Moderate realism

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Moderate realism is a position in the debate on the metaphysics of universals which holds that there is no realm in which universals exist (against platonism), nor do they really exist within the individuals as universals, but rather universals really exist within the particulars as individualised, and multiplied. This position is also called immanent realism.

It is opposed to both realism, such as the theory of Platonic forms, and nominalism. Nominalists deny the existence of universals altogether, even as individualised and multiplied within the individuals.

Aristotle espoused a form of moderate realism.

A more recent and influential version of immanent realism has been advanced by D. M. Armstrong, in works such as his Universals: An Opinionated Introduction.

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