E. F. L. Wood, 1st Earl of Halifax
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Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, 1st Earl of Halifax, KG, OM, GCSI, GCMG, GCIE, TD, PC (16 April 1881 – 23 December 1959), known as The Lord Irwin from 1925 until 1934 and as The Viscount Halifax from 1934 until 1944, was one of the most senior British Conservative politicians of the 1930s, during which he held several senior ministerial posts, most notably as Foreign Secretary from 1938 to 1940. As such he is often regarded as one of the architects of the policy of appeasement prior to World War II. During the war, he served as British Ambassador in Washington.
- 1 Early career
- 2 Viceroy of India
- 3 Halifax and foreign policy
- 4 Ambassador to the United States and later life
- 5 Legacy
- 6 In popular culture
- 7 See also
- 8 Notes
- 9 Bibliography
- 10 References
- 11 Further reading
- 12 External links
He was born into a Yorkshire family. He and his siblings were sickly: his three older brothers died in infancy, leaving him the heir to his father's viscountcy. He was born with a withered left arm with no hand, a disability that in no way affected his riding, hunting or shooting. He was nicknamed the "Holy Fox" by Winston Churchill in reference to these pursuits, his title and also his religiosity, for like his father he was a devout Anglo-Catholic. His childhood was divided mainly between Hickleton Hall near Doncaster and Garrowby in North Yorkshire.
He was son of the 2nd Viscount Halifax. He was educated at Eton and Christ Church, Oxford, becoming a Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, was Member of Parliament for Ripon from 1910 to 1925 when he was elevated to the peerage. He saw some active service in World War I as a major in the Queen's Own Yorkshire Dragoons but remained mostly behind the lines, being moved to a desk job in 1917. In 1918 he wrote in co-operation with George Ambrose Lloyd (later Lord Lloyd) "The Great Opportunity", aiming to set an agenda for a revived Conservative Party separate from the Lloyd George coalition.
Turned down by South Africa for the post of Governor General (it was holding out for a cabinet minister or member of the royal family) and snubbed by Winston Churchill on his assumption of the post of Under-Secretary for the Colonies — on one occasion he stormed into Churchill's office and told him that he "expected to be treated like a gentleman" — a thwarted Wood voted for the downfall of Lloyd George's government and became President of the Board of Education under Andrew Bonar Law in 1922. He held this position (in which he was neither interested nor particularly effective) until 1924 when he was apparently equally undistinguished as Minister for Agriculture under Stanley Baldwin. His career had seemingly become bogged down.
Viceroy of India
Wood was Viceroy of India from 1926 to 1931, proposed in 1925 at the suggestion of King George V, no doubt mindful of his immediate family background (his grandfather had been Secretary of State for India). Created Baron Irwin, he arrived in Bombay on 1 April 1926 hoping to improve Anglo-Indian relations and calm interfaith tensions in the country.
His rule was marked by a period of great political turmoil. The exclusion of Indians from the Simon Commission examining the country's readiness for self-government provoked serious violence, and he was forced into concessions which were poorly received: in London as excessive, in India as half-hearted. Incidents included protests against the Simon Commission Report; the Nehru Report; the All-Parties Conference; the Muslim League leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah's 14 points; the Civil Disobedience Movement launched by the Indian National Congress under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi; and the Round Table Conferences.
He had all the Congress leaders put behind bars and then opened negotiations with Gandhi. Some criticism of Irwin may have been unfair, but he had made an error and the consequences were serious and unrest grew. Irwin's attempts to mediate with Indian leaders were stymied by London's refusal to make concessions, or clarify the position on dominion status.
With little room for manoeuvre, Irwin resorted to repression using his emergency powers to arrest Gandhi, ban public gatherings and crush rebellious opposition, leading to the death of Lala Lajpat Rai and the revenge attack of Bhagat Singh. Gandhi's detention, however, only made matters worse. Irwin ultimately opted to negotiate, signing the Delhi Pact in January 1931, which ended civil disobedience and the boycott of British goods in exchange for a Round Table Conference that represented all interests. The fortnight-long discussions resulted in the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, after which the Civil Disobedience Movement was suspended.
The agreement between Gandhi and Irwin was signed on 5 March 1931. The salient points were:
- The Congress would discontinue the Civil Disobedience Movement.
- The Congress would participate in the Round Table Conference.
- The Government would withdraw all ordinances issued to curb the Congress.
- The Government would withdraw all prosecutions relating to offences not involving violence.
- The Government would release all persons serving sentences of imprisonment for their activities in the civil disobedience movement.
It was also agreed that Gandhi would join the Second Round Table Conference as the sole representative of the Congress.
On 20 March 1931, Irwin paid tribute to Gandhi's honesty, sincerity and patriotism at a dinner given by ruling princes. A month following the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, Lord Irwin retired and left India. On Irwin's return to England in April 1931, the situation was calm, but within a year the conference collapsed and Gandhi was again arrested.
Despite the mixed outcomes, Irwin was overall a successful Viceroy; he had charted a clear and balanced course, and had not lost the confidence of his home government. He had demonstrated toughness and independence. His successful term as Viceroy ensured that he returned to British politics with significant prestige. He formally opened the Indian School of Mines Dhanbad as a premier institute of advanced studies in field of mining and geological sciences.
Halifax and foreign policy
The same year Irwin turned down the position of Foreign Secretary in favour of time at home. Still a firm protege of Baldwin's, Irwin returned to Education in 1932, a position enlivened by his continuing (now backroom) role in Indian politics, his attainment of the position of Master of the Middleton Hunt in 1932 and his election as Chancellor of Oxford University in 1933. In 1934 he inherited the title Viscount Halifax from his father. In the period that followed he held a succession of government posts: Secretary of State for War for five months in 1935, Lord Privy Seal (1935–1937) and Lord President of the Council (1937–1938) under Stanley Baldwin and, after 1937, Neville Chamberlain.
The appointment of Anthony Eden as Foreign Secretary in 1935 seemed initially to tie in well with Halifax's feelings about the direction of foreign policy. The two were in agreement (and in line with prevailing opinion throughout Britain) that Germany's remilitarization of the Rhineland — its "own backyard" — would be difficult to oppose and should be welcomed insofar as it continued Germany's seeming progress towards normality after the tribulations of the post-World War I settlement. However, after Chamberlain succeeded Baldwin in 1937, the new prime minister began increasingly to intervene directly in foreign policy, activity for which his background had not prepared him, and which caused increasing tension with Eden.
Halifax said the Hoare-Laval proposals "were not so frightfully different from those put forward by the Committee of Five. But the latter were of respectable parentage: and the Paris ones were too much like the off-the-stage arrangements of nineteenth-century diplomacy".
In November 1937 Halifax went to Germany at the invitation of Hermann Göring on the pretext of a hunting exhibition (Göring was a passionate hunter and gave Halifax the nickname Halalifax, after Halali!, a German hunting call), but Halifax was publicly and correctly regarded as acting on behalf of the British government to renew dialogue with the German government. A long and barbed meeting with Adolf Hitler ensued. On meeting the Führer, Halifax almost created an incident by nearly handing his coat to him, believing him to be a footman: "As I looked out of the car window, on eye level, I saw in the middle of this swept path a pair of black trousered legs, finishing up in silk socks and pumps. I assumed this was a footman who had come down to help me out of the car and up the steps, and was proceeding in leisurely fashion to get myself out of the car when I heard Von Neurath or somebody throwing a hoarse whisper at my ear of ‘Der Fuhrer, de Fuhrer’; and it then dawned upon me that the legs were not the legs of a footman, but of Hitler". In discussions Halifax ignored Eden's reservations and indicated clearly to Hitler that German designs on Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia and Poland were not regarded as illegitimate by the British, but that only peaceful processes of change would be acceptable. Writing to Baldwin on the subject of the conversation between Karl Burckhardt (the League of Nations' Commissioner of Danzig) and Hitler, Halifax said: "Nationalism and Racialism is a powerful force but I can't feel that it's either unnatural or immoral! I cannot myself doubt that these fellows are genuine haters of Communism, etc.! And I daresay if we were in their position we might feel the same!"
The following year Eden resigned, exasperated by the continued interference of the Prime Minister in foreign affairs and his increasingly determined policy of appeasement (particularly of Benito Mussolini, whom Eden regarded as an untrustworthy gangster). For Halifax, as for Chamberlain and the Chiefs of Staff, every effort had to be made to prevent an alignment of the three great threats to peace and the British Empire: Italy, Germany and Japan. Halifax replaced Eden as Foreign Secretary in February 1938.
Halifax's political line as Foreign Secretary must be seen in the context of existing British foreign policy, which was predicated on a broad consensus that in none of the democracies was there popular support for war, military pressure or even rearmament. There was debate about the extent to which the dictatorships' very separate interests could be teased apart. It was clear that an alignment of Germany and Italy would divide Britain's forces in any general war; and that, without at least a neutral Italy, Britain would be unable to move large naval forces east to confront Japan, given America's refusal to help. For many, especially in the Foreign Office, appeasement was a necessary compromise to buy time for rearmament, a process to which Britain was already heavily committed. For others, especially Churchill, a strong military alliance with France would permit a more robust foreign policy towards the dictators. Churchill was not unusual in the confidence he placed in the large French Army; he was more isolated in his belief that France would be a resilient ally.
Chamberlain and many others who were deeply opposed to war and defence spending embraced the policy of appeasement as a moral force for good. By comparison, Halifax's policy, like that of Samuel Hoare, appears more pragmatic, coupled to a firm albeit unenthusiastic commitment to rearmament. All parties recognised the hostility of public opinion to war or military preparations, and the difficulty of acting without a readiness on the part of America or Russia to play their part (the Labour party was to oppose rearmament until well after Munich). Nonetheless, Halifax (along with Chamberlain, Hoare and twelve others) was criticised as an appeaser in the anonymous 1940 book Guilty Men.
In March 1938 Hitler annexed Austria and Czechoslovakia was clearly next on the agenda, with neither Britain nor France having the military capacity to support Czechoslovakia. Halifax remained in London at the key moments of the Munich crisis of September 1938, where Chamberlain's personal intervention was dramatic. It was during the Munich crisis that Halifax began to take a stronger line than Chamberlain against further concessions to Germany. It appears that a frank conversation with his pugnacious Permanent Secretary, Sir Alexander Cadogan brought Halifax to the sharp realisation that the road to appeasement had taken Britain into a series of concessions that were unwise, and that were unlikely to secure the necessary pacification of Germany. From this point on – as Andrew Roberts, in particular, argues – Halifax set his face firmly towards a policy of deterrence based on increased rearmament, including the reintroduction of conscription; strengthening of alliances and economic support to Eastern Europe; and a firmer line towards Germany, Italy and Japan in the hope that increased British resolution would increase the risks of a combination of all three (it is of note that, when war did begin, neither Japan nor Italy was prepared to join in until the pendulum had swung much further in Germany's favour).
The eventual Munich settlement, while hugely popular around the world and humiliating to many in the British government, was short of Hitler's desires (and of Chamberlain's proposed concessions) and increased Hitler's determination to return to destroy Czechoslovakia in the spring. In the following months, as Hitler's lack of commitment to the Munich agreement became clearer, Halifax worked steadily to assemble a stronger British position, pushing Chamberlain to take economic steps to underpin British interests in Eastern Europe and prevent additional military supplies (e.g., tungsten) from reaching Germany. In particular, it was Halifax's immediate granting of a guarantee to Poland on 31 March 1939 —- triggered by alarming intelligence of German preparations -— that set a firm trigger for war should Germany ignore this signal that, in Halifax's words, there would be "no more Munichs".
In early April 1939, the Foreign Office received intelligence that Italy was about to invade Albania. At a Cabinet meeting on 5 April 1939, Halifax rejected these reports. Two days later, Italy invaded Albania; Halifax met Sir Alexander Cadogan and "decided we can't do anything to stop it".
In the early days of the war, January 1940, Halifax met an emissary of Ulrich von Hassell, a leading member of the German resistance. He stated that, "he personally would be against the Allies taking advantage of a revolution in Germany to attack the Siegfried Line."
Churchill as Prime Minister
On 8 May 1940, Chamberlain's government survived a motion of no confidence brought about by the deteriorating military situation in Norway. The Government, with a majority in the House of 213, won the vote with a majority of 81. Thirty-three Conservatives and eight of their allies voted with the opposition parties and 60 abstained. Churchill, who had never had a good relationship with Chamberlain and had only grudgingly been appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, nevertheless mounted a strong and passionate defence of Chamberlain and his Government in the debate preceding the vote.
Under ordinary circumstances, the result of the vote would not have been a disaster, but at a time when the Prime Minister was being strongly criticised by both side of the House and there was a strong desire for national unity it was catastrophic. After the vote, Chamberlain asked to see Churchill. He told him that he felt dejected and did not think he could go on. Chamberlain stated that he would attempt to form a coalition government with the Labour and Liberal Parties. Churchill was opposed to this.
At a meeting the following day attended by Chamberlain, Halifax, Churchill and the co-leaders of the opposition Labour Party (Clement Attlee and Arthur Greenwood), Chamberlain asked the Labour leaders if they would agree to serve in a coalition government. They replied that they doubted whether this would be possible in a government led by Chamberlain, but that it might be possible with a different Prime Minister. But before they could officially answer they would need to consult the rank and file members of the Labour Party, then at their annual conference in Bournemouth. They were asked to telephone with the result of this consultation by the following afternoon.
Churchill's own account of these events, written six years later, is misleading. It describes the events of the 9th as having taken place the following day, and the description of Chamberlain attempting to persuade him to tacitly agree to Halifax's appointment as Prime Minister does not correspond with Halifax's having expressed his reluctance to do so to Chamberlain at a meeting between the two men on the morning of the 9th.
In his memoirs, Halifax later wrote:
I had no doubt at all in my own mind that for me to succeed him would create a quite impossible situation. Apart altogether from Churchill's qualities as compared with my own at this particular juncture, what would in fact be my position? Churchill would be running Defence, and in this connexion one could not but remember the relationship between Asquith and Lloyd George had broken down in the first war... I should speedily become a more or less honorary Prime Minister, living in a kind of twilight just outside the things that really mattered.
The Labour leaders telephoned at 5 p.m. on the 10th to report that the party would take part in a coalition government, although this had to be under the leadership of someone other than Chamberlain. Accordingly, Chamberlain went to Buckingham Palace to tender his resignation, recommending the King to ask Churchill to form a government. On doing so, one of his first actions was to form a new, smaller, war cabinet by replacing six of the Conservative politicians with Greenwood and Attlee, and retaining only Halifax and Chamberlain.
Churchill's political position was weak; although he was popular with the Labour and Liberal Parties for his stance against appeasement in the 1930s, he was mistrusted by many members of the Conservative Party, nor would he have been the choice of the King. Halifax had the support of most of the Conservative party and of the King, and was acceptable to the Labour party. His position as a peer was a merely technical barrier given the scale of the crisis, and Churchill reportedly was willing to serve under Halifax. As Lord Beaverbrook said, "Chamberlain wanted Halifax. Labour wanted Halifax. Sinclair wanted Halifax. The Lords wanted Halifax. The King wanted Halifax. And Halifax wanted Halifax." The last sentence was incorrect, however; Halifax did not want to become Prime Minister. He believed that Churchill's energy and skills as leader of a desperate cause were superior to his. Like Chamberlain he served in Churchill's cabinet, frequently exasperated by Churchill's style of doing business.
May 1940 War Cabinet Crisis
On 10 May 1940, the day Churchill became Prime Minister, Germany invaded Belgium, the Netherlands, and France, and on 22–23 May the Germany army reached the English Channel, isolating the British Expeditionary Force. Churchill soon had a confrontation with Halifax, who believed that in view of the successful German invasion of France and the encirclement of British forces at Dunkirk, the United Kingdom should try to negotiate a peace settlement with Hitler, using Mussolini as an intermediary. Churchill disagreed, believing "that nations which went down fighting rose again, but those which surrendered tamely were finished" and that Hitler was unlikely to honour any agreement. Moreover he believed that this was the view of the British people.
On 24 May, Hitler issued the order for his armies to halt before they reached Dunkirk. Two days later the British and French navies, assisted by the Royal Air Force, began an evacuation of the Allied forces. Between 25 and 28 May, Churchill and Halifax fought to bring the British War Cabinet around to their own respective points of view; by 28 May it seemed as if Halifax had the upper hand and Churchill might be forced from office as Chamberlain supported Halifax's position of pursuing a negotiated peace. However, Churchill outmanoeuvred Halifax by calling a meeting of his 25-member Outer Cabinet, to whom he delivered a passionate speech, saying "If this long island story of ours is to end at last, let it end only when each one of us lies choking in his own blood upon the ground", convincing all present that Britain must fight on against Hitler whatever the cost.
Churchill told the War Cabinet that there would be no negotiated peace. Halifax had lost. A few weeks later, in July 1940, Halifax rejected German peace offers presented through the Papal Nuncio in Berne and the Portuguese and Finnish prime ministers.
Churchill retained Halifax as Foreign Secretary for seven months, but the two men had never enjoyed a close relationship. In the spring of 1940, during heated Cabinet discussions as France teetered towards defeat, Halifax energetically participated in the debates for and against a recourse to total war and lone opposition to Germany, whatever the cost to Britain's long-term military and economic standing. The Cabinet believed that Italian offices might open peace negotiations and Churchill argued that playing for time was in Britain's interest, but Halifax was concerned that the British Expeditionary Force would be destroyed, and Britain would lose its last bargaining chip. Churchill won the argument, and the BEF was saved at Dunkirk.
Halifax wrote in his memoirs of an occasion during a short holiday in Yorkshire:
One such interlude early in June 1940 is for ever graven into my memory. It was just after the fall of France, an event which at the time it happened seemed something unbelievable as to be almost surely unreal, and if not unreal then quite immeasurably catastrophic. Dorothy and I had spent a lovely summer evening walking over the Wolds, and on our way home sat in the sun for half an hour at a point looking across the plain of York. All the landscape of the nearer foreground was familiar—its sights, its sounds, its smells; hardly a field that did not call up some half-forgotten bit of association; the red-roofed village and nearby hamlets, gathered as it were for company round the old greystone church, where men and women like ourselves, now long dead and gone, had once knelt in worship and prayer. Here in Yorkshire was a true fragment of the undying England, like the White Cliffs of Dover, or any other part of our land that Englishmen have loved. Then the question came, is it possible that the Prussian jackboot will force its way into this countryside to tread and trample over it at will? The very thought seemed an insult and an outrage; much as if anyone were to be condemned to watch his mother, wife or daughter being raped.
Ambassador to the United States and later life
In January 1941 Halifax was sent to Washington, D.C., on the death in office there of Ambassador Marquess of Lothian; he was the last man linked with appeasement to leave the Cabinet, as Chamberlain, Hoare and Simon had already departed.
Halifax, a cautious and elusive public figure, was not an effective public diplomat unlike his predecessor. His relations with President Roosevelt were satisfactory, but Halifax kept a low profile. Churchill's close engagement with the United States and his investment in personal communication with the President meant a more constrained role for the British Ambassador. Communications technology meant that Churchill could communicate directly with Roosevelt and was a regular visitor to Washington. Relations also increasingly turned on military issues channelled through the Joint Chiefs of Staff secretariat in Washington.
In mourning after the death of his middle son in action in 1942, Halifax wearied of Washington and asked Anthony Eden to find someone to replace him, but he stayed until 1946, witnessing the transition to Harry S. Truman and Clement Attlee. Those years contained fraught moments and challenges for the relationship as American power eclipsed that of Britain, and Britain's interests and rights were on occasion ignored, in particular the cessation of nuclear co-operation after construction of the atom bomb. However, the UK-US partnership in World War II was immensely successful and as close as any other such partnership. It was a demanding post by any standards, but Halifax could reasonably claim to have played his part, and he enjoyed a notably longer term than his less successful successor, Archibald Clark Kerr, 1st Baron Inverchapel.
Halifax took part in a plethora of international conferences over the UN and the Soviet Union but, again, he believed that Churchill's view of the Soviet threat was exaggerated and urged him to be more conciliatory, perhaps indicating his reluctance to learn the lessons of the 1930s so obvious in his 1957 autobiography The Fulness of Days, described in the Dictionary of National Biography as "gently evasive".
In retirement from 1946, he returned to largely honorary pursuits as Chancellor of the University of Sheffield and the Order of the Garter and Chairman of the BBC. He died at his estate at Garrowby shortly before Christmas 1959, aged 78.
To one of his supporters, Harold Begbie, Halifax was "the highest kind of Englishman now in politics" whose "life and doctrine were in complete harmony with a very lofty moral principle, but who has no harsh judgement for men who err and go astray".
In 1968 the official records of Halifax's years as Foreign Secretary were released (the "fifty-year rule" was replaced by the "thirty-year rule".) The Conservative historian Maurice Cowling wrote in 1975: "To history, until yesterday, Halifax was the arch-appeaser. This, it is now recognised, was a mistake. His rôle, however, was complicated. In these pages he is not the man who stopped the rot, but the embodiment of Conservative wisdom who decided that Hitler must be obstructed because Labour could not otherwise be resisted".
In popular culture
- Halifax features in the novel The Remains of the Day by Kazuo Ishiguro and the 1993 film of the same name, in which he is portrayed by Peter Eyre.
- Halifax appears in the film Gandhi, portrayed by Sir John Gielgud. The film incorrectly depicts him as possessing a left hand.
- Halifax appears as Lord Irwin in the film The Legend of Bhagat Singh, played by the Israeli actor Gil Alon.
- Halifax is a significant character in Michael Dobbs' novels Winston's War and Never Surrender.
- He is portrayed by British actor Richard Durdon in the BBC docudrama miniseries Dunkirk (2004).
- His cabinet struggle with Churchill is the subject of the 2011 play Three Days in May by Ben Brown.
- He appears as a character in the BBC television drama The Cambridge Spies played by James Fox.
- He was played by Donald Sumpter in the HBO/BBC biographical film Into the Storm.
- Halifax is mentioned in the 2011 novel The Afrika Reich, an alternative history novel in which Halifax became Prime Minister following the fictitious massacre of British forces at Dunkirk, the novel's divergence point, and negotiated an uneasy peace with Nazi Germany.
- In the alternative history novel Dominion by C. J. Sansom, World War II ended in June 1940 when the British government, under the leadership of Halifax, signed a peace treaty with Nazi Germany in Berlin. Due to poor health, Halifax resigned as Prime Minister in 1941 and was succeeded by the 78-year-old David Lloyd George.
- In the alternative history novel For the Sake of England by Richard K. Burns, in which Winston Churchill was born in New York City in 1874 when his mother Jennie Jerome left his father Lord Randolph Churchill and was elected President of the United States in 1936, Halifax became Prime Minister in 1940 and signed a peace treaty with Nazi Germany after the Battle of France. However, Hitler betrayed Halifax and attacked the UK in 1941, leading the United States to enter the war.
- In 2012's Season 2 of Upstairs Downstairs, Halifax is portrayed by British actor Ken Bones.
- List of people on the cover of Time Magazine: 1920s – 12 Apr 1926
- Keith Feiling, A Life of Neville Chamberlain (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 275.
- The Earl of Halifax, Fulness of Days (London: Collins, 1957), p. 185.
- Andrew Roberts, ‘The Holy Fox’. The Life of Lord Halifax (Phoenix, 1997), p. 67.
- "Britain to increase spending on arms". The Guardian. Retrieved 2 September 2013.
- Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm. The Authorized History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, 2009), p. 208.
- "Conduct of the War". Hansard. 8 May 1940. Retrieved 2 January 2013.
- Jenkins 2002, p.582.
- Jenkins 2002 p. 586.
- Jenkins 2002 p.583.
- Blake, Robert (1993). "How Churchill Became Prime MInister". In Blake, Robert B.; Louis, William Roger. Churchill. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 264–270. ISBN 0-19-820626-7.
- "Churchill decides to fight on". BBC. Retrieved 1 January 2013.
- Halifax, p. 215.
- Martin, Stanley (2007). The Order of Merit: one hundred years of matchless honour. London: I. B. Tauris. p. 375.
- A Gentleman with a Duster [pseud. for Harold Begbie], The Conservative Mind (London: Mills & Boon, 1924), pp. 47–48.
- Harold Macmillan, Winds of Change (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. 531.
- Lord Butler, The Art of the Possible (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1971), p. 77.
- Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Hitler. British Politics and British Policy. 1933–1940 (Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 9.
- "Making history with brick and mortar". Hindustan Times. 15 September 2011.
- Churchill, Winston S. Their Finest Hour. New York, 1949.
- Churchill, Winston S. The Gathering Storm. Boston, 1948.
- Colville, John. The Fringes of Power: 10 Downing Street Diaries 1939–1955. New York, 1985.
- Dalton, Hugh. The Fateful Years, Memoirs 1939–1945. London, 1957.
- Gilbert, Martin. Churchill: A Life. New York, 1991.
- Gilbert, Martin. Finest Hour: Winston S. Churchill 1939–1941. London, 1983.
- Gilbert, Martin (ed). The Churchill War Papers Volume I: At the Admiralty. September 1939 – May 1940. London, 1993.
- Gilbert, Martin (ed). The Churchill War Papers Volume II: Never Surrender. May 1940 – December 1940. London, 19
- Gries, Thomas E. (ed). The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean. West Point, New York 2002.
- Halifax, Lord. Fullness of Days. New York, 1957.
- Jenkins, Roy, Churchill. London: Pan, 2002. ISBN 0 330 48805 8
- Lidell Hart, B.H.. History of the Second World War. Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky & Konecky, 1970. ISBN 978-1-56852-627-0
- Lukacs, John. Five Days in London: May 1940. Yale University, 1999 ISBN 0-300-08466-8
- Roberts, Andrew. The Holy Fox The Life of Lord Halifax. London, 1991.
- Young, Peter (ed). Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia. Volume 2. Jaspard Polus, Monaco 1966.
- Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, 2009).
- A Gentleman with a Duster [pseud. for Harold Begbie], The Conservative Mind (London: Mills & Boon, 1924).
- Lord Butler, The Art of the Possible (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1971).
- Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy, 1933–1940 (Cambridge University Press, 1975).
- Keith Feiling, A Life of Neville Chamberlain (London: Macmillan, 1970).
- The Earl of Halifax, Fulness of Days (London: Collins, 1957).
- Andrew Roberts, ‘The Holy Fox’: The Life of Lord Halifax (Phoenix, 1997).
- Alan Campbell-Johnson and R. Hale. Viscount Halifax: A Biography. 1941
- Earl of Birkenhead. Earl of Halifax: The Life of Lord Halifax. Hamilton, 1965.
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- Hansard 1803–2005: contributions in Parliament by the Earl of Halifax
- Lord Irwin
- Biography at spartacus schoolnet
- Lord Halifax, Our War Aims – Now and After, radio broadcast November 1939