|Part of World War II|
RAF photo-reconnaissance picture of the Würzburg radar array at Bruneval
|Commanders and leaders|
|120 commandos, 1 Sqn RAF transports, RN support craft||Approximately 130 |
|Casualties and losses|
|Two killed, six wounded, six captured ||Five killed, two wounded, two captured, three missing |
Operation Biting, also known as the Bruneval Raid, was the codename given to a British Combined Operations raid on a German radar installation in Bruneval, northern France, that occurred between 27–28 February 1942 during World War II.
A number of these installations had been identified from Royal Air Force aerial reconnaissance during 1941, but their exact purpose and the nature of the equipment that they possessed was not known. However, a number of British scientists believed that these stations had something to do with the heavy losses being experienced by RAF bombers conducting bombing raids against targets in Occupied Europe. A request was therefore made by these scientists that one of these installations be raided and the technology it possessed be studied and, if possible, extracted and taken back to Britain for further study. Due to the extensive coastal defences erected by the Germans to protect the installation from a sea-borne raid, it was believed that a commando raid from the sea would only incur heavy losses on the part of the attackers, and give sufficient time for the garrison at the installation to destroy the Würzburg radar set. It was therefore decided that an airborne assault, followed by sea-borne evacuation would be the most practicable way to surprise the garrison of the installation and seize the technology intact, as well as minimise casualties inflicted on the raiding force.
On the night of 27 February, after a period of intense training and several delays due to poor weather, a small detachment of airborne troops under the command of Major John Frost parachuted into France a few miles from the installation. The force then proceeded to assault the villa in which the radar equipment was kept, killing several members of the German garrison and capturing the installation after a brief fire-fight. A technician that had come with the force proceeded to dismantle the Würzburg radar array and remove several key pieces to take back to Britain, and the raiding force then retreated to the evacuation beach. The detachment assigned to clear the beach had failed to do so, however, and another brief fire-fight was required to eliminate the Germans guarding the beach. The raiding force was then picked up by a small number of landing craft and transferred to several Motor Gun Boats which took them back to Britain.
The raid was entirely successful. The airborne troops suffered only a few casualties, and the pieces of the radar they brought back, along with a German radar technician, allowed British scientists to understand German advances in radar and to create counter-measures to neutralise those advances.
After the end of the Battle of France and the evacuation of British troops from Dunkirk during Operation Dynamo, much of Britain's war production and effort was channelled into RAF Bomber Command and the strategic bombing offensive against Germany. However, bomber losses on each raid began to increase during 1941, which British intelligence concluded was due to German use of advanced radar techniques. British and German radar technology and techniques had been in competition for nearly a decade at this point, with the Germans often either at the same level as the British or surpassing them due to heavy military investment in the fledgling technology. By the beginning of World War II, British radar technology had managed to rise to an effective level, primarily due to the work of Robert Watson-Watt, although much of the technology was still rudimentary in nature and mistakes were made, such as the inability of Watson-Watt and other scientists to devise an effective night-defence system in time for the German night-time bombing of Britain during 1940. Another British scientist working on radar technology and techniques was R. V. Jones, who had been appointed in 1939 as Britain's first Scientific Intelligence Officer and had spent the first years of the conflict researching how advanced the German radar technology was in comparison to Britain, and convincing doubters that the Germans actually had radar.
By scrutinising leaked German documents, crashed Luftwaffe bombers and Enigma decrypts, as well as interrogating German prisoners of war, Jones discovered that high-frequency radio signals were being transmitted across Britain from somewhere on the continent, and he believed they came from a directional radar system. Within a few months of this discovery, Jones had identified several such radar systems, one of which was being used to detect British bombers; this was known as the "Freya-Meldung-Freya" system, named after an ancient Nordic goddess. Jones was finally able to see concrete proof of the presence of the Freya system after being shown several mysterious objects caught in reconnaissance pictures taken by the RAF near Cap d'Antifer - two circular dishes approximately 20 feet (6.1 m) in diameter which were being rotated. Having found proof of these Freya installations, Jones and the other scientists under his command could begin devising counter-measures against the system, and the RAF could begin to locate and destroy the installations themselves. Jones had also found evidence of a second part of the Freya system, referred to in Enigma decrypts as "Würzburg", but it was not until he was shown another set of RAF reconnaissance photographs in November 1941 that he learnt what Würzburg was. It consisted of a parabolic reflector about 10 feet (3.0 m) in diameter, which worked in conjunction with Freya to locate British bombers and then direct Luftwaffe night-fighters to their position. The two systems complemented each other: Freya was a long-distance radar system, but lacked precision, whereas Würzburg possessed a far shorter range but was far more precise. Würzburg also had the advantage of being much smaller than the Freya system and easier to manufacture in the quantities needed by the Luftwaffe to defend German territory.
In order to effectively neutralise the Würzburg system by developing counter-measures against it, Jones and his team needed to study one of the systems, or at very least the more vital pieces of technology that the system was composed of. Fortunately for Jones, one such site had recently been located by an RAF reconnaissance Spitfire from the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit during a flight over part of the Channel coast near Le Havre. The site was located on a cliff-top immediately north of the village of Bruneval, which was itself twelve miles north of Le Havre, and was the most accessible German radar site that had been located so far by the British; several other installations had been located in France, but were landlocked, and others were as far away as Romania and Bulgaria. A request was therefore passed along to Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, the commander of Combined Operations, that a raid be mounted against the Bruneval installation and that a Würzburg radar system be captured and brought back to Britain for study. Mountbatten in turn took the proposal to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, who approved the raid after a brief debate. Having received permission to conduct the raid, Mountbatten and his staff studied the Bruneval installation and its defences, rapidly coming to the conclusion that due to the extensive coastal defences erected in the area around the installation it was too well-guarded to permit a commando raid. They considered that such a raid would be costly in terms of casualties for the commando force and would not be fast enough to capture the Würzburg radar before it was destroyed. Believing that surprise and speed were to be the essential requirements of any raid against the installation to ensure the radar was captured, Mountbatten saw an airborne assault as the only viable method. On 8 January 1942, he therefore contacted the headquarters of 1st Airborne Division and 38 Wing RAF, asking if they were able to conduct the raid; Browning was particularly enthusiastic, as a successful operation would be an excellent morale boost to the airborne troops under his command, as well as a good demonstration of their value.
The two commanders believed that training by both airborne troops and aircrews could be completed by the end of February, when there would be suitable meteorological conditions for such an operation to take place. Training for the raid was begun immediately, but encountered several problems. 38 Wing was a new formation and was unable to provide any aircraft or trained aircrews for the raid, meaning that No. 51 Squadron RAF under Wing Commander Percy Charles Pickard was selected to provide the aircraft and aircrew needed for the operation, although Group Captain Nigel Norman would remain in overall command. Another problem encountered was the state of the company of airborne troops chosen to raid the installation. During this period, 1st Airborne Division was composed of only two parachute battalions, of which only one, 1st Parachute Battalion, was fully trained; Major-General Browning, wishing to keep 1st Parachute Battalion intact for any larger operation the division might be selected for, ordered 2nd Parachute Battalion to provide a company for the operation. 'C' Company, commanded by Major John Frost was selected, but the company had been so recently formed that Major Frost and many of his men had not yet completed their parachute jumping course. The level of security imposed on the planning for the raid was so high that when Major Frost was first briefed by a liaison officer from the headquarters of 1st Airborne Division, he was informed that his company was to take part in an airborne warfare demonstration for the War Cabinet. He was also informed that C company would be divided into four sections for the exercise, which went against a plan Frost had devised for the exercise and confused him. It was only after Frost raised several objections with a more senior officer at the headquarters that he was informed of the intended raid, after which the Major dropped his objections and turned his attention to training the company.
The company spent a period training on Salisbury Plain in Wiltshire, and then travelled to Inveraray in Scotland where they underwent specialised training on Loch Fyne, practising night embarkations on landing craft. After finishing this training, which was designed to prepare the company for being evacuated by sea after raiding the radar installation, the company returned to Wiltshire and began carrying out practice parachute drops with the aircraft and aircrews of 51 Squadron. Despite the aircrews of the Squadron having no previous experience in dropping parachutists, these exercises proved to be successful. The company's training was aided by the creation of a scale-model of the radar installation and the surrounding buildings being built by the Photographic Interpretation Unit. During this period, Major Frost was introduced to Commander F. N. Cook of the Royal Australian Navy who would be commanding the naval force intended to evacuate the company at the completion of the raid, as well as to the party of thirty-two officers and men from No. 12 Commando who would remain in the landing craft and cover the company as it withdrew from the beach. Frost also met Flight Sergeant C.W.H Cox of the RAF, who had volunteered for the operation; as an expert radio mechanic, it would be his job to locate the Würzburg radar set and photograph it, as well as disassemble it for transportation back to Britain. Garrard had asked R. V. Jones to get Cox an Army uniform and number for the raid, as if they were captured and Cox was the only one in Air Force uniform he would be the object of special attention, but the War Office were obdurate.
Information about the Bruneval radar installation was also gathered during the training period, often with the help of the French resistance, without whom detailed knowledge of the disposition of the German forces guarding the installation would have been impossible. This reconnaissance was gathered by Gilbert Renault, known to the British by the code-name 'Remy' and several members of his resistance cell. The installation was composed of two distinct areas; a villa approximately 100 yards (91 m) from the edge of a cliff which contained the radar station itself, and an enclosure containing a number of smaller buildings which contained a small garrison. The Würzburg apparatus had been erected between the villa and the cliff. The radar station was permanently manned by signallers and was surrounded by a number of guard posts and approximately thirty guards; the buildings in the small enclosure housed approximately 100 German troops, including another detachment of signallers. A platoon of infantry was stationed to the north in Bruneval itself, and was responsible for manning the defences guarding the evacuation beach; these included a strong-point near the beach as well as pillboxes and machine-gun nests on the top of the cliff overlooking the beach. The beach was not mined and had only sporadic barbed-wire defences, but it was patrolled regularly, and a mobile reserve of infantry was believed to be available at one hour's notice and stationed some distance inland. On the basis of this information, Frost decided to divide the company into five groups of forty men for the raid, each named after a famous Royal Navy admiral: Nelson, Jellicoe, Hardy, Drake and Rodney. Nelson would clear and secure German positions defending the evacuation beach, whilst Jellicoe, Hardy and Drake would capture the radar site and a nearby villa occupied by Luftwaffe radar technicians and their guards; Rodney was the reserve formation, placed between the radar site and the main likely enemy approach to block any counter-attack. It was considered that the combination of a full moon, for visibility, and a rising tide, to allow the landing craft to manoeuvre in shallow water, was vital for the success of the raid, which narrowed the possible dates to a four-day period between 24–27 February. On 23 February, a final rehearsal exercise took place, which proved to be a drastic failure; despite ideal weather conditions, the landing craft meant to evacuate the airborne troops became grounded 60 yards (180 ft) offshore and could not be shifted despite the efforts of all of C company.
The raid was postponed for several days after the end of the exercise on 23 February due to weather conditions, but on 27 February the weather proved to be ideal, with clear skies and good visibility for the aircraft of 51 Squadron, and a full moon scheduled which would provide illumination for the evacuation of the raiding force. The naval force under Commander Cook departed from Britain during the afternoon, and the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley transport aircraft carrying C company took off from RAF Thruxton in the evening. The transport aircraft crossed the English Channel in safety, but as they reached the French coast they came under heavy anti-aircraft fire; none were hit, however, and successfully delivered C company to the designated drop-zone near to the installation. The drop was almost a success, with all of the raiding force landing on the edge of the drop-zone with the exception of half of 'Nelson' detachment, which landed two miles short. Once the other detachments had gathered their equipment and orientated themselves, they moved off to undertake their arranged tasks. 'Jellicoe', 'Hardy and 'Drake' encountered no enemy opposition as they moved towards the villa housing the radar installation, and after surrounding the villa Major Frost gave the order to open fire with grenades and automatic fire. One German guard was killed as he returned fire from an upstairs window, and two more were taken prisoner by the airborne troops; upon interrogation, the prisoners revealed that the majority of the garrison were stationed further inland. However, there still remained a substantial enemy force in the buildings in the small enclosure near to the villa, and this now opened fire on the raiding force after being alerted by the initial fire-fight, killing one of the airborne troops. The volume of fire rapidly began to increase, and enemy vehicles could be seen moving towards the villa from the nearby woods; this in particular worried Frost, as the radio sets the force had been issued failed to work, giving him no means of communication with his other detachments, including 'Nelson' who were tasked with clearing the evacuation beach. Fortunately Flight Sergeant Cox and several sappers arrived at this time and proceeded to dismantle the radar equipment, placing the pieces on specially designed trolleys.
Having secured the radar equipment and under heavy enemy fire, Major Frost gave the order for the three detachments to withdraw to the evacuation beach; it quickly became apparent, however, that the beach had not been secured by 'Nelson' when a machine-gun opened fire on the airborne troops, severely wounding a Company Sergeant Major. Major Frost ordered 'Rodney' and the remains of 'Nelson' to clear the machine-gun nest, whilst he led the other three detachments back to the villa, which had been reoccupied by enemy troops. The villa was soon cleared of enemy troops again, and when Major Frost returned to the beach, he found that the machine-gun nest had been assaulted and cleared by the troops of 'Nelson' that had been mis-dropped; having skirted a number of enemy positions, they had reached the beach and attacked the machine-gun nest from the flank. By this time, it was 02:15 but there was no sign of the naval force that was to evacuate the airborne troops. Frost ordered 'Nelson' to guard the inland approaches to the beach and then fired off an emergency signal flare, and soon after the naval force was seen approaching. The original plan for the operation had called for two landing craft to land on the beach at a time, but this had never been satisfactorily achieved during the training manoeuvres; instead, all six landing craft landed at the same time, with the troops in the landing craft opening fire on German troops gathering by the top of the cliff. This deviation from the original plan, and the enemy fire caused considerable confusion on the beach; some of the landing craft left the beach over-crowded, whilst others left half-empty. However, the radar equipment and the German prisoners were evacuated safely, and the entire raiding force was taken off of the beach and soon transferred to motor gun boats for transport back to Britain. On the journey back, Frost learnt that the naval force had received no signals apart from the last signal flare fired, and had spent much of the time hiding from a German naval patrol that had nearly discovered them. The journey back to Britain was uneventful, with the force being escorted by four destroyers and a flight of Supermarine Spitfire fighters.
The success of the raid against the Bruneval installation had two important effects. Firstly, a successful raid against German-occupied territory was a welcome morale boost for the British public, and was featured prominently in the British media for several weeks after the end of the raid. The British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill took a personal interest in the raid, and on 3 March assembled the War Cabinet to hear from Major Frost and several other officers who had participated in it. Several medals were awarded as a result. On 15 May 1942 a special supplement to the London Gazette carried the announcement of 19 decorations; Frost was awarded the Military Cross (MC), Cook the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) and Cox the Military Medal (MM); there were two other DSCs, two Distinguished Service Medals, one other MC, two further MMs and 9 Mentions in Despatches. Pickard was also subsequently awarded a bar to his Distinguished Service Order, on 26 May. The success of the raid also prompted the War Office to expand the existing British airborne forces, setting up the Airborne Forces Depot and Battle School in Derbyshire in April 1942, and creating the Parachute Regiment as well as converting a number of infantry battalions to airborne battalions in August 1942.
The other important effect was the technical knowledge that British scientists gained. Examination of the components of the radar array showed that it was of a modular design that aided maintenance and made fixing faults far simpler than on similar British radar models. This was confirmed during the interrogation of the captured German technician, who proved to be less well trained than his British counterparts. Examination of the radar array also allowed British scientists to conclude that they would have to deploy a radar countermeasure that had recently been developed, code-named Window. Examination of the Würzburg array showed that it was impervious to being jammed by conventional means used by the British during the early years of the conflict, and thus Window would have to be deployed against German radar installations from this point onwards. The effectiveness of Window against Würzburg radar arrays was confirmed by a raid conducted by RAF Bomber Command on 24 July 1943 against Hamburg (Operation Gomorrah); when the bombers utilised Window, all of the radar arrays in Hamburg were blinded and their operators confused, unable to distinguish between the radar signature of a real bomber and several pieces of Window giving off a similar signature. An unexpected bonus of the raid was the Germans' efforts to improve defences at Würzburg stations and prevent similar commando raids. The radars were surrounded by rings of barbed wire which increased their visibility from the air, making them easier to target prior to Operation Overlord. One final consequence of the raid was that the Telecommunications Research Establishment, where much of the Bruneval equipment was analysed, and British radar systems were designed and tested, was moved from Swanage further inland to Malvern to ensure that it was not the target of a reprisal raid by German airborne forces.
The original model of the area around the radar station, that was used to brief troops taking part in the assault, is preserved in the Parachute Regiment and Airborne Forces Museum, located at the Imperial War Museum Duxford.
See also 
- Operation Clawhammer
- "The Bruneval Raid (title in U.S.)". Secrets of World War II (title in U.S.). March 5, 2012. The Military Channel. Features this operation, and interviews with RV Jones.
- Bernard Glemser's Radar Commandos (1966), is a fictional treatment of the raid.
- The Red Beret, a 1953 film based on Operation Biting and other early raids by the Parachute Regiment
- Frost, p46
- Millar, p156
- Harclerode, p.210
- Frost, p59
- Millar, p.181
- Millar, p.187
- Millar, pp.2–3
- Cornwell, p.262
- Cornwell, p.267
- Cornwell, p.268
- Jones, p.192
- Cornwell, pp.273–274
- Cornwell, p.274
- Cornwell, p.275
- Millar, p.3
- Harclerode, p.208
- Millar, p.4
- Otway, p.65
- Otway, p.66
- Harclerode, pp.208–209
- Harclerode, p.209
- Jones, p. 239
- Chappell, p.27
- Otway, p.67
- Millar, pp.18–19
- Jones, p.238
- Jones, pp.236-237
- Otway, p.68
- Harclerode, pp.209–210
- Harclerode, p.212
- Otway, pp.68–69
- Harclerode, pp.212–213
- Otway, p.69
- Harclerode, p.214
- The London Gazette: . 15 May 1942. Retrieved 2008-11-05.
- Otway, p.70
- The London Gazette: . 22 May 1942. Retrieved 2008-11-05.
- Harclerode, p.218
- Bodanis, p.142
- Jones, p.244
- Millar, p.191
- Johnson, p.116
- Millar, p. 195
- Millar, p.190
- Jones, p.247
- "Airborne Assault, Museum of the Parachute Regiment and Airborne Forces". Army Museums Ogilby Trust. Retrieved 27 August 2012.
- Bodanis, David (2001). Electric Universe. Crown. ISBN 1-4000-4550-9.
- Chappell, Mike (1996). Army Commandos 1940–1945. Elite Series # 64. London: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 1-85532-579-9.
- Cornwall, John (2004). Hitler's Scientists: Science, War and the Devil's Pact. Penguin Books. ISBN 0-14-029686-7.
- Frost, Major General John (1980). A Drop Too Many. Cassell. ISBN 0-85052-927-1.
- Harclerode, Peter (2005). Wings Of War – Airborne Warfare 1918-1945. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN 0-304-36730-3.
- Johnson, Brian (1978). The Secret War. British Broadcasting Corporation. ISBN 0-563-17425-0.
- Jones, R.V. (1978). Most Secret War: British Scientific Intelligence, 1939-1945. Hamish Hamilton. ISBN 0-241-89746-7.
- Millar, George (1975). The Bruneval Raid. Doubleday & Company, Inc. ISBN 0-385-09542-2.
- Otway, Lieutenant-Colonel T.B.H (1990). The Second World War 1939-1945 Army — Airborne Forces. Imperial War Museum. ISBN 0-901627-57-7.