Military history of the United States during World War II
The military history of the United States' involvement in World War II covers the war against Japan, Germany and Italy starting with the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. During the first two years of the global conflict, the United States had maintained formal neutrality, while supplying Britain, the Soviet Union, and China with war material through Lend-Lease which was signed into law on March 11, 1941, as well as deploying the U.S. military to replace the British invasion forces in Iceland (for early U.S. combat activity in the Pacific Theater, see the Flying Tigers). During the war, over 16 million Americans served in the United States Armed Forces, with 290,000 killed in action and 670,000 wounded. There were also 130,201 American POWs, of whom 116,129 returned home after the war. Key civilian advisors to President Franklin D. Roosevelt included Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who mobilized the nation's industries and induction centers to supply the Army, commanded by General George C. Marshall and the Army Air Forces under General Hap Arnold. The Navy, led by Admiral Ernest King, proved more autonomous. Overall priorities were set by Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs, chaired by William D. Leahy. Highest priority went to the defeat of Germany in Europe, but first the war against Japan in the Pacific was more urgent after the sinking of the main battleship fleet at Pearl Harbor.
Admiral King put Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, based in Hawaii, in charge of the Central Pacific War against Japan. The result was a series of some of the most famous naval battles in history. The Imperial Japanese Navy had the advantage, taking the Philippines as well as British and Dutch possessions, and threatening Australia but in June 1942, its main carriers were sunk during the Battle of Midway, and the Americans seized the initiative. The Pacific War became one of island hopping, so as to move air bases closer and closer to Japan. The Army, based in Australia under General Douglas MacArthur, steadily advanced across New Guinea to the Philippines, with plans to invade the Japanese home islands in late 1945. With its merchant fleet sunk by American submarines, Japan ran short of aviation gasoline and fuel oil, as the U.S. Navy in June 1944 captured islands within bombing range of the Japanese home islands. Strategic bombing directed by General Curtis Lemay destroyed all the major Japanese cities, as the U.S. captured Okinawa after heavy losses in spring 1945. With conventional and atomic bombs falling and an invasion imminent, Japan surrendered.
The war against Germany involved aid to Britain, his allies, and the Soviet Union, with the U.S. supplying munitions until it could ready an invasion force. U.S. forces were first tested to a limited degree in the North African Campaign and then employed more significantly with British Forces in Italy in 1942-43, where U.S. forces, representing about a third of Allied forces deployed, bogged down after Italy surrendered and the Germans took over. Finally the main invasion of France took place in June 1944, under Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower. Meanwhile, the Army Air Forces and RAF systematically targeted German transportation links and synthetic oil plants, as it knocked out what was left of the Luftwaffe post Battle of Britain in 1944. With the Soviets unstoppable in the east, and the Allies unstoppable in the west, Germany was squeezed to death. Berlin fell to the Soviets in May 1945, and with Hitler dead, the Germans surrendered.
The military effort was strongly supported by civilians on the home front, who provided the military personnel, the munitions, the money, and the morale to fight the war to victory.
- 1 Origins
- 2 Lend-Lease and Iceland Occupation
- 3 Pacific Theater
- 3.1 The Attack on Pearl Harbor
- 3.2 Fall of the Philippines and Dutch East Indies
- 3.3 Solomon Islands and New Guinea Campaign
- 3.4 Battle of the Coral Sea
- 3.5 Battle of the Aleutian Islands
- 3.6 Battle of Midway
- 3.7 Island hopping
- 3.7.1 Air strategy
- 3.7.2 Combat experience
- 3.7.3 Marine Aviation and the issue of ground support
- 3.7.4 Guadalcanal
- 3.7.5 Tarawa
- 3.7.6 Operations in Central Pacific
- 3.7.7 Liberation of the Philippines
- 3.7.8 Iwo Jima
- 3.7.9 Okinawa
- 3.7.10 Strategic Bombing of Japan
- 3.7.11 Kamikaze
- 4 Minor American front
- 5 European and North African Theaters
- 6 Planned attacks on the United States
- 7 Other units and services
- 8 Timeline
- 9 See also
- 10 References
- 11 Further reading
- 12 External links
American public opinion was hostile to Hitler's Germany, but how much aid to give the Allies was controversial. Public opinion was even more hostile to Japan, and there was little opposition to increased support for China. By 1940 the U.S., while still neutral, was becoming the "Arsenal of Democracy" for the Allies, supplying money and war materials. The sudden defeat of France in spring 1940 caused the nation to begin to greatly grow its armed forces, including the first peacetime draft. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, America began sending Lend Lease aid to the Soviet Union as well as Britain and China.
In 1942 President Franklin D. Roosevelt set up a new command structure to provide leadership in the US Armed Forces while retaining authority as Commander-in-Chief as assisted by Secretary of War Henry Stimson with Admiral Ernest J. King as Chief of Naval Operations in complete control of the Navy and on the Marine Corps through its Commandant, then Lt. General Thomas Holcomb and his successor as Commandant of the Marine Corps, Lt. General Alexander Vandegrift, General George C. Marshall in charge of the Army, and in nominal control of the Air Force, which in practice was commanded by General Hap Arnold on Marshall's behalf. King was also in control for wartime being of the US Coast Guard under its Commandant, Admiral Russell R. Waesche. Roosevelt formed a new body, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which made the final decisions on American military strategy and as the chief policy-making body for the armed forces. The Joint Chiefs was a White House agency chaired by Admiral William D. Leahy, who became FDR's chief military advisor and the highest military officer of the US at that time. As the war progressed Marshall became the dominant voice in the JCS in the shaping of strategy. When dealing with Europe, the Joint Chiefs met with their British counterparts and formed the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Unlike the political leaders of the other major powers, Roosevelt rarely overrode his military advisors. The civilians handled the draft and procurement of men and equipment, but no civilians—not even the secretaries of War or Navy, had a voice in strategy. Roosevelt avoided the State Department and conducted high level diplomacy through his aides, especially Harry Hopkins. Since Hopkins also controlled $50 billion in Lend Lease funds given to the Allies, they paid attention to him.
Lend-Lease and Iceland Occupation
|“||Without American production the United Nations could never have won the war.||”|
The year 1940 marked a change in attitude in the United States. The German victories in France, Poland and elsewhere, combined with the Battle of Britain, led many Americans to believe that the United States would be forced to fight soon. In March 1941, the Lend-Lease program began shipping money, munitions, and food to Britain, China, and (by that fall) the Soviet Union.
By 1941 the United States was taking an active part in the war, despite its nominal neutrality. In spring U-boats began their "wolf-pack" tactics which threatened to sever the trans- Atlantic supply line; Roosevelt extended the Pan-American Security Zone east almost as far as Iceland.
On 16 June 1941, after negotiation with Churchill, Roosevelt ordered the United States occupation of Iceland to replace the British invasion forces. On 22 June 1941, the US Navy sent Task Force 19 (TF 19) from Charleston, South Carolina to assemble at Argentia, Newfoundland. TF 19 included 25 warships and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade of 194 officers and 3714 men from San Diego, California under the command of Brigadier General John Marston. Task Force 19 (TF 19) sailed from Argentia on 1 July. On 7 July, Britain persuaded the Althing to approve an American occupation force under a U.S.-Icelandic defense agreement, and TF 19 anchored off Reykjavík that evening. U.S. Marines commenced landing on 8 July, and disembarkation was completed on 12 July. On 6 August, the U.S. Navy established an air base at Reykjavík with the arrival of Patrol Squadron VP-73 PBY Catalinas and VP-74 PBM Mariners. U.S. Army personnel began arriving in Iceland in August, and the Marines had been transferred to the Pacific by March 1942. Up to 40,000 U.S. military personnel were stationed on the island, outnumbering adult Icelandic men (at the time, Iceland had a population of about 120,000.) The agreement was for the US military to remain until the end of the war (although the US military presence in Iceland remained through 2006).
American warships escorting Allied convoys in the western Atlantic had several hostile encounters with U-boats. On 4 September, a German U-Boat attacked the destroyer USS Greer off Iceland. A week later Roosevelt ordered American warships to shoot U-boats on sight. A U-boat shot up the USS Kearny as it escorted a British merchant convoy. The USS Reuben James was sunk by U-552 on 31 October 1941.
The Attack on Pearl Harbor
Because of Japanese advances in French Indochina and China, the United States, in coordination with the British and Dutch, cut off all oil supplies to Japan, which had imported 90% of its oil. The oil embargo threatened to grind the Japanese military machine to a halt. Japan refused American demands to leave China and decided that war with the United States was inevitable; its only hope was to strike first. President Roosevelt had months earlier transferred the American fleet to Hawaii from California in order to deter the Japanese. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto argued the only way to win the war was to knock out the powerful main American fleet immediately. His elaborately trained fleet approached within 200 miles of Hawaii without being detected. Admiral Chūichi Nagumo held tactical command. Over a five-hour period his six carriers sent two waves of 360 dive-bombers, torpedo planes, and fighters. They destroyed or severely damaged eight battleships, ten smaller warships, and 230 aircraft; 2,403 American servicemen and civilians were killed. Japanese losses were negligible—29 planes shot down (several American planes were also shot down by anti-aircraft fire). Commander Minoru Genda, the chief planner of the raid, begged Nagumo to strike again at the shore facilities, oil storage tanks, and submarines, and to hunt down the American carriers that were supposedly nearby. But Nagumo, having just smashed the Americans in one of the greatest victories of naval history, decided not to risk further action. Japanese success was due to courage, good equipment, excellent pilots, total surprise, and above all, a daring and imaginative plan. To even reach Pearl Harbor, they had to learn how to refuel at sea (a technique the US Navy already had worked out); to sink all those ships they used their superb electric torpedoes and perfected shallow-water bombing tactics. Surprise was decisive. While everyone knew that war was imminent, no one at Pearl expected an attack. Despite later rumors, there was no advance knowledge of the Japanese plan. The commanders had been complacent about routine defensive measures. Even if the defense had been more alert, the surprise and overwhelming power of the Japanese strike probably would have been decisive. In broader perspective, the attack was a failure. The lost battleships reflected obsolete doctrine and were not needed; the lost planes were soon replaced; the casualty list was short by World War II standards. Tokyo's calculation that the Americans would lose heart and seek a compromise peace proved wildly wrong—the "sneak attack" electrified public opinion, committing America with near unanimity to a war to the death against the Japanese Empire.
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt officially pronounced 7 December 1941, as "a date which will live in infamy" and asked for a declaration of war on Japan before a joint session of Congress on 8 December 1941. The motion passed with only one vote against it, in both chambers. Just three days later, on 11 December 1941 Adolf Hitler declared war on the United States, and had already remarked on the evening of the date of the Japanese attack that "We can't lose the war at all. We now have an ally which has never been conquered in 3,000 years".
Fall of the Philippines and Dutch East Indies
Within hours of Pearl Harbor Japanese air forces from Formosa destroyed much of the U.S. Far East Air Force, based near Manila. The Japanese army invaded and trapped the American and Filipino forces on the Bataan peninsula. Roosevelt evacuated General Douglas MacArthur and the nurses, but there was no way to save the trapped men against overwhelming Japanese naval power. MacArthur flew to Australia, vowing "I came out of Bataan and I shall return." Major General Jonathan M. Wainwright surrendered on 8 May; the prisoners died by the thousands in the Bataan Death March and in disease-ridden Japanese prison camps where food and medicine were in very short supply.
The Japanese Navy seemed unstoppable as they seized the Dutch East Indies to gain its rich oil resources. The American, British, Dutch, and Australian forces were combined under the ABDA command but its fleet was quickly sunk in several naval battles around Java.
Solomon Islands and New Guinea Campaign
Following their rapid advance, the Japanese started the Solomon Islands Campaign from their newly conquered main base at Rabaul in January 1942. The Japanese seized several islands including Tulagi and Guadalcanal, before they were halted by further events leading to the Guadalcanal Campaign. This campaign also converged with the New Guinea campaign.
Battle of the Coral Sea
In May 1942, the United States fleet engaged the Japanese fleet during the first battle in history in which neither fleet fired directly on the other, nor did the ships of both fleets actually see each other. It was also the first time that aircraft carriers were used in battle. While indecisive, it was nevertheless a starting point because American commanders learned the tactics that would serve them later in the war.
Battle of the Aleutian Islands
The Battle of the Aleutian Islands was the last battle between sovereign nations to be fought on American soil.[disputed ] As part of a diversionary plan for the Battle of Midway, the Japanese took control of two of the Aleutian Islands. Their hope was that strong American naval forces would be drawn away from Midway, enabling a Japanese victory. Because their ciphers were broken, the American forces only drove the Japanese out after Midway.
Battle of Midway
Having learned important lessons at Coral Sea, the United States Navy was prepared when the Japanese navy under Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto launched an offensive aimed at destroying the American Pacific Fleet at Midway Island. The Japanese hoped to embarrass the Americans after the humiliation of the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo. Midway was a strategic island that both sides wished to use as an air base. Yamamoto hoped to achieve complete surprise and a quick capture of the island, followed by a decisive carrier battle with which he could completely destroy the American carrier fleet. Before the battle began, however, American intelligence intercepted his plan, allowing Admiral Chester Nimitz to formulate an effective defensive ambush of the Japanese fleet. The battle began on 4 June 1942. By the time it was over, the Japanese had lost four carriers, as opposed to one American carrier lost. The Battle of Midway was the turning point of the war in the Pacific because the United States had seized the initiative and was on the offensive for the duration of the war.
Following the resounding victory at Midway, the United States began a major land offensive. The Allies came up with a strategy known as Island hopping, or the bypassing of islands that either served little or no strategic importance or were heavily defended but could be bypassed, such as Rabaul. Because air power was crucial to any operation, only islands that could support airstrips were targeted by the Allies. The fighting for each island in the Pacific Theater would be savage, as the Americans faced a determined and battle-hardened enemy who had known little defeat on the ground.
General George Kenney, in charge of tactical air power under MacArthur, never had enough planes, pilots or supplies. (He was not allowed any authority whatsoever over the Navy's carriers.) But the Japanese were always in worse shape—their equipment deteriorated rapidly because of poor airfields and incompetent maintenance. The Japanese had excellent planes and pilots in 1942, but ground commanders dictated their missions and ignored the need for air superiority before any other mission could be attempted. Theoretically, Japanese doctrine stressed the need to gain air superiority, but the infantry commanders repeatedly wasted air assets defending minor positions. When Arnold, echoing the official Army line, stated the Pacific was a "defensive" theater, Kenney retorted that the Japanese pilot was always on the offensive. "He attacks all the time and persists in acting that way. To defend against him you not only have to attack him but to beat him to the punch."
Key to Kenney's strategy was the neutralization of bypassed Japanese strongpoints like Rabaul and Truk through repeated bombings. He said a major shortfall was "the kids coming here from the States were green as grass. They were not getting enough gunnery, acrobatics, formation flying, or night flying." So he set up extensive retraining programs. The arrival of superior fighters, especially the twin-tailed Lockheed P-38 Lightning, gave the Americans an edge in range and performance. Occasionally a ripe target appeared, as in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea (March 1943) when bombers sank a major convoy bringing troops and supplies to New Guinea. That success was no fluke. High-flying bombers almost never could hit moving ships. Kenney solved that weakness by teaching pilots the effective new tactic of flying in close to the water then pulling up and lobbing bombs that skipped across the water and into the target.
The goal of island hopping was to build forward air fields. AAF commander General Hap Arnold correctly anticipated that he would have to build forward airfields in inhospitable places. Working closely with the Army Corps of Engineers, he created Aviation Engineer Battalions that by 1945 included 118,000 men; it operated in all theatres. Runways, hangars, radar stations, power generators, barracks, gasoline storage tanks and ordnance dumps had to be built hurriedly on tiny coral islands, mud flats, featureless deserts, dense jungles, or exposed locations still under enemy artillery fire. The heavy construction gear had to be imported, along with the engineers, blueprints, steel-mesh landing mats, prefabricated hangars, aviation fuel, bombs and ammunition, and all necessary supplies. As soon as one project was finished the battalion would load up its gear and move forward to the next challenge, while headquarters inked in a new airfield on the maps. Heavy rains often reduced the capacity of old airfields, so new ones were built. Often engineers had to repair and use a captured enemy airfield. Unlike the well-built German air fields in Europe, the Japanese installations were ramshackle affairs with poor siting, poor drainage, scant protection, and narrow, bumpy runways. Engineering was a low priority for the offense-minded Japanese, who chronically lacked adequate equipment and imagination.
Airmen flew far more often in the Southwest Pacific than in Europe, and although rest time in Australia was scheduled, there was no fixed number of missions that would produce transfer out of combat, as was the case in Europe. coupled with the monotonous, hot, sickly environment, the result was bad morale that jaded veterans quickly passed along to newcomers. After a few months, epidemics of combat fatigue (now called Combat stress reaction) would drastically reduce the efficiency of units. The men who had been at jungle airfields longest, the flight surgeons reported, were in a bad shape:
- Many have chronic dysentery or other disease, and almost all show chronic fatigue states. . . .They appear listless, unkempt, careless, and apathetic with almost masklike facial expression. Speech is slow, thought content is poor, they complain of chronic headaches, insomnia, memory defect, feel forgotten, worry about themselves, are afraid of new assignments, have no sense of responsibility, and are hopeless about the future."
Marine Aviation and the issue of ground support
The Marines had their own land-based aviation, built around the excellent Chance-Vought F4U Corsair, an unusually large fighter-bomber. By 1944 10,000 Marine pilots operated 126 combat squadrons. Marine Aviation originally had the mission of close support for ground troops, but it dropped that role in the 1920s and 1930s and became a junior component of naval aviation. The new mission was to protect the fleet from enemy air attacks. Marine pilots, like all aviators, fiercely believed in the prime importance of air superiority; they did not wish to be tied down to supporting ground troops. On the other hand, the ground Marines needed close air support because they lacked heavy firepower of their own. Mobility was a basic mission of Marine ground forces; they were too lightly armed to employ the sort of heavy artillery barrages and massed tank movements the Army used to clear the battlefield. The Japanese were so well dug in that Marines often needed air strikes on positions 300 to 1,500 yards ahead. In 1944, after considerable internal acrimony, Marine Aviation was forced to start helping out. At Iwo Jima ex-pilots in the air liaison party (ALP) not only requested air support, but actually directed it in tactical detail. The Marine formula increased responsiveness, reduced "friendly" casualties, and (flying weather permitting) substituted well for the missing armor and artillery. For the next half century close air support would remain central to the mission of Marine Aviation, provoking eternal jealousy from the Army which was never allowed to operate fixed-wing fighters or bombers, although the Army was allowed to have some unarmed transports and spotter planes.
Guadalcanal, fought from August 1942 to February 1943, was the first major Allied offensive of the war in the Pacific Theater. This campaign pitted American air, naval and ground forces (later augmented by Australians and New Zealanders) against determined Japanese resistance. Guadalcanal was the key to control the Solomon Islands, which both sides saw as strategically essential. Both sides won some battles but both sides were overextended in terms of supply lines. Logistical failures in a hostile physical environment hampered everyone. As happened time and again in the Pacific, the Japanese logistical support system failed, as only 20% of the supplies dispatched from Rabaul to Guadalcanal ever reached there. Consequently the 30,000 Japanese troops lacked heavy equipment, adequate ammunition and even enough food; 10,000 were killed, 10,000 starved to death, and the remaining 10,000 were evacuated in February 1943. In the end Guadalcanal was a major American victory as the Japanese inability to keep pace with the rate of American reinforcements proved decisive. Guadalcanal is an iconic episode in the annals of American military history, underscoring heroic bravery of underequipped individuals in fierce combat with a determined foe.
Marines from the 1st Marine Division and soldiers from the Army XIV Corps landed on 7 August 1942. They quickly captured Henderson Field, and prepared defenses. In the Battle of Bloody Ridge, the Americans held off wave after wave of Japanese counterattacks before charging what was left of the Japanese. After more than six months of combat the island was firmly in control of the Allies on 8 February 1943.
Meanwhile the rival navies fought seven battles, with the two sides diving the victories. They were: Battle of Savo Island, Battle of the Eastern Solomons, Battle of Cape Esperance, Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, Battle of Tassafaronga and Battle of Rennell Island.
Guadalcanal made it clear to the Americans that the Japanese would fight to the bitter end. After brutal fighting in which few prisoners were taken on either side, the United States and the Allies pressed on the offensive. The landings at Tarawa on 20 November 1943, by the Americans became bogged down as armor attempting to break through the Japanese lines of defense either sank, were disabled or took on too much water to be of use. The Americans were eventually able to land a limited number of tanks and drive inland. After days of fighting they took control of Tarawa on 23 November. Of the original 2,600 Japanese soldiers on the island, only 17 were still alive.
Operations in Central Pacific
In preparation of the recapture of the Philippines, the Allies started the Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign to retake the Gilbert and Marshall Islands from the Japanese in summer 1943. Moving closer to Japan, the U.S. Navy decisively won the Battle of the Philippine Sea and landing forces captured the Mariana and Palau Islands in summer 1944. The goal was building airbases within range of the new B-29 bomber aimed at Japan's industrial cities.
Liberation of the Philippines
The Battle of Leyte Gulf in 23–26 October 1944, was a decisive American victory that sank virtually the entire remaining Japanese fleet in the largest naval battle in history. Although the Japanese came surprisingly close to inflicting a major defeat on the Americans, at the last minute the Japanese panicked and lost. The battle was a complex overlapping series of engagements fought off the Philippine island of Leyte, which the U.S. Army had just invaded. The army forces were highly vulnerable to naval attack, and the Japanese goal was to inflict massive destruction. Two American fleets were involved, the Seventh and Third, but they were independent and did not communicate well so the Japanese with a trick maneuver slipped between the two American fleets and almost reached the beaches. However the Japanese communication system was even worse, and the Japanese army and navy did not cooperate, and the three Japanese fleets were each destroyed.
General MacArthur fulfilled his promise to return to the Philippines by landing at Leyte on 20 October 1944. The grueling re-capture of the Philippines took place from 1944 to 1945 and included the battles of Leyte, Luzon, and Mindanao.
The Americans did not bypass the small island of Iwo Jima because it wanted bases for fighter escorts; it was actually used as an emergency landing base for B-29s. The Japanese knew they could not win, but they devised a strategy to maximize American casualties. Learning from the Battle of Saipan they prepared many fortified positions on the island, including pillboxes and underground tunnels. The Marines attack began on 19 February 1945. Initially the Japanese put up no resistance, letting the Americans mass, creating more targets before the Americans took intense fire from Mount Suribachi and fought throughout the night until the hill was surrounded. Over the next 36 days, the Japanese were pressed into an ever shrinking pocket, but they chose to fight on to the end, leaving only 1,000 of the original 21,000 defenders alive. The Marines suffered as well, suffering 25,000 casualties. The battle became iconic in America as the epitome of heroism in desperate hand-to-hand combat.
Okinawa became the last major battle of the Pacific Theater and the Second World War. The island was to become a staging area for the eventual invasion of Japan since it was just 350 miles (550 km) south of the Japanese mainland. Marines and soldiers landed unopposed on 1 April 1945, to begin an 82-day campaign which became the largest land-sea-air battle in history and was noted for the ferocity of the fighting and the high civilian casualties with over 150,000 Okinawans losing their lives. Japanese kamikaze pilots caused the largest loss of ships in U.S. naval history with the sinking of 38 and the damaging of another 368. Total U.S. casualties were over 12,500 dead and 38,000 wounded, while the Japanese lost over 110,000 men. The fierce combat and high American losses led the Navy to oppose an invasion of the main islands. An alternative strategy was chosen: using the atomic bomb to induce surrender.
Strategic Bombing of Japan
The flammability of Japan's large cities, and the concentration of munitions production there, made strategic bombing the favorite strategy of the Americans from 1941 onward. The first efforts were made from bases in China, where massive efforts to establish B-29 bases there and supply them over the Hump (the Himalayas) failed in 1944; the Japanese Army simply moved overland and captured the bases. Saipan and Tinian, captured by the U.S. in June 1944, gave secure bases for the very-long-range B-29. The Boeing B-29 Superfortress boasted four 2,200 horsepower Wright R-3350 supercharged engines that could lift four tons of bombs 33,000 feet (high above Japanese flak or fighters), and make 3,500 mile round trips. However, the systematic raids that began in June 1944, were unsatisfactory, because the AAF had learned too much in Europe; it overemphasized self-defense. Arnold, in personal charge of the campaign (bypassing the theater commanders) brought in a new leader, brilliant, indefatigable, hard-charging General Curtis LeMay. In early 1945, LeMay ordered a radical change in tactics: remove the machine guns and gunners, fly in low at night. (Much fuel was used to get to 30,000 feet; it could now be replaced with more bombs.) The Japanese radar, fighter, and anti-aircraft systems were so ineffective that they could not hit the bombers. Fires raged through the cities, and millions of civilians fled to the mountains.
Tokyo was hit repeatedly, and suffered a fire storm in March that killed 83,000. On 5 June, 51,000 buildings in four miles of Kobe were burned out by 473 B-29s; the Japanese were learning to fight back, as 11 B-29s went down and 176 were damaged. Osaka, where one-sixth of the Empire's munitions were made, was hit by 1,733 tons of incendiaries dropped by 247 B-29s. A firestorm burned out 8.1 square miles, including 135,000 houses; 4,000 died. The Japanese local officials reported:
- Although damage to big factories was slight, approximately one-fourth of some 4,000 lesser factories, which operated hand-in-hand with the big factories, were completely destroyed by fire.... Moreover, owing to the rising fear of air attacks, workers in general were reluctant to work in the factories, and the attendance fluctuated as much as 50 percent.
The Japanese army, which was not based in the cities, was largely undamaged by the raids. The Army was short of food and gasoline, but, as Iwo Jima and Okinawa proved, it was capable of ferocious resistance. The Japanese also had a new tactic that it hoped would provide the bargaining power to get a satisfactory peace, the Kamikaze.
In late 1944 the Japanese invented an unexpected and highly effective new tactic, the Kamikaze suicide plane aimed like a guided missile at American ships. The attacks began in October 1944 and continued to the end of the war. Experienced pilots were used to lead a mission because they could navigate; they were not Kamikazes, and they returned to base for another mission. The Kamikaze pilots were inexperienced and had minimal training; however most were well educated and intensely committed to the Emperor.
Kamikaze attacks were highly effective at the Battle of Okinawa as 4000 kamikaze sorties sank 38 US ships and damaged 368 more, killing 4,900 sailors. Task Force 58 analyzed the Japanese technique at Okinawa in April 1945:
- "Rarely have the enemy attacks been so cleverly executed and made with such reckless determination. These attacks were generally by single or few aircraft making their approaches with radical changes in course and altitude, dispersing when intercepted and using cloud cover to every advantage. They tailed our friendlies home, used decoy planes, and came in at any altitude or on the water."
The Americans decided best defense against Kamikazes was to knock them out on the ground, or else in the air long before they approached the fleet. The Navy called for more fighters, and more warning, which meant combat air patrols circling the big ships, more radar picket ships (which themselves became prime targets), and more attacks on airbases and gasoline supplies. Japan suspended Kamikaze attacks in May 1945, because it was now hoarding gasoline and hiding planes in preparation for new suicide attacks if the Allies dared to invade their home islands. The Kamikaze strategy allowed the use of untrained pilots and obsolete planes, and since evasive maneuvering was dropped and there was no return trip, the scarce gasoline reserves could be stretched further. Since pilots guided their airplane like a guided missile all the way to the target, the proportion of hits was much higher than in ordinary bombing. Japan's industry was manufacturing 1,500 new planes a month in 1945. However, the quality of construction was very poor, and many new planes crashed during training or before reaching targets.
Expecting increased resistance, including far more Kamikaze attacks once the main islands of Japan were invaded, the U.S. high command rethought its strategy and used atomic bombs to end the war, hoping it would make a costly invasion unnecessary.
As victory for the United States slowly approached, casualties mounted. A fear in the American high command was that an invasion of mainland Japan would lead to enormous losses on the part of the Allies, as casualty estimates for the planned Operation Downfall demonstrate. President Harry Truman gave the order to drop the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, hoping that the destruction of the city would break Japanese resolve and end the war. A second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki on 9 August after it appeared that the Japanese high command was not planning to surrender. Approximately 140,000 people died in Hiroshima from the bomb and its aftereffects by the end of 1945, and approximately 74,000 in Nagasaki.
V-J Day which occurred on 15 August 1945 marked the end of the United States' war with the Empire of Japan. Since Japan was the last remaining Axis Power, V-J Day also marked the end of World War II.
Minor American front
The United States contributed several forces to the China Burma India theater, such as a volunteer air squadron (later incorporated into the Army Air Force), and Merrill's Marauders, an infantry unit. The U.S. also had an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, Joseph Stillwell.
European and North African Theaters
The established grand strategy of the Allies was to defeat Germany and its allies in Europe first, and then focus could shift towards Japan in the Pacific. This was because two of the Allied capitals (London and Moscow) could be directly threatened by Germany, but none of the major Allied capitals were threatened by Japan. Germany was the United Kingdom's primary threat, especially after the Fall of France in 1940, which saw Germany overrun most of the countries of Western Europe, leaving the United Kingdom alone to combat Germany. Germany's planned invasion of the UK, Operation Sea Lion, was averted by its failure to establish air superiority in the Battle of Britain. At the same time, war with Japan in East Asia seemed increasingly likely. Although the U.S. was not yet at war with either Germany or Japan, it met with the UK on several occasions to formulate joint strategies. In the March 29, 1941 report of the ABC-1 conference, the Americans and British agreed that their strategic objectives were: (1) "The early defeat of Germany as the predominant member of the Axis with the principal military effort of the United States being exerted in the Atlantic and European area;" and (2) A strategic defensive in the Far East." Thus, the Americans concurred with the British in the grand strategy of "Europe first" (or "Germany first") in carrying out military operations in World War II. The UK feared that, if the United States was diverted from its main focus in Europe to the Pacific (Japan), Hitler might crush both the Soviet Union and Britain, and would then become an unconquerable fortress in Europe. The wound inflicted on the United States by Japan at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 did not result in a change in U.S. policy. Prime Minister Winston Churchill hastened to Washington shortly after Pearl Harbor for the Arcadia Conference to ensure that the Americans didn't have second thoughts about Europe First. The two countries reaffirmed that, "notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the War, our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy. and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow."
The United States entered the war in the west with Operation Torch on 8 November 1942, after their Soviet allies had pushed for a second front against the Germans. General Dwight Eisenhower commanded the assault on North Africa, and Major General George Patton struck at Casablanca.
Allied victory in North Africa
The United States did not have a smooth entry into the war against Nazi Germany. Early in 1943, the U.S. Army suffered a near-disastrous defeat at the Battle of the Kasserine Pass in February. The senior Allied leadership was primarily to blame for the loss as internal bickering between American General Lloyd Fredendall and the British led to mistrust and little communication, causing inadequate troop placements. The defeat could be considered a major turning point, however, because General Eisenhower replaced Fredendall with General Patton.
Slowly the Allies stopped the German advance in Tunisia and by March were pushing back. In mid April, under British General Bernard Montgomery, the Allies smashed through the Mareth Line and broke the Axis defense in North Africa. On 13 May 1943, Axis troops in North Africa surrendered, leaving behind 275,000 men. Allied efforts turned towards Sicily and Italy.
Invasion of Sicily and Italy
The first stepping stone for the Allied liberation of Europe was, in Prime Minister Winston Churchill's words, the "soft underbelly" of Europe on the Italian island of Sicily. Launched on 9 July 1943, Operation Husky was, at the time, the largest amphibious operation ever undertaken. The operation was a success, and on 17 August the Allies were in control of the island.
Following the Allied victory in Sicily, Italian public sentiment swung against the war and Italian dictator Benito Mussolini. He was deposed in a coup, and the Allies struck quickly, hoping resistance would be slight. The first American troops landed on the Italian peninsula in September 1943, and Italy surrendered on 8 September. German troops in Italy were prepared, however, and took up the defensive positions. As winter approached, the Allies made slow progress against the heavily defended German Winter Line, until the victory at Monte Cassino. Rome fell to the Allies on 4 June 1944.
Numerous bombing runs were launched by the United States aimed at the industrial heart of Germany. Using the high altitude B-17, it was necessary for the raids to be conducted in daylight for the drops to be accurate. As adequate fighter escort was rarely available, the bombers would fly in tight, box formations, allowing each bomber to provide overlapping machine-gun fire for defense. The tight formations made it impossible to evade fire from Luftwaffe fighters, however, and American bomber crew losses were high. One such example was the Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission, which resulted in staggering losses of men and equipment. The introduction of the revered P-51 Mustang, which had enough fuel to make a round trip to Germany's heartland, helped to reduce losses later in the war. In mid-1942, the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) arrived in the UK and carried out a few raids across the English Channel. The USAAF Eighth Air Force's B-17 bombers were called the "Flying Fortresses" because of their heavy defensive armament of ten to twelve machine guns, and armor plating in vital locations. In part because of their heavier armament and armor, they carried smaller bomb loads than British bombers. With all of this, the USAAF's commanders in Washington, DC, and in Great Britain adopted the strategy of taking on the Luftwaffe head on, in larger and larger air raids by mutually defending bombers, flying over Germany, Austria, and France at high altitudes during the daytime. Also, both the U.S. Government and its Army Air Forces commanders were reluctant to bomb enemy cities and towns indiscriminately. They claimed that by using the B-17 and the Norden bombsight, the USAAF should be able to carry out "precision bombing" on locations vital to the German war machine: factories, naval bases, shipyards, railroad yards, railroad junctions, power plants, steel mills, airfields, etc.
In January 1943, at the Casablanca Conference, it was agreed RAF Bomber Command operations against Germany would be reinforced by the USAAF in a Combined Operations Offensive plan called Operation Pointblank. Chief of the British Air Staff MRAF Sir Charles Portal was put in charge of the "strategic direction" of both British and American bomber operations. The text of the Casablanca directive read: "Your primary object will be the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.", At the beginning of the combined strategic bombing offensive on 4 March 1943 669 RAF and 303 USAAF heavy bombers were available.
In the late 1943, the 'Pointblank' attacks manifested themselves in the infamous Schweinfurt raids (first and second). Formations of unescorted bombers were no match for German fighters, which inflicted a deadly toll. In despair, the Eighth halted air operations over Germany until a long-range fighter could be found in 1944; it proved to be the P-51 Mustang, which had the range to fly to Berlin and back.
USAAF leaders firmly held to the claim of "precision bombing" of military targets for much of the war, and dismissed claims they were simply bombing cities. However the American Eighth Air Force received the first H2X radar sets in December 1943. Within two weeks of the arrival of these first six sets, the Eighth command gave permission for them to area bomb a city using H2X and would continue to authorize, on average, about one such attack a week until the end of the war in Europe.
In reality, the day bombing was "precision bombing" only in the sense that most bombs fell somewhere near a specific designated target such as a railway yard. Conventionally, the air forces designated as "the target area" a circle having a radius of 1000 feet around the aiming point of attack. While accuracy improved during the war, Survey studies show that, in the over-all, only about 20% of the bombs aimed at precision targets fell within this target area. In the fall of 1944, only seven percent of all bombs dropped by the Eighth Air Force hit within 1,000 feet of their aim point. The only offensive ordnance possessed by the USAAF that was guidable, the VB-1 Azon, saw very limited service in both Europe and in the CBI Theater late in the war.
Nevertheless, the sheer tonnage of explosive delivered by day and by night was eventually sufficient to cause widespread damage, and, more importantly from a military point of view, forced Germany to divert resources to counter it. This was to be the real significance of the Allied strategic bombing campaign—resource allocation. For the sake of improving the US air-force Fire bombing capabilities a mock-up German Village was built up and repeatedly burned down. It contained full scale replicas of German residential homes. Fire bombing attacks proved quite successful, in a single 1943 attack on Hamburg roughly 50,000 civilians were killed and practically the entire city destroyed.
A raid by the 8th Air Force on the Focke Wulf factory at Marienburg, Germany (1943). With the arrival of the brand-new Fifteenth Air Force, based in Italy, command of the U.S. Air Forces in Europe was consolidated into the United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF). With the addition of the Mustang to its strength, the Combined Bomber Offensive was resumed. Planners targeted the Luftwaffe in an operation known as 'Big Week' (20–25 February 1944) and succeeded brilliantly – losses were so heavy German planners were forced into a hasty dispersal of industry and the day fighter arm never fully recovered.
On 27 March 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff issued orders granting control of all the Allied air forces in Europe, including strategic bombers, to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, who delegated command to his deputy in SHAEF Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder. There was resistance to this order from some senior figures, including Winston Churchill, Harris, and Carl Spaatz, but after some debate, control passed to SHAEF on 1 April 1944. When the Combined Bomber Offensive officially ended on 1 April, Allied airmen were well on the way to achieving air superiority over all of Europe. While they continued some strategic bombing, the USAAF along with the RAF turned their attention to the tactical air battle in support of the Normandy Invasion. It was not until the middle of September that the strategic bombing campaign of Germany again became the priority for the USSTAF.
The twin campaigns—the USAAF by day, the RAF by night—built up into massive bombing of German industrial areas, notably the Ruhr, followed by attacks directly on cities such as Hamburg, Kassel, Pforzheim, Mainz and the often-criticized bombing of Dresden.
The second European front that the Soviets had pressed for was finally opened on 6 June 1944, when the Allies attacked the heavily fortified Atlantic Wall. Supreme Allied commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower had delayed the attack because of bad weather, but finally the largest amphibious assault in history began.
After prolonged bombing runs on the French coast by the Army Air Forces, 225 U.S. Army Rangers scaled the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc under intense enemy fire and destroyed the German gun emplacements that could have threatened the amphibious landings.
Also prior to the main amphibious assault, the American 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions dropped behind the beaches into Nazi-occupied France, in an effort to protect the coming landings. Many of the paratroopers had not been dropped on their intended landing zones and were scattered throughout Normandy.
As the paratroops fought their way through the hedgerows, the main amphibious landings began. The Americans came ashore at the beaches codenamed 'Omaha' and 'Utah'. The landing craft bound for Utah, as with so many other units, went off course, coming ashore two kilometers off target. The 4th Infantry Division faced weak resistance during the landings and by the afternoon were linked up with paratroopers fighting their way towards the coast.
However, at Omaha the Germans had prepared the beaches with land mines, Czech hedgehogs and Belgian Gates in anticipation of the invasion. Intelligence prior to the landings had placed the less experienced German 714th Division in charge of the defense of the beach. However, the highly trained and experienced 352nd moved in days before the invasion. As a result, the soldiers from the 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions became pinned down by superior enemy fire immediately after leaving their landing craft. In some instances, entire landing craft full of men were mowed down by the well-positioned German defenses. As the casualties mounted, the soldiers formed impromptu units and advanced inland.
The small units then fought their way through the minefields that were in between the Nazi machine-gun bunkers. After squeezing through, they then attacked the bunkers from the rear, allowing more men to come safely ashore.
By the end of the day, the Americans suffered over 6,000 casualties. Omaha Beach is the code name for one of the five sectors of the Allied invasion of German-occupied France in the Normandy landings on 6 June 1944, during World War II. The beach is located on the coast of Normandy, France, facing the English Channel, and is 5 miles (8 km) long, from east of Sainte-Honorine-des-Pertes to west of Vierville-sur-Mer on the right bank of the Douve River estuary. Landings here were necessary in order to link up the British landings to the east at Gold Beach with the American landing to the west at Utah Beach, thus providing a continuous lodgement on the Normandy coast of the Bay of the Seine. Taking Omaha was to be the responsibility of United States Army troops, with sea transport and naval artillery support provided by the U.S. Navy and elements of the British Royal Navy.
On D-Day, the untested 29th Infantry Division, joined by the veteran 1st Infantry Division and nine companies of U.S. Army Rangers redirected from Pointe du Hoc, were to assault the western half of the beach. The battle-hardened 1st Infantry Division was given the eastern half. The initial assault waves, consisting of tanks, infantry, and combat engineer forces, were carefully planned to reduce the coastal defenses and allow the larger ships of the follow-up waves to land.
The primary objective at Omaha was to secure a beachhead of some five miles (eight kilometres) depth, between Port-en-Bessin and the Vire River, linking with the British landings at Gold Beach to the east, and reaching the area of Isigny to the west to link up with VII Corps landing at Utah Beach. Opposing the landings was the German 352nd Infantry Division, a large portion of whom were teenagers, though they were supplemented by veterans who had fought on the Eastern Front. The 352nd had never had any battalion or regimental training. Of the 12,020 men of the division, only 6,800 were experienced combat troops, detailed to defend a 53-kilometre-long (33-mile) front. The Germans were largely deployed in strongpoints along the coast—the German strategy was based on defeating any seaborne assault at the water line. Nevertheless, Allied calculations indicated that Omaha's defenses were three times as strong as those they had encountered during the Battle of Kwajalein, and its defenders were four times as many. Very little went as planned during the landing at Omaha Beach. Difficulties in navigation caused the majority of landing craft to miss their targets throughout the day. The defenses were unexpectedly strong, and inflicted heavy casualties on landing US troops. Under heavy fire, the engineers struggled to clear the beach obstacles; later landings bunched up around the few channels that were cleared. Weakened by the casualties taken just in landing, the surviving assault troops could not clear the heavily defended exits off the beach. This caused further problems and consequent delays for later landings. Small penetrations were eventually achieved by groups of survivors making improvised assaults, scaling the bluffs between the most heavily defended points. By the end of the day, two small isolated footholds had been won, which were subsequently exploited against weaker defenses further inland, thus achieving the original D-Day objectives over the following days．
After the amphibious assault, the Allied forces remained stalled in Normandy for some time, advancing much more slowly than expected with close-fought infantry battles in the dense hedgerows. However, with Operation Cobra, launched on 24 July with mostly American troops, the Allies succeeded in breaking the German lines and sweeping out into France with fast-moving armored divisions. This led to a major defeat for the Germans, with 400,000 soldiers trapped in the Falaise pocket, and the capture of Paris on 25 August.
Operation Market Garden
The next major Allied operation came on 17 September. Devised by British General Bernard Montgomery, its primary objective was the capture of several bridges in the Netherlands. Fresh off of their successes in Normandy, the Allies were optimistic that an attack on the Nazi-occupied Netherlands would force open a route across the Rhine and onto the North German Plain. Such an opening would allow Allied forces to break out northward and advance toward Denmark and, ultimately, Berlin.
The plan involved a daylight drop of the American 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. The 101st was to capture the bridges at Eindhoven, with the 82nd taking the bridges at Grave and Nijmegen. After the bridges had been captured, the ground force, also known as XXX Corps or "Garden", would drive up a single road and link up with the paratroops.
The operation failed because the Allies were unable to capture the bridge furthest to the north at Arnhem. There, the British 1st Airborne had been dropped to secure the bridges, but upon landing they discovered that a highly experienced German SS Panzer unit was garrisoning the town. The paratroopers were only lightly equipped in respect to anti-tank weaponry and quickly lost ground. Failure to quickly relieve those members of the 1st who had managed to seize the bridge at Arnhem on the part of the balance of the 6th, as well as the armored XXX Corps, meant that the Germans were able to stymie the entire operation. In the end, the operation's ambitious nature, the fickle state of war, and failures on the part of Allied intelligence (as well as tenacious German defense) can be blamed for Market-Garden's ultimate failure. This operation also signaled the last time that either the 82nd or 101st would make a combat jump during the war.
Unable to push north into the Netherlands, the Allies in western Europe were forced to consider other options to get into Germany. In the summer of 1944, the Allies suffered from a large supply crisis, due the long supply route, but by fall 1944, this has largely been resolved (Red Ball Express). As part of the Siegfriend Line Campaign, the Allies tried to push into Germany towards the Rhine. As a first step, Aachen was captured during a heavy battle. The Germans now had the advantage of their old fortification system, the Siegfried line. During the Battle of Hürtgen Forest, the Allies fought a long battle of attrition with the Germans, which ended initially in a stalemate, with the Allies unable to take the complete forest. The battle of the Hürtgen Forrest was later absorbed by a larger offensive, Operation Queen. During this offensive, the Allies intended to push towards the Rur River, as a staging point for a subsequent thrust over the river to the Rhine into Germany. However, against underestimated and stiffened German resistance the Allies were only able to make slow progress. By mid-December the Allies were finally at the Rur, but by then the Germans had completed in preparing their own offensive through the Ardennes, which was launched in the midst of an unsuccessful Allied attack against the Rur dams.
Battle of the Bulge
On 16 December 1944, the Germans launched a massive attack westward in the Ardennes forest, hoping to punch a hole in the Allied lines and capture the Belgian city of Antwerp. The Allies responded slowly, allowing the German attack to create a large "bulge" in the Allied lines. In the initial stages of the offensive, American POW's from the 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion were executed at the Malmedy massacre by Nazi SS and Fallschirmjäger.
As the Germans pushed westward, General Eisenhower ordered the 101st Airborne and elements of the U.S. 10th Armored Division into the road junction town of Bastogne to prepare a defense. The town quickly became cut off and surrounded. The winter weather slowed Allied air support, and the defenders were outnumbered and low on supplies. When given a request for their surrender from the Germans, General Anthony McAuliffe, acting commander of the 101st, replied, "Nuts!", contributing to the stubborn American defense. On 19 December, General Patton told Eisenhower that he could have his army in Bastogne in 48 hours. Patton then turned his army, at the time on the front in Luxembourg, north to break through to Bastogne. Patton's armor pushed north, and by 26 December was in Bastogne, effectively ending the siege. By the time it was over, more American soldiers had served in the battle than in any engagement in American history.
On 31 December, the Germans launched their last major offensive of the war on the Western Front, Operation Nordwind, in Alsace and Lorraine in northeastern France. Against weakened American forces there, the Germans were able to push the Americans back to the south bank of the Moder River on 21 January. On 25 January, Allied reinforcements from the Ardennes arrived, the German offensive was stopped and in fierce fighting the so-called Colmar Pocket was eliminated. The Battle of the Bulge (16 December 1944 – 25 January 1945) was a major German offensive campaign launched through the densely forested Ardennes region of Wallonia in Belgium, France and Luxembourg on the Western Front toward the end of World War II in Europe. The surprise attack caught the Allied forces completely off guard and became the costliest battle in terms of casualties for the United States, whose forces bore the brunt of the attack, during all of World War II. It also severely depleted Germany's war-making resources and was the country's final offensive operation of the war.
The battle was known by different names. The Germans referred to it as Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein ("Operation Watch on the Rhine"), while the French named it the Bataille des Ardennes. The Allies called it the Ardennes Counteroffensive. The phrase "Battle of the Bulge" was coined by contemporary press to describe the way the Allied front line bulged inward on wartime news maps and became the most well-known name for the battle.
The German offensive was supported by several subordinate operations known as Unternehmen Bodenplatte, Greif, and Währung. Germany's goal for these operations was to split the British and American Allied line in half, capturing Antwerp and then proceed to encircle and destroy four Allied armies, forcing the Western Allies to negotiate a peace treaty in the Axis Powers' favour. Once accomplished, Hitler could fully concentrate on the eastern theatre of war.
The offensive was planned with the utmost secrecy, minimizing radio traffic and moving troops and equipment under cover of darkness. The Third U.S. Army's intelligence staff predicted a major German offensive, and Ultra indicated that a "substantial and offensive" operation was expected or "in the wind", although a precise date or point of attack could not be given. Aircraft movement from the Soviet Front to the Ardennes and transport of forces by rail to the Ardennes was noticed but not acted upon, according to a report later written by Peter Calvocoressi and F. L. Lucas at the codebreaking centre Bletchley Park.
Near-complete surprise was achieved by a combination of Allied overconfidence, preoccupation with Allied offensive plans, and poor aerial reconnaissance. The Germans attacked a weakly defended section of the Allied line, taking advantage of a heavy overcast, which grounded the Allies' overwhelmingly superior air forces. Fierce resistance on the northern shoulder of the offensive around Elsenborn Ridge and in the south around Bastogne blocked German access to key roads to the west that they counted on for success. This and terrain that favoured the defenders threw the German timetable behind schedule and allowed the Allies to reinforce the thinly placed troops. Improved weather conditions permitted air attacks on German forces and supply lines, which sealed the failure of the offensive. In the wake of the defeat, many experienced German units were left severely depleted of men and equipment, as survivors retreated to the defenses of the Siegfried Line.
With about 610,000 men committed and some 89,000 casualties, including 19,000 killed, the Battle of the Bulge was the largest and bloodiest battle fought by the United States in World War II
Race to Berlin
Following the defeat of the German army in the Ardennes, the Allies pushed back towards the Rhine and the heart of Germany. With the capture of the Ludendorff bridge at Remagen, the Allies crossed the Rhine in March 1945. The Americans then executed a pincer movement, setting up the Ninth Army north, and the First Army south. When the Allies closed the pincer, 300,000 Germans were captured in the Ruhr Pocket. The Americans then turned east, meeting up with the Soviets at the Elbe River in April. The Germans surrendered Berlin to the Soviets on 2 May 1945.
The war in Europe came to an official end on V-E Day, 8 May 1945.
Planned attacks on the United States
Other units and services
- Cactus Air Force
- Devil's Brigade (1st Special Service Force)
- Eagle Squadron
- Flying Tigers
- Merrill's Marauders
- Office of Strategic Services
- Tuskegee Airmen
|Battle||Campaign||Date start||Date end||Victory|
|Attack on Pearl Harbor||7 December 1941||7 December 1941||Japan|
|United States declares war on Japan||8 December 1941||15 August 1945|
|Battle of Guam||8 December 1941||8 December 1941||Japan|
|Battle of Wake Island||Pacific Ocean theater of World War II||8 December 1941||23 December 1941||Japan|
|Battle of the Philippines||South West Pacific||8 December 1941||8 May 1942||Japan|
|Battle of Balikpapan||Netherlands East Indies campaign||23 January 1942||24 January 1942||Japan|
|Battle of Ambon||Netherlands East Indies campaign||30 January 1942||3 February 1942||Japan|
|Battle of Makassar Strait||Netherlands East Indies campaign||4 February 1942||4 February 1942||Japan|
|Battle of Badung Strait||Netherlands East Indies campaign||18 February 1942||19 February 1942||Japan|
|Battle of Timor||Netherlands East Indies campaign||19 February 1942||10 February 1943||Japan (tactical); Allies (strategic)|
|Battle of the Java Sea||Netherlands East Indies campaign||27 February 1942||1 March 1942||Japan|
|Battle of Sunda Strait||Netherlands East Indies campaign||28 February 1942||1 March 1942||Japan|
|Battle of Java||Netherlands East Indies campaign||28 February 1942||12 March 1942||Japan|
|Invasion of Tulagi||Solomon Islands campaign||3 May 1942||4 May 1942||Japan|
|Battle of the Coral Sea||New Guinea campaign||4 May 1942||8 May 1942||Japan (tactical); Allies (strategic)|
|Battle of Corregidor||5 May 1942||6 May 1942||Japan|
|Battle of Midway||Pacific Theater of Operations||4 June 1942||7 June 1942||United States|
|Battle of the Aleutian Islands||Pacific Theater of Operations||6 June 1942||15 August 1943||Allies|
|Battle of Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo||Guadalcanal campaign||7 August 1942||9 August 1942||Allies|
|Battle of Savo Island||Guadalcanal campaign||8 August 1942||9 August 1942||Japan|
|Makin Raid||Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign||17 August 1942||18 August 1942||United States|
|Battle of the Tenaru||Guadalcanal campaign||21 August 1942||21 August 1942||Allies|
|Battle of the Eastern Solomons||Guadalcanal campaign||24 August 1942||25 August 1942||United States|
|Battle of Milne Bay||New Guinea campaign||25 August 1942||5 September 1942||Allies|
|Battle of Edson's Ridge||Guadalcanal campaign||12 September 1942||14 September 1942||United States|
|Second Battle of the Matanikau||Guadalcanal campaign||23 September 1942||27 September 1942||Japan|
|Third Battle of the Matanikau||Guadalcanal campaign||7 October 1942||9 October 1942||United States|
|Battle of Cape Esperance||Guadalcanal campaign||11 October 1942||12 October 1942||United States|
|Battle for Henderson Field||Guadalcanal campaign||23 October 1942||26 October 1942||United States|
|Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands||Guadalcanal campaign||25 October 1942||27 October 1942||Japan|
|Naval Battle of Guadalcanal||Guadalcanal campaign||12 November 1942||15 November 1942||United States|
|Battle of Buna-Gona||New Guinea campaign||16 November 1942||22 January 1943||Allies|
|Battle of Tassafaronga||Guadalcanal campaign||29 November 1942||29 November 1942||Japan|
|Battle of Rennell Island||Guadalcanal campaign||29 January 1943||30 January 1943||Japan|
|Battle of Wau||New Guinea campaign||29 January 1943||31 January 1943||Allies|
|Battle of the Bismarck Sea||New Guinea campaign||2 March 1943||4 March 1943||Allies|
|Battle of Blackett Strait||Solomon Islands campaign||6 March 1943||6 March 1943||United States|
|Battle of the Komandorski Islands||Aleutian Islands campaign||27 March 1943||27 March 1943||Inconclusive|
|Death of Isoroku Yamamoto||Solomon Islands campaign||18 April 1943||18 April 1943||United States|
|Salamaua-Lae campaign||New Guinea campaign||22 April 1943||16 September 1943||Allies|
|Battle of New Georgia||Solomon Islands campaign||20 June 1943||25 August 1943||Allies|
|Battle of Kula Gulf||Solomon Islands campaign||6 July 1943||6 July 1943||Inconclusive|
|Battle of Kolombangara||Solomon Islands campaign||12 July 1943||13 July 1943||Japan|
|Battle of Vella Gulf||Solomon Islands campaign||6 August 1943||7 August 1943||United States|
|Battle of Vella Lavella||Solomon Islands campaign||15 August 1943||9 October 1943||Allies|
|Bombing of Wewak||New Guinea campaign||17 August 1943||17 August 1943||United States|
|Finisterre Range campaign||New Guinea campaign||19 September 1943||24 April 1944||Allies|
|Naval Battle of Vella Lavella||Solomon Islands campaign||7 October 1943||7 October 1943||Japan|
|Battle of the Treasury Islands||Solomon Islands campaign||25 October 1943||12 November 1943||Allies|
|Raid on Choiseul||Solomon Islands campaign||28 October 1943||3 November 1943||Allies|
|Bombing of Rabaul||New Guinea campaign||1 November 1943||11 November 1943||Allies|
|Bougainville campaign||New Guinea campaign||1 November 1943||21 August 1945||Allies|
|Battle of Tarawa||Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign||20 November 1943||23 November 1943||United States|
|Battle of Makin||Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign||20 November 1943||24 November 1943||United States|
|Battle of Cape St. George||Solomon Islands campaign||26 November 1943||26 November 1943||United States|
|New Britain Campaign||New Guinea campaign||15 December 1943||21 August 1945||Allies|
|Landing at Saidor||New Guinea campaign||2 January 1944||10 February 1944||Allies|
|Battle of Cape St. George||Solomon Islands campaign||29 January 1944||27 February 1944||Allies|
|Battle of Kwajalein||Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign||31 January 1944||3 February 1944||United States|
|Operation Hailstone||Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign||17 February 1944||18 February 1944||United States|
|Battle of Eniwetok||Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign||17 February 1944||23 February 1944||United States|
|Admiralty Islands campaign||New Guinea campaign||29 February 1944||18 May 1944||Allies|
|Landing on Emirau||New Guinea campaign||20 March 1944||27 March 1944||United States|
|Battle of Saipan||Mariana and Palau Islands campaign||15 June 1944||9 July 1944||United States|
|Battle of the Philippine Sea||Mariana and Palau Islands campaign||19 June 1944||20 June 1944||United States|
|Battle of Guam||Mariana and Palau Islands campaign||21 July 1944||8 August 1944||United States|
|Battle of Tinian||Mariana and Palau Islands campaign||24 July 1944||1 August 1944||United States|
|Battle of Peleliu||Mariana and Palau Islands campaign||15 September 1944||25 November 1944||United States|
|Battle of Angaur||Mariana and Palau Islands campaign||17 September 1944||30 September 1944||United States|
|Battle of Leyte||Philippines campaign (1944–45)||20 October 1944||31 December 1944||Allies|
|Battle of Leyte Gulf||Philippines campaign||23 October 1944||26 October 1944||United States|
|Battle of Ormoc Bay||Philippines campaign||11 November 1944||21 December 1944||United States|
|Battle of Mindoro||Philippines campaign||13 December 1944||16 December 1944||United States|
|Battle for the Recapture of Bataan||Philippines campaign||31 January 1945||8 February 1945||Allies|
|Battle of Manila (1945)||Philippines campaign||3 February 1945||3 March 1945||Allies|
|Battle for the Recapture of Corregidor||Philippines campaign||16 February 1945||26 February 1945||Allies|
|Battle of Iwo Jima||Volcano and Ryukyu Islands campaign||19 February 1945||16 March 1945||United States|
|Invasion of Palawan||Philippines campaign||28 February 1945||22 April 1945||United States|
|Battle of Okinawa||Volcano and Ryukyu Islands campaign||1 April 1945||21 June 1945||Allies|
|Operation Ten-Go||Volcano and Ryukyu Islands campaign||7 April 1945||7 April 1945||United States|
|Battle of Tarakan||Borneo campaign (1945)||1 May 1945||19 June 1945||Allies|
|Battle||Campaign||Date start||Date end||Victory|
|Nazi Germany declares war on the United States||European and Mediterranean theater of World War II||11 December 1941||8 May 1945||Allies|
|Operation Torch||North African campaign||8 November 1942||10 November 1942||Allies|
|Run for Tunis||Tunisia campaign||10 November 1942||25 December 1942||Germany|
|Battle of Sidi Bou Zid||Tunisia campaign||14 February 1943||17 February 1943||Germany|
|Battle of the Kasserine Pass||Tunisia campaign||19 February 1943||25 February 1943||Germany|
|Battle of El Guettar||Tunisia campaign||23 March 1943||7 April 1943||Germany|
|Battle of Hill 609||Tunisia campaign||27 April 1943||1 May 1943||United States|
|Operation Vulcan||Tunisia campaign||6 May 1943||12 May 1943||United States|
|Operation Flax||Tunisia campaign||5 April 1943||27 April 1943||United States|
|Allied invasion of Sicily||Italian campaign||9 July 1943||17 August 1943||Allies|
|Allied invasion of Italy||Italian campaign||3 September 1943||16 September 1943||Allies|
|Bernhardt Line||Italian campaign||1 December 1943||15 January 1944||Allies|
|Battle of Monte Cassino||Italian campaign||17 January 1944||19 May 1944||Allies|
|Operation Shingle||Italian campaign||22 January 1944||5 June 1944||Allies|
|Battle of Normandy||Western Front||6 June 1944||25 August 1944||Allies|
|Operation Dragoon||Western Front||15 August 1944||14 September 1944||Allies|
|Allied advance from Paris to the Rhine||Western Front||25 August 1944||7 March 1945||Allies|
|Gothic Line||Italian campaign||25 August 1944||17 December 1944||Allies|
|Operation Market Garden||Western Front||17 September 1944||25 September 1944||Germany|
|Battle of Huertgen Forest||Western Front||19 September 1944||10 February 1945||Germany|
|Battle of Aachen||Western Front||1 October 1944||22 October 1944||United States|
|Operation Queen||Western Front||16 November 1944||16 December 1944||Germany|
|Battle of the Bulge||Western Front||16 December 1944||25 January 1945||Allies|
|Operation Bodenplatte||Western Front||1 January 1945||1 January 1945||Allies|
|Colmar Pocket||Western Front||20 January 1945||9 February 1945||Allies|
|Spring 1945 offensive in Italy||Italian campaign||6 April 1945||2 May 1945||Allies|
|Western Allied invasion of Germany||Western Front||8 February 1945||5 May 1945||Allies|
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to World War II.|
- List of Medal of Honor recipients for World War II
- Equipment losses in World War II
- Military history of the United States
- United States casualties of war
- World War II casualties
- Allied war crimes during World War II
- Greatest Generation
- United States home front during World War II
- American Minority Groups in World War II
- "World War 2 Casualties". World War 2. Otherground, LLC and World-War-2.info. 2003. Retrieved 20 June 2006.
- "World War II POWs remember efforts to strike against captors". The Times-Picayune. Associated Press. 5 October 2012. Retrieved 23 June 2013.
- Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (1995).
- Henry H. Adams, Witness to Power: The Life of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy (1985)
- Grace P. Hayes, The history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan (1953)
- Maurice Matloff et al. Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-42 (1951)
- Eric Larrabee, Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War (1987)
- Secretary of War Henry Stimson, however, did control decisions about building and using the atomic bomb.
- One War Won, TIME Magazine, 13 December 1943
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1975). The Battle of the Atlantic September 1939-May 1943. Little, Brown and Company. pp. 74–79.
- George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U. S. Navy, 1890-1990 (1996) p. 162
- Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (1982) is one of the best of many books
- Alan Zimm, The Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions (2011) covers the technical details from the Japanese side
- Peter Grier (December 7, 2011). "Pearl Harbor Day: How did Adolf Hitler react to the attack?". The Christian Science Monitor. csmonitor.com. Retrieved September 9, 2012.
- Donald J. Young, The Battle of Bataan: A Complete History (2009)
- "Battle of Midway, 4-7 June 1942" history.navy.mil
- "Pacific Theater, World War II — Island Hopping, 1942-1945", USHistory.com.
- George Kenney, ‘’General Kenney reports: a personal history of the Pacific War’’ (Office of Air Force History - 1949) full text online
- Quoted in William M. Leary, ’’We Shall Return!: MacArthur's Commanders and the Defeat of Japan‘’ (2004) p. 99
- Kenney p 112
- Martin W. Bowman, B-17 Flying Fortress Units of the Pacific War (2003) p. 59
- Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces In World War II: Vol 7: Services Around The World (1958) ch 10
- Mae Mills Link and Hubert A. Coleman, Medical support of the Army Air Forces in World War II (1955) p 851
- Robert Lee Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II (1952)
- Charles W. Koburger, Pacific Turning Point: The Solomons Campaign, 1942-1943 (1995) online edition
- Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 5: The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942-February 1943 (1949)
- C. Vann Woodward, The Battle for Leyte Gulf (1947
- Joseph H. Alexander, Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima (1994), short Marine Corps history online edition
- William L. O'Neill, The Oxford Essential Guide to World War II (2002) p 279
- John Olsen, A History of Air Warfare (2009) p 74
- Donald L. Miller, D-days in the Pacific (2005) p. 2222
- William W. Ralph, "Improvised Destruction: Arnold, LeMay, and the Firebombing of Japan," War in History Vol. 13, No. 4, 495-522 (2006)
- Thomas R. Searle, "'It Made a Lot of Sense to Kill Skilled Workers': The Firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945" The Journal of Military History, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Jan. 2002), pp. 103-133 in JSTOR
- Syohgo Hattori, "Kamikaze: Japan's Glorious Failure." Air Power History 1996 43(1): 14-27. Issn: 1044-016x
- Rikihei Inoguchi and Tadashi Nakajima, The Divine Wind: Japan's Kamikaze Force in World War II (1994)
- Robin L. Rielly, Kamikazes, Corsairs, and Picket Ships: Okinawa, 1945 (2010)
- quoted in Norman Friedman, U.S. naval weapons: every gun, missile, mine, and torpedo used by the U.S. Navy from 1883 to the present day (1982) p 93
- John Ray Skates, The invasion of Japan: alternative to the bomb (2000) p. 241
- "A Chronology of US Historical Documents". Oklahoma College of Law
- "Command Failures: Lessons Learned from Lloyd R. Fredendall" Steven L. Ossad, findarticles.com
- ""NUTS!" Revisited: An Interview with Lt. General Harry W. O. Kinnard". thedropzone.org
- "Battle of the Bulge remembered 60 years later". defenselink.mil
- Perret, Geoffrey. Winged Victory: The Army Air Forces in World War II (1997)
- Perret, Geoffrey. There's a War to Be Won: The United States Army in World War II (1997)
- Weigley, Russell. Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaigns of France and Germany, 1944-45 (1990)
- Sherrod, Robert Lee. History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II (1987)
- Morison, Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War (2007)
- Hornfischer, James D. (2011). Neptune's Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal. Bantam Books. ISBN 978-0-553-80670-0.
- Hornfischer, James D. (2006). Ship of Ghosts: The Story of the USS Houston, FDR's Legendary Lost Cruiser, and the Epic Saga of Her Survivors. Bantam Books. ISBN 978-0-553-80390-7.
- Hornfischer, James D. (2004). The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors: The Extraordinary World War II Story of the U.S. Navy's Finest Hour. Bantam Books. ISBN 978-0-553-38148-1.
- Parshall, Jonathan and Anthony Tully. Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway (2005).
- Spector, Ronald. Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan (1985)
- Tillman, Barrett. Whirlwind: The Air War Against Japan, 1942-1945 (2010).
- Tillman, Barrett. Clash of the Carriers: The True Story of the Marianas Turkey Shoot of World War II (2005).
- Ambrose, Stephen. The Supreme Commander: The War Years of Dwight D. Eisenhower (1999) excerpt and text search
- Beschloss, Michael R. The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941-1945 (2002) excerpt and text search
- Buell, Thomas B. Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (1995).
- Buell, Thomas. The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond Spruance. (1974).
- Burns, James MacGregor. vol. 2: Roosevelt: Soldier of Freedom 1940-1945 (1970), A major interpretive scholarly biography, emphasis on politics online at ACLS e-books
- Davis, Richard G. (1997). HAP: Henry H. Arnold, Military Aviator. USAF. ISBN 0-16-049071-5.
- Larrabee, Eric. Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War (2004), chapters on all the key American war leaders excerpt and text search
- James, D. Clayton. The Years of MacArthur 1941-1945 (1975), vol 2. of standard scholarly biography
- Leary, William ed. We Shall Return! MacArthur's Commanders and the Defeat of Japan, 1942-1945 (1988)
- Morison, Elting E. Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson (1960)
- Pogue, Forrest. George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942 (1999); George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945 (1999); standard scholarly biography
- Potter, E. B. Bull Halsey (1985).
- Potter, E. B. Nimitz. (1976).
- Showalter, Dennis. Patton And Rommel: Men of War in the Twentieth Century (2006), by a leading scholar; excerpt and text search
- David J. Ulbrich (2011). Preparing for Victory: Thomas Holcomb and the Making of Modern Marine Corps, 1936-1943. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-903-7.
- World War II, from USHistory.com.
- A Chronology of US Historical Documents, Oklahoma College of Law.
- FAQ: D-Day and the Battle of Normandy, D-Day Museum.
- Omaha Beachhead, American Forces in Action Series.Washington D.C., United States Army Center of Military History 1994 (facsimile reprint of 1945). CMH Pub. 100-11.
- Lend-Lease Act, 11 March 1941, U.S. Congress. (from history.navy.mil)
- Cole, Hugh M.The Ardennes:Battle of the Bulge. United States Army in World War II Series. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1965.