Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army

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Nagorno Karabakh Republic's Defense Army
Լեռնային Ղարաբաղի Հանրապետության Պաշտպանության Բանակ
Army NKR.jpg
NKR Defense Army shoulder insignia
Service branches Army
Air Force
Air Defense
Headquarters Stepanakert
Leadership
Commander-in-Chief President Bako Sahakyan
Minister of Defense Lieutenant General Movses Hakobyan
Manpower
Military age 18
Conscription 2 years
Active personnel 18,500 - 25,000
Reserve personnel 20,000 - 30,000[1]
Expenditures
Budget ?
Percent of GDP ?
Related articles
History Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988–1994)
Mardakert skirmishes (2008)
Mardakert skirmish (2010)
2012 Armenian–Azerbaijani border clashes
2014 Armenian–Azerbaijani clashes

The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Defense Army (Armenian: Լեռնային Ղարաբաղի Հանրապետության պաշտպանության բանակ, Lerrnayin Gharabaghi Hanrapetut’yan pashtpanut’yan banak) is the formal defense force of the unrecognized but de facto independent Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). Established in 1992, it united previously disorganized self-defense units which were formed in the early 1990s with the avowed goal of protecting the ethnic Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh from the attacks by the Soviet and Azerbaijani armed forces.[2] The Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army is currently composed of around 20,000 well-trained and -equipped officers and soldiers and maintains a "constant state of readiness, undergoing more serious combat training and operational exercises than any other former Soviet army."[3]

History[edit]

Establishment[edit]

The Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army was founded on May 9, 1992. It created "its own central command and military structure distinct from the Armenian Army."[4] Its founders included Robert Kocharyan (the former president of Armenia, he was the first commander in chief of the Army);[5] Serzh Sargsyan (current president of Armenia); Vazgen Sargsyan (Armenia's Defense Minister 1992-93, State Minister in Charge of defence 1993-95, Armenia's Prime-Minister 1998-99);[5] Monte Melkonian (responsible for Martuni region);[6] Samvel Babayan (Nagorno Karabakh's Defence Minister from 1994 to 2000) and others.[5] Many of the men who served in its ranks and in the officer corps during the Nagorno-Karabakh War were seasoned veterans of the Soviet military and had fought with distinction in the Soviet war in Afghanistan.[3]

Nagorno-Karabakh War[edit]

Main article: Nagorno-Karabakh War

The formal formation of the NKR Defense Army was rooted in the concept of the Jokat (volunteer detachment).[6] With the early outbreak of hostilities prior to 1992, Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh began forming small detachments of volunteers, often self-described as Fedayeen, inheriting the name of the fighters who actively resisted the Ottoman Empire in the final decades of the nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth centuries.

At the outset these detachments were small groups of no more than 12-40 men. For example, during Operation Ring, Shahumyan was defended by a force as small as 22 men under the command of Tatul Krpeyan. These volunteer militia would initially arm themselves with whatever was available, including hunting shotguns borrowed from local farmers and even home-made rifles. In the later stages of the war, these units armed themselves with AK-47s, RPGs and sometimes portable anti-aircraft MANPADs, transforming the defense force into a highly mobile and flexible force that was capable of waging guerilla warfare. Likewise, these units initially had no heavy military equipment, but later started taking over large quantities of Azerbaijani tanks and armored personnel carriers that were abandoned on the battlefield. Most of these captured tanks and APCs later became part of the NKR Defense Army's equipment. Improvisation, multi-functionality, creativity, strong-morale, focus on defensive tactics, adaptation, flexibility, high-mobility and a native knowledge of the mountainous terrain are all important factors in understanding the combat success of these small units.

The initial purpose of these detachments, made up of volunteers, was mainly to defend Armenian civilian population, each in a particular village or town. Each of them was operating independently with no central command or leadership. Yet, these units would regularly collaborate in joint operations such as the battle of Khojaly in February 1992 or the June 1992 surprise counter-offensives during operation Goranboy. The increasing scale and intensity of Azeri attacks, the devastation caused by the bombardments emanating from Grad multiple rocket launchers in Shushi and the Lachin, the blockade from mainland Armenia had broadened the notion of security beyond the mere defense of a small village. Capturing Shushi and Lachin as well as turning the tide of operation Goranboy became, for the Armenians, not only a matter of security, but that of survival.[7] For the successful conduct of such large-scale operations, the detachments had to be consolidated under a single, unified command.

Mient Jan Faber argues that '..August 1992 marked the watershed between purely voluntary Armenian Karabakh forces reinforced by volunteers from Armenia and an organised NKR army with its own central command and a military structure distinct from the Armenian army.'[8]

Post war[edit]

The Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army's primary role after the conclusion of the Nagorno-Karabakh War in 1994 is the protection of the NKR from foreign and domestic threats. Though the war ended with the signing of a cease fire between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the de facto independence of the NKR, the Azerbaijani leadership has repeatedly threatened to restart hostilities to retake the region.[9] Violations of the cease fire along the line of contact are frequent and often result in the deaths of several soldiers and civilians each year. The most significant breach of the ceasefire occurred in Mardakert on March 8, 2008, when up to sixteen soldiers were killed. Both sides accused the other of starting the battle.[10]

In June 2010, new skirmishes broke out between Armenian and Azerbaijani troops along the line of contact, resulting in the deaths of four Armenian servicemen.[11]

Ranks[edit]

Equipment[edit]

The Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army's equipment consists of infantry, tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft systems. The Karabakh army's heavy military hardware includes:

As for infantry weapon most rely on the AK-74 rifle and older AKMs in reserve for standard issue rifles. While other basic weapons consists of Makarov PM pistols PK machine guns and RPG-7 rocket launchers mostly supplied by Armenia. The Nagorno-Karabakh military is deeply integrated with the Armenian military, and the NKR depends on the Armenian Army to ensure its survival as an independent national entity. Armenia considers any act of aggression against Karabakh as an act of aggression against itself.[3]

Air Force[edit]

The Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army maintains a small air-force with a personnel of around 250 men.[1]

Aircraft Type Active Notes
Ground-Attack Aircraft
Sukhoi Su-25 Close air support aircraft 2[1]
Attack Helicopters
Mil Mi-24 Attack helicopter 5 During the military parades on 9 May 2007 and 2012, 5 Mi-24 helicopters were on display as part of Nagorno-Karabakh's Air-Force.
Transport and Utility Helicopters
Mi-8 Medium transport helicopter 5 Advanced Research and Assessment Group of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom reports that NKR Army has 5 other helicopters.[1] These are most likely to be transport and utility helicopters. Indeed, in 2012 parade, 5 of Mi-8 helicopters were on display.
Unmanned aircraft
Krunk UAV UAV 4 At least 2 new upgraded types of Krunk UAV shown on 2012 military parade in Stepanakert

Main battles participated in[edit]

See also[edit]

External links[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ a b c d Blandy, C. W. "Azerbaijan: Is War Over Nagornyy Karabakh a Realistic Option?" Advanced Research and Assessment Group. Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Caucasus Series 08/17, 2008, p.16.
  2. ^ Important Facts about the NKR Defence Army (Nagorno Karabakh Army). Office of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Washington D.C. Accessed November 27, 2009.
  3. ^ a b c Giragosian, Richard. "Armenia and Karabakh: One Nation, Two States." AGBU Magazine. № 1, Vol. 19, May 2009, pp. 12-13.
  4. ^ Dzelilovic, Vesna Bojicic. "From Humanitarianism to Reconstruction: Towards an Alternative Approach to Economic and Social Recovery from War" in Global Insecurity (Restructuring the Global Military Sector) , Vol. 3. Eds. Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee. London: Pinter, 2000, p. 79.
  5. ^ a b c De Waal, Thomas (2003). Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War. New York: New York University Press. pp. 196–197, 210. ISBN 0-8147-1945-7. 
  6. ^ a b For a concise description of these units, see Melkonian, Markar (2005). My Brother's Road, An American's Fateful Journey to Armenia. New York: I. B. Tauris. ISBN 1-85043-635-5. 
  7. ^ See Melkonian. My Brother's Road, p. 225.
  8. ^ Mient Jan Faber in Mary Kaldor, 'Global insecurity : Restructuring the global military sector, volume III' UNU/WIDER, Pinter, London and New York, ISBN 1-85567-644-1, 79.
  9. ^ "Azeri Assault on Karabakh Outpost Kills Four Armenian Soldiers." Asbarez. June 21, 2010. Retrieved June 22, 2010.
  10. ^ Yevgrashina, Lada and Hasmik Mkrtchyan. "Azeris, Armenians spar after major Karabakh clash". Reuters. March 5, 2008. Retrieved March 10, 2008.
  11. ^ "OSCE, EU Condemn Karabakh 'Armed Incident'." RFE/RL. June 22, 2010. Retrieved 22 June 2010.
  12. ^ http://www.uniforminsignia.net/index.php?option=com_insigniasearch&Itemid=53&state=138&search_id=main Ranks and Insignia - www.uniforminsignia.org
  13. ^ a b c d e DeRouen, Karl and Uk Heo (eds.) Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts since World War II. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2007, p. 151.
  14. ^ a b c Hans-Joachim Schmidt, [“Military Confidence Building and Arms Control in Unresolved Territorial Conflicts” http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/PRIF_MilitaryConfidenceBuildingAndArmsControlInUnresolvedTerritorialConflicts.pdf], PRIF Reports No 89, Frankfurt am Main, 2009, p.12.