Battle of Messines

Battle of Messines Part of the Western Front of the First World War Map of the battle, depicting the front on 7 June and subsequent action until 14 June. Date 7–14 June 1917 Location Flanders, Belgium Result Decisive British victory Belligerents United Kingdom Australia New Zealand German Empire Commanders and leaders Herbert Plumer Alexander Godley Alexander Hamilton-Gordon Thomas Morland Sixt von Armin Strength 12 divisions 216,000 men total 5 divisions 126,000 men total Casualties and losses 17,000 25,000

The Battle of Messines was a battle of the Western front of the First World War. It began on 7 June 1917 when the British Second Army under the command of General Herbert Plumer launched an offensive near the village of Mesen (Messines) in West Flanders, Belgium. The target of the offensive was a ridge running north from Messines village past Wytschaete village which created a natural stronghold southeast of Ypres. One of the key features of the battle was the detonation of 19 mines immediately prior to the infantry assault, a tactic which disrupted German defences and allowed the advancing troops to secure their objectives in rapid fashion. The attack was also a prelude to the much larger Third Battle of Ypres, which began on 11 July 1917.

Background

At a meeting between Sir Douglas Haig and his army commanders on 13 January 1916, the capture of Messines Ridge (part of the southern arc of the Ypres Salient) had been suggested by Lieut.-General Plumer, as an essential preliminary to the occupation of the Gheluvelt Plateau, part of the larger plan to clear the Belgian coast. On 25 January the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army Général d'Armée Joffre agreed that a Flanders campaign would be the main British effort in the summer of 1916, following limited Anglo-French attacks on the Somme earlier in the year. The Flanders campaign had to be postponed due to the effects of the German offensive at Verdun and the demands of the Somme offensive of 1916.

When it became apparent that the Nivelle Offensive (16 April—9 May 1917) would not succeed, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig instructed the Second Army to undertake the operation to capture the Messines—Wytschaete Ridge as soon as possible, to force the Germans to move troops from the front at Vimy—Arras and as the prelude to a larger assault in the Ypres Salient. The capture of Messines Ridge would give the British control of strategically important ground and flatten out the southern flank of the Ypres Salient. This would reduce the manpower needed to maintain the front and reduce the German strategic and tactical advantages in the area by giving the British observation over the southern side of Menin Ridge.

Mining operations

Co-ordinated by the tunnelling companies of the Royal Engineers, over a period beginning more than a year before the attack, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and British engineers tunnelled under the German trenches and laid 22 mines totaling 455 tonnes of ammonal explosive. Several compliments were given to the military geologists who planned the tunnels. “It was said that one reason for the great success of the British operations at Messines ridge, where fifty or more mines were exploded, was the skill of the geologist who planned their location; for in some cases they were so surrounded by quicksands that the Germans could not countermine. I cannot vouch for the truthfulness of this, but, knowing the men concerned, I believe it.” After the war, an examination of the lessons learned in military geology to reorganize the German Army also reviewed this incident,

Starting early in 1916 the British conducted a most extensive and persistent mining offensive against the “Wytschaete Salient”. After March 1916, they had the advice of two military geologists in this undertaking; sub-surface conditions here were especially complex: several different Tertiary and Quaternary formations with separate ground water tables made mining most troublesome, but the advice of the British geologists helped to overcome many technical difficulties. Starting from a long distance away, their sappers drifted galleries several hundred metres long (5,454 m altogether) to points deep underneath the German front lines; moreover, they diverted the attention of German sappers from their deepest attack galleries by making countless secondary attacks using the upper mine galleries. Thus the military geologists on the British side proved themselves to be “indispensible and extremely valuable.”

To solve the problem of wet soil, the tunnels were made in the layer of "blue clay", 80–120 feet (25–30 m) below the surface. The galleries dug in order to lay these mines totalled over 8,000 metres in length and had been constructed in the face of tenacious German counter-mining efforts. On several occasions, German tunnellers were within metres of large British mine "chambers". One mine was found by the Germans and the chamber was wrecked by a countermine.

"Lone Tree Crater" in November 2009

The largest of the 22 Messines mines was at Spanbroekmolen; the "Lone Tree Crater" formed by the blast is approximately 250 feet (80 m) in diameter and 40 feet (12 m) deep. The mine consisted of 41 tons of ammonal explosive, in a chamber dug 88 feet (27 m) below ground.

The evening before the attack, General Plumer remarked to his staff, "Gentlemen, we may not make history tomorrow, but we shall certainly change the geography."

Opposing forces

The assault on a 17,000 yard front was conducted by three corps of Plumer's Second Army. On the northern edge of the sector was British X Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Morland with the 23rd, 47th, 41st Divisions and 24th Division in reserve. In the centre was IX Corps commanded by Sir Alexander Hamilton-Gordon with 19th, 16th Irish, 36th Ulster Divisions and 11th (Northern) Division in reserve. To the southeast, Lieutenant-General Sir Alexander Godley commanded II Anzac Corps with 25th, New Zealand (including the New Zealand (Māori) Pioneer Battalion) and 3rd Australian Divisions with 4th Australian Division in reserve. II Brigade, Heavy Branch Machine-Gun Corps, with 72 of the new Mk IV tanks was in support, (20 tanks with II ANZAC Corps, 16 with IX Corps, 12 with X Corps plus 24 in reserve) mainly to attack on the flanks at Dam Strasse in the north and Messines in the south. XIV Corps was held in reserve with Guards, 1st, 8th and 32nd Divisions.

Opposing Plumer's Second Army was Gruppe Wijtschate, (commanded by General Von Laffert) part of von Armin's Fourth Army. To the northeast, the 204th (Württemberg) and 35th divisions defended Hill 60 and Battle Wood. In the centre, the 2nd Division, 40th (Saxon) and 3rd Bavarian Division defended the Wijtschatebogen (Messines and Wytschaete ridge). In the southeast, the southern banks of the River Douve were defended by the 4th Bavarian Division. The Germans relied on defence in depth; the front-lines were lightly defended, with defensive fortifications distributed up to half a mile behind the front line. A captured Corps Order from Gruppe Wijtshate received by Sir Douglas Haig on 1 June read,

2(a) The unconditional retention of the independent strong points, Wytschaete and Messines, is of increased importance for the domination of the whole Wytschaete salient. These strong points must therefore not fall even temporarily into the enemy's hands.

the British plan envisaged an advance to the 'Oosttaverne Line' a maximum depth of 3,000 yards. For all the effort the Germans had made to fortify the ridge, most of the defences were obsolete, due to being on the forward slope where they were overlooked from Kemmel Hill, 5,000 yards west of Wytschaete and from Haubourdin Hill ('Hill 63') south of the Douve valley. The east slope of the ridge was convex whch meant that it was impossible to support infantry counter-attacks towards the ridge from the east with observed artillery fire; it was because of this that the first part of the Flandern Line built that spring was six miles behind the ridge, from Linselles on the Lys river, past Werwicq to Becelaere (where the topography gave the closest artillery observation areas of the ground to the west).

German defensive arrangements

With the precedent of Vimy Ridge in mind, Field Marshal Crown Prince Rupprecht, commander of Army Group Rupprecht agreed with his Chief of Staff General von Kuhl in April, that it would be better to withdraw to the Warneton (third) Line on the reverse slope, when a British attack seemed imminent. On 2 May Kuhl's suggestion was rejected by the three local divisional commanders due to the Warneton Line's inadequacy and by their belief in the assurances of the commander of German mining operations that counter-mining had neutralised any British underground threat. The convex slope meant that there could be no artillery observation of the line from the east and the Ypres-Comines canal and the river Lys restricted the space in which infantry could manoeuvre for counter-attacks, amidst a defence-in-depth below the ridge. British observation from the ridge would make the ground to the east untenable as far as the Flandern Line six miles beyond. A withdrawal this far would uncover the southern slopes of Menin Ridge, which was the most vital part of the Flanders Position.

Crown Prince Rupprecht had another look at the Warneton (third) Line and also the extra Sehnen Line (Oosttaverne Line to the British) built between the Warneton Line and the Hohen (second) Line, accepted the wishes of the local commanders and dropped the withdrawal proposal in favour of holding the existing position as strongly as possible. The three divisions of Gruppe Wytschaete (XIX Corps) were reinforced by the 24th Division in early May. German sensitivity to the threat to the north end of the ridge, where it met the Menin Ridge led to the frontage of the 204th Division there being restricted to 2,600 yards. The 24th Division held 2,800 yards, the 2nd Division (to the left centre) 4,000 yards and the 40th Division in the south 4,800 yards. The 35th and 3rd Bavarian divisions were brought up as Eingreif divisions and Gruppe Wytschaete substantially reinforced with artillery, ammunition and aircraft.

The German front line regiments held areas 700-1,200 yards wide with one ('Kampf') battalion forward, one in support ('Bereitschaft') and the third in reserve 3–4 miles back. The Kampf battalion usually had three companies in the front system and one in the Sonne (intermediate) Line (with a company of the support battalion there as well, available for immediate counter-attack) between the front system and the Hohen (second) Line on the ridge crest. The other three companies of the support battalion sheltered in the Hohen (second) Line. All of the infantry garrison had concrete shelters. Dispersed around the defensive zone were about 32 machine-gun posts per regimental sector. The German defence was intended to be mobile, Stosstrupps in the third breastwork (Ic) were to conduct immediate counter-attacks to recapture Ia and Ib if possible. If they had to fall back then the support battalions would advance to restore the front system (Spanbroekmolen Hill was excepted from this due to its importance and was to be held unbedingtes Halten (at all costs).

On 8 May the British bombardment began and on 23 May became much heavier. The breastworks of the front defences were demolished and the concrete shelters on both sides of the ridge were systematically destroyed. Air superiority allowed up to 60–70 British artillery observation machines to cruise over the German defences at a time, despite the defensive efforts of the Richthofen Circus. On 26 May the German front garrisons were ordered to move forward fifty yards into shell-holes in no-man's-land at dawn and return to their shelters at night; when until the shelters were destroyed, shell-hole positions were made permanent as were those of the companies further back. Troops in the Hohen (second) Line were withdrawn behind the ridge. From reliefs every five days, by the end of May the front battalions were changed every two days, because of the strain caused by the bombardment.

On 1 June the British bombardment became even more intense, more than 3,500,000 shells being fired into the six mile front of the Messines position in a week. Nearly every German defensive position on the forward slope was obliterated. Air observation on the reverse slope was less efficient but Messines and Wytschaete villages were demolished, as were much of the Hohen and Oosttaverne Lines, although many pill boxes survived. Long-range fire on Comines, Warneton, Wervicq and villages, road junctions, railways and bridges caused much damage and a number of ammunition dumps were destroyed.

By the end of May the effect of British firepower was so great that it was decided that 24th and 40th (front-holding) divisions should be relieved by the Eingreif divisions (35th and 3rd Bavarian), which were replaced by the 7th and 1st Guard Reserve divisions in early June. Some of the German troops still on the ridge were convinced by sounds underneath them, that the mine danger was real and their morale was not helped by the statement of a prisoner taken on 6 June that the attack would by synchronised with mine explosions.

Battle

A dummy tree used as an observation post on Hill 63 by Australian troops during the battle

The plan for the attack on Messines Ridge called for heavy artillery fire before zero hour. At 03:00am, the mines would be detonated, followed by a frontal assault of nine infantry divisions aimed at securing the ridge. In the week before the attack, some 2,230 guns bombarded the German trenches and conducted counter-battery fire against the 630 German guns and howitzers (236 field guns, 108 field howitzers, 54 100mm—130mm guns, 24 150mm guns, 174 medium howitzers, 40 heavy howitzers and four heavy 210mm and 240mm guns) with 3,561,530 shells. Equipped with new highly detailed maps of the battlefield, British artillery succeeded in destroying close to 90% of the German field-gun positions on Messines Ridge. The German Official Account records that by the morning of 7 June Gruppe Wytschaete had lost a quarter of its field artillery and half of its heavy artillery.

The 'blue line' was to be occupied by zero + 1.40 with a two hour pause. At zero + 3.40 the advance to the 'black line' would begin and consolidation was to start by zero + 5.00. Fresh troops would pass through to attack the Oosttaverne line at zero + 10.00. As soon as the black line was captured all guns were to be employed to bombard the Oosttaverne Line, on counter-battery fire and on a standing barrage before the black line. All tanks still operational were to join with the 24 held in reserve to support the infantry advance to the Oosttaverne line.

Detonation of the mines

At 02:50am on 7 June, the artillery bombardment ceased. Expecting an immediate infantry assault, German defenders returned to their forward positions. About 3.00 a.m. a white ball of light was dropped on a parachute over the ridge by an aeroplane, followed shortly by a ball of yellow light. At 3:10am, the mines were detonated, killing approximately 10,000 German soldiers and destroying most of the fortifications on the ridge, as well as the village of Messines. Reports were made that the shockwave from the explosion was heard as far away as London and Dublin. To make matters worse for the Germans, the explosions occurred while front line troops were being relieved, catching both groups in the blasts.

While determining the power of explosions is difficult, the 1917 Messines mines detonation was probably the largest planned explosion in history prior to the Trinity atomic weapon test in July 1945 and the largest non-nuclear planned explosion before the British explosive efforts on the Heligoland Islands in April 1947. With approximately 10,000 killed, the Messines detonation is history's deadliest non-nuclear man-made explosion.

Artillery plan

Artillery fire resumed at the same moment as the explosion of the mines. The fireplan called for most of the 18-pounder field guns to fire a creeping barrage of shrapnel immediately ahead of the advance, while the other field guns and 4.5 inch howitzers fired a standing barrage some 700 yards (640 m) further ahead. The standing barrage was aligned with German positions and lifted to the next target when the advance got within 400 yards (370 m) of it. As each objective was taken by the infantry, the creeping barrage would pause 150 to 300 yards (140 to 270 m) ahead of them and become a standing barrage, protecting the newly gained positions from counterattack while the infantry consolidated. During this time the pace of fire slackened to one round per gun a minute, allowing the gun-crews a respite, before resuming full intensity as the barrage moved on. The heavy and super-heavy artillery fired on German rear areas and over 700 machine guns participated in the barrage, firing over the heads of the advancing troops.

Assault

Immediately after the mine explosions and closely following the creeping artillery barrage, British, Australian and New Zealand troops from the II ANZAC Corps, IX Corps and X Corps advanced on the Messines salient from three sides. The front lines were overrun without opposition. German troops surrendered "in droves" and the first objectives had been secured almost entirely within three hours. Advancing on the southern flank, the New Zealand Division captured the village of Messines proper, despite intricate layers of fortifications beyond the front line.

Bronze plaque overview of the
Battle of Messines assault on 7 June 1917

In the centre, 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) further north, the 36th (Ulster) Division and 16th (Irish) Division advanced in tandem, capturing the village of Wytschaete and pushing beyond to secure their objectives. Many considered this joint effort to be of considerable political significance, given the turmoil in Ireland at the time. The Irish Nationalist Party MP Major William Redmond was fatally wounded in this action. The most serious resistance was in the northern sector, where the 47th Division had to navigate the Ypres-Comines canal. This obstacle slowed the advance considerably but the Londoners had secured all their objectives by mid-morning and the goals of the first phase were achieved by 10:00am at all points on the line of attack.

Once the first objectives were secured, more than forty batteries of artillery were brought forward to support the second phase of the attack. Bombardment continued for several hours and at approximately 3:00pm the reserve divisions, supported by tanks, advanced towards the second line of objectives. In just over an hour, all these were secured. At 11:00 a.m., German troops counterattacked at several points along the new British line. Although British troops had had very little time to consolidate their positions, the German attacks were easily repulsed which resulted in further territorial gains. Heavy British artillery bombardments on 10 June meant that further counter-attacks never materialized.

There were four Victoria Crosses awarded during the battle, two in the Australian 3rd Division (to Private John Carroll and Captain Robert Cuthbert Grieve), one in the New Zealand Division (to Lance-Corporal Samuel Frickleton) and one in the 25th Division (to Private William Ratcliffe).

Aftermath

Australian Victoria Cross recipient, Private John Carroll

The operation was a great success. Meticulously planned and well executed, the assault secured its objectives in less than twelve hours, took 7,354 prisoners, 48 guns, 218 machine-guns and 60 trench mortars for a relatively modest (by WWI standards) 24,562 casualties, 1–12 June. The German Official Account gives 23,000 casualties (less 'wounded likely to return to duty within a reasonable time' which the British Official Historian considered to amount to another 30%, although this has been disputed ever since) including 10,000 missing, 21 May—10 June. The combination of tactics proven in other sectors—notably the use of mines, creeping barrages and small-unit tactics—allowed for surprise and rapid infantry advances. The offensive also secured the southern end of the Ypres salient in preparation for the offensive in that area. The Gruppe Wytschaete commander, General von Laffert was sacked two days after the battle.

Although the operation was successful, it had the effect of inflating expectations for the Passchendaele offensive. While Messines led Haig and other British commanders to believe that success could be had relatively cheaply in the main offensive as well, the circumstances of the operations were substantially different and attempts to apply similar tactics would result in a general failure.

Two of the 21 mines did not go off on time. On 17 July 1955, lightning set off one of these mines, killing a cow. The 21st mine—the mine abandoned as a result of its discovery by German counter-miners—is believed to have been found but no attempt has been made to remove it.

See also

• Western Front (World War I)
• Third Battle of Ypres
• Ronald Skirth, British pacifist artilleryman, vowed not to take another human life after the Battle of Messines

References

• Burke, Tom, MBE; "A Guide to the Battlefield of Wijtschate: June 1917", The Royal Dublin Fusiliers Association (pub June 2007); ISBN 0-9550418-1-3
• Bülow, K von &, Kranz, W. et al (1938). Wehrgeologie. USGS Library. 
• Cleland, Herdman (1918). The Geologist in War Time: Geology on the Western Front. Economic Geology XIII. 
• Edmonds, James (1991). Military Operations France and Belgium 1917 II. 7 June—10 November. Messines and Third Ypres (Passchendaele). Nashville: The Battery Press. ISBN 0898391660. 
• Groom, Winston (2002). A Storm in Flanders, the Ypres Salient, 1914–1918. Atlantic Monthly Press. ISBN 0-87113-842-5
• Keegan, John; The First World War New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999
• Liddell Hart, B.H. The Real War 1914–1918. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1930
• Steel, Nigel; Hart, Peter (2001). Passchendaele—The Sacrificial Ground. Cassel. pp. 45 & 54. ISBN 9781407214672. 
• Mallett. 
• Sheldon, Jack (2007). The German Army at Passchendaele. London: Pen and Sword Books. ISBN 1844155641. 
• Stokesbury, James L; A short history of World War I. New York: Perennial, 1981
• Strachan, Hew; The First World War. New York: Viking, 2003
• Terraine, J. (1984). The Road to Passchendaele: The Flanders Offensive 1917, A Study in Inevitability. London: Leo Cooper. ISBN 0436517329. 
• United States Army, American Expeditionary Forces, Intelligence Section (1920). Histories of Two Hundred and Fifty-one Divisions of the German Army which Participated in the War (1914-1918). Washington: Government Print Office. ISBN 5872969171. 
• Wolff, Leon; In Flanders Fields, Passchendaele 1917.
• Wynne, G. C. (1976). If Germany Attacks : The Battle in Depth in the West. Connecticut: Greenwood Press. ISBN 0837150299. 

Further reading

• Bean, C.E.W.; "The Battle of Messines", Chapter 15 in The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918, Vol IV, The AIF in France: 1917, 1941.
• Passingham, Ian; Pillars of Fire: the Battle of Messines Ridge, June 1917, 1998.
• Stewart, H; "The Battle of Messines", Chapter V in The New Zealand Division 1916–1919: A Popular History based on Official Records, 1921.

External links

• No Man's Land The European Group for Great War Archaeology, "Plug Street Project" : Report on Archaeological Excavations in St Yvon area. 2007
• The Plugstreet Archaeology Project [1]
• The Battle for Messines Ridge
• First World War.com – A more detailed overview of the battle with links to present day pictures of the battlefield
• An account of the experiences of an ordinary soldier at Messines ridge, as recounted in his letters home
• Battle for Messines (NZHistory.net.nz) includes film and interactive showing the creeping barrage
• Farmer who is sitting on a bomb – The Daily Telegraph
• WWI underground: Unearthing the hidden tunnel war BBC News (10 June 2011)