|Outline of War|
Mission-type tactics (German: Auftragstaktik, from Auftrag and Taktik; also known as Mission Command in the US and UK), have (arguably) been a central component of the tactics of German armed forces since the 19th century. The term Auftragstaktik was coined by opponents of the development of mission-type tactics. Opponents of implementation mission-type tactics were called Normaltaktiker. In todays German army Bundeswehr, the term "Auftragstaktik" is considered an incorrect characterization of the concept, instead "Führen mit Auftrag" ("leading by mission") is used.
In mission-type tactics, the military commander gives their subordinate leaders a clearly defined goal (the mission), the forces needed to accomplish that goal and a time frame within which the goal must be reached. The subordinate leaders then implement the order independently. The subordinate leader is given, to a large extent, the planning initiative and a freedom in execution which allows a high-degree of flexibility at the Operational and Tactical levels of command. Mission-type Orders free the higher leadership from tactical details.
For the success of the mission-type tactics it is especially important that the subordinate leaders understand the intent of the orders and are given proper guidance and that they are trained so they can act independently. The success of the doctrine rests upon the receiver of orders understanding the intent of the issuer of the orders and acting to achieve their goal even if their actions violated other guidance or orders they had received. Clearly taking the risks of violating other previously expressed limitations as a routine step to achieving a mission is a behaviour most easily sustained in a particular type of innovative culture. That culture is often one associated today with elite units and not a whole army.
In translation to English, the German word (which is not, nor ever has been, part of the official German Military lexicon) loses some of its impact. It does not describe a set of tactics per se; it is certainly not limited to the tactical level of operations, nor is it a method of leadership, but it does encapsulate a style of Command - in English (perhaps): Tactics focused on accomplishing the task/mission as opposed to Befehlstaktik, i.e. Tactics focussed on executing a set of orders. Direct orders are an exception in the German armed forces, while "tasks" are the standard instrument of leadership from high command down to squad level.
For mission-focussed command to succeed, it is crucial that subordinate leaders:
- understand the intent of their orders,
- are given proper guidance and
- are trained to act independently.
The obverse of this, is the implicit requirement imposed on superior commanders:
- to give their subordinates no more orders than are essential (every order given is regarded as an additional constraint upon its recipient), and:
- to be extremely rigorous, absolutely clear, and very succinct in the expression of their commands.
The success of the doctrine rests upon the receiver of orders understanding the intent of whoever issues the orders and acting to achieve their goal even if their actions violate other guidance or orders they had received. Mission type tactics assume the possibility of violating other, previously expressed limitations as a step to achieving a mission and is a concept most easily sustained in a decentralised command culture. This is quite alien to any organisation in which, at every level, a subordinate commander is only expected (and, therefore, trained) to follow detailed orders.
This has significant implications for any Army considering the adoption of Auftragstaktik. To clarify, the classic German approach called for every commander to be trained to function effectively at 2 levels of command above his appointment (a platoon commander would be expected to control Battalion actions, if need be - and platoon commander was - and is - an NCO appointment in the German Army).
Some would say that today, such a culture is associated only with elite units and not a whole army. Certainly few armies seem to have mastered the approach. The Wehrmacht are perhaps the most perfect example - a degree of competence achieved only after rigorous training under Hans von Seeckt between 1919 and 1935. Ironically, since WW2, only the Israeli Defence Force seem to have come close to matching the Wehrmacht of WW2 in the exercise of command in this style: partly due to a conscious decision on the part of Moshe Dayan, who fought under British command in WW2, and who attended a British Army Staff training course which - according to his memoirs - disappointed him, to put it mildly.
This style of command originates in a state (Prussia) which perceived itself as small, surrounded by enemies, and in imminent danger of destruction. The same may perhaps be said of Israel. The failure of other equally (or more) developed armies to adopt this way of exercising command (the British Army in 1987 announced an intention to adopt 'Mission Command' yet an internal 2004 British Army review of command and control in the Iraq War in 2003 clearly shows that they had achieved the reverse: British orders were substantially more detailed, and subordinates generally more constrained (than twenty years earlier) indicating that there is more to Auftragstaktik than process.
After the heavy defeat of the Prussians in the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt by Napoleon in 1806, the Prussians rethought their military approach and aimed to build a college of military capability, the General Staff, as a systemic counter to the individual genius that had so soundly beaten them. Napoleon fought a continual battle of manoeuvre or movement and throughout his career (at least until Spain) demonstrated his ability to defeat all comers by the greater flexibility of his formations and deployment. The fact that his troops were mainly conscripts showed that it was his organisation of them that must be superior. The institutionalization of excellence within the Prussian Army was to build this same flexibility as well as the other role of the General Staff Officer, which was to make sure each unit understood and performed their mission.
One of the earliest alleged uses of Auftragstaktik was at the Battle of Königgrätz in the Austro-Prussian War. Auftragstaktik is one of the tools often claimed to have given the Prussians their decisive victory. This claim is difficult to accept, since no appreciation of Augtragstaktik had been accepted officially. The Bohemian Campaign could only have been an example of its use if having subordinate commanders that ignore directives from superiors, that march southward when ordered to march east, and treat their senior commanders with barely concealed contempt, can truly be described as a form of "flexible command". Most of the Prussian Commanders, particularly Frederick Charles of the 1st Prussian Army, had no understanding of Moltke the Elder's strategy. He did not much like those parts he did understand. He was uncooperative when under Moltke's orders and disobeyed them several times. During the battle and without authorisation, he acted on his own initiative and launched a premature attack on the Austrian Army, which nearly ended in disaster. If the Crown Prince Frederick William had arrived only an hour later, the battle might have been decisively lost.
After the First World War, this monitoring, coaching and training role built a level of trust, competency and understanding across the whole 4000 strong German post-war officer corps which made a new level of excellence possible.
Excellence in this case is derived in part from the tradition of Gerhard von Scharnhorst, Carl von Clausewitz and Helmuth von Moltke and was based upon the premise that hard-and-fast rules had no place in the environment of war, which was the realm of human emotion, friction, chance and uncertainty. Moltke is considered one of the principal advocates of independent thinking and acting among his subordinates:
“Diverse are the situations under which an officer has to act on the basis of his own view of the situation. It would be wrong if he had to wait for orders at times when no orders can be given. But most productive are his actions when he acts within the framework of his senior commander's intent.”
Under the Auftragstaktik system the selection of combat formations, as well as their route and rate of advance, was based upon a unit's mission, the terrain and the enemy's disposition, something Napoleon was renowned for doing. Building a high level of trust, competency and understanding is crucial for the success of such a doctrine. The freedoms this might imply have challenged many armies' views of military discipline, including the Prussian army's.
The force flexibility that underlies this command style poses particular challenges once this new, task-oriented formation is created. The creation of combined-arms forces poses particular challenges to command, especially if they are attached during a battle. To this end (in and before WW2) the German General Staff cross-posted officers and NCOs between the different branches of the Army. It was therefore not unusual to find an armor commander with experience of artillery and infantry command. Similarly, NCOs with cross-branch tactical experience ensured that these combined-arms teams did operate in an integrated fashion. The German High Command (OKH) ran multiple exercises, or war games, in the 1930s, starting with small operations and in later years involving very large formations and major movements to ensure doctrinal coherence and the opportunity to revise and learn. The General Staff played a vital role in assuring the quality of these exercises and in ensuring lessons were learnt and much of the philosophy was incorporated in their 1933 Field Manual Truppenführung.
Auftragstaktik can be seen as a doctrine within which formal rules can be selectively suspended in order to overcome "friction". Carl von Clausewitz stated that "Everything in war is very simple but the simplest thing is difficult". Problems will occur with misplaced communications, troops going to the wrong location, delays caused by weather, etc., and it is the duty of the commander to do his best to overcome them. Auftragstaktik encourages commanders to exhibit initiative, flexibility and improvisation while in command. In what may be seen as surprising to some, Auftragstaktik empowers commanders to disobey orders and revise their effect as long as the intent of the commander is maintained.
Interestingly there are cases cited where in combat the operational orders were a copy of orders that had been issued for an earlier operation or training exercise. It is claimed that almost the only thing that was changed were unit names and locations. This strongly suggests that long experience of operations had allowed senior commanders to be quite abstract in their orders, issued without great fear of being misunderstood. It also suggests that sequences of moves on quite a large scale were already familiar to the forces involved which probably made their execution better.
The Information Age 
"The paradox of war in the Information Age is one of managing massive amounts of information and resisting the temptation to overcontrol it. The competitive advantage is nullified when you try to run decisions up and down the chain of command. All platoons and tank crews have real-time information on what is going on around them, the location of the enemy, and the nature and targeting of the enemy's weapons system. Once the commander's intent is understood, decisions must be devolved to the lowest possible level to allow these front line soldiers to exploit the opportunities that develop". — General Gordon R. Sullivan, quoted in Delivering Results by David Ulrich.
Analysis by the US Army of the 1939 German campaign in Poland found that "The emphasis which the Germans placed on the development of leadership and initiative in commanders during years of preparatory training brought its rewards in the Polish campaign. With confidence that these principles had been properly inculcated, all commanders, from the highest to the lowest echelons, felt free to carry out their missions or meet changes in situations with a minimum of interference by higher commanders." They recognized that "initiative, flexibility and mobility" were the essential aspects of German tactics.
A key aspect of Mission-type tactics is forward control. In order to understand what is happening at the point of action and to be able to take decisions quickly, the operational commander needs to be able to observe results. The decision to deviate from original plans in pursuit of the mission must be made here for 'friction' to be overcome and momentum to be sustained. The impact of the application of personal influence was thought to be critical and only possible because of the bench-strength provided by General Staff officers managing in the formations' rear. This aspect is also responsible for the high casualty rate amongst commanders even in successful operations (5% of all dead). Heinz Guderian ensured that all German tanks had radio receivers in order to make his command effective.
The domination of the battlefield, combined with the difficulty of discerning the pattern of the attacker's assault which uses integrated command of combined arms teams, means that conventional force strategies are rendered ineffective as the "Front seemed to disappear".
Recent research has shown that, apart from the well known processes of "Fire, Move and Communicate", the key success factor in US Marine Corps operations was "the recognition that the situation was not that which was expected".
See also 
- Vernichtungsgedanke: "the concept of annihilation", one of Blitzkrieg's predecessors
- Blitzkrieg, lightning war style attributed to the German Army in World War II
- War of manoeuvre, the doctrine behind Blitzkrieg, also known as Bewegungskrieg.
- Attrition warfare, the strategic concept that victory can be assured by wearing the enemy down
- Befehlstaktik, (lit. detailed-order tactics), control by detailed order or command push.
- Command and obedience in the Bundeswehr
- Distributed operations
- Intent (Military)
- Citino 2005, p. 170.
- Citino 2005, p. 171.
- Citino 2005, p. 172.
- Generals Balck And Von Melletnhin On Tactics: Implications For NATO Military Doctrine an 1980 paper where the concept of the auftragstaktik is explained and demonstrated.
- Auftragstaktik article by Major General Widder (German Army) which gives overview and latest views.
- Manuel de Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, 1991.
- von Luck, Hans. Panzer Commander. Cassell Military, 1991. Available online, accessed 4 October 2005.
- Auftragstaktik, or Directive Control, in Joint and Combined Operations . "Parameters", US Army War College Quarterly. Autumn 1999, Vol. XXIX, No. 3. David M. Keithly and Stephen P. Ferris. Available online, accessed 11 November 2005.
- Gerhard Muhm: German Tactics in the Italian Campaign.
- Gerhard Muhm, La tattica tedesca nella campagna d'Italia, in Linea gotica avamposto dei Balcani, a cura di Amedeo Montemaggi - Edizioni Civitas, Roma 1993.
- Condell, Bruce; Zabecki, David T., eds. (2001). On the German Art of War: Truppenführung. Foreword by James S. Corum. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN 9781555879969. LCCN 2001019798. OCLC 46704038. Originally published in German as Heeresdienstvorschrift 300: Part 1 (1933) and Part 2 (1934)..