Mohammad Najibullah

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Mohammad Najibullah
نجيب الله
Chairman of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council
In office
30 September 1987 – 16 April 1992
Preceded by Haji Mohammad Chamkani
Succeeded by Abdul Rahim Hatef (Acting)
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Watan Party
In office
4 May 1986 – 16 April 1992
Preceded by Babrak Karmal
Succeeded by Office abolished
Minister of State Security
In office
11 January 1980 – 21 November 1985
Preceded by Asadullah Amin
Succeeded by Ghulam Faruq Yaqubi
Personal details
Born February 1947
Kabul, Afghanistan
Died September 28, 1996(1996-09-28) (aged 49)
Kabul, Afghanistan
Political party Watan Party
Alma mater Kabul University
Religion Sunni Islam

Mohammad Najibullah Ahmadzai (February 1947 – 28 September 1996), better known mononymously as Najibullah or Najib, was the fourth and last President of the Communist-led Republic of Afghanistan and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Watan Party (WP).

Contents

[edit] Early years

Najibullah was born in February 1947 to the Ahmadzai sub-tribe of the Ghilzai Pashtun tribe in Gardiz, Kingdom of Afghanistan.[1]

Though born in Kabul, his ancestral village was located between the towns of Said Karam and Gardēz in Paktia Province, this place is known as Mehlan. He was educated at Habibia High School,St.Joseph's School Baramulla Kashmir and Kabul University, where he graduated with a doctor degree in medicine in 1975.

[edit] Political career

In 1965 Najibullah joined the Parcham faction of the Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and in 1977 joined the Central Committee.

In 1978 the PDPA took power in Afghanistan, with Najibullah a member of the ruling Revolutionary Council. However, the Khalq faction of the PDPA gained supremacy over his own Parcham faction, and after a brief stint as ambassador in Iran, he was dismissed from government and went into exile in Europe.

[edit] Minister of State Security: 1980–1985

He returned to Kabul after the Soviet intervention in 1979. In 1980, he was appointed the head of KHAD, the Afghan equivalent to the Soviet KGB,[2] and was promoted to the rank of Major General.[1] He was appointed following lobbying made by the Soviets, most notable among them was Yuri Andropov, the KGB Chairman. During his six years as head of KHAD he had two to four deputies under his command, who in turn were responsible for an esimated 12 departments. According to evidence, Najibullah dependent on his family and his professional network, and appointed more often than not people he know to top positions within the KHAD.[2] In June 1981, Najibullah, along with Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, a former tank commander and the then Minister of Communications and Major General Mohammad Rafi, the Minister of Defence were appointed to the PDPA Politburo.[3] Under Najibullah, KHAD's personnel increased from 120 to 25,000 to 30,000.[4] KHAD employees were amongst the best-payed government bureaucrats in communist Afghanistan, and because of it, the political indoctrination of KHAD officials was a top priority. During a PDPA conference Najibullah, talking about the indoctrination programme of KHAD officials, said "a weapon in one hand, a book in the other."[5] Terrorist activities launched by KHAD reached its peak under Najibullah.[6] He reported directly to the Soviet KGB, and a big part of KHAD's budget came from the Soviet Union itself.[7]

As time would show, Najibullah was very efficient, and during his tenure as leader of KHAD several thousands were arrested, tortured and executed. It was this efficiency which made him interesting to the Soviets.[1] Because of this, KHAD became known for its ruthlessness. During his ascension to power, several Afghan politician did not want Najibullah to succeed Babrak Karmal because of the fact that Najibullah was known for exploiting his powers for his own benefit. It didn't help either that during his period as KHAD chief that the Pul-i Charki had become the home of several Khalqist politicians. Another problem was that Najibullah allowed graft, theft, bribery and corruption on a scale not seen previously.[8] As would later be proven by the power struggle he had with Karmal after becoming PDPA General Secretary, despite Najibullah heading the KHAD for five years, Karmal still had sizeable to support in the organisation.[9]

[edit] Rise to power: 1985–1986

Shuja Shah Durrani of Afghanistan in 1839.jpg
History of Afghanistan
See also: Timeline

Wikipedia book Book · Category Category · Portal Portal

He was appointed to the PDPA Secretariat in November 1985.[10] Najibullah's ascent to power was proven by turning KHAD from a government organ to a ministry in January 1986.[11] With the situation in Afghanistan deteriorating, and the Soviet leadership looking for ways to withdraw, Mikhail Gorbachev wanted Karmal to resign as PDPA General Secretary. The question of who was to succeed Karmal was hotly debated, but Gorbachev supported Najibullah.[12] Yuri Andropov, Boris Ponomarev and Dmitriy Ustinov all thought highly of Najibullah, and negotiations of who would succeed Karmal might have begun as early as 1983. Despite this, Najibullah was not the only choice the Soviets had; a GRU report claimed he was unfit to be leader considering the fact that he was a Pashtun nationalist, a stance which could decreased the regimes popularity even more. The GRU believed that Assadullah Sarwari, earlier head of ASGA, the pre-KHAD secret police. They believed that Sarwari, in contrast to Najibullah would be able to balance between the Pashtuns, Tajiks and Uzbeks. Another viable candidate was Abdul Qadir Dagarwal, who had been a participant in the Saur Revolution.[13] Najibullah succeeded Karmal as PDPA General Secretary on 4 May 1986 at the 18th PDPA meeting, but Karmal still retained his post as Chairman of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council.[14]

On 15 May Najibullah announced that a collective leadership had been established, which was led by himself consisted of himself as head of party, Karmal as head of state and Sultan Ali Keshtmand as Chairman of the Council of Ministers.[15] When Najibullah took the office of PDPA General Secretary, Karmal still had enough support in the party to disgrace Najibullah. Karmal went as far as to spread rumours that Najibullah's rule was little more than a interregnum, and that he would soon be reappointed to the general secretaryship. As it turned out, Karmal's power base during this period was KHAD.[14] The Soviet leadership wanted to ease Karmal out of politics, but when Najibullah began to complain that he was hampering his plans of National Reconciliation, the Soviet Politburo decided to remove Karmal; this motion was supported by Andrei Gromyko, Yuli Vorontsov, Eduard Shevardnadze, Anatoly Dobrynin and Viktor Chebrikov. A meeting in the PDPA in November relieved Karmal of his Revolutionary Council chairmanship, and he was exiled to Moscow where he was given a state-owned apartment and a dacha.[16]

[edit] Leader: 1986–1992

However, all of these measures were largely outweighed by the broad powers of the president, who commanded a military and police apparatus under the control of the Homeland Party (Hizb-i Watan, as the PDPA became known in 1988). In September he set up the National Compromise Commission to contact Afghan Arabs "in order to complete the Saur Revolution in its new phase". Allegedly some 40,000 Afghan Arabs were contacted.

In this way, Najibullah had stabilized his political position enough to begin matching Moscow's moves toward withdrawal. On July 20, 1987, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country was announced.

It was also during his Administration that the peak of the fighting came in 1985-86. The Soviet forces launched their largest and most effective assaults on the Mujahideen supply lines adjacent to Pakistan. Major campaigns had also forced the mujahedeen back to defensive positions near Herat and Kandahar.

Najibullah made an expanded reconciliation offer to the resistance in July 1987, including twenty seats in State (formerly Revolutionary) Council, twelve ministries and a possible prime ministership and Afghanistan's status as an Islamic non-aligned state. Military, police, and security powers were not mentioned, and the offer still fell far short of what even the moderate mujahedeen parties would accept.

Najibullah then reorganized his government to face the mujahedeen alone. A new constitution took effect in November 1987. The name of the country was reverted to the Republic of Afghanistan, the State Council was replaced by a National Assembly for which multiple parties could freely compete. Mohammad Hasan Sharq, a non-party politician, was named Prime Minister.

On June 7, 1988, President Najibullah addressed the UN General Assembly in request of support for a peace solution of the crisis in Afghanistan.

[edit] Afghan–Soviet relations

[edit] Soviet withdrawal

Main articles: Soviet war in Afghanistan and Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan

While he may have been the de jure leader of Afghanistan, Soviet advisers still did the majority of work when Najibullah took power. As Gorbachev remarked "We're still doing everything ourselves [...]. That's all our people know how to do. They've tied Najibullah hand and foot."[17] Fikryat Tabeev, the Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan, was accused of acting like a governor general by Gorbachev. Tabeev was recalled from Afghanistan in July 1986, but while Gorbachev called for the end of Soviet management of Afghanistan, he could not help but to do some managing himself. At a Soviet Politburo meeting, Gorbachev said "It's difficult to build a new building out of old material [...] I hope to God that we haven't made a mistake with Najibullah."[17] As time would prove, the problem was that Najibullah's aim were the opposite of the Soviet Union's; Najibullah was opposed to a Soviet withdrawal, the Soviet Union wanted a Soviet withdrawal. This was logical, considering the fact that the Afghan military was on the brink of dissolution. The only means of survival seemed to Najibullah was to retain the Soviet presence.[17] In July 1986 six regiments, which consisted up to 15,000 troops, were withdrawn from Afghanistan. The aim of this early withdrawal was, according to Gorbachev, to show the world that the Soviet leadership was serious about leaving Afghanistan.[18] The Soviets told the United States Government that they were planning to withdraw, but the United States Government didn't believe it. When Gorbachev met with Ronald Reagan during his visit the United States, Reagan called, bizzarely, for the dissolution of the Afghan army.[19]

Najibullah giving a decoration to a Soviet serviceman

On 14 April the Afghan and Pakistani governments signed the Geneva Accords, and the Soviet Union and the United States signed as guarantors; the treaty specifically stated that the Soviet military had to withdraw from Afghanistan by 15 February 1989. Gorbachev later confided to Anatoli Chernyaev, a personal advisor to Gorbachev, that the Soviet withdrawal would be criticised for creating a bloodbath which could have been averted if the Soviets stayed.[20] During a Politburo meeting Eduard Shevardnadze said "We will leave the country in a deplorable situation",[21] and further talked about the economic collapse, and the need to keep at least 10 to 15,000 troops in Afghanistan. In this Vladimir Kryuchkov, the KGB Chairman, supported him. This stance, if implemented, would be a betrayal of the Geneva Accords just signed.[21] During the second phase of the Soviet withdrawal, in 1989, Najibullah told Valentin Varennikov openly that he would do everything to slow down the Soviet departure. Varennikov in turn replied that such a move would not help, and would only lead to an international outcry against the war. Najibullah would repeat his position later that year, to a group of senior Soviet representatives in Kabul. This time Najibullah stated that Ahmad Shah Massoud was the main problem, and that he needed to be killed. In this, the Soviets agreed,[22] but repeated that such a move would be a breach of the Geneva Accords; to hunt for Masud so early one would disrupt the withdrawal, and would mean that the Soviet Union would fail to meet its deadline for withdrawal.[23]

During his January 1989 visit to Shevardnadze Najibullah wanted to retain a small presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and called for moving Soviet bombers to military bases close to the Afghan–Soviet border and place them on permanent alert.[24] Najibullah also repeated his claims that his government could not survive if Massoud remained alive. Shevardnadze again repeated that troops could not stay, since it would lead to international outcry, but said he would look into the matter. Shevardnadze demanded that the Soviet embassy created a plan in which at least 12,000 Soviet troops would remain in Afghanistan either under direct control of the United Nations or remain as "volunteers".[25] The Soviet military leadership, when hearing of Shevardnadze's plan, became furious. But they followed orders, and named the operation Typhoon, maybe ironic considering that Operation Typhoon was the German military operation against the city of Moscow during World War II. Shevardnadze contacted the Soviet leadership about moving a unit to break the siege of Kandahar, and to protect convoys from and to the city. The Soviet leadership were against Shevardnadze's plan, and Chernyaev even believed it was part of Najibullah's plan to keep Soviet troops in the country. To which Shevardnadze replied angrily "You've not been there, [...] You've no idea all the things we have done there in the past ten years."[25] At a Politburo meeting on 24 January, Shevardnadze argued that the Soviet leadership could be indifferent to Najibullah and his government; again, Shevardnadze received support from Kryuchkov. In the end Shevardnadze lost the debate, and the Politburo reaffirmed their commitment to withdraw from Afghanistan.[26] There was still a small presence of Soviet troops after the Soviet withdrawal; for instance, parachutists who protected the Soviet embassy staff, military advisors and special forces and reconnaissance troops still operated in the "outlying provinces", especially along the Afghan–Soviet border.[27]

[edit] Aid

Soviet military aid continued after their withdrawal, and massive quantities of food, fuel, ammunition and military equipment was given to the government. Varennikov visited Afghanistan in May 1989 to discuss ways and means to deliver the aid to the government. In 1990 Soviet aid mounted to an estimated 3 billion United States dollars. As it turned out, the Afghan military was entirely dependent on Soviet aid to function.[28]

[edit] Civil war

Victory at Jalalabad dramatically revived the morale of the Kabul government. Its army proved able to fight effectively alongside the already hardened troops of the Soviet-trained special security forces. Defections decreased dramatically when it became apparent that the resistance was in disarray, with no capability for a quick victory.

In March 1990 his government successfully withstood a Khalqi coup d'état, headed by Defense Minister Shahnawaz Tanai. According to Halimzai, a few months before the coup Mohammad Zahir Ofoq, the head of a small communist party, met with Shahnawaz Tanai to make a strategy for the coup. Halimzai says "When we were discussing how to take over the control, I told them that the coup will be unsuccessful unless we have control of departments like Media, Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in our hand. I told them that I am not willing to bring about such change. I said that you both should be aware of the all circumstances. We can't take over Kabul, and once we fail no power will stop Ashrar (Mujahedeen) to enter Kabul. Eventually they agreed and said that they will first create grounds for a coup afterwards will act. But they were actually planning the coup and just before the coup Mr. Ofoq went to India and after failing Mr. Tanai fled to Islamabad. And I was right, Dr. Najib's regime became weaker and in March 1992, Ashrar were wandering in the streets of Kabul, who were now Mujahedeen." Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was one of the main supporters of the coup.

Najibullah had been working on a compromise settlement to end the civil war with Ahmad Shah Massoud, brokered by the United Nations. However, talks broke down and the government fell, and by 1992 Najibullah agreed to step down in favor of a transitional government. He also announced that a bicameral parliament would be established "within a few months," on the basis of "free and democratic elections."

[edit] Downfall

The regime collapsed, as Kabul was short of fuel and food at the end of winter in 1992. Najibullah, on March 18, announced his willingness to resign in order to make way for a neutral interim government. On April 16, having lost internal control, was forced to resign by his own ruling party, following the capture of the strategically important Bagram air base and the nearby town of Charikar, by the Jamiat-e Islami guerrilla group.

Najibullah tried to meet Benon Sevan - director and senior political advisor to the UN Secretary-General's representative on the Afghan conflict at Kabul International Airport, but he was blocked by Abdul Rashid Dostum. On April 17, he sought sanctuary in the UN compound in Kabul. The newly created interim government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan left him unharmed.

[edit] Death

When the Taliban were about to enter Kabul Ahmad Shah Massoud offered Najibullah, a political enemy but someone he had known since childhood as they had lived in the same neighborhood, twice to flee Kabul. Najibullah refused, believing the Taliban, Ghilzai Pashtuns like Najibullah, would spare his life and not harm him. General Tokhi, who was with Dr. Najibullah until the day before his torture and murder, wrote that when three people came to both Dr. Najibullah and General Tokhi and asked them to come with them to flee Kabul, they rejected the offer. This proved to be a fatal mistake. Najibullah was at the UN compound when the Taliban soldiers came for him on September 27, 1996. He was castrated[29] before the Taliban dragged him to death behind a truck in the streets. His blood-soaked body was hanged from a traffic light.[30] His brother Shahpur Ahmadzai was also with him throughout this whole ordeal at the UN compound, and was shot to death.

[edit] International reaction

There was widespread international condemnation,[31] particularly from the Muslim world.[32]

India, which supported Najibullah as a proxy against Pakistan, strongly condemned the public execution of Najibullah and began to support Ahmed Shah Massoud's Northern Alliance in an attempt to contain the rise of the Taliban.[33]

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b c Tucker, Spencer (2010). The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts. 1. ABC-CLIO. p. 874. ISBN 978-1851099476. 
  2. ^ a b Dorronsoro, Gilles (2005). Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present. C. Hurst & Co Publishers. p. 178. ISBN 9781850657033. 
  3. ^ Weiner, Myron; Banuazizi, Ali (1994). The Politics of Social Transformation in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. Syracuse University Press. p. 47. ISBN 9780815626084. 
  4. ^ Kakar, Hassan; Kakar, Mohammed (1997). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982. University of California Press. p. 156. ISBN 9780520208933. 
  5. ^ Amtstutz, J. Bruce (1994). Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation. DIANE Publishing. p. 266. ISBN 9780788111116. 
  6. ^ Amtstutz, J. Bruce (1994). Afghanistan: Past and Present. DIANE Publishing. p. 152. ISBN 9780788111116. 
  7. ^ Girardet, Edward (1985). Afghanistan: The Soviet War. Taylor & Francis. p. 124. ISBN 9780709938026. 
  8. ^ Braithwaite, Rodric (2007). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989. Indo-European Publishing. p. 275. ISBN 9781604440027. 
  9. ^ Kalinovsky, Artemy (2011). A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Harvard University Press. p. 106. ISBN 9780674058668. 
  10. ^ Kalinovsky, Artemy (2011). A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Harvard University Press. pp. 96–97. ISBN 9780674058668. 
  11. ^ Dorronsoro, Gilles (2005). Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present. C. Hurst & Co Publishers. p. 194. ISBN 9781850657033. 
  12. ^ Kalinovsky, Artemy (2011). A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Harvard University Press. p. 95. ISBN 9780674058668. 
  13. ^ Kalinovsky, Artemy (2011). A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Harvard University Press. p. 96. ISBN 9780674058668. 
  14. ^ a b Kalinovsky, Artemy (2011). A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Harvard University Press. p. 97. ISBN 9780674058668. 
  15. ^ Clements, Frank (2003). Conflict in Afghanistan: a Historical Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. p. 303. ISBN 9781851094028. 
  16. ^ Kalinovsky, Artemy (2011). A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Harvard University Press. p. 98. ISBN 9780674058668. 
  17. ^ a b c Braithwaite, Rodric (2007). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989. Indo-European Publishing. p. 276. ISBN 9781604440027. 
  18. ^ Braithwaite, Rodric (2007). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989. Indo-European Publishing. p. 277. ISBN 9781604440027. 
  19. ^ Braithwaite, Rodric (2007). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989. Indo-European Publishing. p. 280. ISBN 9781604440027. 
  20. ^ Braithwaite, Rodric (2007). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989. Indo-European Publishing. p. 281. ISBN 9781604440027. 
  21. ^ a b Braithwaite, Rodric (2007). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989. Indo-European Publishing. p. 282. ISBN 9781604440027. 
  22. ^ Braithwaite, Rodric (2007). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989. Indo-European Publishing. p. 285. ISBN 9781604440027. 
  23. ^ Braithwaite, Rodric (2007). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989. Indo-European Publishing. p. 286. ISBN 9781604440027. 
  24. ^ Braithwaite, Rodric (2007). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989. Indo-European Publishing. p. 287. ISBN 9781604440027. 
  25. ^ a b Braithwaite, Rodric (2007). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989. Indo-European Publishing. p. 288. ISBN 9781604440027. 
  26. ^ Braithwaite, Rodric (2007). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989. Indo-European Publishing. p. 289. ISBN 9781604440027. 
  27. ^ Braithwaite, Rodric (2007). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989. Indo-European Publishing. p. 294. ISBN 9781604440027. 
  28. ^ Braithwaite, Rodric (2007). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989. Indo-European Publishing. p. 296. ISBN 9781604440027. 
  29. ^ Naughton, Philippe; Costello, Miles. "President of hell: Hamid Karzai's battle to govern post-war, post-Taliban Afghanistan". The Times. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/article1143612.ece. 
  30. ^ "Flashback: When the Taliban took Kabul". BBC. October 15, 2001. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1600136.stm. 
  31. ^ "Endorses the Special Rapporteur's condemnation of the abduction from United Nations premises of the former President of Afghanistan, Mr. Najibullah, and of his brother, and of their subsequent summary execution;" United Nations Resolution 51/108 article 10
  32. ^ "After the execution, even Taliban acknowledged that such behavior was 'un-Islamic' " p.25 in In the Shadow of the Prophet: The Struggle for the Soul of Islam by Milton Viorst, published by Westview Press 2001; ISBN 0813339022.
  33. ^ Pigott, Peter. Canada in Afghanistan: The War So Far. Toronto: Dundurn Press Ltd, 2007. ISBN 1550026747, ISBN 9781550026740. P. 54.

[edit] External links

Political offices
Preceded by
Haji Mohammad Chamkani		 President of Afghanistan
1987 – 1992		 Succeeded by
Abdul Rahim Hatef
Acting
Government offices
Preceded by
Asadullah Amin
Head of the KAM		 General Secretary of the State Information Agency
1980 – 1986		 Succeeded by
Ghulam Faruq Yaqubi
Preceded by
Babrak Karmal		 Chairman of the Revolutionary Council
1986 – 1987		 Succeeded by
Office abolished
Party political offices
Preceded by
Babrak Karmal		 General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
1986 – 1992		 Succeeded by
Office abolished

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