Martin Shubik

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Martin Shubik (born March 24, 1926) is an American economist, who is Professor Emeritus of Mathematical Institutional Economics at Yale University. He was educated at the University of Toronto and Princeton University. On the Yale faculty since 1963, Shubik specializes in strategic analysis, the study of financial institutions, the economics of corporate competition, and game theory. A collection of Shubik's papers, with an emphasis on his work with game theory, is housed at the Rubenstein Library at Duke University.[1] He has written many books and essays, including Political Economy, Oligopoly and Experimental Games, 1999,[2] and The Theory of Money and Financial Institutions, 2004.[3]

In 2010, Shubik was recognized by the American Economic Association as a Distinguished Fellow for "major contributions to a variety of fields in economics."[4][5] The associated AEA citation discusses papers (co)authored by Shubik on computational and game-theoretical representations of for example:

  • a two-sided market in which a product that comes in large, indivisible units (houses, cars, etc.) is exchanged for money[6]
  • the phenomenon of escalation among competitors [such that] actual behavior may deviate from the purely rational mode of play embodied in Nash equilibria[7]
  • money play[ing] a crucial strategic role [as a] central paradigm in monetary analysis [with the generality of the Walrasian model][8]
  • the shift in warfare brought about by the increasing permeability of national borders.[9][5]

Shubik is the middle of three children. His siblings are Philippe Shubik, the cancer researcher and founder of the Toxicology Forum, and Irene Shubik, a former BBC producer.

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ "Martin Shubik Papers, 1947-2007 and undated (bulk 1960-1993)". Rubenstein Library, Duke University. 
  2. ^ Martin Shubik, 1999. Political Economy, Oligopoly And Experimental Games: The Selected Essays of Martin Shubik, 2 v., Edward Elgar. Description and several chapter-preview links: Part I Political Economy; Part II Oligopoly; Part III Gaming; Part IV Game Theory and Operations Research.
  3. ^ Martin Shubik, 2004. The Theory of Money and Financial Institutions, MIT Press:
    v. 1. Description, contents, and chapter-preview links
    v. 2. Description and contents.
    v. 3: Description.
  4. ^ Elhanan Helpman and David M. Kreps were fellow honorees in 2010.
  5. ^ a b American Economic Association, 2010. Distinguished Fellows, "Martin Shubik".
  6. ^ Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik, 1971. "The Assignment Game I: The Core," International Journal of Game Theory, 1(1), pp. 111-130.
  7. ^ Martin Shubik, 1971. "The Dollar Auction Game: A Paradox in Noncooperative Behavior and Escalation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 15(1), pp. 109-111.
  8. ^ • Martin Shubik, 1973. "Commodity Money, Oligopoly, Credit, and Bankruptcy in a General Equilibrium Model," Economic Inquiry, 11(1), pp. 24–38.
       • Martin Shubik and Charles Wilson, 1977. "The Optimal Bankruptcy Rule in a Trading Economy Using Fiat Money," Journal of Economics, 37(3-4), pp. 337-354.
       • Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik, 1977. "Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment," Journal of Political Economy, 85(5), pp. 937-968.
  9. ^ Martin Shubik, 1997. "Terrorism, Technology, and the Socioeconomics of Death," Comparative Strategy, 16(4), pp. 399-414.

Selected publications[edit]

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  • 1953. "A Comparison of Treatments of a Duopoly Situation," wirh J. P. Mayberry and J. F. Nash, Econometrica, 21(1), pp. 141-154.
  • 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," with Lloyd S. Shapley, American Political Science Review, 48(3), pp. 787-792. Reprinted in A. Roth, ed., 1988. The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley. Cambridge, ch. 3, 41-48.
  • 1959. Strategy and Market Structure: Competition, Oligopoly, and the Theory of Games, Wiley. Description and review extract.
  • 1959. Edgeworth Market Games.
  • 1960. "Game Theory as an Approach to the Firm," American Economic Review, 50(2), pp. 556-559.
  • 1962. "Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing," Management Science, 8(3), pp. 325-343
  • 1969. "On Market Games," with Lloyd S. Shapley, Journal of Economic Theory, 1(1), pp. 9-25.
  • 1969. "On the Core of an Economic System with Externalities," with Lloyd S. Shapley, American Economic Review, 59(4, Part 1), pp. 678-684.
  • 1970. "A Curmudgeon's Guide to Microeconomics," Journal of Economic Literature, 8(2 ), pp. 405-434.
  • 1971. "The Assignment Game I: The Core," with Lloyd S. Shapley, International Journal of Game Theory, 1(1), pp. 111-130.
  • 1977. "Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment," with Lloyd S. Shapley, Journal of Political Economy, 85(5), pp. 937-968
  • 1978. "Game Theory: Economic Applications," in W. Kruskal and J.M. Tanur, ed., International Encyclopedia of Statistics, v. 2, pp. 372-78.
  • 1980. Market Structure and Behavior, with Richard Levitan, Harvard University Press. Review extract.
  • 1981. "Game Theory Models and Methods in Political Economy," in K. J. Arrow and M. D. Intriligator, Handbook of Mathematical Economics, v. 1, pp. 285-330. Elsevier.
  • Game Theory in the Social Sciences, v. 1 & 2, MIT Press:
1985. Concepts and Solutions. Description.
1987. A Game-Theoretic Approach to Political Economy. MIT Press. Description and review extract.
  • 1987. "A Critique of Rational Expectations Equilibrium," with Pradeep Dubey and John Geanakoplos, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 16(2), pp. 105-137.
  • 1990. "A Game Theoretic Approach to the Theory of Money and Financial Institutions," ch. 5, in B. M. Friedman and & F. H. Hahn, ed. Handbook of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, v. 1, pp. 171-219.
  • 1993. "Worldwide Nuclear Coalition Games: A Valuation of Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces," Operations Research, with Jerome Bracken, 41(4), pp. 655-668.

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