Dungan Revolt (1862–77)
| Qing Empire
Hui Muslim loyalists
Khufiyya order under Ma Zhan'ao in Gansu (1872-1877)
Eleven Gedimu Battalions of Shaanxi (1872-1877)
|Kashgaria (Kokandi Uzbek Andijanis under Yaqub Beg)
Taranchi Turkic Muslim rebels in Ili
|Hui Muslim rebels
Gedimu Eighteen Shaanxi Battalions (Eleven of the Battalion leaders surrendered and defected to the Qing dynasty, six were killed, and one, Bai Yanhu, fled to Russia)
Jahriyya order under Ma Hualong in Gansu
Khufiyya order under Ma Zhan'ao in Gansu (1862-1872)
|Commanders and leaders|
Ma Zhan'ao (1872-1877)
Ma Anliang (1872-1877)
Ma Qianling (1872-1877)
Ma Haiyan (1872-1877)
Cui Wei (1872-1877)
Hua Decai (1872-1877)
|Cui Wei (1862-1872)
Hua Decai (1862-1872)
|Hunan Army, 120,000 Zuo Zongtang army and Khafiya Chinese Muslim troops||Andijani Uzbek troops and Afghan volunteers, Han Chinese and Hui forcibly drafted into Yaqub's army, and separate Han Chinese militia||Rebels in Shaanxi and Gansu|
|Casualties and losses|
|Muslim death in Shanxi alone could be as high as 4,000,000 during the Tong Zhi Muslim Revolt (同治回乱） of 1862||Total deaths: 8,000,000-12,000,000, including civilians and soldiers|
The Dungan Revolt (1862–77) (simplified Chinese: 同治新疆回变; traditional Chinese: 同治新疆回變; pinyin: Tóngzhì Xīnjiāng Huí Biàn) was a mainly ethnic war in 19th-century China also known as the Hui Minorities War. The term is sometimes used to include the Panthay Rebellion in Yunnan, which occurred during the same period. However, this article relates specifically to the uprising by members of the Muslim Hui and other Muslim ethnic groups in China's Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia Provinces, as well as Xinjiang, between 1862 and 1877. The revolt arose over a pricing dispute involving bamboo poles, when a Han merchant selling to a Hui did not receive the amount demanded for the goods.
The uprising occurred on the western bank of the Yellow River in Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia, but excluded Xinjiang Province. It was chaotic affair and often involved diverse warring bands and military leaders with no common cause or a single specific goal. A common misconception is that the revolt was directed against the Qing dynasty, but there is no evidence to show that the rebels intended to attack the capital, Beijing, or to overthrow the entire Qing government. When the rebellion failed, mass emigration of the Dungan people from Ili into Imperial Russia ensued.
- 1 Nomenclature
- 2 Rebellion in Gansu and Shaanxi
- 3 Hui Muslims in non-rebellious areas
- 4 Rebellion in Xinjiang
- 5 Aftermath
- 6 See also
- 7 Footnotes
- 8 Bibliography
In this article "Dungan people" refers specifically to Hui people, who are a predominantly Muslim ethnic group in China. They are sometimes called "Chinese Muslims" and should not to be confused with the "Turkestanis" or "Turkic" people mentioned, who are Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs, Tatars and Uzbeks amongst others.
The ethnic group now known as Uyghur people was not known by that name before the 20th century. The Uzbeks of Yaqub Beg were called "Andijanis" or "Kokandis", while the Uyghurs in the Tarim Basin were known as "Turki". Uyghur immigrants from the Tarim Basin to Ili were called "Taranchi". The modern name "Uyghur" was assigned to this ethnic group by the Soviet Union in 1921 at a conference in Tashkent, with the name "Uyghur" taken from the old "Uyghur Khaganate". As a result, sources from the period of the Dungan revolt make no mentions of Uyghurs.
Although the name "Hui" was used for the ethnic group by the Chinese, Europeans commonly referred to them as "Dungan" or "Tungan" during the Dungan revolt.
Rebellion in Gansu and Shaanxi
|Islam in China|
|Islam in China portal|
During the Qianlong era (1735–1796), scholar Wei Shu (魏塾) commented on Jiang Tong's (江统) essay Xironglun (徙戎论) that if the Muslims did not migrate, they would end up like the Five Hu, who overthrew the Western Jin with the result an ethnic rather than religious conflict breaking out between the Five Hu and the Han Chinese. During Qianlong's reign there were clashes between the Qing authorities and the Jahriyya Sufi sect, but not with the majority non-Sufi Sunnis or the Khafiyya Sufis.
Chinese Muslims had travelled to West Asia for many years prior to the Hui Minorities' War. In the 18th century several prominent Muslim clerics from Gansu studied in Mecca and Yemen under Naqshbandi Sufi teachers. Two different forms of Sufism were brought back to northwest China by two charismatic Hui sheikhs: Khafiya (also spelled Khafiyya or Khufiyah; 虎夫耶; Hǔfūyē), associated with Ma Laichi (1681–1766), and the more radical Jahriyya (also spelled Jahriya, Jahariyya, Jahariyah, etc.; 哲赫林耶; Zhéhèlínyē or 哲合忍耶; Zhéhérěnyē), founded by Ma Mingxin (1719?-1781). These coexisted with the more traditional, non-Sufi Sunni practices, centered around local mosques and known as gedimu (qadim, 格底目 or 格迪目). The Khafiya school and non-Sufi gedimu tradition—both tolerated by Qing authorities—were referred to as "Old Teaching" (老教; lǎo jiào), while Jahriya, viewed by authorities as suspect, became known as the "New Teaching" (新教; xīn jiào).
Disagreements between adherents of Khafiya and Jahriya, as well as perceived mismanagement, corruption and the anti-Sufi attitudes of Qing officials, resulted in uprisings by Hui and Salar followers of the New Teaching in 1781 and 1783, but these were promptly suppressed. Hostilities between different groups of Sufis contributed to the violent atmosphere before the Dungan revolt between 1862 and 1877.
Course of the rebellion
As Taiping troops approached southeastern Shaanxi in the spring of 1862, the local Han Chinese, encouraged by the Qing government, formed Yong Ying militias to defend the region against the attackers. Afraid of the now-armed Han, the Muslims formed their own militia units as a response.
According to modern researchers, the Dungan rebellion began in 1862, not as a planned uprising but as a succession of local brawls and riots triggered by trivial causes. There were also rumors—false, as it turned out—spread that the Hui Muslims were aiding the Taiping Rebels. It is also said that the Hui Ma Hsiao-shih claimed that the Shaanxi Muslim rebellion was connected to the Taiping.
Many Green Standard Army troops of the Imperial army were Hui. One of the many brawls and riots that contributed to the rebellion was initiated by a fight triggered over the price of bamboo poles that a Han merchant was selling to a Hui. This eventually led to a massacre of Hui in many area villages when they refused to agree to the price of the poles. Afterwards, Hui mobs attacked Han and other Hui people who had not joined them in revolt. It was this seemingly trivial and unimportant dispute over bamboo poles that set off the full-scale revolt. A Manchu official noted that there were many non-rebellious Muslims who were loyal citizens, and warned the Qing court that exterminating all Muslims would force loyal ones to support the rebels and make the situation even worse. He said, "Among the Muslims, there are certainly evil ones, but doubtless there are also numerous peaceful, law-abiding people. If we decide to destroy them all, we are driving the good ones to join the rebels and create for ourselves an awesome, endless job of killing the Muslims".
Given the low prestige of the Qing dynasty and its armies being occupied elsewhere, the rebellion that began in the spring of 1862 in the Wei River valley spread rapidly throughout southeastern Shaanxi. By late June 1862, organized Muslim bands laid siege to Xi'an, which was not relieved by Qing general Dorongga (zh) (sometimes written To-lung-a) until the fall of 1863. Dorongga was a Manchu bannerman in command of the army in Hunan Province. His forces defeated the Muslim rebels and completely destroyed their position in Shaanxi province, driving them out of the province to Gansu. Dorranga was later killed in action in March 1864 by Taiping rebels in Shaanxi.
The Governor-general of the region, En-lin, advised the Imperial government not to alienate Muslims. He officially made it clear that there was to be no mistreatment of or discrimination against Muslims, resulting in the implementation of a "policy of reconciliation". Muslim rebels tried to seize Lingzhou (present-day Lingwu) and Guyuan in several attacks as a result of false rumors spread by some Muslims that the government was going to kill all Muslims.
A vast number of Muslim refugees from Shaanxi fled to Gansu. Some of them formed the "Eighteen Great Battalions" in eastern Gansu, intending to fight their way back to their homes in Shaanxi. While the Hui rebels took over Gansu and Shaanxi, Yaqub Beg, who had fled from Kokand Khanate in 1865 or 1866 after losing Tashkent to the Russians, declared himself ruler of Kashgar and soon managed to take complete control of Xinjiang.
In 1867 the Qing government sent one of its most capable commanders, General Zuo Zongtang—who had been instrumental in putting down the Taiping Rebellion—to Shaanxi. Zuo's approach was to pacify the region by promoting agriculture, especially the growing of cotton and grain, as well as supporting orthodox Confucian education. Due to the region's extreme poverty, Zuo had to rely on financial support from outside Northwestern China.
Zuo Zongtang called on the government to "support the armies in the northwest with the resources of the southeast", and arranged the finances of his planned expedition to conquer Gansu by obtaining loans worth millions of taels from foreign banks in the southeastern provinces. The loans from the banks would be paid back by fees and taxes levied by Chinese authorities on goods imported through their ports. Zuo also arranged for massive amounts of supplies to be available before he would go on the offensive. Ten thousand of the old Hunan Army troops commanded by General Zeng Guofan, were dispatched by him under Gen. Liu Songshan to Shaanxi to help General Zuo, who had already raised a 55,000-man army in Hunan before he began the final push to reconquer Gansu from the Dungan rebels. They participated along with other regional armies (the Szechuan, Anhui and Henan Armies also joined the battle).
Zuo's forces consisted of the Hunan, Sichuan, Anhuiand Henan Armies, along with thousands of cavalry. The Hunan soldiers were expert marksmen and excelled in battlefield maneuvers under the command of Gen. Liu Songshan. Western military drill was experimented with, but Zuo decided to abandon it. The troops practiced "twice a day for ten days" with their western made guns.
The Lanzhou Arsenal was established in 1872 by Zuo Zongtang during the revolt and staffed by Cantonese. The Cantonese officer in charge of the arsenal was Lai Ch'ang, who was skilled at artillery. The facility manufactured "steel rifle-barreled breechloaders" and provided munitions for artillery and guns. The Muslim Jahriyya leader Ma Hualong controlled a massive Muslim trading network with many traders, having control over trade routes to multiple cities over various kinds of terrain. He monopolized trade in the area and used his wealth to purchase guns. Zuo Zongtang became suspicious of Ma's intentions, thinking that he wanted to seize control over the whole of Mongolia. Liu Songshan died in combat during an offensive against the hundreds of rebel forts protected by difficult terrain. Liu Jintang, his nephew, took over his command whereupon a temporary lull in the offensive set in. After suppressing the rebellion in Shaanxi and building up enough grain reserves to feed his army, Zuo attacked Ma Hualong. General Liu Jintang led the siege, bombarding the town over its walls with shells. The people of the town had to cannibalize dead bodies and eat grass roots to survive. Zuo's troops reached Ma's stronghold, Jinjibao (金积堡; Jinji Bao; "Jinji Fortress, sometimes romanised as Jinjipu, using an alternative reading of the Chinese character 堡") in what was then north-eastern Gansu in September 1870, bringing Krupp siege guns with him. Zuo and Lai Ch'ang themselves directed the artillery fire against the city. Mines were also utilized. After a sixteen-month siege, Ma Hualong was forced to surrender in January 1871. Zuo sentenced Ma and over eighty of his officials to death by slicing. Thousands of Muslims were exiled to other parts of China.
Zuo's next target was Hezhou (now known as Linxia), the main center of the Hui people west of Lanzhou and a key point on the trade route between Gansu and Tibet. Hezhou was defended by the Hui forces of Ma Zhan'ao. As a pragmatic member of the Khafiya (Old Teaching) sect, he was ready to explore avenues for peaceful coexistence with the Qing government. When the revolt broke out, Ma Zhan'ao escorted Han Chinese to safety in Yixin, and did not attempt to conquer more territory during the rebellion. After successfully repulsing Zuo Zongtang's initial assault in 1872 and inflicting heavy losses on Zuo's army, Ma Zhan'ao offered to surrender his stronghold to the Qing, and provide assistance to the dynasty for the duration of the war. He managed to preserve his Dungan community with his diplomatic skill. While Zuo Zongtang pacified other areas by exiling the local Muslims (with the policy of "washing off the Muslims" (洗; Xǐ Huí) approach that had been long advocated by some officials), in Hezhou, the non-Muslim Han were the ones Zuo chose to relocate as a reward for Ma Zhan'ao and his Muslim troops helping the Qing crush Muslim rebels. Hezhou (Linxia) remains heavily Muslim to this day, achieving the status of Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture under the PRC. Other Dungan generals including Ma Qianling and Ma Haiyan also defected to the Qing side along with Ma Zhan'ao. Ma's son Ma Anliang also defected, and their Dungan forces assisted Zuo Zongtang's Qing forces in crushing the rebel dungans. Dong Fuxiang also defected to the Qing. He was in no sense a fanatical Muslim or even interested in rebellion, he merely gained support during the chaos and fought, just as many others did. He joined the Qing army of Zuo Zongtang in exchanged for a Mandarinate. He acquired estates which were large.
Reinforced by the Dungan people of Hezhou, Zuo Zongtang planned to advance westward along the Hexi Corridor toward Xinjiang. However, he felt it necessary to first secure his left flank by taking Xining, which not only had a large Muslim community of its own, but also sheltered many of the refugees from Shaanxi. Xining fell after a three-month siege in late 1872. Its commander Ma Guiyuan was captured, and defenders were killed in their thousands. The Muslim population of Xining was spared but the Shaanxi refugees sheltering there were resettled to arable land in eastern and southern Gansu, which were isolated from other Muslim areas.
Despite repeated offers of amnesty, many Muslims continued to resist at Suzhou (Jiuquan), their last stronghold in the Hexi Corridor in west Gansu. The city was under the command of Ma Wenlu, who was originally from Xining. Many Hui people who had retreated from Shaanxi were also in the city. After securing his supply lines, Zuo Zongtang laid siege to Suzhou in September 1873 with 15,000 troops. The fortress could not withstand Zuo's siege guns and the city fell on October 24. Zuo had 7,000 Hui people executed, and resettled the rest in southern Gansu, to ensure that the entire Gansu Corridor from Lanzhou to Dunhuang would remain Hui-free, thereby preventing the possibility of future collusion between the Muslims of Gansu and Shaanxi and those of Xinjiang. Han and Hui loyal to the Qing seized the land of Hui rebels in Shaanxi, so the Shannxi Hui were resettled in Zhanjiachuan in Gansu.
The rebels were disorganized and without a common purpose. Some Han Chinese rebelled against the Qing state during the rebellion, and rebel bands fought each other. The main Hui rebel leader, Ma Hualong, was even granted a military rank and title during the rebellion by the Qing dynasty. It was only later when Zuo Zongtang launched his campaign to pacify the region, did he decide which rebels who surrendered were going to be executed, or spared.
Zuo Zongtang generally massacred New Teaching Jahriyya rebels, even if they surrendered, but spared Old Teaching Khafiya and Sunni Gedimu rebels. Ma Hualong belonged to the New Teaching school of thought, and Zuo executed him, while Hui generals belonging to the Old Teaching clique such as Ma Qianling, Ma Zhan'ao and Ma Anliang were granted amnesty and even promoted in the Qing military. Moreover, an army of Han Chinese rebels led by Dong Fuxiang surrendered and joined Zuo Zongtang. General Zuo accepted the surrender of Hui people belonging to the Old Teaching school, provided they surrendered large amounts of military equipment and supplies, and accepted relocation. He refused to accept the surrender of New Teaching Muslims who still believed in its tenets, since the Qing classified them as a dangerous heterodox cult, similar to the White Lotus Buddhists. Zuo said, "The only distinction is between the innocent and rebellious, there is none between Han and Hui".
The Qing authorities decreed that the Hui rebels who had taken part in violent attacks were merely heretics and not representative of the entire Hui population, just as the heretical White Lotus did not represent all Buddhists. Qing authorities decreed that there were two different Muslim sects, the "old" religion and "new" religion. The new were heretics and deviated from Islam in the same way that the White Lotus deviated from Buddhism and Daoism, and stated its intention to inform the Hui community that it was aware that the original Islamic religion was one united sect before the advent of new "heretics", saying they would separate Muslim rebels by which sect they belonged to.
Nature of the Rebellion
During the rebellion, some Hui people fought for the Qing against the rebels from the beginning. A Hui leader, Wang Dagui, fought on the side of the Qing dynasty against Hui rebels, and was rewarded for doing so, until he and his family were all killed by other Hui rebels. In addition, the Hui Chinese rebel leaders never called for Jihad, and never claimed that they wanted to establish an Islamic state. This stood in contrast to the in contrast to the Xinjiang Turki Muslims who called for Jihad. Instead of overthrowing the government, the rebels wanted to exact revenge from local corrupt officials and others who had done them injustices.
When Ma Hualong originally negotiated with the Qing authorities in 1866, he agreed to a "surrender", giving up thousands of foreign weapons, spears, swords, and 26 cannons. Ma assumed a new name signifying loyalty to the Dynasty, Ma Chaoqing. Mutushan, the Manchu official, hoped that this would lead to other Muslims following his lead and surrendering, however, Ma Hualong's surrender had no effect and the rebellion continued to spread. Even after Ma Hualong was sentenced to death, Zuo canceled the execution when Ma surrendered for the second time in 1871, surrendering all his weapons, such as cannons, gingalls, shotguns, and western weapons. Zuo also ordered him to convince other leaders to surrender. Zuo then discovered a hidden cache of 1,200 western weapons in Ma Hualong's headquarters in Jinjipao, and Ma failed to persuade the others to surrender. Thereafter Ma along with male members of his family and many of his officers were killed. Zuo then stated that he would accept the surrender of New Teaching Muslims who admitted that they were deceived, radicalized, and misled by its doctrines. Zuo excluded khalifas and mullas from the surrender.
As noted in the previous sections, Zuo relocated Han Chinese from Hezhou as a reward for the Hui leader Ma Zhan'ao after he and his followers surrendered and joined the Qing to crush the rebels. Zuo also moved Shaanxi Muslim refugees from Hezhou, only allowing native Gansu Muslims to stay behind. Ma Zhanao and his Hui forces were then recruited into the Green Standard Army of the Qing military.
Hui Muslims in non-rebellious areas
Hui Muslims living in areas that did not take part in the rebellion were completely unaffected by it, with no restrictions placed on them, nor did they try to join the rebels. Professor Hugh D. R. Baker stated in his book Hong Kong Images: People and Animals, that the Hui Muslim population of Beijing remained unaffected by the Muslim rebels during the Dungan revolt. Elisabeth Allès wrote that the relationship between Hui Muslim and Han peoples continued normally in the Henan area, with no ramifications or consequences from the Muslim rebellions of other areas. Allès wrote in the document Notes on some joking relationships between Hui and Han villages in Henan published by the French Center for Research on Contemporary China that "The major Muslim revolts in the middle of the nineteenth century which involved the Hui in Shaanxi, Gansu and Yunnan, as well as the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, do not seem to have had any direct effect on this region of the central plain."
Rebellion in Xinjiang
By the 1860s, Xinjiang had been under Qing rule for a century. The area had been conquered in 1754 from the Zunghar Khanate whose core population, the Oirats, subsequently became the targets of genocide. However, as Xinjiang consisted mostly of semi-arid or desert lands, these were not attractive to potential Han settlers except some traders, so other people such as Uyghurs settled in the area. The whole of Xinjiang was divided into three administrative circuits:
- The North-of-Tianshan Circuit (天山北路; Tianshan Beilu), including the Ili basin and Dzungaria. This region roughly corresponds to the modern Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture and included prefectures it controlled along with a few smaller adjacent prefectures.
- The South-of-Tianshan Circuit (天山南路; Tianshan Nanlu). This included the "Eight cities" in turn comprising the "Four Western Cities" of Khotan, Yarkand, Yangihissar, Kashgar and the "Four Eastern Cities" (Ush, Aqsu, Kucha, Karashahr.
- The Eastern Circuit (东路; Donglu), in eastern Xinjiang, centered around Urumqi.
Overall military command of all three circuits fell to the General of Ili, stationed in Huiyuan Cheng. He was also in charge of the civilian administration (directly in the North-of-Tianshan Circuit, and via local Muslim (Uyghur) begs in the South Circuit). However, the Eastern Circuit was subordinated in matters of civilian administration to Gansu Province.
The Qing's not always successful attempts to prevent repetition of incursions by Afaqi khojas from Kokand into Kashgaria, similar to those of Jahangir Khoja in the 1820s and Wali Khan in 1857, meant that the government had increased troop levels in Xinjiang to some 50,000. Both Manchu and Han units were stationed in the province with the latter, mainly recruited in Shaanxi and Gansu, having a heavily Hui (Dungan) component. A large part of the Qing army in Xinjiang was based in the Nine Forts of the Ili Region, but there were also forts with Qing garrisons in most other cities of Xinjiang.
Maintaining this army involved much higher costs than the taxation of the local economy could sustainably provide, and required subsidies from the central government. Such support became unfeasible by the 1850-60s due to the costs of suppressing the Taiping and other rebellions in the Chinese heartland. The Qing authorities in Xinjiang responded by raising taxes, introducing new ones, and selling official posts to the highest bidders (e.g. that of governor of Yarkand to Rustam Beg of Khotan for 2,000 yambus, and that of Kucha to Sa'id Beg for 1,500 yambus). The new officeholders would then proceed to recoup their investment by fleecing their subject populations.
Increasing tax burdens and corruption only added to the discontent amongst the Xinjiang people, who had long suffered both from the maladministration of Qing officials and their local beg subordinates and from the destructive invasions of the khojas. Qing soldiers in Xinjiang, however, were still not paid on time or properly equipped.
With the start of the rebellion in Gansu and Shaanxi in 1862, rumors spread among the Hui (Dungans) of Xinjiang that the Qing authorities were preparing a wholesale preemptive slaughter of the Hui people in Xinjiang, or in a particular community. Opinions as to the veracity of these rumors vary: while the Tongzhi Emperor described them as "absurd" in his edict of September 25, 1864, Muslim historians generally believe that massacres were indeed planned, if not by the imperial government then by various local authorities. Thus it was the Dungans who usually revolted in most Xinjiang towns, although the local Turkic people—Taranchis, Kyrgyzs, and Kazakhs—would usually quickly join the fray.
The first spark of rebellion in Xinjiang proved small enough for the Qing authorities to easily extinguish it. On March 17, 1863, some 200 Dungans from the village of Sandaohe (a few miles west of Suiding), supposedly provoked by a rumor of a preemptive Dungan massacre, attacked Tarchi (塔勒奇城; Tǎlēiqí Chéng now part of Huocheng County), one of the Nine Forts of the Ili Basin. The rebels seized weapons from the fort's armory and killed the soldiers of its garrison, but were soon defeated by government troops from other forts and were themselves slaughtered.
Rebellion broke out again the following year—this time, almost simultaneously in all three Circuits of Xinjiang—on a scale that made its suppression beyond the capability of the authorities.
On the night of June 3–4, 1864, the Dungans of Kucha, one of the cities south of Tianshan, rose up and were soon joined by the local Turkic people. The Han fort, which, unlike many other Xinjiang locations, was located inside the town rather than outside it, fell within a few days. Government buildings were burnt and some 1000 Hans and 150 Mongols killed. As neither the Dungan nor Turkic leaders of the rebellion had sufficient authority over the entire community to become commonly recognized as a leader, the rebels instead choose a person who had not participated in the rebellion, but was known for his spiritual role: Rashidin (Rashīdīn) Khoja, a dervish and the custodian of the grave of his ancestor of saintly fame, Arshad-al-Din (? - 1364 or 65). Over the next three years, he sent military expeditions east and west in an attempt to bring the entire Tarim Basin under his control; however, his expansion plans were frustrated by Yaqub Beg.
Only three weeks after the events in Kucha, rebellion broke out in the Eastern Circuit. The Dungan soldiers of the Ürümqi garrison rebelled on June 26, 1864, soon after learning about the Kucha rebellion. The two Dungan leaders were Tuo Ming (a.k.a. Tuo Delin), a New Teaching ahong from Gansu, and Suo Huanzhang, an officer who also had close ties to Hui religious leaders. Large parts of the city were destroyed, the tea warehouses burned, and the Manchu fortress besieged. The Ürümqi rebels then advanced westward through what is today Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture, taking the cities of Manas (also known then as Suilai) on July 17 (the Manchu fort there fell on September 16) and Wusu (Qur Qarausu) on September 29.
On October 3, 1864, the Manchu fortress of Ürümqi also fell to the joint forces of Ürümqi and Kuchean rebels. In a pattern that was to repeat in other Han forts throughout the region, the Manchu commander, Pingžui, preferred to explode his gunpowder, killing himself and his family, rather than surrender.
After they learned of the Qing authorities' plan to disarm or kill them, the Dungan soldiers in Yarkand in Kashgaria rose up in the early hours of July 26, 1864. Their first attack on the Manchu fort (which was outside of the walled Muslim city) failed, but it still cost the lives of 2,000 Qing soldiers and their families. In the morning, the Dungan soldiers entered the Muslim city, where some 7,000 Hans were massacred. The Dungans being numerically few compared to the local Turkic Muslims, they picked a somewhat neutral party—one Ghulam Husayn, a religious man from a Kabul noble family—as the puppet padishah.
By the early fall of 1864, the Dungans of the Ili Basin in the Northern Circuit also rose up, encouraged by the success of Ürümqi rebels at Wusu and Manas, and worried by the prospects of preemptive repressions by the local Manchu authorities. The General of Ili, Cangcing (常清; Cháng Qīng), hated by the local population as a corrupt oppressor, was sacked by the Qing government after the defeat of his troops by the rebels at Wusu. Attempts by Mingsioi, Cangcing's replacement, to negotiate with the Dungans proved in vain. On November 10, 1864, the Dungans rose both in Ningyuan (the "Taranchi Kuldja"), the commercial center of the region, and Huiyuan (the "Manchu Kuldja"), its military and administrative headquarters. Kulja's Taranchis (Turkic-speaking farmers who later formed part of the Uyghur people) joined in the rebellion. When the local Muslim Kazakhs and Kyrgyzs felt that the rebels had gained the upper hand, they joined them. Conversely, the Buddhist Kalmyks, and Xibes mostly remained loyal to the Qing government.
Ningyuan immediately fell to the Dungan and Turki rebels, but a strong government force at Huiyuan made the insurgents retreat after 12 days of heavy fighting in the streets of the city. The local Han Chinese, seeing the Manchus winning, joined forces with them. However, a counter-offensive by Qing forces failed. The imperial troops lost their artillery while Mingsioi barely escaped capture. With the fall of Wusu and Aksu, the Qing garrison, entrenched in the Huiyuan fortress was completely cut off from the rest of empire-controlled territory forcing Mingsioi to send his communications to Beijing via Russia.
While the Qing forces in Huiyuan successfully repelled the next attack of the rebels on 12 December 1864, the rebellion continued to spread through the northern part of the province (Dzungaria), where the Kazakhs were glad to take revenge on the Kalmyk people that had ruled the area in the past.
For Chinese New Year 1865, the Hui leaders of Tacheng (Chuguchak) invited the local Qing authorities and Kalmyk nobles to assemble in the Hui mosque, in order to swear a mutual oath of peace. However, once the Manchus and Kalmyks were in the mosque, the Hui rebels seized the city armory, and started killing the Manchus. After two days of fighting, the Muslims gained control of the town, while the Manchus were besieged in the fortress. Nevertheless wiith the help of the Kalmyks the Manchus were able to retake the Tacheng area by the fall of 1865. This time, it was the Hui rebels who were locked up in the mosque. The fighting resulted in the destruction of Tacheng and the surviving residents fleeing the town.
Both the Qing government in Beijing and the beleaguered Kulja officials asked the Russians for assistance against the rebels via the Russian envoy in Beijing, Alexander Vlangali (ru) and the Russian commander in Semirechye, General Gerasim Kolpakovsky (ru) respectively. The Russians, however, were diplomatically non-committal. On the one hand, as Vlangali wrote to Saint Petersburg, a "complete refusal" would be bad for Russia's relations with Beijing; on the other, Russian generals in Central Asia generally felt that providing China with serious assistance against Xinjiang's Muslims would do nothing to improve Russia's problems with its own new Muslim subjects. Were the rebellion to succeed and lead to the creation of a permanent Hui state, having been on the Qing side of the former conflict would offer Russia no benefit in its relations with that new neighbor. The decision was thus made in Saint Petersburg in 1865 to avoid offering any serious help to the Qing, beyond agreeing to train Chinese soldiers in Siberia—should they send any—and to sell some grain to the defenders of Kuldja on credit. The main priority of the Russian government remained guarding its border with China and preventing any possibility of the spread of the rebellion into Russia's own domain.
Considering that offense is the best form of defense, Kolpakovsky suggested to his superiors in February 1865 that Russia should go beyond defending its border and move in force into Xinjiang's border area then seize the Chuguchak, Kuldja and Kashgar areas. These could then be colonized with Russian settlers—all to better protect the Romanov empire's other domains. The time was not ripe for such an adventure, however: as Foreign Minister Gorchakov noted, such a breach of neutrality would be not a good thing if China eventually recovered its rebel provinces.
Meanwhile Qing forces in the Ili Valley did not fare well. In April 1865, the Huining (惠宁) fortress (today's Bayandai (zh), located between Yining and Huiyuan), fell to the rebels after a three month siege. Its 8,000 Manchu, Xibe, and Solon defenders were massacred, and two survivors with their ears and noses cut off were sent to Huiyuan—the Qing's last stronghold in the valley—to tell the Governor-general the fate of Huining.
Most of the Huiyuan (Manchu Kulja) fell to the rebels on January 8, 1866. The majority of the residents and garrison perished along with some 700 rebels. Mingsioi, still holding out in the Huiyuan fortress with the remainder of his troops, but having run out of food, sent a delegation to the rebels, bearing a gift of 40 sycees of silver and four boxes of green tea, and offered to surrender, provided the rebels guaranteed their lives and allowed them to keep their allegiance to the Qing government. Twelve Manchu officials with their families left the citadel along with the delegation. The Huis and Taranchis received them and allowed the refugees from Huiyuan to settle in Yining ("the Old Kuldja"). However, the rebels would not accept Mingsioi's conditions, requiring instead that he surrender immediately and recognize the authority of the rebels. Since Mingsioi had rejected the rebels' proposal, they immediately stormed the citadel. On March 3, the rebels having broken into the citadel, Mingsioi assembled his family and staff in his mansion, and blew it up, dying under its ruins. This was the temporary end, for the time being, of Qing rule in the Ili Valley.
Yaqub Beg in Kashgaria
As noted by Muslim sources, the Qing authorities in Kashgar had all along intended to eliminate local Dungans, and managed to carry out their preemptive massacre in the summer of 1864. This weakening of the local Dungan contingent was possibly the reason why the initial rebellion had not been as successful in this area as in the rest of the province. Although the Dungan rebels were able to seize Yangihissar, neither they nor the Kyrgyzs of Siddiq Beg could break into either the Manchu forts outside Yangihissar and Kashgar, nor into the walled Muslim city of Kashgar itself, which was held by Qutluq Beg, a local Muslim appointee of the Qing.
Unable to take control of the region on their own, the Dungans and Kyrgyzs turned for help to Kokand's ruler Alim Quli. Assistance arrived in early 1865 in both spiritual and material form. Spiritual aid came in the person of Buzurg Khoja (also known as Buzurg Khan), a member of the influential Afaqis family of khojas, whose religious authority could be expected to raise the rebellious spirit of the populace. He was heir to a long family tradition of starting mischief in Kashgaria, being a son of Jahangir Khoja and brother of Wali Khan Khoja. Material assistance—as well as the expected conduit of Kokandian influence in Kashgaria—consisted of Yaqub Beg, a young but already well known Kokandian military commander, with an entourage of a few dozen Kokandian soldiers, who became known in Kashgaria as Andijanis.
Although Siddiq Beg's Kyrgyzs had already taken the Muslim town of Kashgar by the time Buzurg Khoja and Yaqub Beg arrived, he had to allow the popular khoja to settle in the former governor's residence (the urda). Siddiq's attempts to assert his dominance were crushed by Yaqub Beg's and Buzurg's forces. The Kyrgyzs then had to accept Yaqub's authority.
With his small, but comparatively well trained and disciplined army consisting of local Dungans and Kashgarian Turkic people (Uighurs, in modern terms), their Kyrgyz allies, Yaqub's own Kokandians, as well as some 200 soldiers sent by the ruler of Badakhshan, Yaqub Beg was able not only to take the Manchu fortress and the Han Chinese town of Kashgar during 1865 (the Manchu commander in Kashgar, as usual, blowing himself up), but to defeat a much larger force sent by the Rashidin of Kucha, who sought domination of the Tarim Basin region for himself.
While Yaqub Beg asserted his authority over Kashgaria, the situation back home in Kokand changed radically. In May 1865, Alim Quli lost his life while defending Tashkent against the Russians. Many of his soldiers (primarily, of Kyrgyz and Kipchak background) deemed it advisable to flee to the comparative safety of Kashgaria. They appeared at the borders of Yaqub Beg's domain in early September 1865. Afghan warriors also assisted Yaqub Beg. Yaqub Beg's rule was unpopular among the natives with one of the local Kashgaris, a warrior and a chieftain's son, commenting: "During the Chinese rule there was everything; there is nothing now." There was also a falling-off in trade.
Yaqub Beg's Kashgaria declares Jihad against the Dungans
Taranchi Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang initially cooperated with the Dungans (Hui people) when they rose in revolt, but later abandoned them after the Hui attempted to subject the entire region to their rule. The Taranchi massacred the Dungans at Kuldja and drove the rest through the Talk pass[clarification needed Is this the correct spelling?] to the Ili Valley. The Hui people in Xinjiang where neither trusted by the Qing authorities nor the Turkestani Muslims.
Yaqub Beg's Kokandi Andijani Uzbek forces declared a Jihad against Dungan rebels under T'o Ming (Tuo Ming a.k.a. Daud Khalifa). Fighting broke out between Dungan and Kokandi Uzbek rebels in Xinjiang. Yaqub Beg enlisted Han militia under Xu Xuegong in order to fight against the Dungan troops under T'o Ming. T'o Ming's Dungan forces were defeated at the Battle of Urumqi (1870) as part of Yaqub Beg's plan to conquer Dzungaria and seize all Dungan territory. Poems were written about the victories of Yaqub Beg's forces over the Hans and the Dungans . Yakub Beg seized Aksu from Dungan forces and forced them north of the Tian Shan, committing massacres upon the Dungan people (Tunganis). Independent Han Chinese militia who were not affiliated with the Qing government joined both the Turkic forces under Yaqub Beg, and the Dungan rebels. In 1870, Yaqub Beg had 1,500 Han Chinese troops with his Turkic forces attacking Dungans in Urumqi. The following year, the Han Chinese militia joined the Dungans in fighting against Turkic forces.
Foreign relations of Kashgaria Yaqub Beg
Russia and Britain signed several treaties with Yaqub Beg's regime in Kashgar with Yaqub seeking to secure British and Russian aid for his government.
Relations with Russia
Relations between Yaqub Beg and the Russian Empire alternated between fighting and peaceful diplomatic exchanges.
The Russians detested the native population of Kashgar because of their elite's close contacts with the Kokand Khans who had recently been expelled during the Russian conquest of Turkestan. This animosity would have ruined Yaqub Beg had he sought extensive aid from them as he had originally intended.
Ottoman and British support
Qing reconquest of Xinjiang
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As Qing General Zuo Zongtang moved into Xinjiang to crush the Muslim rebels under Yaqub Beg, he was joined by Dungan (Hui) General Ma Anliang and his forces, which were composed entirely out of Muslim Dungan people. In addition, General Dong Fuxiang had an army of both Hans and Dungan people. Ma Anliang and his Dungan troops attacked the Muslim rebel forces, reconquering Xinjiang for the Empire of the Great Qing. General Dong Fuxiang's army seized the Kashgaria and Khotan area. Dong Fuxiang's army took Khotan.
General Zuo implemented a conciliatory policy toward the Muslim rebels, pardoning those who did not rebel and those who surrendered if they had joined in only for religious reasons. If rebels assisted the government against the rebel Muslims they received rewards. In contrast to General Zuo, the Manchu leader Dorongga sought to massacre all the Muslims and saw them all as the enemy. Zuo also instructed General Zhang Yao that 'The Andijanis are tyrannical to their people; government troops should comfort them with benevolence. The Andijanis are greedy in extorting from the people; the government troops should rectify this by being generous.', telling him to not mistreat the Turkic Muslim natives of Xinjiang. Zuo wrote that the main targets were only the 'die-hard partisans' and their leaders, Yaqub Beg and Bai Yanhu. The natives were not blamed or mistreated by the Qing troops, a Russian wrote that soldiers under General Liu 'acted very judiciously with regard to the prisoners whom he took . . . . His treatment of these men was calculated to have a good influence in favour of the Empire of the Great Qing' .
Zuo Zongtang, previously a general in the Xiang Army, was the commander in chief of all Qing troops participating in this counterinsurgency. His subordinates were the Han Chinese General Liu Jintang and Manchu Jin Shun.
Liu Jintang's army had modern German artillery, which Jin Shun's forces lacked and neither was Jin's advance as rapid as Liu's. After Liu bombarded Ku-mu-ti, Muslim rebel casualties numbered 6,000 dead while Bai Yanhu was forced to flee for his life. Thereafter Qing forces entered Urumqi unopposed. Zuo Zongtang wrote that Yaqub Beg's soldiers had modern western weapons but were cowardly: 'The Andijani chieftain Yaqub Beg has fairly good firearms. He has foreign rifles and foreign guns, including cannon using explosive shells [Kai Hua Pao]; but his are not as good nor as effective as those in the possession of our government forces. His men are not good marksmen, and when repulsed they simply ran away.'
Dabancheng was destroyed by Liu's forces in April. Yaqub's subordinates defected to the Qing or fled as his forces started to fall apart. The oasis fell easily to the Qing troops. Toksun fell to Liu's army on April 26.
Zuo Zongtang employed divide and conquer tactics in Xinjiang, sending messages to the people of Kashgaria that they had been fooled by the Central Asian troops under Yaqub Beg, the man who had persuaded them to rebel in the first place. Yaqub Beg became nervous when the tactic worked, and he executed several natives in Kashgaria. His forces disintegrated after fighting.
After all official and private residences had been destroyed, the Muslim population was compelled by Bai Yenhu to follow him in his retreat. He appears to have been the commander of a portion of the rebel army left round Korla. Not only was Kashgaria deserted by its inhabitants, but so was the whole area controlled by Yakub Beg's forces thereabouts. Some, indeed, had fled to the mountains, but were afraid to return when they saw the Qing army established in their homes. The Qing army followed their usual plan of settling fresh Han Chinese, Manchu and Mongol people in the town. The Mongol noble, Cha-hi-telkh, was directed to move up some hundreds of the members of his tribe to occupy this important post, to restore the homes and restock the fields. While this work proceeded across the territory conquered by Qing troops, that through which they passed in hostile guise was subjected to far worse treatment. On 9 October, the Qing army marched against Korla from two sides, and on that day a cavalry skirmish took place in which fifteen of Bai Yanhu's horsemen were slain and two taken prisoner. Some volunteers in Bai's army told Qing troops that Bai Yanhu had withdrawn with all his forces to Kucha. Once the Qing army had exhausted their stock of information they beheaded the prisoners. The same day they entered Korla, which they found to be completely deserted, although not flooded. The walls remained, but many of the houses had been demolished. Here, the general's plight bordered on desperate because provisions transported by cart and camel had not arrived. The prospect of starvation almost compelled the victorious army to retreat before an idea struck the competent general. He guessed that there might still be supplies concealed in the city, which the rebels had been unable to carry away with them. Accordingly the whole army set to work to search the houses, and to dig into the ground in all likely places. Their toil was soon rewarded, and "several tens of thousand catties' weight of food" were discovered. However, this was a meagre supply for an army of men which was probably under 10,000 strong.
The mass retreat of the rebel army shrank their sphere of control smaller and smaller. The next Qing army advance, which they could not expect to be as unopposed as their previous one, would bring them onto the plain of Kashgaria. No sooner had Karashar and Korla fallen into their possession than an edict was issued inviting the Mohammedan descendants to return to their homes. Many of them accepted the invitation. "In this quarter, the arms of the Empire of the Great Qing were not disgraced by any excesses, and moderation towards the unarmed population extenuated their severity towards armed forces."
Yaqub Beg lost more than 20,000 men either though desertion or at the hands of the enemy. He consequently considered it prudent to withdraw still further into his territory, and left Karashar after a few days' residence in Korla. Some weeks before the occurrence of these events, Yaqub Beg had sent an envoy to Tashkent to solicit the aid of the Russians against the advancing Qing army. But the Russians only gave his messenger fair words, and did not interfere with Mr. Kamensky's commercial transactions with the Qing army. At the moment, too, Russia was so busily occupied in Europe that "she had no leisure to devote to the Xinjiang issue£".
General Zhang Yao captured the small towns of Chightam and Pidjamin in the middle of April without encountering serious opposition. From the latter, some fifty miles east of Turfan, he commenced a concerted movement with his superior, Zuo Zongtang, which overcame all Kashgarian resistance. At Turfan, Yakub Beg was trapped between two armies advancing from Urumqi and Pidjam, and if defeated his line of retreat would be greatly exposed to an enterprising enemy. Once the Qing army saw the success of their preliminary movements a general advance was ordered in all directions. It is evident that the Qing army at first met strenuous resistance at Devanchi. The forcing of the Tian Shan defiles had not been accomplished when news reached the garrison that their ruler had been expelled from Turfan by a fresh Qing army. Confusion then quickly spread through all ranks of Yakub Beg's followers. In doubt and unreasoning panic, the majority of his soldiers either went over to the enemy or fled headlong to Kashgaria. At this moment of desperation "the Athalik Ghazi still bore himself like a good soldier. Outside Turfan he gave battle to the Qing army, and though driven from the field by overwhelming odds he yet once more made a stand at Toksun, forty miles west of Turfan. When defeated a second time he withdrew to Kashgaria to make fresh efforts to withstand the invading army. Yakub Beg probably lost in these engagements."
During a halt of a few days at Korla, Jin Shun learned that Bai Yanhu had coerced the people east of Kucha at Tsedayar and other places to withdraw to Kucha and to destroy their crops. He at once resolved to frustrate the plan, and set out in person at the head of 1,500 light infantry and 1,000 cavalry to protect the inhabitants. By forced marches, sometimes carried on through the better part of the night, he reached Tsedayar on the 17 October, where he learnt that Bai Yanhu had driven off the whole of the population, and was already at Luntai on the road to Kucha. "At the next village to Tsedayar, a fortified post known as Tangy Shahr, he found that Bai Yanhu was still ahead of him, and that he was setting fire to the villages on his line of march. Jin Shun left a portion of his infantry behind to put out the conflagration, and resolutely pressed on with the remainder of his force to Luntai. This small town had also been set on fire, but here the rapidity of Qing general's advance was rewarded with the news that the enemy's army, with a large number of the inhabitants, was only a short distance ahead. The rear-guard, composed of 1,000 cavalry, was soon touched, and the Kashgaria, emboldened by the small numbers of Qing troops, came on to the attack in gallant fashion. Their charge was broken, however, by the steadiness of Qing infantry, armed with excellent rifles, and the cavalry performed the rest. The Kashgaria left 100 slain on the field of battle and twelve prisoners. From these latter it was discovered that the main body of 2,000 soldiers was some distance on the road to Kucha, with the family of Bai Yanhu and the villagers under its charge. It was too late to advance further that day, but on the next the forward movement was resumed. A large multitude—" some tens of thousands of people"—was speedily sighted by the advanced guard, but on examining these through glasses it was discovered that scarcely more than a thousand carried arms. All the troops were then brought to the front, and Jin Shun issued instructions that all those found with arms in their hands should be slain, but the others spared."
The armed portion of the rebel army drew off from the unarmed, leaving in their midst a large assemblage of rebel villagers who were being carried off to Kucha. These were sent to the rear by order of Jin Shun, and distributed in such of the villages as were most convenient. In the meanwhile a sharp fight took place a few miles in the rear of the old position, near a village called Arpa Tai. The action appears to have been well contested, but the superior tactics and weapons of Jin Shun's small army prevailed; and the rebel army retreated with considerable loss and in great disorder. "Kin Shun followed up his success with marvelous rapidity and restless energy, while the rebel troops fled to Kucha, abandoning the people and their control range to Qing troops. The unfortunate inhabitants implored with piteous entreaties the mercy of the conqueror, and it is with genuine satisfaction we record the fact that Jin Shun informed them of their safety, and bade them have no further alarm." By this time it is probable that Qing army had been largely reinforced from the rear so they began the attack on Kucha. When Qing troops appeared before its walls they found that a battle was proceeding there between the Kashgarian soldiers and the townspeople, who refused to accompany them in a further retreat westward. On the appearance of Qing army, the Kashgarian force evacuated the city and joined battle with it on the western side of Kucha. Qing soldiers attacked them immediately with little success in the first instance and a charge of the cavalry, numbering some four or five thousand men, was only repulsed with some difficulty. But the cannon of the Qing soldiers had a remarkable effect upon the rebel forces while Qing reserves arrived constantly. The infantry were at last ordered to advance, under the cover of a heavy artillery fire, and the cavalry made a charge at the most opportune moment. The whole enemy army then broke and fled in irretrievable confusion, leaving more than a thousand of their number on the ground. The numbers on each side were probably about 10,000 men, and it was won as much by superior tactics and skill as by brute force and courage. All the movements of Qing army were characterized by remarkable forethought, and evinced the greatest ability on the part of the general and his lieutenants, as well as obedience, valor, and patience on the part of his soldiers. The rapid advance from Kuhwei to Karashar, the forced march thence to Luntai, the capture of Kucha and the forbearance of Qing troops towards the inhabitants, all combined to make this portion of the war most creditable to the Qing and her generals. The reason given in the official report for the Kashgarian authorities attempting to carry off the population was that the rebels wished in the first place to deprive Qing armed forces of all assistance, thus making further pursuit very difficult. Furthermore, to ingratiate themselves with the Qing authorities reestablished in Kashgaria, the rebels delivered this large mass of Turkic Muslims into their hands. Bai Yanhu was thereby considered no Hakim Khan Sur by contemporary author Charles Boulger who also believed that Bai must have been either a Dungan refugee or a subordinate of Beg Bacha's.
"A depot was formed at Kucha, and a large body of troops remained there as a garrison; but the principal administrative measures were directed to the task of improving the position of the Turkic Muslim population. A board of administration was instituted for the purpose of providing means of subsistence for the destitute, and for the distribution of seed-corn for the benefit of the whole community. It had also to supervise the construction of roads, and the establishment of ferry boats, and of post-house in order to facilitate the movements of trade and travel and expedite the transmission of mails." Magistrates and prefects were appointed to all the cities, and special precautions were promptly taken to prevent the outbreak of epidemic or the onset of famine. Boulger writes: "There is no reason to believe that in the vast region from Turfan to Kucha Qing authorities have departed from the statesmanlike and beneficent schemes which marked their re-installation as rulers; and whatever harshness or cruelty they manifested towards the Dungan revolts and the rebel soldiers was more than atoned for by the mildness of their treatment of the people."
On the 19th, or more probably the 22 October, Jin Shun resumed his forward movement and encountered no serious opposition. His first halt was at a village called Hoser, where he stopped for one night. He prepared a report to Peking, which described the successes and movements of the previous three weeks. At the next town, known as Bai, Jin Shun halted to await the arrival of the rear-guard under General Zhang Yao. This force arrived before the end of October, and the advance against Aksu resumed. Up to this point, the chief interest centered in the army south of the Tian Shan and the achievements of Jin Shun. "The only authority for this portion of the account of the campaign is the Peking Gazette."
The Northern Army under the immediate command of Zuo Zongtang operated in complete secrecy. Estimates vary as to its strength—Boulger believes it comprised a minimum of 28,000 men and writes: "a St. Petersburg paper, on the authority of a Russian merchant, who had been to Manas, computed it to be of that strength." It was concentrated in the neighborhood of Manas, and along the northern outskirts of the Tian Shan; and also on the frontier of the Russian dominions in Kuldja. To all appearance this army was consigned to a part of enforced inactivity since it was impossible to enter Kuldja, and thus proceed by their old routes through the Bedel Pass or Muzat River. But it was not so; the travels of Colonel Prjevalsky in the commencement of 1877 had not been unobserved by Qing authorities, and it was assumed that where a Russian officer with his Cossack following could go, there also could go a Qing troop. By those little-known mountain passes, which are made by the Tekes and Great Yuldus rivers, Qing army which was under General Zuo crossed over into Kashgaria; and it is probable that the two armies joined in the neighborhood of Bai. It was by this stroke of strategy on the part of Zuo Zongtang that Qing army found themselves before the walls of Aksu. At that moment, the imperial army was an overwhelming army at the very sight of which all thought of resistance died away from the hearts of the rebel peoples and garrisons. General Zuo appeared before the walls of Aksu, the bulwark of Kashgaria on the east. And its commandant, who were panic and stricken, abandoned his post at the first onset. He was subsequently taken prisoner by an officer of Kuli Beg, and executed. Qing army then advanced on Uqturpan, which also surrendered without a blow. It is said that the Chinese have not published any detailed description of this portion of the war, and we are consequently unable to say what their version is of those reported atrocities at Aksu and Uqturpan, of which the Russian papers have made so much. There is no doubt that a very large number of refugees fled to Russian territory, perhaps 10,000 in all, and these brought with them the tales of fear and exaggerated alarm. We may feel little hesitation in accepting the assertion as true, that the armed garrisons were slaughtered without exception; but that the unarmed population and the women and children shared the same fate we distinctly refuse to credit. There is every precedent in favor of the assumption that a more moderate policy was pursued, and there is no valid reason why the Qing authorities should have dealt with Aksu and Uqturpan differently to Kucha or Turfan. The case of Manas has been greatly insisted upon by the agitators on this "atrocity" question; but there is the highest authority for asserting that only armed men were massacred there. This was what Qing troops had always done; it was a national custom, and they certainly did not depart from it in the case of the Dungan and Kashgaria. But there is no solid ground for convicting them of any more heinous crime, even in the instances of Manas and Aksu, which are put so prominently forward.
Early in December all Qing troops began their last attack against the capital city of the Kashgarian regime, and on December 17 the Qing army made a fatal assault. The rebel troops were finally defeated and the residual troops started to withdraw to Yarkant, whence they fled to Russian territory. With the fall of Kashgaria Qing's reconquest of Xinjiang was completed, and the other cities, Yangi Hissar and Yarkant, speedily shared the same fate. Khotan and Sarikol also sent in formal promises of subjection. But the capture of Kashgaria virtually closed down the rebels. No further rebellion was encountered, and the reestablished Qing authorities began the task of recovery and reorganization. The Qing forces beheaded Turkic rebel commanders, and also tortured Ottoman Turkish military officers who served with the rebels. When the city of Kashgaria fell, the greater portion of the army, knowing that they could expect no mercy at the hands of Qing authorities, fled to Russian territory, and then spread reports of fresh Chinese massacres, which probably only existed in their own imagination.
It was stated at the time that the strength of the Empire of the Great Qing has been thoroughly demonstrated and that her prestige remained unsullied. "Whatever danger there may be to the permanence of Qing's triumph lies rather from Russia than from the peoples of Tian Shan Nan Lu; nor is there much danger that the Chinese laurels will become faded even before a European foe. Zuo Zongtang and his generals such as Jin Shun and Chang Yao, accomplished a task which would reflect credit on any army and any country. They have given a luster to the modern Chinese administration which must stand it in good stead, and they have acquired a personal renown that will not easily depart. Qing Empire's reconquest of Xinjiang is beyond doubt the most remarkable event that has occurred in Asia during the last fifty years, and it is quite the most brilliant achievement of a Chinese army, led by Chinese generals, that has taken place since Emperor Qianlong subdued the country more than a century ago. It also proves, in a manner that is more than unpalatable to us, that the Chinese possess an adaptive faculty that must be held to be a very important fact in every-day politics in Central Asia. They reconquered Kashgaria with European weapons and by careful study of Western science and technology. Their soldiers marched in obedience to instructors trained on the Prussian principle; and their generals maneuvered their troops in accordance with the teachings of Moltke and Manteuffel. Even in such minor matters as the use of telescopes and field glasses we could find this Chinese army well supplied. Nothing was more absurd than the picture drawn by some over-wise observer of this army, as consisting of soldiers fantastically garbed in the guise of dragons and other hideous appearances. All that belonged to an old-world theory. The rebel troops were as widely different from all previous Chinese armies in Central Asia as it well could be; and in all essentials closely resembled that of a European power. Its remarkable triumphs were chiefly attributable to the thoroughness with which China had in this instance adapted herself to Western notions"
Yaqub Beg and his son Ishana's corpses were "burned to cinders" in full public view. This angered the population in Kashgar, but Qing troops quashed a rebellious plot by Hakim Khan. Surviving members of Yaqub Beg's family included his four sons, four grandchildren (two grandsons and two granddaughters), and four wives. They either died in prison in Lanzhou, Gansu or were killed by the Qing government. His sons Yima Kuli, K'ati Kuli, Maiti Kuli, and grandson Aisan Ahung were the only survivors alive in 1879. They were all underage children at that time. They were put on trial and sentenced to an agonizing death if they were found to be complicit in their father's rebellious "sedition". If they were innocent, they were to be sentenced to castration and servitude as eunuch slaves to the Qing troops. Afterwards, when they reached the age of 11 years old, they would be handed over to the Imperial Household to be executed or castrated. In 1879, it was confirmed that the sentence of castration was carried out, Yaqub Beg's son and grandsons were castrated by the Chinese court in 1879 and turned into eunuchs to work in the Imperial Palace.
On January 25, 1891, a temple was constructed by Liu Jintang. He had been one of the generals participating in the counterinsurgency against the Dungan revolt and at that time he was the Governor of Gansu. The temple was built in the capital of Gansu as a memorial to the victims who died during the Dungan revolt in Kashgaria and Dzungaria. The victims numbered 24,838 and included officials, peasants, and members of all social classes and ethnic groups. It was named Chun Yi Ci. Another temple was already built in honor of the Xiang Army soldiers who fought during the revolt.
Flight of the Dungans to the Russian Empire
The failure of the revolt led to the immigration of some Hui people into Imperial Russia. According to Rimsky-Korsakoff (1992), three separate groups of the Hui people fled to the Russian Empire across the Tian Shan during the exceptionally severe winter of 1877/78:
- The first group of some 1000 people originally from Turpan in Xinjiang and led by Ma Daren (马大人), also known as Ma Da-lao-ye (马大老爷) reached Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan.
- The second group of 1130 people originally from Didaozhou (狄道州) in Gansu led by ahong A Yelaoren (阿爷老人), were settled in the spring of 1878 in the village of Yardyk some 15 kilometres (9.3 mi) from Karakol in Eastern Kyrgyzstan.
- The third group, originally from Shaanxi and led by Bai Yanhu (白彦虎; also spelt Bo Yanhu; 1829(?)-1882), one of the leaders of the rebellion, were settled in the village of Karakunuz (now Masanchi), in the modern Zhambyl Province of Kazakhstan. Masanchi is located on the northern (Kazakh) side of the Chu River, 8 kilometres (5.0 mi) north of the city of Tokmak in north-western Kyrgyzstan. This group numbered 3314 on arrival.
Another wave of immigration followed in the early 1880s. In accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Saint Petersburg signed in February 1881, which required the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Upper Ili Basin (the Kulja area), the Hui and Taranchi (Uighur) people of the region were allowed to opt for moving to the Russian side of the border. Most people choose that option and according to Russian statistics, 4,682 Hui moved to the Russian Empire under the treaty. They migrated in many small groups between 1881–83, settling in the village of Sokuluk some 30 kilometres (19 mi) west of Bishkek, as well as at a number of points between the Chinese border and Sokuluk, in south-eastern Kazakhstan and northern Kyrgyzstan.
The descendants of these rebels and refugees still live in Kyrgyzstan and neighboring parts of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. They still call themselves the Hui people (Huizu), but to the outsiders they are known as Dungan, which means Eastern Gansu in Chinese.
After the Sino-Soviet split, Soviet propaganda writers such as Rais Abdulkhakovich Tuzmukhamedov called the Dungan revolt (1862–1877) a "national liberation movement" for their political proposes.
Increase in Hui military power
The rebellion increased the power of Hui Generals and military men in the Qing Empire. Many Hui Generals who served in the campaign were promoted by the Emperor, including Ma Anliang, and Dong Fuxiang. This led Hui armies to fight again in the Dungan Revolt (1895) against the rebels, and in the Boxer Rebellion against Christian Western Armies. The Hui Gansu Braves rose to fame for protecting the Emperor and Polytheist Han Chinese against the Chinese Christians and Westerners.
Border dispute with Russia
After General Zuo Zongtang and his Xiang Army crushed the rebels, they demanded Russia return the city of Kuldja in Xinjiang, which they had occupied. Zuo was outspoken in calling for war against Russia and hoped to settle the matter by attacking Russian forces in Xinjiang. In 1878, tensions in the area increased. Zuo massed Qing troops toward the Russian occupied Kuldja. Chinese forces also fired on Russian expeditionary forces originating from Yart Vernaic, expelling them, which resulted in a Russian retreat.
After the incompetent negotiator Chong Hou was bribed by the Russians, he signed a treaty granting Russia extraterritorial rights, consulates, control over trade, and an indemnity—all without permission from the Qing government. Thereafter a massive uproar by the Chinese literati ensued with some individuals calling for the execution of Chong Hou. Zhang Zhidong demanded the beheading of Chong Hou and that China stand up to the government of Russia and declare the treaty invalid. He also stated that "The Russians must be considered extremely covetous and truculent in making the demands and Chong Hou was extremely stupid and absurd in accepting them . . . . If we insist on changing the treaty, there may not be trouble; if we do not, we are unworthy to be called a state.' The Chinese literati demanded the government mobilize armed forces against Russia. The government acted after this, giving important posts to officers from the Xiang Army. Charles Gordon became an advisor to the Chinese.
The Russians were in a very bad diplomatic and military position vis-a-vis China. Russia feared the threat of military conflict, which forced them into diplomatic negotiations instead.
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- Dungan Revolt (1895)
- Islam during the Qing Dynasty
- List of rebellions in China
- Taiping Rebellion
- Nien Rebellion
- Miao Rebellion (1854–73)
- Panthay Rebellion
- Punti–Hakka Clan Wars
- Nepalese-Tibetan War
- List of wars and disasters by death toll
- This article incorporates text from Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, Volume 4, Issues 1-2, by Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen. Afd. Letterkunde, a publication from 1904 now in the public domain in the United States.
- This article incorporates text from Sectarianism and religious persecution in China: a page in the history of religions, Volume 2, by Jan Jakob Maria Groot, a publication from 1904 now in the public domain in the United States.
- This article incorporates text from Accounts and papers of the House of Commons, by Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons, a publication from 1871 now in the public domain in the United States.
- This article incorporates text from Encyclopædia of religion and ethics, Volume 8, by James Hastings, John Alexander Selbie, Louis Herbert Gray, a publication from 1916 now in the public domain in the United States.
- This article incorporates text from Appletons' annual cyclopaedia and register of important events, Volume 4, a publication from 1880 now in the public domain in the United States.
- This article incorporates text from Translations of the Peking Gazette, by 1880, a publication from now in the public domain in the United States.
- This article incorporates text from The American annual cyclopedia and register of important events of the year ..., Volume 4, a publication from 1888 now in the public domain in the United States.
- This article incorporates text from Appletons' annual cyclopedia and register of important events: Embracing political, military, and ecclesiastical affairs; public documents; biography, statistics, commerce, finance, literature, science, agriculture, and mechanical industry, Volume 19, a publication from 1886 now in the public domain in the United States.
- This article incorporates text from The Chinese times, Volume 5, a publication from 1891 now in the public domain in the United States.
- This article incorporates text from The Canadian spectator, Volume 1, a publication from 1878 now in the public domain in the United States.
- Garnaut, Anthony. "From Yunnan to Xinjiang: Governor Yang Zengxin and his Dungan Generals". Pacific and Asian History, Australian National University). p. 105. Retrieved 2010-07-14.
- James Hastings, John Alexander Selbie, Louis Herbert Gray (1916). Encyclopædia of religion and ethics 8. T. & T. Clark. p. 893. Retrieved 2010-11-28.
- John Powell (2001). John Powell, ed. Magill's Guide to Military History 3 (illustrated ed.). Salem Press. p. 1072. ISBN 0-89356-014-6. Retrieved 2010-11-28.
- Lipman (1998), p. 120–121
- Sir H. A. R. Gibb. Encyclopedia of Islam, Volumes 1-5. Brill Archive. p. 849. ISBN 90-04-07164-4. Retrieved 2011-03-26.
- Jonathan D. Spence (1991). The search for modern China. W. W. Norton & Company. p. 191. ISBN 0-393-30780-8. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- Michael Dillon (1999). China's Muslim Hui community: migration, settlement and sects. Richmond: Curzon Press. p. 62. ISBN 0-7007-1026-4. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 218. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "The Ch'ing began to win only with the arrival of To-lung-a (1817-64) as Imperial Commissioner. Originally a Manchu banner officer, To-lung-a had, through the patronage of Hu Lin-i, risen to commander of the Hunan Army (the force under him being identified as the Ch'u-yung). In 1861 To-lung-a helped Tseng Kuo-ch'üan to recover Anking from the Taipings and, on his own, captured Lu-chou in 1862. His yung-ying force proved to be equally effective against the Muslims. In March 1863 his battalions captured two market towns that formed the principal Tungan base in eastern Shensi. He broke the blockade around Sian in August and pursued the Muslims to western Shensi. By the time of his death in March 1864—in a battle against Szechwanese Taipings who invaded Shensi—he had broken the back of the Muslim Rebellion in that province. A great many Shensi Muslims had, however, escaped to Kansu, adding to the numerous Muslim forces that had already risen there."
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 218. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "While the rebellion in Shensi was clearly provoked by the Han elite and Manchu officials, in Kansu it seems that the Muslims had taken the initiative, with the New Teaching group under Ma Hua-lung playing a large role. As early as October 1862 some Muslim leaders, spreading rumors of an impending Ch'ing massacre of Muslims, organized themselves for a siege of Ling-chou, a large city only 40-odd miles north of Ma Hua-ling's base, Chin-chi-pao. Meanwhile, in southeastern Kansu, Ku-yuan, a strategic city on a principal transport route, was attacked by Muslims. Governor-general En-lin, in Lanchow, saw no alternative to a policy of reconciliation. In January 1863, acting on his recommendation, Peking issued an edict especially for Kansu, reiterating the principle of non-discrimination towards the Muslim population."
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 227. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "Tso had also been assured of a solution to his financial and logistical problems. In war-torn Shensi and Kansu, food was scarce and prices extremely high. Tso declared that his forces would go into major battle only when there were three months' supplies on hand.57 In addition to munitions, large amounts of grain also had to be brought to Shensi and Kansu from other provinces. To finance the purchase of thee supplies, Tso had to depend on Peking's agreement to the formula adopted by many dynasties of the past: "support the armies in the northwest with the resources of the southeast". In 1867 five provinces of the southeast coast were asked by the government to contribute to a "Western expedition fund" (Hsi-cheng hsiang-hsiang) totaling 3.24 million taels annually. The arrangement came under the Ch'ing fiscal practice of "interprovincial revenue assistance" (hsieh-hsiang), but at a time when these provinces were already assessed for numerous contributions to meet the needs of Peking or other provinces.58 Tso reported, as early as 1867, to a strategem that would compel the provinces to produce their quotas for his campaigns. He requested, and obtained, the government's approval for his arranging lump-sum loans from foreign firms, guaranteed by the superintendents of customs at the treaty ports and confirmed by the seals of the provincial governors involved, to be repaid by these provinces to the foreign firms by a fixed date."
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 226. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "Tso's preparations for his offensive in Kansu were nearly complete. From Hunan his veteran officers had recruited a new force of some 55,000 troops. In addition, Tseng Kuo-fan had transferred to Shensi in 1867 the only unit of his Hunan Army that was not disbanded--about 10,000 men under Gen. Liu Sung-shan, one of Tseng's best generals. The government had also assigned to Tso's command 10,000 men from the Szechuan Army (Ch'uan-chün) under Huang Ting; 7,000 men of the Anhwei provincial army (Wan-chün) under Kuo Pao-ch'ang; and 6,500 men of the Honan Army (Yü-chün) under Chang Yueh. These forces all had experience in fighting the Taipings of the Niens, and they included 7,500 cavalry, reinforcing the 5,000 mounts Tso himself procured.55 However, apart from employing Manchu officers from Kirin to instruct his cavalry, Tso seems to have paid little attention to the training of his forces. He appreciated the fact that Liu Sung-shan's troops were adept in tactical formations and sharpshooting, but from his own experience in the Taiping Rebellion, he was convinced that the two essentials for victory were courageous men and ample rations."
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 226. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "Tso's preparations for his offensive in Kansu were nearly complete. From Hunan his veteran officers had recruited a new force totalling some 55,000 men. In addition, Tseng Kuo-fan had transferred to Shensi in 1867 the only unit of his Hunan Army that was not disbanded--about 10,000 men under Liu Sung-shan, one of Tseng's best generals. The government had also assigned to Tso's command 10,000 men from the Szechwan Army (Ch'uan-chün) under Huang Ting; 7,000 men of the Anhwei provincial army (Wan-chün) under Kuo Pao-ch'ang; and 6,500 men of the Honan Army (Yü-chün) under Chang Yueh . . . and they included a total of 7,500 cavalry, reinforcing the 5,000 mounts Tso himself procurred. Liu Sung-shan's troops were adept in tactical formations and sharpshooting, but from his own experience in the Taiping Rebellion, Tso was convinced that the two essentials for victory were courageous men and ample rations. He had briefly tried Western drill"
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 227. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "on his troops late in the rebellion, but found that "command words cannot be used for large formations of soldiers". Although Tso equipped his troops with Western firearms, somehow he came to think that target practice "twice a day for ten days" was sufficient before the troops were sent into battle.56 Fortunately for him, in the forthcoming offensive in Kansu he was to engage in actions that, despite the more difficult terrain, chiefly involved attacks on stockades and walled cities--not altogether different from the Taiping Rebellion. However, Tso did value the large siege guns, which a few of his veteran officers had learned to use."
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 571. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "When Tso Tsung-t'ang constructed the Lanchow Arsenal in 1872, he called for workers from Canton because of their well-known skill."
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 234. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "Tso Tsung-t'ang moved into his governor-general's seat at Lanchow in August 1872, but he concentraded first on Hsi-ning, 120 miles northwest of Lanchow, because in 1872 it was under the control of Shensi Muslim leaders, including Pai Yen-hu who had been Ma Hua-ling's partisan and now had more than 10,000 seasoned Muslim fighters at his disposal. The task of attacking Hsi-ning was undertaken by Liu Chin-t'ang in August. It took three months to penetrate the difficult and well-defended terrain into Hsi-ning, but he finally took the city. He annihilated the 10,000 Muslim partisans but Pai Yen-hu escaped. Ma Kuei-yuan, the "Muslim gentry leader" of Hsi-ning who protected the New Teaching, was tracked down in the Tsinghai Salar territory.81. All this time Tso had in fact been preparing for the crucial assault on Su-chou, where New Teaching commander Ma Wen-lu (originally from Hsi-ning) and numerous tungan leaders had gathered. To add to Hsu Chan-piao's forces, Tso sent to Su-chou 3,000 men from his own Hunan Army in December 1872, and at his request both Sung Ch'ing and Chang Yueh of the Honan Army were ordered to join the campaign. Chin-shun, the recently appointed general-in-chief at Uliasutai, also participated. Tso had his hands full arranging finances and supplies, including the establishment of a modest arsenal at Lanchow where Lai Ch'ang, a Cantonese and a talented artillery officer with some knowledge of ordnance, began manufacturing extra shells for the German siege guns. Tso was obsessed with the organization of the war, yet both conscience and policy called for making arrangements for the livelihood of "good Muslims", with a view to removing the root causes of communal conflict."
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 240. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "Tso's arsenral at Lanchow, besides manufacturing cartridges and shells (some of which did not prove to be entirely satisfactory), even succeeded in 1875 in producing four "steel rifle-barreled breechloaders", witnessed by a Russian official."
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 226. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "The Shensi Muslims now entrenched themselves in Tung-chih-yuan, a fertile plain in southeastern Kansu, where their "Eighteen Great Battalions" continued to conduct raids in every direction. Further north, meanwhile, the New Teaching leader Ma Hua-lung, ever since his "surrender" to the Ch'ing early in 1866, had built up Chin-chi-pao as an economic as well as military base. His followers included many Muslim merchants with long experience in the trade between Kansu and Pao-t'ou in Inner Mongolia, employing caravan routes as well as rafts made of inflated hides that navigated the eastward great bend of the Yellow River. Ma himself owned two trading firms and invested in the businesses of many of his followers. He was situated as to be able to control the entire trade between Mongolia and southern Kansu.53 His interest was, however, religious and military. He purchased firearms from as far as Kuei-hua (present-day Huhehot) and forwarded them to the New Teaching centers elsewhere in Kansu. Ma also traded with the Shensi Muslims at Tung-chih-yuan, selling horses and munitions and buying grain. When Tso returned to Shensi in November 1868, he was convinced that Ma Hua-lung not only had connections in Sinkiang but had designs on Mongolia "both north and south of the great desert".54"
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 231. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "Moving southward from Ling-chou, Liu Sung-shan had to fight his way through hundreds of fortified villages, enclosed by hills on three sides and by the Yellow River in the west. The rural defenders, who possessed firearms, were also Ma's staunchest devotees. Liu had to advance slowly, and on 14 February 1870, he met his death under 'cannon fire'.79 Although his able nephew and former staff officer, Liu Chin-t'ang (1844-94), managed to hold his force together, its forward movement came to a halt."
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 232. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "Tso's immediate appointment of Liu as commander of the 'Old Hunan Army' (Lao Hsiang-chün)added to the youthful commander's prestige. . . By September 1870, Liu Chin-t'ang had reduced all but a score of the 500-odd forts around Chin-chi-pao. Krupp siege guns shipped to Kansu form Shanghai were now sent to Liu along with an officer who had served Tseng Kuo-fan as a gunner. The shells failed to breach Chin-chi-pao's heavy walls (said to be thirty-five feet thick), but in October Liu Chin-t'ang built a high gun position from which he bombarded the city over its walls. . .Chin-chi-pao's dwindling number of inhabitants were now surviving on grass roots and flesh from dead bodies. In January, Ma Hua-lung finally surrendered to Liu Chin-t'ang,"
- Located in the town of Jinji (金积镇, Jinji Zheng), some 8 km southwest from Wuzhong City in Wuzhong prefecture of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (formerly part of Gansu).
- See the Town of Jinji (金积镇, Jinji Zheng) on Wuzhong map
- 金积镇 (Jinji Town) mentioned as being 金积堡 (Jinji Fortress) in the past
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 252. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "In mid-September, Tso himself was on the scene, with his arsenal manager, Lai Ch'ang, who was also an expert gunner. The Krupp guns now bombarded the heavy walls, their fire being coordinated with mines that exploded under the walls."
- Lipman, Jonathan N. (Jul 1984). Ethnicity and Politics in Republican China: The Ma Family Warlords of Gansu. Sage Publications, Inc. p. 294. JSTOR 189017.
- Mary Clabaugh Wright (1957). Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism the T'Ung-Chih. Stanford University Press. p. 121. ISBN 0-8047-0475-9. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- James Hastings, John Alexander Selbie, Louis Herbert Gray (1916). Encyclopædia of religion and ethics, Volume 8. T. & T. Clark. p. 893. Retrieved 2010-11-28.
- Lipman, Jonathan N. (Jul 1984). Ethnicity and Politics in Republican China: The Ma Family Warlords of Gansu. Sage Publications, Inc. p. 293. JSTOR 189017.
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Cambridge University Press. p. 228. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen. Afd. Letterkunde (1904). Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, Volume 4, Issues 1-2. North-Holland. p. 323. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- Jan Jakob Maria Groot (1904). Sectarianism and religious persecution in China: a page in the history of religions, Volume 2. J. Miller. p. 324. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- Jonathan Neaman Lipman (2004). Familiar strangers: a history of Muslims in Northwest China. Seattle: University of Washington Press. p. 131. ISBN 0-295-97644-6. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- Jonathan Neaman Lipman (2004). Familiar strangers: a history of Muslims in Northwest China. Seattle: University of Washington Press. p. 132. ISBN 0-295-97644-6. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- Bruce A. Elleman (2001). Modern Chinese warfare, 1795-1989. Psychology Press. p. 66. ISBN 0-415-21474-2. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Cambridge University Press. p. 220. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Cambridge University Press. p. 232. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Cambridge University Press. p. 233. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Cambridge University Press. p. 234. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- Hugh D. R. Baker (1990). Hong Kong images: people and animals. Hong Kong University Press. p. 55. ISBN 962-209-255-1.
- Allès, Elizabeth (september-october 2003, Online since 17 january 2007). "Notes on some joking relationships between Hui and Han villages in Henan". French Centre for Research on Contemporary China. p. 6. Retrieved 2011-07-20.
- Peter Perdue, China marches west: the Qing conquest of Central Eurasia. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2005.
- While the weight of a sycee (known in northern China as yambu - Chinese: 元宝, yuánbǎo) varied, Russian merchants trading at the Chinese border posts at the time reported that a sycee would weigh up to 50 taels, i.e. some 1875 grams, of silver
- Ildikó Bellér-Hann (2008). Community matters in Xinjiang, 1880-1949: towards a historical anthropology of the Uyghur. BRILL. p. 84. ISBN 90-04-16675-0.
- Demetrius Charles de Kavanagh Boulger (1878). The life of Yakoob Beg: Athalik ghazi, and Badaulet; Ameer of Kashgar. LONDON : W. H. ALLEN & CO., 13, WATERLOO PLACE, S.W.: W. H. Allen. p. 152. Retrieved 2012-01-18. ". As one of them expressed it, in pathetic language, "During the Chinese rule there was everything; there is nothing now." The speaker of that sentence was no merchant, who might have been expected to be depressed by the falling-off in trade, but a warrior and a chieftain's son and heir. If to him the military system of Yakoob Beg seemed unsatisfactory and irksome, what must it have appeared to those more peaceful subjects to whom merchandise and barter were as the breath of their nostrils?"
- Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons (1871). Accounts and papers of the House of Commons. Ordered to be printed. p. 35. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Cambridge University Press. p. 223. ISBN 0521220297. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911 Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series. Cambridge University Press. p. 223. ISBN 0521220297.
- Ildikó Bellér-Hann (2008). Community matters in Xinjiang, 1880-1949: towards a historical anthropology of the Uyghur. BRILL. p. 74. ISBN 9004166750. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons (1871). Accounts and papers of the House of Commons. Ordered to be printed. p. 34. Retrieved 2010-12-28.
- Ho-dong Kim (2004). Holy war in China: the Muslim rebellion and state in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-1877. Stanford University Press. p. 96. ISBN 0804748845. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- Robert Michell (1870). Eastern Turkestan and Dzungaria, and the rebellion of the Tungans and Taranchis, 1862 to 1866. Calcutta : Office of Superintendent of Government Printing. p. 50. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "Yakub-Bek may also be well inclined towards Russia, but a suspicion of it in Kashgar might ruin him, for the Russians are unmitigatedly hateful to the native population."
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 225. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "Ya'qub probably had been in touch with the Ottoman sultanate in the late 1860s, but it was not until 1873 that the Sublime Porte's recognition of his kingdom was made public. He was made an emir and in the same year the sultan-caliph sent him a gift of three thousand rifles, thirty cannon, and three Turkish military instructors. Meanwhile, exploratory visits to Kashgar by R. B. Shaw in 1868 and by D. T. Forsyth and others in 1870 had aroused British enthusiasm for Ya'qub's regime. Forsyth was sent to Kashgar again in 1873, when he presented Ya'qub with several thousand old-style muskets from British India's arsenal. Early in 1874 he concluded with the emir a commercial treaty that also conferred diplomatic recognition upon the new Kashgarian state."
- Lanny B. Fields (1978). Tso Tsung-tʼang and the Muslims: statecraft in northwest China, 1868-1880. Limestone Press. p. 81. ISBN 0-919642-85-3. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- DeWitt C. Ellinwood (1981). Ethnicity and the military in Asia. Transaction Publishers. p. 72. ISBN 0-87855-387-8. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- Ho-dong Kim (2004). Holy war in China: the Muslim rebellion and state in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-1877. Stanford University Press. p. 176. ISBN 0-8047-4884-5. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- Lanny B. Fields (1978). Tso Tsung-tʼang and the Muslims: statecraft in northwest China, 1868-1880. Limestone Press. p. 81. ISBN 0-919642-85-3. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 241. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "From Su-chou, Tso wrote to Chang Yueh, who was to leave Hami on an invasion of Turfan, saying it was good policy to treat the inhabitants of southern Sinkiang well. 'The Andijanis are tyrannical to their people; government troops should comfort them with benevolence. The Andijanis are greedy in extorting from the people; the government troops should rectify this by being generous.'"
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 241. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "To Liu Chin-t'ang, Tso wrote that the two chief enemies to catch were Ya'qub Beg and Pai Yen-hu along with their 'diehard partisans' (ssu-tang)."
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 241. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "Tso did not find fault with the indigenous inhabitants of Altishahr. After the short Ta-fan-ch'eng campaign. Liu Chin-t'ang was reported by the Russians to have 'acted very judiciously with regard to the prisoners whom he took . . . . His treatment of these men was calculated to have a good influence in favour of the Chinese.'"
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 240. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "Meanwhile, under Liu Chin-t'ang and the Manchu General Chin-shun, Tso's offensive in Sinkiang had started."
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 241. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "In a belt of towns north of Urumchi, the Sinkiang Tungans made their last stand as a cohesive group. The heavily walled city of Ku-mu-ti, fifteen miles north-east of Urumchi, was attacked by Liu Chin-t'ang's big German guns. Tso reported that 6,000 Muslims were killed and 215 captured; only a few, including Pai Yen-hu, escaped. The very next day, on 18 August, Urumchi fell without resistance ... Tso, who directed battles from his headquarters at Su-chou, noted in a letter to a colleague: 'The Andijani chieftain [Ya'qub Beg] has fairly good firearms. He has foreign rifles and foreign guns, including cannon using explosive shells [k'ai-hua p'ao]; but his are not as good nor as effective as those in the possession of our government forces. His men are not good marksmen, and when repulsed they simply ran away.'"
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 241. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "But in April, after the snow on the Ti'ein Shan foothills melted making operations again possible, Liu Chin-t'ang attacked Ta-fan-ch'eng and reduced it in four days.98 More desertions from Ya'qub's army ensued and his officials in such oasis cities at Aksu, especially those who had been begs or hakim begs under Ch'ing rule before 1867, now contacted the Ch'ing forces and offered their services."
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 242. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "On 26 April, Chang Yueh entered Turfan, and on the same day Liu Chin-t'ang took Toksun, forty miles to the west. . .Ch'ing forces now re-won one oasis town after another. . .Tso's proposal, though modified as to detail, was realized in 1884, when Liu Chin-t'ang became Sinkiang's first governor (serving 1884-91). Peking's most tangible motive was to reduce the cost of maintaining large yung-ying armies in Sinkiang, which even after the Ili crisis cost as much as 7,9 million taels annually. The conversion of Sinkiang into a province presupposed the reduction of existing troops there to only 31,000 men. They were to be placed under the Green Standard framework and maintained by interprovincial revenue assistance pared down to an annual total of 4,8 million taels (30 per cent of this amount was to be delivered to Kansu, supposedly to cover expenses incurred in that province on behalf of Sinkiang, such as forwarding of military supplies)."
- DeWitt C. Ellinwood (1981). Ethnicity and the military in Asia. Transaction Publishers. p. 73. ISBN 0-87855-387-8. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- William Leslie Bales (1937). Tso Tsungt'ang, soldier and statesman of old China. Kelly and Walsh, Limited. p. 357. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "encountering no resistance. His cavalry pursued Ma Jente and Pai Yenhu for some distance and claimed to have killed over 600 of the Moslems. Almost within a month from the arrival of the army at Kucheng, Liu"
- Demetrius Charles de Kavanagh Boulger (1878). The life of Yakoob Beg: Athalik ghazi, and Badaulet; Ameer of Kashgar. London: W. H. Allen & Co., 13, Waterloo Place, S.W. p. 276. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "The inundation from the Kaidu had spread as far as here, and the town was several feet under water. All the official and private residences had been destroyed alike, and the Turki-Mussulman, as the Pekin Gazette styles them, population had been compelled by Bay en Hu to follow him in his retreat. It would be interesting to know whom the Chinese meant by Bayen Hu, but it is almost impossible to say. As it was not Hakim Khan, the most probable personage would be one of the Tungan leaders, either of Urumtsi or Hamil, who had been mediatized by Yakoob Beg and placed in command of the Turfan region. He appears to have been the commander of that portion of the Kashgarian army which was left round Korla. Not only was Karashar deserted by its inhabitants, but so was the whole country round about. Some, indeed, had fled to the mountains, but these were afraid to return when they saw the Chinese established in their homes. And then the conquerors followed out their usual plan by settling fresh colonists in the town. The Mongol noble, Cha-hi-telkh, was directed to move up some hundreds of the members of his tribe to occupy this important post, to restore the homes and to retill the fields; and while this work of restoration was proceeding on territory conquered by the Chinese, that through which they passed in hostile guise was subjected to far other treatment. On the 9th of October the Chinese marched against Korla from two sides, and on that day a cavalry skirmish took place, in which fifteen of Bayen Hu's horsemen were slain, and two taken prisoners. From the evidence of these, who were dressed in the Khokandian garb, but were Mussulman subjects of China, being natives of Shensi, it was learnt that Bayen Hu had withdrawn with all his forces to Kucha, taking with him the produce of the country and the majority of the people. They affirmed that the small detachment to which they belonged was only a scouting party, sent out to learn what the Chinese army was doing. When the Chinese had exhausted their stock of information they beheaded them. The same day they entered Korla, which they found to be completely deserted, although not flooded. The walls remained, but many of the houses had been thrown down. Here the general was nearly reduced to a desperate plight, as the provision train, which was transported by cart and camel, did not come up, and there was the prospect of starvation compelling the victorious army to retreat. But happily the thought struck the able general, or perhaps some one gave him a hint, that there might be some stores concealed in the city which the Kashgari had been unable to carry away with them. Accordingly the whole army set to work to search the houses, and to dig into the ground in all likely places for hidden stores. Their toil was soon rewarded, and "several tens of thousand catties' weight of food" were discovered. As a catty weighs If lb., this was no slight supply for an army of men which was probably under 10,000 strong. These concerted movements of the army south of the Tian Shan placed the country as far west as Karashar in the possession of the invader. Their next advance, which they could not expect to be as unopposed as their late one, would bring them into the plain of Kashgar. No sooner had Karashar and Korla fallen into their possession than an edict was issued inviting the Mahomedan population to return to their homes, and many of them accepted the invitation. In this quarter the arms of China were not disgraced by any excesses, and moderation towards the unarmed population extenuated their severity towards armed foes."
- Boulger 1878, p. 248.
- & Boulger 1878, p. 247.
- Boulger 1878, p. 268.
- Boulger 1878, p. 269.
- Boulger 1878, p. 270.
- Boulger 1878, p. 271.
- Boulger 1878, p. 272.
- Boulger 1878, p. 273.
- Boulger 1878, p. 274.
- Boulger 1878, p. 275.
- Appletons' annual cyclopaedia and register of important events, Volume 4. TD. Appleton and company. 1880. p. 145. Retrieved 2011-05-12.
- Translations of the Peking Gazette. 1880. p. 83. Retrieved 2011-05-12.
- The American annual cyclopedia and register of important events of the year ..., Volume 4. D. Appleton and Company. 1888. p. 145. Retrieved 2011-05-12.
- Appletons' annual cyclopedia and register of important events: Embracing political, military, and ecclesiastical affairs; public documents; biography, statistics, commerce, finance, literature, science, agriculture, and mechanical industry, Volume 19. Appleton. 1886. p. 145. Retrieved 2011-05-12.
- Peter Tompkins (1963). The eunuch and the virgin: a study of curious customs. C. N. Potter. p. 32. Retrieved 2010-11-30.
- The Chinese times, Volume 5. VOLUME V. TIENTSIN: THE TIENTSIN PRINTING CO. 1891. p. 74. Retrieved 2011-05-08. "25th Januarv, 1891. Temple Erected To Those Killed In The Mohammedan Rebellion. Wei Kuang-tao, acting Governor of Kansu and the New Dominion, reports the erection of a temple in the provincial capital of Kansu to the memory of those killed in the Mohammedan rebellion, consisting of Manchus, Chinese, officials, gentry, soldiers, peasants, matrons and maidens massacred in Songaria and Kashgaria, —the two provinces known as the "New Dominion,"—and amounting to 24,838 souls. The temple has been erected at the expense of Liu Chin-t'ang (Governor of Kansu, at present on a mission of pacification of the Miaotze on the confines of that province) and Kung T'ang, Military Lieut.-Governor of Urumtsi. The temple named Chun Yi-t'sze is inside the East gate of the capital; all the paraphernalia have also been purchased by he officials named, and therefore no call need be made on the Board of Revenue ; the Imperial permission is, however, asked that the local officials may worship there in the Spring and Autumn. Memorialist adds that a temple had previously been erected by Liu Chin-t'ang at his own expense to the memory of the soldiers from Hunan who fell in the rebellion.—Rescript: Let the Board concerned take note. Favours To The Family Of Si. L&ng-o, Former Governor Of Iii The same official reports that in accordance with instructions given him by the Board of Rites, he has made enquiries as to the family left by Se Leng-o, and has ascertained that the latter's only son having died young he had no grandsons, but had some nephews who are all employed in Peking. Memorialist adds that when the body arrives in the capital, the deputy Lieut.-Governor of the deceased officer's banner will be able to report fully to the Emperor. Meanwhile memorialist has carried out his instructions.—Rescript: Let the Yamcn concerned take note. Forced Change Of Residence Of A MonGolian Saint. Wei-kuang-tao in a postscript reports the arrival of the Kun-ka-clia-la-t'san Saint (Hut'ukht'u), on the 15th of the 10th moon. A memorial had first been presented by Liu Chinfang asking the Emperor to command the Saint through the Mongolian Superintendency to take up his residence in the New Dominion. Afterwards the Tsung-li Yamdn and the Mongolian Superintendency reported that the Saint had, on being asked, agreed to move into the "New Dominion" of Kansu, with his following of disciples, but asked that transport should be provided for him. Memorialist adds that when the Saint is thoroughly established in the capital of the New Dominion, he will report further and in detail to the Emperor.—Rescript: Let the Yamen concerned take note. 26th January, 1S91. Court News. The Board of Rites have memorialized the Throne to depute two officials to pour libations at the Gate and the Bridge (the Hsi-chih-men and the Yi-hung-ch'iao—popularly known as the Bridge of Kao Liang jgj i^jjj a mythical military character in history, see note on the route of Prince Ch'un's funeral procession), and the Emperor has accordingly appointed Prince Chuang, and En Chung-t'ang. [The legend of the Bridge of Kao Liang is told as follows: During one of the early dynasties the people of Peking having somehow offended the wife of the Water Dragon, she determined to bring about a drought which should kill off the whole population. In order to effect this she resolved on a certain day to collect all the well and river water in and around the capital in barrels, to be placed on a water-barrow, which she would then wheel away. A militarygovernor of that time named Kao Liang, was however, warned by a good fairy in a dream of the threatened vengeance, and told that on the following morning the goddess, under the disguise of an old woman, would pass over the bridge wheeling a water-barrow. Next morning by the Fairy's advice, Kao Liang mounted a fast horse, armed himself with a spear, and took up his post on the bridge. After a time the old woman appeared trundling her barrow at a great pace towards it. Kao Liang thereupon grasped his spear and galloping alongside, pierced all the barrels with successive thrusts, when the released water flowed back to the rivers and wells, the wicked goddess vanished, and the capital was saved.]"
- Rais Abdulkhakovich Tuzmukhamedov (1973). How the national question was solved in Soviet Central Asia (a reply to falsifiers). Progress Publishers. p. 74. Retrieved 2011-01-01.
- The Canadian spectator, Volume 1. 1878. p. 462. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 94. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "Countless memorials poured into the court demanding severe punishment of the signatory and rejection of the treaty. The most eloquent of these came from a young librarian of the Supervisorate of Imperial Instruction, Chang Chih-tung (1837-1909), who announced: 'The Russians must be considered extremely covetous and truculent in making the demands and Ch'ung-hou extremely stupid and absurd in accepting them . . . . If we insist on changing the treaty, there may not be trouble; if we do not, we are unworthy to be called a state.' He demanded that Ch'ung-hou be decapitated to show China's determination to reject the treaty, even at the price of war. Because he spoke the mind of the literati and officials, Chang gained immediate fame.41"
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 94. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "The court did not intend to precipitate a clash, but was pushed by literati-official sentiment into taking a stronger positions than it wanted. To prepare for the eventuality of war, it installed several Hunan army officers of Taiping fame in key positions, and through Rober Hart invited Charles Gordon to China to help with defence."
- John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 95. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. "The Russians, who secretly feared war at this point. . .The Russians finally acquiesced but negotiations progressed slowly. The Russians were in no position to wage a distant war, due to their depressed economy following the Turkish War of 1876-7 and their international isolation after the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The St Petersbug government was further restrained by fear of revolution at home, and concern that the adverse effect of war on trade might goad Europe and America into taking sides with China."
- Kim Hodong, "Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-1877". Stanford University Press (March 2004). ISBN 0-8047-4884-5. (Searchable text available on Amazon.com)
- Bruce Elleman, "Modern Chinese Warfare (Warfare and History)". 2001, ISBN 0-415-21474-2. (p. 65-, the section on "The Tungan Rebellion, 1862-73").
Background, and the war in Shaanxi-Gansu
- Jonathan N. Lipman, "Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China (Studies on Ethnic Groups in China)", University of Washington Press (February 1998), ISBN 0-295-97644-6. (Searchable text available on Amazon.com)
War in Xinjiang, and Russian involvement
- Boulger, Demetrius Charles de Kavanagh (1878). The Life of Yakoob Beg: Athalik Ghazi, and Badaulet; Ameer of Kashgar. London: W. H. Allen & Co. Retrieved 2012-01-18.
- "Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier", by Sarah C. M. Paine (1996) ISBN 1-56324-723-2
- "The Ili Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy, 1871-1881", by Immanuel Chung-yueh Hsü (1966)
- V.A. Moiseev, "Muslim Rebellion in Xinjiang and Russia's policy (1864-1871)", in "Россия и Китай в Центральной Азии (вторая половина XIX в. - 1917 гг.)" (Russia and China in Central Asia (second half of the 19 c. thru 1917). Barnaul, Azbuka Publishers, 2003. ISBN 5-93957-025-9
- Svetlana Rimsky-Korsakoff Dyer. Karakunuz: An Early Settlement of the Chinese Muslims in Russia, with an English translation of V. Tsibuzgin and A.Shmakov's work. "Asian Folklore Studies", Vol. 51 (1992), pp. 243–279.
- The "Shaanxi Village" in Kazakhstan (Chinabroadcast.cn)