a bid for power by means of an attempt to topple Goulart's economically conservative Minister of Finance Carvalho Pinto in order to take the post himself. Brizola wanted to foster his radical agenda, and reportedly said at the time, "if we want to make a revolution, we must have the key to the safe". Brizola's bid for the Ministry eventually failed, the post being given to a nonentity. Nevertheless, this did much to radicalize Brazilian political life at the time, as put by the most politically conservative newspaper O Globo at the time, it was as if "the task of putting down the fire fell to the chief arsonist".
Seen with hindsight, many authors contend that Brizola's uncompromising radicalism denied his brother-in-law's government the ability to "compromise and conciliate" so as to foster a feasible reformist agenda. Other authors, however, contend that Brizola only struggled for a reformist agenda centered on concrete issues (land reform, extension of the franchise, foreign capital controls), whose mere acceptance as such was regarded as simply unbearable and indigestible by the existing ruling classes and its international allies, and whose deployment was therefore alien to the contemporary political system, irrespective of its formally democratic character. In a March 1964 State Department telegram sent to the (approvingly) American Embassador in Brazil, US support to the incoming military coup was equated with denying both Goulart & Brizola a position of democratic legitimacy that allowed them to foster their "extremist" blueprints.
Exile and return (1964–1979)
In April 1964, when a coup d'état overthrew Goulart, Brizola was the only political leader to offer active support for the president, sheltering him in Porto Alegre, capital of Rio Grande do Sul, with the hope that a bid could be made at rousing the local army units towards the restoration of the toppled régime. Brizola engaged himself immediately in various schemes for confronting the military putschists, including a fiery public speech delivered before the Porto Alegre City Hall, exhorting army NCOs to "occupy barracks and arrest the generals" something that earned him the lasting hatred of the dictatorship's military top brass. After a month of no success in Rio Grande, Brizola eventually fled in early May 1964 to Uruguay, where Goulart had previously gone into exile, after offering little support to his in-law's attempts at armed resistance.
As a political loner during his early Uruguayan exile, Brizola eventually came to prefer insurrectionist politics rather than reformist, appearing as a kind of belated revolutionary leader. In early 1965, a group of Brizola's sympathizers (mostly Army NCOs) staged a botched attempt at the articulation of a theater for guerrilla warfare in the Eastern Brazilian mountains of Caparaó, which amounted for little more than some underground military training, and was suppressed without a single fire being shot. Another group of Brizolista guerrillas dispersed only after a shoot-out with the army in Southern Brazil. This event raised suspicions about Brizola's mismanaging of funds offered to him by Fidel Castro. Except for this episode, Brizola spent the first ten years of the Brazilian military dictatorship generally on his own in Uruguay, where he managed his wife's landed property and kept aloof of domestic news from various opposition movements in Brazil. Characteristically, he rejected attempts at being recruited into the Frente Ampla (Broad Front), a mid-1960s informal caucus of pre-dictatorship leaders, intent on pressuring for redemocratization, which included Carlos Lacerda and Juscelino Kubitschek, and even broke the few remaining ties with his brother-in-law, and fellow exile, João Goulart over the attempted recruitment.
In the late 1970s, however, the emergence of a military dictatorship in Uruguay allowed the Brazilian government to pressure the authorities of Uruguay to seize Brizola into the framework of Operation Condor, the cooperation between Latin American dictatorships for hounding leftist opponents. Brizola may have owed his physical survival to the efforts of the Jimmy Carter administration to curb Human Right abuses in Latin America, as in 1977 he was deported from Uruguay for alleged "violations of norms of political asylum", and was given immediate asylum in the United States.
According to recent declassified Brazilian diplomatic documents, on 20 September 1977, Brizola and his wife went to Buenos Aires, from whence they took a plane to the USA. As the Argentinian capital was at the time a very dangerous place for Latin American exiles, the Brizolas were followed by American CIA agents, and stayed overnight in a CIA safe house at the Argentinian capital, from where they boarded a nonstop flight to New York on September 22. Shortly after arriving in New York, Brizola met with US Senator Edward Kennedy, who helped the Brazilian to be allowed to stay in the US for six-months. From a suite at the Roosevelt Hotel, Brizola profited from his American stay to organize a network of contacts with Brazilian exiles and American academics interested in devising an strategy for ending military rule in Brazil. Later, Brizola moved from the USA to live in Portugal, where, through Mario Soares, he approached the Socialist International leadership, therefore siding with a Social-Democratic, reformist blueprint for post-dictatorship Brazil. Also, during his American stay, Brizola was contacted by Afro-Brazilian activist Abdias do Nascimento, and became acquainted with identity politics, something that would give a new shape to his post-dictatorship career. In a political manifesto launched in Lisbon - the Charter of Lisbon, which stated his intention of re founding a Labor Party in Brazil, Brizola adhered to race politics by stating that Blacks and Native Brazilians suffered from more unjust and painful forms of exploitation than regular class exploitation, and therefore needed special measures which addressed their particular plights.
In the late 1970s the Brazilian military dictatorship was in the wane; in 1978, as passports were quietly being given to prominent political exiles, Brizola remained blacklisted, alongside a core group of supposed "radicals" as "public enemy number one", and was refused the right of return. It was only in 1979, after a general amnesty, that his exile came to an end.
Late Brizolismo (1979–1989)
Brizola returned to Brazil with the avowed intention of restoring the Brazilian Labour Party as a radical nationalist Left mass movement and as a confederacy of historical Vargoist bigwigs. However, he was hampered in this by the emergence of new grassroots movements such as the new trade unionism centered around the São Paulo metalworkers and their leader Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, as well as the Catholic grassroots organizations of the rural poor spawned by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, CNBB. Eventually, he was denied the right to use the historical name of the Brazilian Labour Party, previously conceded to a rival group centered around a military dictatorship-friendly figure, the Congresswoman Ivete Vargas, the grandniece of Getúlio Vargas. Instead, Brizola founded an entirely new party, the Democratic Labour Party (Partido Democrático Trabalhista, PDT). The party joined the Socialist International in 1986, and since then the party symbol has contained a hand with a red flower (symbol of SI).
Brizola quickly restored his position of political prominence in his home state of Rio Grande do Sul, at the same time acquiring political preeminence in the State of Rio de Janeiro, where he was to develop his search for a new basis of political support. Instead of associating with the organized working class, either by means of corporatist trade unionism, or by vying with Lula and the WP for the support of the new trade unionism, Brizola searched for a basis of support among the unorganized urban poor, by means of an ideological tie-in between traditional radical nationalism and a charismatic lumpen-friendly populism, in what a scholar called "the aesthetics of the ugly". For his opponents, Brizola and his Brizolismo stood for shady deals with the "dangerous", resentful, "overrebellious" underclasses; for his supporters, they stood for the empowerment (although in a paternalistic fashion) of the destitute, the lowest, least organized and poorest layers of the working classes. "Politics, from a Brizolista viewpoint, is above all to assume a radical option for the poor and the meek".
In short, the late Brizola shunned the class-based, corporatist character of his early populism, and adopted instead a Christian rhetoric of friendship to the "people" in general, more akin to the Russian narodniks than to classical Latin American populism. This brand-new radical populism, notwithstanding its being seen as a threat to more orderly liberal-democratic politics, however, suffered from a fatal flaw: lacking mastery of more impersonal mass politics techniques, it required the charismatic and highly personal leadership of Brizola in order to function effectively. In Brizola's absence, or without the presence, at least, of his persona, the PDT could never become a contender to power, something that hampered its development on the national level.
In 1982, Brizola entered the race for governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro in the first free and direct gubernatorial elections in that state since 1965. He ran a ticket of candidates for Congress that tried to compensate for his party's lack of cadres by offering a roster of people with no previous ties to professional politics, such as the Native Brazilian leader Mário Juruna and the singer Agnaldo Timóteo, as well as a sizeable number of Afro-Brazilian activists. Aware that this last foray into race politics contradicted his previous and more conventionally radical policies, Brizola nicknamed his ideology Socialismo Moreno ("Socialism of Color" or "mixed-race socialism").
At the same time, he centered his personal campaign on burning issues such as education and public security, offering a candidacy that had clear oppositional overtones and proposed to upheld the Vargoist legacy. By developing a nucleus of combative militants around himself, the so-called Brizolândia, Brizola led a campaign that melded violent confrontations and street brawls with a paradoxically festive mood, expressed by the motto Brizola na cabeça (a pun between "Brizola at the head of the ticket" and "High on Brizola", brisola being a contemporary slang for a small parcel of cocaine).
In order to have his victory in the 1982 elections acknowledged, Brizola had first to publicly denounce what was described by the paper Jornal do Brasil as an attempt at fraudulent accounting of the ballots by the private contractor Proconsult, a computer engineering firm owned by former military intelligence operatives, contracted by the electoral court in order to supposedly offer speedy electoral statistics. During the early ballot counting process, Proconsult repeatedly supplied media with communiqués offering belated voting statistics from rural areas (where Brizola was at a disadvantage), which were immediately echoed by TV Globo. By denouncing this supposedly fraud at various press conferences interviews and public statements - which included a verbal showdown with Globo CEO Armando Nogueira on live TV - Brizola preempted the scheme of any chance of success, as official ballot numbers eventually came to give him a lead.
Brizola then proceeded to keep and expanded his nationwide political visibility during his controversial first term as governor of Rio (1983–1987). He developed his early education policies in a grander scale, by means of an ambitious programme of construction of huge fundamental and high school buildings, the so-called CIEPs(" Integrated Centers for Public Education") whose architectural project had been made by Oscar Niemeyer and were supposed to be open on a day long basis, providing food as well as recreational activities to students. During this time he also developed policies for providing public services and recognized housing property for dwellers in shantytowns. In a nutshell, Brizola opposed policies for shantytowns based on forcible resettlement to housing projects, and proposed instead, in the words of his chief adviser Darcy Ribeiro, that "slums are not part of the problem, but part of the solution". Once property rights were acknowledged and basic infrastructure provided, it was up to the shantytown dwellers themselves to find their own solutions as far as house-building was concerned.
Brizola also adopted a radical new policy for police action in the poor suburbs and slums (favelas) within the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan area. Alleging old relations and modus operandi were founded on repression, conflict and disrespect, he ordered the state police to refrain from random criminal-searching raids at favelas and also repressed the activities of vigilante death squads, which included policemen on leave. These policies were opposed by the Right, who contended that it made slums an open territory for organized crime, represented by huge gangs like Comando Vermelho (Red Command), by means of a conflation between common criminality and leftism. It was alleged that gangs had been born through the association of common convicted prisoners and leftist political prisoners in the 1970s.
Brizola's policies, which included a no small amount of porkbarrel, poor management, personalism, and wild spending of public funds, as well as displaying a tendency at opportunistic, short term solutions, nevertheless procured for him the political clout required for running for president in 1989.
Amid the ongoing economic crisis and rampant inflation of 1980s Brazil, there were many conservative observers who took Brizola as chief radical bogey, a throwback to 1960s populism. It was during the 1989 presidential election that Brizola's charismatic leadership would expose its shortcomings when he finished the first run third, losing the second position, which would have qualified him for a runoff, by a very narrow margin to Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, whose Workers' Party had exactly the cadres, the professional activism and the deep penetration in the organized social movements that Brizola's lacked. Fernando Collor de Mello was eventually elected in the runoff. Brizola carried the first round elections regionally, winning huge majorities in both his home state of Rio Grande do Sul and in his adopted home state of Rio de Janeiro, but only received 1.4% of the votes from São Paulo state. Contrariwise, Lula used his stronghold in the most industrialized areas of the Southeast as a springboard,and managed to gather new voters in the Northeast, where Brizola was practically a no show candidate.Eventually, Lula won the right to stand against Collor in the runoff elections, surpassing Brizola by a mere 0.6% of the electorate.
Brizola, however, was a staunch supporter of Lula's candidacy in the 1989 run-off elections, something he justified by a humorous declaration before PDT cronies that remains to this day in Brazilian political lore: "I will be candid: a politician from the old school, Senator Pinheiro Machado, once said that politics is the art of swallowing toads (engolir sapo). Wouldn't that be fascinating to force-feed Brazilian élites and having them to swallow the Bearded Toad, Lula?" Brizola's support was crucial in blostering voting for Lula in both Rio de Janeiro & Rio Grande do Sul, where Lula passed from a first round 12.2% in Rio de Janeiro and 6.7% in Rio Grande to a second round 72.9% in Rio and 68.7% in Rio Grande.
Political decline and death (1989–2004)
After the 1989 election there were still chances that Brizola could achieve his dream of winning the Presidency if only he could overcome his party's absence of national penetration. Therefore, some of his advisers proposed him a candidacy to the Senate in the ensuing 1990 elections, something that could offer him national highlights. Brizola, however, refused, preferring to present himself as a candidate to the gubernatorial elections in the same year, winning a second term as Governor of Rio de Janeiro by a first-round majority of 60.88% of all valid ballots. The second term of Brizola as Rio's governor was a political failure, whose hallmarks were the various instances of disorganized management caused by Brizola's ultra centralism and distaste for proper bureaucratic procedure, being further marred by the support eventually offered by Brizola to the Collor administration in exchange for funds for public works. That exchange allowed Brizola to be charged with collaborating with the embezzlement schemes that would lead to Collor's 1992 impeachment.
Emptied of national support and forsaken by close associates such as Cesar Maia and Anthony Garotinho, who decided to abandon Brizola's ship for the sake of their personal careers, Brizola nevertheless ran again for president on the PDT's ticket, amid the success of Minister of Finance and presidential candidate Fernando Henrique Cardoso's anti-inflation Plano Real. The 1994 presidential elections were a huge failure for Brizola, who scored fifth place on an election in which Cardoso was elected in the first round by an absolute majority. It was the end of Brizolismo as a national political force, as expressed by the fact that some weeks before actual elections, the kiosk in downtown Rio de Janeiro, around which Brizolandia cronies met, was torn down by City Hall officers, never to be rebuilt. During Cardoso's first term, Brizola remained an acerbic critic of his neoliberal policies of privatization of public companies, going so far as to affirm in 1995 that "if there is no civil reaction to privatization, there will be a military one". When Cardoso ran for reelection four years later, Brizola contented himself with a Vice Presidential candidacy on Lula's ticket, and both lost to Cardoso.
In his final years Brizola took another shift in his jagged relationship with Lula and the Workers' Party, refusing to support them in the first round of the 2002 presidential elections, supporting instead the candidacy of Ciro Gomes for president, while personally entering the race for a seat in the Senate. Gomes finished third, while Lula was elected president and Brizola lost his bid for the Senate, in what was his end even as a regional force. Although Brizola supported Lula in the second round of the 2002 elections, therefore qualifying for jumping into his victorious bandwagon with other preeminent political figures, he came to be regarded as a secondary character in his last two years, a mere veteran of Left Populism. Despite supporting Lula at some periods during his first term, Brizola's last public appearances were wont at criticizing him for what he termed neoliberalist policies and for neglecting traditional left-wing and workers' struggles. Brizola's late takes on Lula also took a more personal character. During May 2004, he was one of the sources for a Larry Rohter story on Lula's supposed alcoholism, where he told the then New York Times correspondent about having advised Lula "to get hold of this thing and control it".
Brizola died 21 June 2004 after a heart attack. He planned to run for the Presidency in 2006 and, although ailing, had just received his former confederate Anthony Garotinho and his wife Rosinha Garotinho the day before.
- "ITAPOAN FM FAZ DOBRADINHA COM RÁDIO METRÓPOLE NO CORONELISMO RADIOFÔNICO DE SALVADOR". Archived from the original on October 27, 2009., (Portuguese)
- F.C. Leite Filho, El caudillo Leonel Brizola: um perfil biográfico. São Paulo: Aquariana, 2008, ISBN 978-85-7217-112-0 , pages 233/234; others, however, contend that Brizola's father was simply a common thief murdered for running away with someone else's livestock: Cf. R. S. Rose, The Unpast: Elite Violence And Social Control In Brazil, 1954–2000. Ohio University Press, 2005, pages 54/55
- PDT homepage
- Cf. Carlos E. Cortés, Gaúcho politics in Brazil: the politics of Rio Grande do Sul, 1930–1964. Albuquerque : University of New Mexico Press, 1974, page 162
- Cf. Arthur José Poerner, Brizola quem é? Rio de Janeiro, 1989: Editora Terceiro Mundo, page16
- Biorn Maybury-Lewis, The Politics of the Possible: The Brazilian Rural Workers' Trade Union Movement, 1964–1985. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994, ISBN 1-56639-167-9 , page 126
- Cf. John W. F. Dulles, Castello Branco: the making of a Brazilian president. College Station, Texas A&M University Press, 1978, page 250. What created the crisis around Goulart was the fact that the Brazilian 1946 Constitution allowed for the (direct) election of a President and Vice-President from different tickets; therefore the leftist Goulart was Vice-President to the maverick rightist Quadros.
- Cf. Angelina Cheibub Figueiredo, Democracia ou Reformas?. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1993, page 43
- cf. Betariz T. Daudt Fischer, "Arquivos Pessoais: Incógnitas e Possibilidades na Construção de uma Biografia", IN Elizeu Clementino de Souza, ed. Tempos, Narrativas E Ficções: a Invenção de Si. Porto Alegre, EDIPUCRS, 2006, ISBN 85-7430-591-X, page 277, footnote. Available at 
- Samir Perrone de Miranda, "Projeto de Desenvolvimento e Encampações no discurso do governo Leonel Brizola: Rio Grande do Sul, 1959-1963". UFRGS, Master dissertation in Political Science, 2006, available at . Retrieved June 26, 2014
- Ruth Leacock, Requiem for revolution: the United States and Brazil, 1961–1969. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1990, page 85. ISBN 978-0-87338-402-5 . Available at . Page 89
- Noel Maurer, The Empire Trap: The Rise and Fall of U.S. Intervention to Protect American Property Overseas, 1893-2013. Princeton University Press, 2013, ISBN 978-0-691-15582-1 ,page 329
- Jeffrey Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America. New York, Routledge, 2007, ISBN 0-415-97770-3, Chapter 5
- Leacock, 85 ; CIA released document,13th. July 1962, available at 
- Arthur Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, Volume 1. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1978 , page 579
- Noel Maurer, The Empire Trap,329/330
- Jeffrey Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy
- Be it said, however, that Nasser was known at the time by his lack of scruples ("A reactionary to the marrow, who used his privileged condition ... to work for the worst causes" - João Aveline, Macaco preso para interrogatório: retrato de uma época , Porto Alegre, AGE, 1999, page 131, available at ) and had been heaping vitriol on Brizola, by calling him, among other things, a "halfwit" (boçal) who " had learnt to read in the Southern wind at the university of horse thieves": Cf. Luís Maklouf,Cobras criadas: David Nasser e O Cruzeiro , São Paulo: Editora SENAC, ISBN 85-7359-212-5, page 424
- Mauro Osório, Rio nacional Rio local: mitos e visões da crise carioca e fluminense. Rio de Janeiro: SENAC, 2005, page 97
- R.S. Rose, The Unpast, 55
- Cf. Thomas Skidmore, Brazil: de Getúlio a Castelo, Portuguese translation of Politics in Brazil 1930–1964. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1982, pages 340/341. Leacock, Requiem for Revolution, 151, however, adds that the "elevensome" actually existed mostly in Brizola's imagination, that they represented "political theater more than anything else"
- Apud Gabriel da Fonseca Onofre, "San Tiago Dantas e a Frente Progressista (1963-1964)". XIV Encontro Regional da ANPUH-Rio, 2010, ISBN 978-85-609790-8-0
- Skidmore, Brasil de Gatulio a Castelo, 304
- In 1963, it fell to Brizola, as leader of the nationalist caucus in the House of Representatives, to present a bill with a comprehensive project for land reform, which proposed paying indemnities to expropriated landowners by means of government bonds; cf. João Pedro Stédile,Douglas Estevam, eds., A questão agrária no Brasil: Programas de reforma agrária, 1946–2003 . São Paulo: Expressão Popular, 2005, ISBN 85-87394-71-1 , page 81
- New York Times, 23rd. May 1963, apud Skidimore, Brasil de Getúlio a Castelo, 304
- In the Time Magazine issue of 19th of July 1963, he was called "Latin America's noisiest leftist South of Cuba". Cf. 
- Skidmore Brasil de Getúlio a Castelo, 324
- João Roberto Laque, Pedro e os Lobos. Ana Editorial, 2010, pages 83/84
- Jan Knippers Black, United States Penetration of Brazil. The University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977, ISBN 0-7190-0699-6 ,page 26.
- Demian Melo, A Miséria da Historiografia. B.A. Monograph, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, originally published as a paper in Outubro, n.14, p. 111–130, 2006, available at . Retrieved 26 May 2013
- Lincoln Gordon, Brazil's second chance: en route toward the first world, Brookings Institution Press, 2001, ISBN 0-8157-0032-6, page 69
- Leite Filho, El caudillo Leonel Brizola, 275
- David R. Kohut & Olga Vilella, Historical Dictionary of the 'Dirty Wars' . Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2010, ISBN 978-0-8108-5839-8, page 81
- Cf. the rabidly anti-Brizola account offered by the former War Minister of the dictatorship, the diehard general Sylvio Frota: Ideais Traídos, Rio: Jorge Zahar Editor, 2006, ISBN 85-7110-904-4, pages 487/489. Still in the 1990s and 2000s, "to miss the military dictatorship and hate Brizola", stood as cliché for rightist diehard:Luiz Eduardo Soares,André Batista,Rodrigo Pimentel, Elite Squad: A Novel, New York: Weinstein Books, 2008 ISBN 978-1-60286-090-2
- Robert Jackson Alexander,Eldon M. Parker, A history of organized labor in Brazil. Westport, CN: Praeger, 2003, ISBN 0-275-97738-2, page141
- Denise Rollemberg, O apoio de Cuba à luta armada no Brasil: o treinamento guerrilheiro, Rio de Janeiro: MAUAD, 2001 , ISBN 85-7478-032-4, page 29; and Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical & Critical Study, New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 2009, ISBN 978-0-7658-0406-8 , page 329, calls Brizola, alongside with Carlos Marighella and Carlos Lamarca, as" spostati (misfits) by choice".
- Catholic Church. Archdiocese of São Paulo (Brazil), ed., Torture in Brazil: A Shocking Report on the Pervasive Use of Torture by Brazilian Military Governments, 1964–1979. University of Texas Press, 1986, page 100
- Marcelo Ridenti, 'O fantasma da revolução brasileira São Paulo:UNESP, 1993, ISBN 85-7139-050-9, page 214
- Rollemberg, O apoio de Cuba à luta armada no Brasil, 29/31; Rollemberg also speaks of possible support offered Brizola by the People's Republic of China and the Guyanese Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan
- Lincoln de Abreu Penna (org.), Manifestos Políticos do Brasil contemporâneo. Rio de Janeiro: E-papers, 20085, ISBN 978-85-7650-183-1, page 288
- R.S. Rose, The Unpast, 137
- Cf. J. Patrice McSherry, Predatory states: Operation Condor and covert war in Latin America, Rowman & Littlefield, 2005, ISBN 978-0-7425-3687-6, page 164;something for which Brizola held a lifelong gratitude to Carter, cf. George A. López & Michael Stolz, eds. Liberalization and redemocratization in Latin America. Westport, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1987, page 248 . Brizola's personal gratitude to Carter raised a few hackles among his leftist friends: the filmmaker Glauber Rocha complained that Brizola had made friends with "Carter, the Van Johnson of politics" - cf. Darcy Ribeiro,Isa Grinspum Ferraz (ed.),Utopia Brasil, São Paulo, Hedra, 2008, ISBN 978-85-7715-025-0, page 115
- Jan Knippers Black, Latin America, its problems and its promise: a multidisciplinary introduction. Westview Press, 1995, page 480
- Folha de S. Paulo, August 22, 2010: "Um gaúcho em NY"
- McSherry, Predatory states, 164
- James N. Green, We Cannot Remain Silent: Opposition to the Brazilian Military Dictatorship in the United States. Duke University Press, 2010, page 344
- Oswaldo Munteal Filho, As Reformas de Base na Era Jango. Post-Doctorate report, Fundação Getúlio Vargas/EBAPE, Rio de Janeiro, 2008, page 200, available at  . Retrieved November 24, 2013
- James N. Green, We Cannot Remain Silent, 345
- Ana Lucia Araujo, Public Memory of Slavery. Amherst, NY: 2010, Cambria Press, ISBN 978-1-60497-714-1 , page 220
- João Trajano Sento-Sé. Brizolismo. Rio de Janeiro: Espaço e Tempo/Editora FGV, 1999, ISBN 85-225-0286-2, 53
- Sento Sé, Brizolismo, 89/96
- Riordan Roett, Brazil: politics in a patrimonial society . Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999, ISBN 0-275-95900-7, page 50, available at 
- Sento Sé, Brizolismo, Chapter III
- Alba Zaluar,Marcos Alvito, eds., 1 século de favela. Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 1988, ISBN 85-225-0253-6, page 41
- Sento Sé, Brizolismo, 163
- "As much as the narodnicks turned towards the peasants, brizolistas turned themselves towards shantytown dwellers and outcasts of all hues" -Sento Sé, Brizolismo, 194
- Sento Sé, Brizolismo, 193
- Henry Avery Dietz,Gil Shidlo, eds. , Urban Elections in Democratic Latin America. Wilmington, DE, Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, ISBN 0-8420-2627-4 , page 284
- "If, on one side, bureaucratic logic imposes ... a routinization of charisma, as posed by Max Weber, on the other side Brizola's movement achieved, in Rio de Janeiro, a kind of enchantment of bureaucracy, even in its routine working" - Sento Sé, Brizolismo, 197
- Kurt von Mettenheim, The Brazilian Voter: Mass Politics in Democratic Transition, 1974–1986. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995, page 122
- Ana Lucia Araujo, Public Memory of Slavery: Victims and Perpetrators in the South Atlantic. Amhrest, NY, Cambria Press, 2010, ISBN 978-1-60497-714-1, page 221
- Rebecca Lynn Reichmann, ed., Race in Contemporary Brazil: From Indifference to Inequality. Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999, ISBN 0-271-01905-0 , page 15
- Sento Sé, Brizolismo, 224/227
- Maria Alves,Philip Evanson, Living in the Crossfire: Favela Residents, Drug Dealers, and Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011, ISBN 978-1-4399-0003-1, page 221
- "Há 30 anos, 'JB' revelou escândalo do Proconsult e derrubou fraude na eleição". Jornal do Brasil, online edition, 27 November 2012 , . Retrieved September 27, 2013
- Leite Filho, El Caudillo Leonel Brizola, 496/497
- Jornal Nacional - A Notícia Faz História (Rede Globo festschrift). Rio: Jorge zahar Editor, 2004, page 111
- Francisco Machado Carrion Jr., Brizola: Momentos de Decisão". Porto Alegre: L&PM, 1989, page 55
- Cf. Aduato Lúcio Cardoso, "O Programa Favela-Bairro - Uma Avaliação", paper, available at 
- cf. Wolfgang S. Heinz & Hugo Frühling, Determinants of gross human rights violations by state and state-sponsored actors in Brazil, Uruguay, Chile and Argentina, 1960–1990, The Hague, Kluwer, 1999, page 202, footnote; Paul Chevigny,Bell Gale Chevigny,Russell Karp, Police abuse in Brazil: summary executions and torture in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, Americas Watch Committee, 1987, page 17
- Cf. Robert Gay, Popular organization and democracy in Rio de Janeiro: a tale of two favelas. Philadelphia : Temple University Press, 1994, pages 29/31, available at 
- Alfred P. Montero, Shifting States in Global Markets. Pittsburgh: U. Of Penn. Press, 2010, ISBN 0-271-02189-6 , page 152; Manfred Wöhlke, Brasilien 1983: Ambivalenzen seiner politischen und wirtschaftlichen Orientierung. Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1983, page 17
- Donald V. Coes, Macroeconomic Crises, Policies, and Growth in Brazil, 1964–90. World Bank Publications, 1995, ISBN 0-8213-2299-0, page 56
- Jacky Picard, ed. Le Brésil de Lula: Les défis d'un socialisme démocratique à la périphérie du capitalisme. Paris: Khartala, 2003, page 81
- Mettenheim, The Brazilian Voter, 122
- André Singer, Esquerda e direita no eleitorado brasileiro: a identificação ideológica nas disputas presidenciais de 1989 e 1994. São Paulo: EDUSP, 2002, ISBN 85-314-0524-6, page 61
- Brazilian Finace Ministry electronic news clipping
- Wendy Hunter, The Transformation of the Workers' Party in Brazil, 1989–2009. Cambridge University Press, 2010, ISBN 978-0-521-51455-2 , page 111
- Sento Sé, Brizolismo, 232
- Sento Sé, Brizolismo, 263/264
- Sento Sé, Brizolismo, 294
- Sento-Sé, Brizolismo, 346
- Larry Diamond,Marc F. Plattner,Philip J. Costopoulos, eds.,Debates on Democratization, The Johns Hopkins University Press / National Endowment for Democracy, 2010, ISBN 978-0-8018-9776-4 , page 49, note 6
- Svenja Schell, Die Geschichte der brasilianischen Arbeiterpartei 'Partido dos Trabalhadores' ". GRIN Verlag, ISBN 978-3-640-61812-5, page 20
- "Brazilian Leader's Tippling Becomes National Concern". New York Times, May 09 2004, . Retrieved June 01 2013
- Leite Filho, El Caudillo Leonel Brizola, 517
- The Guardian obituary, 23 June 2004, . Retrieved June 01 2013
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