The one-child policy (simplified Chinese: 计划生育政策; traditional Chinese: 計劃生育政策; pinyin: jìhuà shēngyù zhèngcè, officially translated as "family planning policy") is the population control policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC). It restricts urban couples to only one child, while allowing additional children in several cases, including twins, rural couples, ethnic minorities, and couples who are both only children themselves. In 2007, according to a spokesman of the Committee on the One-Child Policy, approximately 35.9% of China's population was subject to a one-child restriction. The Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau are exempt from the policy. Also exempt from this law are foreigners living in China.
This policy was introduced in 1978 and initially applied from 1979. It was created by the Chinese government to alleviate social, economic, and environmental problems in China, and authorities claim that the policy has prevented more than 250 million births between 1980 and 2000, and 400 million births from about 1979 to 2011; this claim is disputed by two independent scholars, who put the number of prevented births from 1979 to 2009 at 100 million. The policy is controversial both within and outside China because of the manner in which the policy has been implemented, and because of concerns about negative social consequences. The policy has been implicated in an increase in forced abortions, female infanticide, and underreporting of female births, and has been suggested as a possible cause behind China's sex imbalance. Nonetheless, a 2008 survey undertaken by the Pew Research Center reported that 76% of the Chinese population supports the policy.
The policy is enforced at the provincial level through fines that are imposed based on the income of the family and other factors. Population and Family Planning Commissions (Chinese: 计划生育委员会; pinyin: Jìhuà Shēngyù Wěiyuánhuì) exist at every level of government to raise awareness about the issue and carry out registration and inspection work. Despite this policy, there are still many citizens that continue to have more than one child.
In 2008, China's National Population and Family Planning Commission said that the policy will remain in place for at least another decade. The deputy director of the Commission stated that the policy would remain unaltered until at least 2015. However, widespread criticism from officials and well-placed commentators suggests that the policy will be substantially relaxed under the new government of Xi Jinping. In 2010, it was announced that the majority of the citizens initially subject to the policy are no longer of reproductive age and it has been speculated that many citizens simply disregard or violate the policy in more recent years. Among several small relaxations and hints of change, in March 2011, the government said it would consider allowing couples to have a second child.
|Population in China|
|Source: Census of China|
History and background 
During the period of Mao Zedong's leadership in the People's Republic of China, while the crude birth rate fell from 37 to 20 per thousand, infant mortality declined from 227/1000 births in 1949 to 53/1000 in 1981, and life expectancy dramatically increased from around 35 years in 1949 to 65 years in 1976. Until the 1960s, the government encouraged families to have as many children as possible because of Mao's belief that population growth empowered the country, preventing the emergence of family planning programs earlier in China's development. The population grew from around 540 million in 1949 to 940 million in 1976. Beginning in 1970, citizens were encouraged to marry at later ages and have only two children. Although the fertility rate began to decline significantly, future population growth proved overwhelming and the one child policy was announced by Chinese leaders. The one child policy had been planned as early as 1977, although it was not mandated nationwide until 1979.
In order to address overpopulation, the one-child policy was introduced to promote one-child families and forbids couples from having more than one child in urban areas. Parents with multiple children are not given the same benefits as parents of one child. In most cases, wealthy families pay a fee to the government in order to have a second child or more children.
Current status 
The limit has been strongly enforced in urban areas, but the actual implementation varies from location to location. In most rural areas, families are allowed to apply to have a second child if their first-born is a daughter or suffers from physical disability, mental illness or mental retardation. Second children are subject to birth spacing (usually 3 or 4 years). Additional children will result in large fines. Families violating the policy are required to pay monetary penalties and may possibly be denied bonuses at their workplace. Children born in overseas countries are not counted under the policy if they do not obtain Chinese citizenship. Chinese citizens returning from abroad are allowed to have a second child.
As of 2007, 35.9% of the population were subject to a strict one-child limit. 52.9% were permitted to have a second child if their first was a daughter; 9.6% of Chinese couples were permitted two children regardless of their genders; and 1.6%—mainly Tibetans—had no limit at all.
The social fostering or maintenance fee (simplified Chinese: 社会抚养费; traditional Chinese: 社會撫養費; pinyin: shèhuì fǔyǎngfèi) sometimes called in the West a family planning fine, is collected as a fraction of either the annual disposable income of city dwellers or of the annual cash income of peasants, in the year of the child's birth. In 2007, the formula for figuring the amount of the fine for a "private enterprise boss" was as follows: For an income of 200,000 yuan per year, the maximum social child-raising fee would be 20,000×6+(200,000-20,000)×2=480,000 yuan (about US$63,763) and a minimum 20,000×3+(200,000-20,000)×1=240,000 yuan (US$31,884). Both members of the couple would need to pay a fine, although it was left unclear whether they both would pay the same amount. The parents also have to pay for both the children to go to school and all the family's health care. Some children who are in one-child families pay less than the children in other families.
The one-child policy was designed from the outset to be a one-generation policy.
The one-child policy is now enforced at the provincial level and enforcement varies; some provinces have relaxed the restrictions. After Henan loosened the requirement, the majority of provinces and cities now permit two parents who were only children themselves to have two children. Beginning in 1987, official policy granted local officials the flexibility to make exceptions and allow second children in the case of "practical difficulties" (such as cases in which the father is a disabled serviceman) or when both parents are single children, and some provinces had other exemptions worked into their policies as well. Following the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, a new exception to the regulations was announced in Sichuan province for parents who had lost children in the earthquake. Similar exceptions have previously been made for parents of severely disabled or deceased children. People have also tried to evade the policy by giving birth to a second child in Hong Kong, but at least for Guangdong residents, the one-child policy is also enforced if the birth was given in Hong Kong or abroad.
In accordance with PRC's affirmative action policies towards ethnic minorities, all non-Han ethnic groups are subjected to different laws and are usually allowed to have two children in urban areas, and three or four in rural areas. Han Chinese living in rural areas are also permitted to have two children. Because of couples such as these, as well as urban couples who simply pay a fine (or "social maintenance fee") to have more children, the overall fertility rate of mainland China is close to 1.4 children per woman.
An April 2007 study taken by the University of California, Irvine, which claimed to be the first systematic study of the policy, found that it had proved "remarkably effective". Other reports have shown population ageing and negative population growth in some areas.
An advocacy group, composed of academics inside and outside China, has studied the policy since 2001. That group distributed a report in 2004, documenting the policy's effects on age and gender distribution, but government response was not favorable. They distributed a second report in 2009, but the government has stated that the policy will not change until 2015 at the earliest.
Effects on population growth and fertility rate 
After the introduction of the one-child policy, the fertility rate in China fell from 2.63 births per woman in 1980 (already a sharp reduction from more than five births per woman in the early 1970s) to 1.61 in 2009. However, the policy itself is probably only partially responsible for the reduction in the total fertility rate.
The Chinese government makes the claim that it had three to four hundred million fewer people in 2008 with the one-child policy, than it would have had otherwise. Chinese authorities thus consider the policy a great success in helping to implement China's current economic growth. The reduction in the fertility rate and thus population growth has reduced the severity of problems that come with overpopulation, like epidemics, slums, overwhelmed social services (such as health, education, law enforcement), and strain on the ecosystem from abuse of fertile land and production of high volumes of waste. Even with the one-child policy in place, China still has 1.9 million more births than deaths every five weeks.
By 2012, fueled partly by public disgust with instances of forced abortion, but also other considerations, repeal of the policy was being discussed in some quarters. One thought, backed by demographic research, is that Chinese would not have many more children without the policy than is allowed under the policy.
Other available policy alternatives 
One type of criticism has come from those who acknowledge the challenges stemming from China's high population growth but believe that less intrusive options, including those that emphasized delay and spacing of births, could have achieved the same results over an extended period of time. Susan Greenhalgh's (2003) review of the policy-making process behind the adoption of the OCPF shows that some of these alternatives were known but not fully considered by China's political leaders.
Policy benefits exaggerated 
Another criticism is that the claimed effects of the policy on the reduction in the total fertility rate are exaggerated.
The government states that 400 million births were prevented by the one-child policy until 2011; this claim is disputed as official propaganda by Wang Feng, director of the Brookings-Tsinghua Center for Public Policy, and Cai Yong from the Carolina Population Center at University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, who put the number of prevented births from 1979 to 2009 at around 100 or 200 million. In response, Zhai, the professor quoted by official sources for the 400 million claim, clarified that it referred not just to the one-child policy, but includes births prevented by predecessor policies implemented one decade before.
Studies by Chinese demographers, funded in part by the UN Fund for Population Activities, showed that combining poverty alleviation and health care with relaxed targets for family planning was more effective at reducing fertility than vigorous enforcement of very ambitious fertility reduction targets. In 1988, Zeng Yi and Professor T. Paul Schultz of Yale University discussed the effect of the transformation to the market on Chinese fertility, arguing that the introduction of the contract responsibility system in agriculture during the early 1980s weakened family planning controls during that period. Zeng contended that the "big cooking pot" system of the People's Communes had insulated people from the costs of having many children. By the late 1980s, economic costs and incentives created by the contract system were already reducing the number of children farmers wanted.
As Hasketh, Lu, and Xing observe: "[T]he policy itself is probably only partially responsible for the reduction in the total fertility rate. The most dramatic decrease in the rate actually occurred before the policy was imposed. Between 1970 and 1979, the largely voluntary "late, long, few" policy, which called for later childbearing, greater spacing between children, and fewer children, had already resulted in a halving of the total fertility rate, from 5.9 to 2.9. After the one-child policy was introduced, there was a more gradual fall in the rate until 1995, and it has more or less stabilized at approximately 1.7 since then." These researchers note further that China could have expected a continued reduction in its fertility rate just from continued economic development, had it kept to the previous policy.
Human rights violation and forced abortions 
The one-child policy is challenged in principle and in practice for violating a human right to determine the size of one's own family. According to a 1968 proclamation of the International Conference on Human Rights, "Parents have a basic human right to determine freely and responsibly the number and the spacing of their children."
A 2001 report exposed that a quota of 20,000 abortions and sterilizations was set for Huaiji County in Guangdong Province in one year due to reported disregard of the one-child policy. The effort included using portable ultrasound devices to identify abortion candidates in remote villages. Earlier reports also showed that women as far along as 8.5 months pregnant were forced to abort by injection of saline solution. There were also reports of women in their 9th month of pregnancy, or already in labour, having their children killed whilst in the birth canal or immediately after birth.
In 2002, China outlawed the use of physical force to make a woman submit to an abortion or sterilization, but it is not entirely enforced. In the execution of the policy, many local governments still demand abortions if the pregnancy violates local regulations, or even force abortions on women violating the policy. One such case, Feng Jianmei, gained international attention after the family posted graphic pictures of the aborted fetus online. Feng's case has been credited for renewing public debate on the one-child policy both in and out of China.
Although China has had a reputation for heavy-handed eugenics policies as part of its population planning policies, the government has backed away from such policies recently, as evidenced by China's ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which compels the nation to significantly reform its genetic testing laws. Recent scholarship has also emphasized the necessity of understanding a myriad of complex social relations that affect the meaning of informed consent in China. Furthermore, in 2003, China revised its marriage registration regulations and couples no longer have to submit to a pre-marital physical or genetic examination before being granted a marriage license.
The United Nations Population Fund's (UNFPA) funding for this policy led the United States Congress to pull out of the UNFPA during the Reagan years, and again under George W. Bush's presidency, citing human rights abuses and stating that the right to "found a family" was protected under the Preamble in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. President Obama resumed U.S. government financial support for the UNFPA shortly after taking office in 2009, intending to "work[ing] collaboratively to reduce poverty, improve the health of women and children, prevent HIV/AIDS and provide family planning assistance to women in 154 countries".
The "four-two-one" problem 
As the first generation of law-enforced only-children came of age for becoming parents themselves, one adult child was left with having to provide support for his or her two parents and four grandparents. Called the "4-2-1 Problem", this leaves the older generations with increased chances of dependency on retirement funds or charity in order to receive support. If personal savings, pensions, or state welfare fail, most senior citizens would be left entirely dependent upon their very small family or neighbours for assistance. If, for any reason, the single child is unable to care for their older adult relatives, the oldest generations would face a lack of resources and necessities. In response to such an issue, all provinces have decided that couples are allowed to have two children if both parents were only children themselves: By 2007, all provinces in the nation except Henan had adopted this new policy; Henan followed in 2011.
Some parents may over-indulge their only child. The media referred to the indulged children in one-child families as "little emperors". Since the 1990s, some people have worried that this will result in a higher tendency toward poor social communication and cooperation skills among the new generation, as they have no siblings at home. No social studies have investigated the ratio of these over-indulged children and to what extent they are indulged. With the first generation of children born under the policy (which initially became a requirement for most couples with first children born starting in 1979 and extending into 1980s) reaching adulthood, such worries were reduced. However, the "little emperor syndrome" and additional expressions, describing the generation of Chinese singletons are very abundant in the Chinese media, Chinese academy and popular discussions. Being over-indulged, lacking self-discipline and having no adaptive capabilities are adjectives which are highly associated with Chinese singletons.
Some 30 delegates called on the government in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in March 2007 to abolish the one-child rule, attributing their beliefs to "social problems and personality disorders in young people". One statement read, "It is not healthy for children to play only with their parents and be spoiled by them: it is not right to limit the number to two children per family, either." The proposal was prepared by Ye Tingfang, a professor at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who suggested that the government at least restore the previous rule that allowed couples to have up to two children. According to a scholar, "The one-child limit is too extreme. It violates nature’s law. And in the long run, this will lead to mother nature’s revenge."
Unequal enforcement 
Government officials and especially wealthy individuals have often been able to violate the policy in spite of fines. For example, between 2000 and 2005, as many as 1,968 officials in central China's Hunan province were found to be violating the policy, according to the provincial family planning commission; also exposed by the commission were 21 national and local lawmakers, 24 political advisors, 112 entrepreneurs and 6 senior intellectuals. Some of the offending officials did not face penalties, although the government did respond by raising fines and calling on local officials to "expose the celebrities and high-income people who violate the family planning policy and have more than one child."
Circumvention through "birth tourism" 
Reports surfaced of Chinese women giving birth to their second child overseas, a practice known as birth tourism. Many went to Hong Kong, which is exempt from the one-child policy. Likewise, a Hong Kong passport differs from China mainland passport by providing additional advantages. Recently though, the Hong Kong government has drastically reduced the quota of births set for non-local women in public hospitals. As a result fees for delivering babies there have surged. As further admission cuts or a total ban on non-local births in Hong Kong are being considered, mainland agencies that arrange for expectant mothers to give birth overseas are predicting a surge in those going to North America. As the United States practices birthright citizenship, children born in the US will be US citizens. The closest option (from China) is Saipan in the Northern Mariana Islands, a US dependency in the western Pacific Ocean that allows Chinese visitors without visa restrictions. The island is currently experiencing an upswing in Chinese births. This option is used by relatively affluent Chinese who often have secondary motives as well, wishing their children to be able to leave mainland China when they grow older or bring their parents to the US. Canada is less popular as Ottawa denies many visa requests.
Leftover women 
Sheng nu or shengnü or leftover woman is a pejorative term and classification of women who remain unmarried in their mid to late twenties. Women that fall into this category are often publicly criticized, stigmatized, and targeted in both the mainstream media and state sponsored programs.
According to The New York Times, the State Council of the People's Republic of China issued an edict in 2007 regarding the Population and Family Planning Program (one-child-policy) to address the urgent gender imbalance and cited it as a major "threat to social stability". The council further cited “upgrading population quality (suzhi)” as one of its primary goals and appointed the All-China Women's Federation, a state established agency in 1949 to “protect women’s rights and interests”, to oversee and resolve the issue.
In the same year, the All-China Women's Federation and the Chinese Ministry of Education released an official statement defining sheng nu as any "unmarried women over the age of 27" and added it to the national lexicon. The ministry categorized it as a "failure to find a husband" due to an "overly high expectations for marriage partners" in a subsequent statement. A series of articles were published with the purpose of pressuring unwed women who were in their late twenties into marriage to lessen the gap of single unwed men.
China, like many other Asian countries, has a long tradition of son preference. The commonly accepted explanation for son preference is that sons in rural families may be thought to be more helpful in farm work. Both rural and urban populations have sexist economic and traditional incentives, including widespread remnants of Confucianism, to prefer sons over daughters. Sons are preferred as they provide the primary financial support for the parents in their retirement, and a son's parents typically are better cared for than his wife's. In addition, Chinese tradition holds that daughters, on their marriage, become primarily part of the groom's family. Male-to-female sex ratios in the current Chinese population are high in both rural and urban areas.
Gender-based birth rate disparity 
The sex ratio at birth (between male and female births) in mainland China reached 117:100 and remained steady between 2000 and 2013, substantially higher than the natural baseline, which ranges between 103:100 and 107:100. It had risen from 108:100 in 1981—at the boundary of the natural baseline—to 111:100 in 1990. According to a report by the National Population and Family Planning Commission, there will be 30 million more men than women in 2020, potentially leading to social instability, and courtship-motivated emigration. The correlation between the increase of sex ratio disparity on birth and the deployment of one child policy would appear to have been caused by the one-child policy.
Other Asian regions also have higher than average ratios, including Taiwan (110:100) and South Korea (108:100), which do not have a family planning policy and the ratio in South Korea was as high as 116:100 in the early 1990s but since then has moved substantially back toward a normal range, with a ratio of 107:100 in 2005. Many studies have explored the reason for the gender-based birth rate disparity in China as well as other countries. A study in 1990 attributed the high preponderance of reported male births in mainland China to four main causes: diseases which affect females more severely than males; the result of widespread underreporting of female births; the illegal practice of sex-selective abortion made possible by the widespread availability of ultrasound; and finally, acts of child abandonment and infanticide. The number of bachelors in China had already increased between 1990 and 2005, implying that China's lack of brides is not solely linked to the one-child policy, as single-child families were only enforced from 1979.
Emily Oster (2005) proposed a biological explanation for the gender imbalance in Asian countries, including China. Using data on viral prevalence by country as well as estimates of the effect of hepatitis on sex ratio, Oster claimed that Hepatitis B could account for up to 75% of the gender disparity in China. Oster later retracted her claim in 2008.
Monica Das Gupta (2005) has shown that "whether or not females 'go missing' is determined by the existing sex composition of the family into which they are conceived. Girls with no older sisters have similar chances of survival as boys. Girls conceived in families that already have a daughter, experience steeply higher probabilities of being aborted or of dying in early childhood. Gupta claims that cultural factors provide the overwhelming explanation for the "missing" females."
The disparity in the sex ratio at birth increases dramatically after the first birth, for which the ratios remained steadily within the natural baseline over the 20 year interval between 1980 and 1999. Thus, a large majority of couples appear to accept the outcome of the first pregnancy, whether it is a boy or a girl. If the first child is a girl, and they are able to have a second child, then a couple may take extraordinary steps to assure that the second child is a boy. If a couple already has two or more boys, the sex ratio of higher parity births swings decidedly in a feminine direction.
This demographic evidence indicates that while families highly value having male offspring, a secondary norm of having a girl or having some balance in the sexes of children often comes into play. For example, Zeng et al. (1993) reported a study based on the 1990 census in which they found sex ratios of just 65 or 70 boys per 100 girls for births in families that already had two or more boys. A study by Anderson and Silver (1995) found a similar pattern among both Han and non-Han nationalities in Xinjiang Province: a strong preference for girls in high parity births in families that had already borne two or more boys. This evidence is consistent with the observation by another researcher that for a majority of rural families "their ideal family size is one boy and one girl, at most two boys and one girl".
A 2006 review article by the Editorial Board of Population Research (Chinese: 人口研究; pinyin: Rénkǒu Yánjiū), one of China's leading demography journals, argued that only an approach that makes the rights of women central can succeed in bringing down China's high gender ratio at birth and improve the survival rate of female infants and girls. A section written by East China Normal University demography professor Ci Qinying, "Research on the Sex Ratio at Birth Should Take a Gender Discrimination Approach," argued that researchers must pay closer attention to gender issues in demography, and a human rights perspective in demographic research is crucial.
The authors of another review article, "Girl Survival in China: History, Present Situation and Prospects," which was presented at a 2005 conference supported by the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), concluded that "The Chinese government has already set the goal of achieving a normal gender ratio at birth by 2010, and to achieve preliminary results in establishing a new cultural outlook on marriage and having children. The government is working to change the system, way of thinking and other obstacles to attacking the root of the problem. Only if equality of males and females is strongly promoted ... will the harmonious and sustainable development of society be possible."
Abandoned or orphaned children and adoption 
Social pressure exerted by the one-child policy has affected the rate at which parents abandon unwanted children. Many unwanted children live in state-sponsored orphanages, and thousands are adopted from these institutions each year, either by international or Chinese parents. However, in the 1980s and early 1990s, poor care and high mortality rates in some state institutions generated intense international pressure for reform.
It is commonly assumed that children offered for adoption have better lives than if they had stayed with their biological parents. Parents may believe that putting unwanted children in orphanages or foster homes is a safe and beneficial step toward moving the children into permanent adoptive homes. On the contrary, many orphanages in China are overcrowded and can have difficulty meeting children's basic needs.
According to Sten Johansson and Ola Nygren (1991), adoptions accounted for half of the so-called "missing girls" in the 1980s in the PRC. Through the 1980s, as the one-child policy came into force, parents who desired a son but had a daughter often failed to report or delayed reporting female births to the authorities. Some parents may have offered up their daughters for formal or informal adoption. A majority of children who went through formal adoption in China in the later 1980s were girls, and the proportion who were girls increased over time (Johansson and Nygren 1991).
The practice of placing daughters for adoption is consistent with the preference of many Chinese couples for sons. At the same time, the relative availability of female children for adoption may be satisfying the wishes of many other Chinese couples, such as those who already have one or more sons, or those who have been unable to have biological children. [Zeng et al. (1993) and Anderson and Silver (1995)] This seems to be borne out as well by Weiguo Zhang's 2006 research on adoption in rural China, which notes increasing receptivity to adopting girls.
Officially registered adoptions increased from about 2,000 in 1992, when China instituted its first adoption law, to 55,000 in 2001. According to one scholar, these figures "represent a small proportion of adoptions in China because many adopted children were adopted informally without official registrations." International adoption rates climbed dramatically after the early 1990s. In the United States, for example, there were about 200 adoptions from China in 1992, more than 7,900 in 2005, and the rate of such adoptions continued to increase rapidly.
According to the Los Angeles Times, many babies put up for adoption had not been abandoned by their parents, but confiscated by family planning officials. The prevalence of such activity is unknown.
Gender-selected abortion, abandonment, and infanticide are illegal in China. Nevertheless, the US State Department, the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and the human rights organization Amnesty International have all declared that China's family planning programs contribute to infanticide.
Anthropologist G. William Skinner at the University of California–Davis and Chinese researcher Yuan Jianhua have claimed that infanticide was fairly common in China before the 1990s.
Twins sought 
Since there are no penalties for multiple births, it is believed that an increasing number of couples are turning to fertility medicines to induce the conception of twins. According to a 2006 China Daily report, the number of twins born per year in China had doubled.[timeframe?]
Impact on health care 
It is reported that the focus of China on population control helps provide a better health service for women and a reduction in the risks of death and injury associated with pregnancy. At family planning offices, women receive free contraception and pre-natal classes that contributed to the policy's success in two respects. First, the average Chinese household expends fewer resources, both in terms of time and money, on children, which gives many Chinese more money with which to invest. Second, since young Chinese can no longer rely on children to care for them in their old age, there is an impetus to save money for the future.
Economic growth 
The original intent of the one-child policy was economic, to reduce the demand of natural resources, maintaining a steady labour rate, reducing unemployment caused from surplus labor, and reducing the rate of exploitation. The CPC's justification for this policy was based on their support of Mao Zedong's supposedly Marxist theory of population growth, though Marx was actually witheringly critical of Malthusianism.
Prospects for change 
A major diminution of the policy appears likely under the new leadership of Xi Jinping, after recent small relaxations and criticism from influential figures. It is "certain .. only a question of time", according to a recently retired official of the Family Planning Commission, while Tian Xueyuan, one of the policy's original drafters, has repeatedly said that it is "a special policy with a time limit, specifically, to control the births of one generation" and that it ”has "run its course", now that the unbalanced sex ratio risks social instability caused by a surplus of men without partners. In November 2012, outgoing President Hu Jintao notably omitted the usual objective to “maintain a low birth rate” in a work report to a Communist Party congress. Director of the National Statistics Bureau of China Ma Jiantang called for "an appropriate and scientific family planning policy” after the country’s working-age population fell for the first time, in January 2013.
See also 
- Demographics of the People's Republic of China
- Demographic momentum
- Family planning
- Human population control
- Human rights in China
- Only child
- Reproductive health
- Two-child policy
- Urbanization in China
- Voluntary Human Extinction Movement
- Iron Fist Campaign
- Demographic trap
- Mao Hengfeng
- Information Office of the State Council Of the People's Republic of China (August 1995). "Family Planning in China". Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Lithuania. Retrieved 27 October 2008. Section III paragraph 2.
- BBC: China steps up "one-child policy".
- "Most people free to have more child". 2007-07-11. Retrieved 2009-07-31.
- Rocha da Silva, Pascal (2006). "La politique de l'enfant unique en République populaire de Chine" ("The politics of one child in the People's Republic of China"). Université de Genève (University of Geneva). p. 22–8. (French)
- "400 million births prevented by one-child policy". People's daily online. October 2011. Retrieved 27 March 2012.
- Mara Hvistendahl (17 September 2010). "Has China Outgrown The One-Child Policy?". Science 329 (5998): 1458–1461. doi:10.1126/science.329.5998.1458. PMID 20847244.
- Damien Mcelroy (2001-04-08). "Chinese region 'must conduct 20,000 abortions'". London: Telegraph.
- For studies that reported underreporting or delayed reporting of female births, see the following:
- M. G. Merli and A. E. Raftery. 1990. "Are births under-reported in rural China? Manipulation of statistical records in response to China's population policies", Demography 37 (February): 109–126
- Johansson, Sten; Nygren, Olga (1991). "The missing girls of China: a new demographic account". Population and Development Review (Population Council) 17 (1): 35–51. doi:10.2307/1972351. JSTOR 1972351.
- Merli, M. Giovanna; Raftery, Adrian E. (2000). "Are births underreported in rural China?". Demography 37 (1): 109 126.
- "The Chinese Celebrate Their Roaring Economy, As They Struggle With Its Costs". 2008-07-22. Retrieved 2009-07-31.
- Arthur E. Dewey, Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees and Migration Testimony before the House International Relations Committee Washington, DC December 14, 2004 http://statelists.state.gov/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind0412c&L=dossdo&P=401
- "China Sticking With One-Child Policy." The New York Times, 11 March 2008. Retrieved 7 November 2008.
- "China's one-child policy little enforced – and set to end". MarketWatch. March 29, 2010. Retrieved March 29, 2010.
- China's one-child policy may be coming to an end, SCMP, 22 January 2013
- China reportedly considering ‘two-child’ policy. MarketWatch. March 8, 2011. Retrieved March 9, 2011.
- China may scrap one-child policy. DeccanChronicle. March 8, 2011. Retrieved March 9, 2011.[dead link]
- Mann, Jim (1992-06-07). "The Physics of Revenge : WHEN DR. LU GANG'S AMERICAN DREAM DIED, SIX PEOPLE DIED WITH IT". Los Angeles Times Magazine. Retrieved July 14, 2012.
- "The One Child Family Policy". BMJ.
- CIA World Factbook. CIA Factbook.
- Ansley J. Coale “Population Trends, Population Policy, and Population Studies in China.” Population and Development Review, Vol. 7, No. 1. Mar 1981. Web. 25 Mar 2011. Coale shows birth and death data up to 1979 in quite some detail, as well as cultural background to the famine in 1959-61.
- See Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific report "Status of Population and Family Planning Program in China by Province".
- Hu Huiting (18 October 2002). "Family Planning Law and China's Birth Control Situation". China Daily. Retrieved 2 March 2009.
- PBS (14 February 1984). "Family Planning Law and China's Birth Control Situation". NOVA. Retrieved 13 October 2009.
- Are the rich challenging family planning policy?
- Callick, Rowan (24 January 2007). "China relaxes its one-child policy". The Australian.
- Summary of Family Planning notice on how FP fines are collected
- Vanessa L. Fong; Only Hope: Coming of Age Under China's One-Child Policy; Stanford University Press, Feb 15, 2006; Page 179
- "Regulations on Family Planning of Henan Province". Henan Daily. 5 April 2000. Retrieved 29 October 2008."国务院专家：建议全面放开二胎". yaolan.com. 6 July 2012. Retrieved 17 July 2012. Article 13.
- Scheuer, James (4 January 1987). "America, the U.N. and China's Family Planning (Opinion)". The New York Times. Retrieved 27 October 2008.
- Sichuan, for example, has allowed exemptions for couples of certain backgrounds; see Articles 11–13, "Revised at the 29th session of the standing committee of the 8th People's Congress of Sichuan Province". United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. 17 October 1997. Retrieved 31 October 2008.
- One-Child Policy Lifted for Quake Victims’ Parents, by Andrew Jacobs. New York Times, 27 May 2008. Retrieved May 28, 2008.
- Baby offer for earthquake parents BBC. Retrieved on 31 October 2008.
- China Amends Child Policy for Some Quake Victims
- Yardley, Jim (11 May 2008). "China Sticking With One-Child Policy". The New York Times. Retrieved 20 November 2008.
- "New rich challenge family planning policy." Xinhua.
- "The most surprising demographic crisis". The Ecoonomist. 5 May 2011. Retrieved 25 February 2013.
- "First systematic study of China’s one-child policy reveals complexity, effectiveness of fertility regulation". Today@UCI (University of California Irvine). April 18, 2007. Retrieved 2007-04-19.
- People's Daily Online - Wuhan sees negative population growth
- Therese Hasketh, Li Lu, and Zhu Wei Xing. 2005. "The effects of China's One-Child Family Policy after 25 Years", New England Journal of Medicine, 353, No. 11 (September 15): 1171–1176.
- Family Planning Law and China's Birth Control Situation
- John Taylor (2005-02-08). "China - One Child Policy". Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Retrieved 2008-07-01.
- Edward Wong (July 22, 2012). "Reports of Forced Abortions Fuel Push to End Chinese Law". The New York Times. Retrieved July 23, 2012.
- Susan Greenhalgh. 2003. "Science, Modernity, and the Making of China's One-Child Policy", Population and Development Review 29 (June): 163–196.
- "Experts challenge China's 1-child population claim".
- U.S. Embassy Beijing June 1988 report PRC Family Planning: The Market Weakens Controls But Encourages Voluntary Limits.
- PRC journal Social Sciences in China [Zhongguo Shehui Kexue, January 1988].
- Freedman, Lynn P.; Isaacs, Stephen L. (Jan.– Feb. 1993). "Human Rights and Reproductive Choice". Studies in Family Planning (Population Council) 24 (1): 18–30. doi:10.2307/2939211. JSTOR 2939211. PMID 8475521.
- "Proclamation of Teheran". International Conference on Human Rights. 1968. Archived from the original on 2007-10-17. Retrieved 2007-11-08.
- Mosher, Steven W. (July 1993). A Mother's Ordeal. Harcourt. ISBN 0-15-162662-6.
- "Forced Sterilization".
- Father in forced abortion case wants charges filed
- "Implications of China's Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities".
- "Genetic testing, governance, and the family in the People's Republic of China".
- "Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China".
- Don't Fund UNFPA Population Control
- Damien McElroy (2002-02-03). "China is furious as Bush halts UN 'abortion' funds". London: Telegraph.
- Sichan Siv (2003-01-21). "United Nations Fund for Population Activities in China". U.S. Department of State. Archived from the original on 19 February 2003.
- "UNFPA Welcomes Restoration of U.S. Funding," UNFPA News, January 29, 2009.
- Haider Rizvi, "Obama Sets New Course at the U.N.," IPS News, March 12, 2009.
- 李雯 (Li Wen) (5 April 2008). ""四二一"家庭，路在何方？('Four-two-one families', where is the road going?" (in Chinese). 云南日报网 (Yunnan Daily Online). Retrieved 31 January 2011.
- ""四二一"家庭真的是问题吗？(Are 'four-two-one' families really a problem?)" (in Chinese). 中国人口学会网 (China Population Association Online). 10 October 2010. Retrieved 31 January 2011.
- "Rethinking China's one-child policy". CBC. October 28, 2009. Retrieved June 11, 2010.
- "计生委新闻发言人:11%以上人口可生两个孩子 (English: "Spokesperson of the one-child policy committee: 11% or more of the population may have two children)" (in Chinese). Sina.com. 10 July 2007. Retrieved 7 November 2008.
- China's most populous province amends family-planning policy
- Daniela Deane (July 26, 1992). The Little Emperors. Los Angeles Times. p. 16
- Chinese Singletons - Basic ‘Spoiled’ Related Vocabulary,Thinking Chinese, November 11, 2010.
- "Consultative Conference: "The government must end the one-child rule"". AsiaNews.it. 2007-03-16.
- "Advisors say it's time to change one-child policy". Shanghai Daily. 2007-03-15.
- "Over 1,900 officials breach birth policy in C. China". Xinhua. 8 July 2007. Retrieved 11 November 2008. "But heavy fines and exposures seemed to hardly stop the celebrities and rich people, as there are still many people, who can afford the heavy penalties, insist on having multiple kids, the Hunan commission spokesman said.
Three officials... who were all found to have kept extramarital mistresses, were all convicted for charges such as embezzlement and taking bribes, but they were not punished for having more than one child."
- Birth tourism on the upswing. See: http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat=1&newsID=116516
- 'Many Chinese giving birth in CNMI trying to get around one child policy'. See: http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat=1&newsID=116544
- Magistad, Mary Kay (20 February 2013). "BBC News - China's 'leftover women', unmarried at 27". BBC Online (Beijing). Retrieved 29 March 2013.
- Lee, Deborah Jian; Sushima Subramanian (17 October 2011). "China's Educated Women Can't Find Eligible Men". Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting (in English) (China). Retrieved 29 March 2013.
- Fincher, Leta Hong (12 October 2012). "OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR; China's 'Leftover' Women". The New York Times. Retrieved 29 March 2013.
- Simpson, Peter; De Lacey, Martha (28 February 2013). "'Chinese men want wives who are easier to control': How China's high-flying single women are rejected because male suitors are intimidated by their successes". Mail Online. Retrieved 29 March 2013.
- Chen Wei (2005). "Sex Ratios at Birth in China". Retrieved 2 March 2009.[unreliable source?]
- "Chinese facing shortage of wives". BBC. 2007-01-12. Retrieved 2007-01-12.
- See the Central Intelligence Agency report Sex ratio.
- "Where Boys Were Kings, a Shift Toward Baby Girls,"New York Times, December 24, 2007.
- "The worldwide war on baby girls". The Economist. March 8, 2010. Retrieved May 4, 2010.
- Oster, Emily (December 2005). "Hepatitis B and the case of the missing women". Journal of Political Economy 113 (6): 1163–1216. doi:10.1086/498588.[dead link]
- Oster, Emily (December 2008). Hepatitis B Does Not Explain Male-Biased Sex Ratios in China.
- Monica Das Gupta, "Explaining Asia's 'Missing Women'", Population and Development Review 31 (September 2005): 529–535.
- This tendency to favour girls in high parity births to couples who had already borne sons was also noted by Coale, who suggested as well that once a couple had achieved its goal for the number of males, it was also much more likely to engage in "stopping behavior", i.e., to stop having more children. See Ansley J. Coale (1996), "Five Decades of Missing Females in China", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 140 (4): 421–450.
- Zeng Yi et al. 1993. "Causes and Implications of the Recent Increase in the Reported Sex Ratio at Birth in China", Population and Development Review 19 (June): 283–302.
- Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver. 1995. "Ethnic Differences in Fertility and Sex Ratios at Birth in China: Evidence from Xinjiang", Population Studies 49 (July): 211–226.
- Weiguo Zhang, "Child Adoption in Contemporary Rural China", Journal of Family Issues, 27 (March 2006), p. 306.
- "China’s Sex Ratio at Birth: From Doubts About its Existence to Looking for a Solution." Population Research 1/2006 issue 原载《人口研究》2006年第1期]
- "China’s Sex Ratio at Birth: From Doubts About its Existence to Looking for a Solution." Population Research 1/2006 issue 原载《人口研究》2006年第1期.
"If we do pay more attention to the problem of the rising sex ratio, still the focus is on the rights of males such as the right to marry, and ignores women’s rights such as the right to survive, the right to reproduce, the right to health, etc. This approach inflicts even more harm on women. If this approach is taken, women will never be able to escape their subsidiary position and their role of satisfying the desires of others. Robbing females of their right to exist [shengmingquan 生命权] is for the sake of giving birth to males – that is putting the right to survive of males first. Moreover, protecting women’s right to exist is merely for the purpose of provide a wife to sons. A measure to ensure that a counterpart is available to ensure that male can exercise his right to marry. In both case, the male is primary and the female is subsidiary."
- "China’s Sex Ratio at Birth: From Doubts About its Existence to Looking for a Solution." Population Research 1/2006 issue 原载《人口研究》2006年第1期].
"Therefore, how a researcher approaches the question of the sex ratio at birth – from what point for view, considering whose rights – is critical. This depends upon the values of the researcher, the humanistic orientation of the researcher and the consciousness the researcher has about gender and gender discrimination. Protecting the right to exist, the right to reproduce, and the right to health of girls should be at the very core of policy and action measures to control sex ratio at birth. That is because females are the biggest victims of the rising sex ratio. The rising sex ratio is in fact robbing females of their right to exist and completely discriminates against females."
- "China’s Sex Ratio at Birth: From Doubts About its Existence to Looking for a Solution." Population Research 1/2006 issue 原载《人口研究》2006年第1期].
"Social controls on methods of selective reproduction are needed not only because of the higher birth ratio that results but also because selective reproduction harms the body and soul of the mother and robs unborn infants (regardless of being boy or girl) of their right to live. Selective reproduction itself should be more closely regulated and brought under control."
- "China’s Sex Ratio at Birth: From Doubts About its Existence to Looking for a Solution." Population Research 1/2006 issue 原载《人口研究》2006年第1期].
"Even aside from the question of the rising sex ratio at birth, we should also intervene against and oppose elective abortion. Elective abortion robs unborn female infants of their right to live and their right to exist, accentuates the social custom of favoring males over females. Not only does it harm women’s bodies it also reduces women to the role of a mere tool for reproduction. Women bodies and spirits are suffering grievous wounds. Therefore no matter what the results of an elective abortion might be, we should intervene against and oppose elective abortion. The rise of the sex ratio at birth is only one among several reasons for intervening on selective reproduction."
- http://web.archive.org/web/20081220091758/http://www.wsic.ac.cn/Appendix/Download.aspx?AppendixMainId=SAM-1229 Li Shuzhuo, Wei Yan and Jiang Quanbao, "Girl Survival in China: History, Present Situation and Prospects", background materials for the August 2005 conference "Women and Health" available online in Chinese. The conference was sponsored by the United Nations Fund for Population Activities.
- Lerner, K. Lee. "Human Population". The Gale Encyclopedia of Science. Retrieved December 11, 2012.
- Lerner, K. Lee and Brenda. "Human Populaton". The Gale Encyclopedia of Science. Retrieved December 11, 2012.
- See Human Rights Watch report "A Policy of Fatal Neglect in China’s State Orphanages" , ISBN 1-56432-163-0 Missing or empty
|title=(help) and CHINESE ORPHANAGES A Follow-up.
- Thurston, Anne. "In a Chinese Orphanage". Retrieved January 24, 2013.
- Sten Johansson and Ola Nygren. 1991. "The Missing Girls of China: A New Demographic Account", Population and Development Review 17 (March): 35–51.
- Weiguo Zhang. 2006. "Child Adoption in Contemporary Rural China", Journal of Family Issues 27 (March): 301–340.
- U.S. State Department report, "Immigrant Visas Issued to Orphans Coming to the U.S.", at http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/stats/stats_451.html.
- Demick, Barbara (20 Sept. 2009). "Chinese Babies Stolen by Officials for Foreign Adoptions". Los Angeles Times.
- See Associated Press article US State Department position.
- See publication of the United Kingdom Parliament position regarding Human Rights in China and Tibet.
- See Amnesty International's report on violence against women in China.
- "Steve Mosher’s China report" The Interim, 1986
- "Case Study: Female Infanticide" Gendercide Watch, 2000
- "Infanticide Statistics: Infanticide in China" AllGirlsAllowed.org, 2010
- Sarah Lubman (2000-03-15). "Experts Allege Infanticide In China 'Missing' Girls Killed, Abandoned, Pair Say". San Jose Mercury News (California).
- Associated Press (14 February 2006). "China: Drug bid to beat child ban". China Daily. Retrieved 11 November 2008.
- Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2007.
- 全慰天:社会主义经济规律与中国人口问题 Google Translated Version; Days of full-comfort: the law of the socialist economy with Chinese population
- Tain Z (March 1983). "[Studying Marxist theory on population and initiating a new situation in demographic research]". Renkou Yanjiu (in Chinese) (2): 13–4. PMID 12313010.
- Wen TZ (July 1981). "Comrade Mao Ze-dong's contribution to Marxist theory on population—in commemoration, of the 60th anniversary of the birth of the Chinese Communist Party". Renkou Yanjiu (in Chinese) (3): 8–11. PMID 12264239.
Further reading 
- Better 10 Graves Than One Extra Birth (ISBN 1-931550-92-1, Laogai Research Foundation)
- Greenhalgh, Susan, (2008). Just One Child: Science and Policy in Deng's China (ISBN 978-0-520-25339-1, University of California Press)
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Population policy in China|