Norway Debate

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The Norway Debate, sometimes called the Narvik Debate, was a significant debate in the British House of Commons that took place on 7 and 8 May 1940. It immediately led to the formation of a widely-based National Government led by Winston Churchill, which was to govern Britain until the end of World War II in Europe. The debate, following on from an adjournment motion and concerning the progress of the Norwegian Campaign, brought to a head widespread dissatisfaction with the adequacy of the Conservative government, led by Neville Chamberlain, to the challenges of waging war. In the debate, Chamberlain's government was criticised not only by the Opposition but also by respected members of his own party. The Opposition forced a vote, effectively a motion of no confidence, which the government won with a greatly reduced majority. With over a quarter of Government Members of Parliament (MPs) voting with the Opposition or abstaining despite a three line whip, it was clear that support for Chamberlain in his own party was crumbling. Following ill-judged remarks by him in the course of the debate, it was not possible for him to form a coalition with the opposition Labour and Liberal parties. On 10 May, Chamberlain resigned, and was succeeded as Prime Minister by Churchill.

Background[edit]

In 1937, Chamberlain, previously Chancellor of the Exchequer, had succeeded Stanley Baldwin as Prime Minister of a National Government, which in fact was overwhelmingly composed of Conservatives. It was opposed by the Labour and Liberal parties; there were small National Liberal, National Labour, and Liberal National parties supporting the National Government. Faced with a resurgent and irredentist Nazi Germany, Chamberlain had attempted to avert war by a policy of appeasement, only abandoned after Germany became more overtly expansionist with the annexation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. After Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, Britain and France declared war on Germany. At this point a government supporter noted privately:

Once Germany had rapidly overrun Poland, there was a sustained period of military inactivity lasting until April 9, 1940, when, days after Chamberlain had told a Conservative Party meeting that Hitler "had missed the bus",[2] Germany ended this "phony war" by an attack in overwhelming force on a neutral and unsuspecting Norway. In response to the German invasion, Britain sent limited land and naval forces to assist the Norwegians. Apart from naval success at Narvik, the subsequent Norwegian campaign had gone badly for Britain for very basic reasons.

Churchill had had a brilliant political career before World War I; first elected as a Conservative MP, he had become a Liberal Home Secretary and then First Lord of the Admiralty. During the war, as a result of the failure of the Gallipoli campaign he had been forced to take a more junior post, and then removed from government altogether by the Conservatives before becoming Minister of Munitions under Lloyd George. After the war, he had served as a Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer, before entering the political wilderness. His past views and actions on domestic issues, most notably his very active exertions to break the 1926 United Kingdom general strike, did not make him a natural associate of the labour movement. He had vigorously urged various policies outside the political mainstream; when he had first warned against the rise of Germany and argued strongly for rearmament, he had largely been ignored. He had argued against appeasement even at the height of its popularity.

The British-German naval battles at Narvik on 10 and 13 April.

On the outbreak of the World War II, Chamberlain brought Churchill into government as First Lord of the Admiralty. Churchill therefore had direct responsibility for the conduct of naval operations, and was required to defend the government of which he was a member, whatever his private views. Churchill had pressed the Cabinet to ignore Norwegian neutrality and to mine Norwegian territorial waters, and to be prepared to seize Narvik, in both cases to disrupt the export of Swedish iron ore to Germany during winter months, when the Baltic Sea was frozen. On behalf of the Admiralty, he had also advised that a major landing in Norway was not realistically within Germany's powers.[4]

The deeper background was the conduct of World War I, which offered both political and military parallels. Politically, there were two obvious precedents: the reconstruction of the Asquith government in 1915 as a wartime coalition still led by the peacetime leader of the majority party, and more dangerously for Chamberlain, Asquith's subsequent replacement in 1916 by Lloyd George, of which Churchill later said:

Militarily, speakers attempted to draw lessons from the experience (in many cases their experience) of the earlier war, explicitly mentioning the Antwerp expedition and the attempt to force the Dardanelles as relevant to the hazards which were run or should have been run in Norway. Churchill had been associated with both, so in part this was a coded discussion of the soundness of Churchill's military judgement, on which opinion was sharply divided.

The debate was an adjournment debate, in which the motion technically is "that this house do now adjourn". Under Westminster rules in such debates, held to allow for wide-ranging discussion of a variety of topics, the question is usually not put to a vote, but in this case, the Opposition forced a vote to demonstrate their deep concern, and the vote was therefore effectively on a motion of confidence.[b]

7 May: the debate begins[edit]

Chamberlain's opening speech[edit]

Chamberlain said that since his previous statement to the House on progress in Norway on 2 May, British forces had successfully withdrawn from southern Norway. Chamberlain began to make a case that actual Allied losses had been light and German losses disproportionate to any benefit they had gained, but was interrupted by Labour MPs pointing out that the reverse had come as a shock to the country and the world.

Chamberlain attempted to deal with this by saying that it had been a shock because of unrealistic expectations for which Ministers were not to blame, but at several points MPs derisively shouted out "They missed the bus!"[6] The Speaker had to call on Members not to interrupt and Chamberlain was eventually forced to defend the phrase directly. He asserted that the phrase had not been intended as a prediction but a retrospective comment that the totalitarian states had prepared for war while the United Kingdom was thinking only of peace, and so he would have expected an attack at the outbreak of war when the disparity of arms was at its greatest.

Returning to the conduct of the campaign, he pointed out that much of Norway was not yet controlled by the Germans; the Allies had been right to send the forces they had to southern Norway, and right to withdraw them. Preparations had been thought adequate to aid the Norwegians against any likely German intervention. In the event, the scale of the German invasion and its ruthless breach of neutrality meant that the rapid seizure by the Germans of all major ports had prevented the landing of significant Allied forces, and that the rapid reinforcement of the German invasion forces, unobstructed by expected demolitions on roads from the South, had prevented the landed British forces from taking Trondheim.

On the conduct of the war, he still saw no need for a smaller and more powerful War Cabinet, but Churchill, already First Lord of the Admiralty and Chairman of the Military Co-ordinating Committee of the Cabinet was to be given powers to direct the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Responding to interventions by Lloyd George and Herbert Morrison, Chamberlain said that Churchill would retain all his existing responsibilities, and that his additional role had been decided upon since the start of the Norwegian campaign but not as a response to it. Other minor changes would doubtless be made from time to time, but "it would be better to occupy ourselves with increasing our war effort rather than disputing about the form of Government."[c] He invited "the co-operation of MPs from all parties" but was met with a cry of "No, no" from a Liberal MP. Chamberlain resumed, concluding:

Opposition party leaders reply[edit]

Attlee (Labour)[edit]

Clement Attlee, Leader of the (Labour) Opposition, responded. He quoted some of Chamberlain's (and Churchill's) previous confident assertions about the likely victory of the British. Ministers' statements, and even more so the press, guided (or deliberately left uncorrected) by the government, had painted far too optimistic a picture of the Norwegian campaign; that "at last, when the enemy had been locked behind his walls, he had now put out his head to be hit," which prompted a Chamberlain supporter to shout "It was very badly hit." Attlee then turned to the conduct of the campaign itself, concluding "the gravamen of my attack on the Government is that it does not seem that there was a thinking-out of our plans beforehand, that there was not adequate intelligence, that there was not the necessary concentration on the essential objective and I ask whether, at any time, there was not delay and discussion where action was necessary?" He then attacked the organisation of the Government, talking of "a failure of grip, a failure of drive" in pursuit of the war, concluding "I say that there is a widespread feeling in this country, not that we shall lose the war, that we will win the war, but that to win the war, we want different people at the helm from those who have led us into it."

Sinclair (Liberal)[edit]

Sir Archibald Sinclair, the leader of the Liberals, then spoke. He too was critical. He drew from Chamberlain the admission that whilst troops had been held in readiness to be sent to Norway, no troopships had been retained to send them in. Sinclair gave instances of inadequate and defective equipment and of disorganisation reported to him by servicemen returning from Norway. Chamberlain had suggested that Allied plans had failed because the Norwegians had not put up the expected resistance to the Germans. However, Sinclair reported that the servicemen "...paid a high tribute to the courage and determination with which the Norwegians fought alongside them. They paid a particular tribute to the Norwegian ski patrols. Norwegians at Lillehammer for seven days held up with rifles only a German force with tanks, armoured cars, bombing aeroplanes and all the paraphernalia of modern war."[d]

Conservative backbench critics[edit]

The rest of the first day's debate saw speeches both supporting and criticising the Chamberlain government; they included two devastating attacks on the conduct of the campaign and of the war by Conservative backbenchers whose views carried weight.

Keyes: "I speak for the fighting Navy"[edit]

Sketch of Keyes by Glyn Warren Philpot, 1918. Imperial War Museum

Sir Roger Keyes, Conservative Member of Parliament for a constituency in the naval town of Portsmouth, a naval hero of World War I, and an Admiral of the Fleet no longer on the active list, spoke on the conduct of naval operations, particularly the abortive operations to retake Trondheim.[7] Harold Nicolson called it the most dramatic speech he had ever heard.[7] In full uniform with six rows of medals,[6] Keyes told the House:

The House listened in breathless silence. Keyes finished by quoting Britain's greatest naval hero:

When he sat down there was thunderous applause.[7]

Amery: "In the name of God, go!"[edit]

The former Cabinet minister Leo Amery delivered a fierce attack on the Chamberlain government, criticising not merely the conduct of the Norwegian campaign, but the Government's unpreparedness for it, despite intelligence warning of likely German intervention and the clear possibility of some such response to the planned British infraction of Norwegian neutrality by the mining of Norwegian territorial waters.

Amery went on to criticise the whole conduct of the war to date, and called for formation of a truly National Government and a small War Cabinet, similar to that of World War I under Lloyd George, and for a change of personnel (his final quote was directed against the Government Front Bench). He too quoted a national hero:

Greenwood: "We have had a serious reverse"[edit]

Arthur Greenwood, Labour Deputy Leader, spoke near the end of the first day's debate; he made use of Keyes' speech and of Amery's. He spoke first of what he saw as the true mood of the House:

And then of what he thought the mood of the country to be:

He contrasted Chamberlain's attitude with the mood of the Navy as reported by Keyes:

Britain had lost the confidence of the neutrals as well; for all these reasons the campaign was a serious reverse:

Criticism about the Norwegian campaign was bringing to a head many other criticisms; a change of personnel was needed, and responsibility for bringing about that change lay with Government MPs:

8 May: There will be a vote[edit]

Morrison: "We must divide the House"[edit]

At the start of the second day's debate, Herbert Morrison declared that the Labour Opposition wished to call for a vote of censure on the Government. He hardly minced matters:

Chamberlain: "I have friends in this House"[edit]

Chamberlain replied that he welcomed the chance for a division:

This shocked many present, who regarded it as divisive to so explicitly rely on whipped support from his own party.[9][h] Robert Boothby, a maverick Conservative MP and strong critic of Chamberlain, called out "Not I."

Lloyd George: "the worst strategic position in which this country has ever been placed"[edit]

The former Prime Minister David Lloyd George "The Man Who Won the [First World] War" now spoke. Members had to call upon him to speak up: he was now 77, and this was to be his last major contribution to debate in the House in which he had sat for 50 years. He told Members he was a Welshman and would warm up once he got going: he did.

He first attacked the conduct of the campaign:

Britain was in the worst position strategically that it had ever been as a result of foreign policy failures, which he began to review from Munich onwards. Interrupted at this point, he retorted "You will have to listen to it, either now or later on. Hitler does not hold himself answerable to the whips." British prestige had been greatly impaired; before Norway, Americans had not doubted the Allies would win the war, but now they said, "It will be up to us to defend Democracy."

He criticised the rate of re-armament pre-war and to date:

Churchill and Chamberlain intervene in Lloyd George's speech[edit]

Dealing with an intervention at this point, Lloyd George said in passing that he did not think that the First Lord was entirely responsible for all the things that happened in Norway. Churchill intervened to take complete responsibility for "everything that had been done by the Admiralty, and my full share of the burden." Lloyd George retorted "The right hon. Gentleman must not allow himself to be converted into an air-raid shelter to keep the splinters from hitting his colleagues" and resumed:

This drew another intervention this time from Chamberlain:

Lloyd George: Chamberlain "should sacrifice the seals of office"[edit]

The response to this intervention was a direct call for Chamberlain to resign:

Churchill winds up for the Government[edit]

Churchill wound up the debate for the government, defending the conduct of the Norwegian campaign with some robustness. He explained that even the successful use of a battleship at Narvik had put her at risk from many hazards; had any come to pass, the operation—now hailed as an example of what should have been done elsewhere—would have been condemned as foolhardy. "It is easy when you have no responsibility. If you dare, and forfeit is exacted, it is murder of our sailors; and if you are prudent, you are craven, cowardly, inept and timid." If nothing similarly bold had been done at Trondheim, it was not because it was thought too dangerous; but because it had been thought unnecessary: military advice had been against an opposed landing and instead predicted rapid success from the steps actually taken.

He deplored the "cataract of unworthy suggestions and of actual falsehoods which have been poured out to the public during the last few days."

Responding to a comment by a Labour MP he said of him "he skulks in the corner"; this provoked uproar and repeated interventions, Churchill complaining "All day long we have had abuse, and now hon. Members opposite will not even listen."

Having defended the conduct of the naval operations in the Norwegian campaign at length he said little to rebut the wider-ranging criticisms, except that the debate should not have become one of confidence at such short notice. Indeed, elements of his reply echoed points made by anti-Government speakers:

8 May: Motion and vote[edit]

After Churchill's speech the House divided. The motion was "that this House do now adjourn"[10] and constituted a vote of confidence.

Yes votes 281
No votes 200

The Government's notional majority was 213 but 39 Government supporters voted with the Opposition, and some others abstained. The Government still won the vote by 281 to 200, but the catastrophic fall in the Government's majority put great pressure on it. The Labour MP Josiah Wedgwood led the singing of Rule Britannia, joined by Conservative rebel Harold Macmillan of the Noes; this gave way to cries of "Go!" as Chamberlain left the Chamber.[11]

9–10 May: A new Prime Minister emerges[edit]

9 May: Chamberlain must go[edit]

The following day, 9 May, Chamberlain attempted to form a National Coalition Government. In talks at Downing Street with Lord Halifax and Churchill he indicated that he was quite ready to resign if that was necessary for Labour to enter such a Government. Attlee and Arthur Greenwood then joined the meeting, and when asked, indicated that they must first consult their party (then in conference at Bournemouth) but it was unlikely they could serve in a government led by Chamberlain; they probably would be able to serve under some other Conservative.[i]

9 May: Halifax is a non-runner[edit]

After Attlee and Greenwood left Chamberlain asked whom he should recommend to the King as his successor.

The version of events given by Churchill[12] is that Chamberlain's preference for Halifax was obvious (Churchill implies that the spat between Churchill and the Labour benches the previous night had something to do with this); there was a long silence which Halifax eventually broke by saying he did not believe he could lead the government effectively as a member of the House of Lords instead of the House of Commons. Churchill’s version gets the date wrong, and fails to mention the presence of David Margesson, the government Chief Whip.

Halifax's account omits the dramatic pause and gives an additional reason: "PM said I was the man mentioned as most acceptable. I said it would be hopeless position. If I was not in charge of the war (operations) and if I didn't lead in the House, I should be a cypher. I thought Winston was a better choice. Winston did not demur."[i] According to Halifax, Margesson then confirmed that feeling in the House of Commons had been veering to Churchill.

In a letter to Churchill written that night,[13] Robert Boothby asserted that parliamentary opinion was hardening against Halifax, claiming in a postscript that according to Clement Davies "Attlee & Greenwood are unable to distinguish between the PM & Halifax and are not prepared to serve under the latter."

10 May: Churchill becomes Prime Minister[edit]

Neville Chamberlain speaks to the nation following his resignation as Prime Minister, 10 May 1940.

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On the morning of 10 May, Germany invaded the Netherlands and Belgium. Chamberlain initially felt that a change of Government at such a time would be inappropriate, but upon being given confirmation that Labour would not serve under him, announced to the War Cabinet his intention to resign.[14] Scarcely more than three days after he had opened the debate, Chamberlain then went to the Palace to resign as Prime Minister. (Despite resigning as PM, he continued to be the leader of the Conservative Party.) He explained to the King why Halifax (whom the King thought the obvious candidate)[15] did not want to become Prime Minister. The King then sent for Churchill and asked him to form a new government; according to Churchill, there was no stipulation that this be a coalition government.[16]

At 9 pm on 10 May, Chamberlain announced the change of Prime Minister over the BBC. Churchill's first act as Prime Minister was to ask Attlee to come to the Admiralty to see him. Next, he wrote to Chamberlain to thank him for his promised support. He then began to construct his coalition cabinet: before he went to bed at 3 am on 11 May, six hours after Chamberlain's original announcement, Churchill had established the composition of the new War Cabinet, including the heads of the Service Ministries.[17]

13 May: The Coalition Government is endorsed[edit]

By 13 May, most of the senior government posts were filled. That day was Whit Monday and therefore normally a Bank Holiday. However, the Bank Holiday was cancelled by the incoming government, and Churchill spoke to a specially convened sitting of the House of Commons. Speaking to them for the first time as Prime Minister, he began:

He went on to make one of his most famous speeches ("I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat") which includes a brief account of how the Cabinet had been formed.

Lees-Smith: "We have had unity by discussion, persuasion, good will and good sense"[edit]

The speech in reply made by Hastings Lees-Smith announcing that Labour would vote for the motion, drew comfort not only from the formation of the new all-party coalition, but also from the process by which it had been formed and the ease with which the nation had changed horses in midstream

Vote[edit]

Yes votes 381
No votes 0

Thus the wartime coalition was endorsed unanimously by the House, save for two tellers for the noes.[20]

Place in Parliamentary culture[edit]

The Norway debate is regarded as a high-point in British Parliamentary history, as it occurred at a pivotal moment in a battle for the nation's survival, and showed that individual backbench Members of Parliament could assert their power. When asked to choose the most historic and memorable speech for a volume commemorating the centenary of Hansard as an official report of the House of Commons, former Speaker Betty Boothroyd chose Leo Amery's speech in the debate, remarking "Amery, by elevating patriotism above party, showed the Back Bencher's power to help change the course of history".[21]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ Said to have been David Margesson, the Government Chief Whip.[1]
  2. ^ Unless otherwise referenced, quotes below are from the full text of the debate as given in Hansard, or the Official Report, Fifth Series, volume 360, columns 1073–196 and 1251–366 (see links at the bottom).
  3. ^ Perhaps a deliberate echo of Alexander Pope's Essay on Man: "For forms of Government let fools contest", perhaps an unfortunate one; Pope continues "whate'er is best administered is best".
  4. ^ To avoid confusion or mis-editing: the account of the debate in Martin Gilbert's multi-volume biography of Churchill gives Sinclair a markedly different speech, which in fact is that made by Arthur Greenwood later in the debate.
  5. ^ Cromwell said 'gentlemen' not 'they' but meant the enemy, as did Amery
  6. ^ The same thought appears in Churchill's post-Dunkirk speech
  7. ^ A 'friend' in this Parliamentary context is a member of the same party who will vote for you
  8. ^ and upon the Whips to enforce that support by applying their powers of persuasion: see John Profumo.
  9. ^ a b quoted in Gilbert, as from David Dilks, ed. (1971). The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan O.M 1938-45. London: Cassel. p. 280. ISBN 0-30493737-1.  (diary entry for 9 May 1940)

References[edit]

  1. ^ Marwick 1976, p. 13.
  2. ^ The Times, 3 April 1940
  3. ^ Buckley 1977, pp. 25–26.
  4. ^ Hinsley 1979, pp. 119–125.
  5. ^ Churchill's speech of tribute on the death of Lloyd George. Hansard 28 March 1945 c 1379
  6. ^ a b Nicolson 1967, p. 76.
  7. ^ a b c Nicolson 1967, p. 77.
  8. ^ Hansard 3 Sept 1939 c293 (Greenwood speech on announcement of war)
  9. ^ Nicolson 1967, p. 78.
  10. ^ Hansard, House of Commons, 5th Series, vol. 360, col. 1365
  11. ^ Nicolson, p 79 - others say Harold Macmillan
  12. ^ Churchill 1948, pp. 523–524.
  13. ^ cited in Gilbert. "Letter of 9 May 1940, marked by Churchill 'secret, for dinner, in a box'; Churchill papers 2/392"
  14. ^ War Cabinet No 119 of 1940, 4.30 p.m. (there were 3 War Cabinet meetings that day): Cabinet papers 65/7 cited in Gilbert
  15. ^ Wheeler-Bennett 1958, pp. 433–434.
  16. ^ Churchill 1948, p. 525.
  17. ^ Gilbert 1983, pp. 299–314.
  18. ^ Hansard, 13 May 1940 column 1501
  19. ^ Hansard, 13 May 1940 columns 1504-5
  20. ^ Hansard, House of Commons, 5th Series, vol. 360, col. 1525
  21. ^ Betty Boothroyd, "Ferocious attack that spelt the end for Chamberlain and opened the way for Churchill", in "Official Report [HANSARD]", Centenary Volume, House of Commons 2009, p. 91.

Further reading[edit]

External links[edit]