Military deception

Military deception is an attempt to amplify, or create an artificial fog of war or to mislead the enemy using psychological operations, information warfare and other methods. As a form of strategic use of information (disinformation), it overlaps with psychological warfare. To the degree that any enemy that falls for the deception will lose confidence when it is revealed, he may hesitate when confronted with the truth.

When referring to military deception in military doctrines of the Soviet Union and Russia, the Russian loanword maskirovka (literally: camouflage, concealment) is sometimes used.

Large scale examples

World War I

Before the Battle of Megiddo (1918) the Egyptian Expeditionary Force commanded by General E. Allenby, masked the movement of three cavalry division from the eastern end of the front line to the western end on the Mediterranean Sea, where the successful infantry breakthrough was exploited by the mounted divisions. These divisions moved under cover of darkness, to naturally camouflaged areas in olive and orange groves, behind the front line. Meanwhile the remaining mounted division reinforced with infantry maintained the illusion that the valley was fully garrisoned.

They achieved this deception by building a bridge in the valley, infantry were repeatedly marched into the Jordan Valley (Middle East) during the day, driven out by motor lorry at night, and marched back in the next day. In the vacated regimental lines the tents which were left standing, 142 fires were lit each night and 15,000 dummy horses, made from canvas and stuffed with straw, wore real horse–rugs and nose–bags. Every day mules dragged branches up and down the valley (or the same horses were ridden backwards and forwards all day, as if taking the animals to water) to keep up the normally thick clouds of dust.

Further Allenby's staff disseminated a mass of false information and clues, including a grand race meeting to be held on the day the battle began. And Fast’s Hotel in Jerusalem was suddenly evacuated, sentry boxes placed at its entrances and rumours spread that it was to become Allenby’s advanced headquarters in preparation for a renewal of the Transjordan campaign eastwards towards Amman and Es Salt.

During the concentration of Allenby's force on the western end of the front line, German and Ottoman aircraft were unable to carry out reliable aerial reconnaissances as the British and Australian aircraft had virtual complete dominance of the skies. Only four of their aircraft succeeded in crossing the lines during the period of concentration, prior to Megiddo as against over 100 during one week in June.

Though these deceptions did not induce Liman von Sanders, commander of the Ottoman Army in Palestine, to concentrate his forces on the eastern flank, nor did he concentrate his forces on the western flank. Allenby was, thereby able to concentrate a superior force by five to one in infantry and even more in artillery on the Mediterranean flank opposing the Ottoman XXII Corps, where the main attack was successfully made.

World War II

Before Operation Barbarossa, the German High Command masked the creation of the massive force arrayed to invade the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and heightened their diplomatic efforts to convince Joseph Stalin that they were about to launch a major attack on Britain.

Before D-Day, Operation Quicksilver portrayed "First United States Army Group" (FUSAG), which was merely a skeleton headquarters commanded by General Omar Bradley, as a genuine large army group commanded by General George Patton. In Operation Fortitude South, the Germans were then persuaded that FUSAG would invade France at the Pas-de-Calais. British and American troops used false signals and the messages of double agents to deceive German intelligence organizations and radio intercept operators. Contrary to popular myth, dummy equipment played a negligible role in the operation, for the Germans were unable to mount reconnaissance over English territory in the face of total Allied control of the air. This had the desired effect of misleading the German High Command as to the location of the primary invasion, thus inducing them to keep reserves away from the actual landings. Erwin Rommel and Hitler himself were the primary targets of this operation: convinced that Patton would lead the invasion, Rommel was caught off guard and unwilling to react strongly, as Patton's illusionary FUSAG had not yet landed. The Germans awaited this landing for many crucial weeks, finally concluding that it would not take place because of Allied success in breaking out from the Normandy bridgehead. Confidence and speed was reduced enough that the German response to the beachhead was weaker than it would otherwise have been.

During World War II, The London Controlling Section, a British organization, and the Joint Planning Staff, the US counterpart, were responsible for devising and coordinating cover and deception plans.

Opinions on the value of military deception

The value of military deception is subject to a difference of opinions among military pundits. For example, the two books that are usually considered the most famous classics on warfare Sun Tzu's The Art of War and Clausewitz' On War seem to have diametrically opposed views on the matter. Sun Tzu greatly emphasizes military deception and considers it the key to victory. Clausewitz on the other hand argues that a commander has a foggy idea of what is going on anyway and that creating some sort of false appearance, particularly on a large scale, is costly and can only be acceptable from a cost-benefit-analysis point of view under special circumstances.

As a more modern example, the British military writer John Keegan seems to come close to Clausewitz' opinion in this particular matter, despite normally being highly critical of Clausewitz. In his book Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda he gives several historical examples of situations where one side held a great information advantage over his opponent and argues that in none of these cases was this decisive in and of itself for the outcome.

Bibliography

• Bruce, Anthony (2002). The Last Crusade: The Palestine Campaign in the First World War. London: John Murray Ltd. ISBN 978-0-7195-5432-2. 
• Sefton Delmer, "The Counterfeit Spy: The Untold Story of the Phantom Army That Deceived Hitler" (Hutchinson & Co., 1973) ISBN 0-09-109700-2
• Erickson, Edward J. (2007). John Gooch and Brian Holden Reid. ed. Ottoman Army Effectiveness in World War I: A Comparative Study. No. 26 of Cass series: military history and policy. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-203-96456-9. 
• Falls, Cyril; A. F. Becke (maps) (1930). Military Operations Egypt & Palestine from June 1917 to the End of the War. Official History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. 2 Part II. London: HM Stationary Office. OCLC 256950972. 
• Hamilton, Patrick M. (1996). Riders of Destiny The 4th Australian Light Horse Field Ambulance 1917–18: An Autobiography and History. Gardenvale, Melbourne: Mostly Unsung Military History. ISBN 978-1-876179-01-4. 
• Roger Fleetwood Hesketh, "Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign" (The Overlook Press, 2002) ISBN 1-58567-075-8
• Thaddeus Holt, "The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War" (A Lisa Drew Book/Scribner, 2004) ISBN 0-7432-5042-7
• Michael Howard, "Strategic Deception in the Second World War: Brithish Intelligence Operations Against the German High Command" (W. W. Norton & Co., First published as a Norton paperback by arrangement with HMSO, 1995) ISBN 0-393-31293-3
• Jon Latimer, "Deception in War" (John Murray, 2001) ISBN 978-0719556050
• Liddell Hart, Basil Henry (1972). History of the First World War. London: Pan Books. ISBN 9780330233545. 
• Mitchell, Elyne (1978). Light Horse The Story of Australia's Mounted Troops. Melbourne: Macmillan. OCLC 5288180. 
• Paget, G.C.H.V Marquess of Anglesey (1994). Egypt, Palestine and Syria 1914 to 1919. A History of the British Cavalry 1816–1919 Volume 5. London: Leo Cooper. ISBN 978-0-85052-395-9. 
• Powles, C. Guy; A. Wilkie (1922). The New Zealanders in Sinai and Palestine. Official History New Zealand's Effort in the Great War, Volume III. Auckland: Whitcombe & Tombs Ltd. OCLC 2959465. 
• Dennis Wheatley, "The Deception Planners" (Hutchinson & Co., 1980) ISBN 0-09-141830-5
• Woodward, David R. (2006). Hell in the Holy Land World War I in the Middle East. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 978-0-8131-2383-7.