General Luigi Cadorna
September 4, 1850|
Verbania, Piedmont-Sardinia (now part of Italy)
|Died||December 21, 1928
|Allegiance||Kingdom of Italy|
|Service/branch||Royal Italian Army|
|Years of service||1868 - 1924|
|Rank||Marshal of Italy|
|Battles/wars||World War I|
Luigi Cadorna (September 4, 1850, Verbania, Piedmont-Sardinia – December 21, 1928) was an Italian Field Marshal, most famous for being the chief of staff of the Italian army during the first part of World War I.
Luigi Cadorna was born to General Raffaele Cadorna in Verbania Pallanza, Piedmont in 1850. In 1860 Cardona became a student at the "Teuliè" Military School in Milan. At fifteen he entered the Turin Military Academy. Upon graduation he was commissioned as a second lieutenant of artillery in 1868. In 1870, as an officer in the 2nd Regiment of Artillery, Cadorna participated in the occupation of Rome as part of a force commanded by his father. As major he was appointed to the staff of General Pianell, afterwards taking the post of Chief of Staff of the Verona Divisional Command. As Colonel commanding the 10th Regiment of Bersaglieri from 1892 Cadorna acquired a reputation for strict discipline and harsh punishment. He wrote a manual of infantry tactics which laid stress on the doctrine of the offensive. Promoted to lieutenant general in 1898 Cadorna subsequently held a number of senior staff and divisional/corps command positions. On the eve of Italy's entry into World War (1915) he was close to peace-time retirement age and had a history of differences with his political and military superiors.
Cadorna had been offered the post of Chief of Staff for the first time in 1908, which he had rejected over the issue of political control during wartime. He was again offered the position in July 1914, as the Triple Entente and Central Powers girded for war. When Italy entered the war in May 1915 on the side of the Entente, Cadorna fielded thirty-six infantry divisions composed of 875,000 men, but with only 120 modern artillery pieces.
First World War
Cadorna launched four offensives in 1915, all along the Isonzo River. The goal of these offensives was the fortress of Gorizia, the capture of which would permit the Italian armies to pivot south and march on Trieste, or continue on to the Ljubljana Gap. All four offensives failed, resulting in some 250,000 Italian casualties for little material gain. Cadorna would ultimately fight eleven battles on the Isonzo between 1915 and 1917. Additional forces were arrayed along the Trentino salient, attacking towards Rovereto, Trento, and Bolzano. These attacks also failed. The terrain along the Isonzo and Trentino was completely unsuited for offensive warfare–mountainous and broken, with no room for maneuver.
On October 24, 1917, a combined Austro-Hungarian/German army struck across the Soča (the Slovene name for the Isonzo River) at Kobarid (called Caporetto in Italian) and by November 12 had advanced all the way to the Piave River. Cadorna's disposition of most of his troops far forward, with little defense in depth, contributed greatly to the disaster; but graver still were the responsibilities of other officers, notably Pietro Badoglio, then corps commander in a sector overrun by the Austro-German attack. Cadorna himself had been on leave for most of October and his immediate subordinate was seriously ill.
The Italian Army fled in disarray and seemed on the verge of total collapse; 275,000 soldiers surrendered. Italy's allies Britain and France sent eleven divisions to reinforce the Italian front, and insisted on the dismissal of Cadorna. The new Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando was in agreement with the need for more competent military leadership and Cadorna was replaced as Chief of General Staff with the respected General Armando Diaz; Cadorna was appointed as the Italian representative to the Allied Supreme War Council set up in Versailles. Then the Italian forces rallied behind the Piave and Monte Grappa and reversed, with the help of the Allied divisions, the course of the conflict.
After the war, there was an enquiry held by the Italian government to investigate the defeat at Caporetto. It was published in 1919 and was highly critical of Cadorna, at that time a bitter man busy with writing his memoirs who claimed that he had no responsibility for the defeat, despite fleeing to Padua during the battle and abandoning the entire Italian Second Army to its fate. Nevertheless, he was made a Field Marshal (Maresciallo d'Italia) in 1924 after Benito Mussolini seized power.
Field Marshal Cadorna died in Bordighera in 1928.
Historians record Cadorna as an unimaginative martinet who was ruthless with his troops and dismissive of his country's political authorities. David Stevenson, Professor of International History at the London School of Economics describes him as earning "opprobrium as one of the most callous and incompetent of First World War commanders". In manner he appeared as a reserved and aristocratic officer of the old-fashioned Piedmontese school. During the course of the war Cadorna dismissed 217 officers and during the Battle of Caporetto he would order the summary execution of officers whose units retreated. One in every seventeen Italian soldiers under his leadership faced a disciplinary charge during the war and 61 percent were found guilty. About 750 were executed, the highest number in any army in World War I. Claims have been made that he also reintroduced the ancient Roman practice of decimation - the killing of every tenth man - for units which failed to perform in battle. However the military historian John Keegan records that his "judicial savagery" took the form of the summary executions of individual stragglers rather than the formalized winnowing of entire detachments.
He was the father of Raffaele Cadorna, Jr, an Italian general who fought during World War I and World War II, who was famous as one of the commanders of the Italian Resistance against German occupying forces in north Italy after 1943.
- Marshall, 108. Keegan claims 25 divisions. See Keegan, 227.
- Marshall, 108-110.
- Keegan, 347.
- Stevenson, David. With Our Backs to the Wall. p. 24. ISBN 978-0-713-99840-5.
- Marshall, 215.
- Stevenson, David. With Our Backs to the Wall. p. 101. ISBN 978-0-713-99840-5.
- Duggan, Christopher. The Force of Destiny. p. 391. ISBN 978-0-713-99709-5.
- Keegan, 227.
- Hew Strachan (2003) The First World War
- David Gilmour (2011). The Pursuit of Italy. Penguin Group. p. 288.
- Keegan, John. The First World War. pp. 375–376. ISBN 0 09 1801788.
- One specific instance of actual decimation occurred in the Italian Army, in May 1916 involving the execution of one in ten soldiers of a 120 strong company of the 141 º Catanzaro Infantry Brigade which had mutinied killing officers, carabinieri and other soldiers. Two days later Cadorna endorsed the shooting of the 12 mutineers in a telegram sent to senior officers, but it is not clear whether he had been responsible for initiating this draconian measure
- Keegan, John (1999). The First World War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. ISBN 0-375-40052-4.
- Marshall, S. L. A.. The American Heritage History of World War I. New York: American Heritage.