|Part of Strategic bombing during World War II|
| United States Army Air Forces
Soviet Air Force
Royal Hungarian Air Force
Operation Frantic was a series of seven shuttle bombing operations during World War II conducted by American aircraft based in Great Britain and Southern Italy which then landed at three Soviet airfields in Ukraine. The operation began in June, 1944 and ended in September.
American plans to use air bases in the USSR began as United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) staff studies soon after the German invasion on 22 June 1941. After the Japanese attack on the United States on 7 December, the concept was expanded to hit the Japanese Home Islands from Siberia. However, Soviet air cooperation was negligible through 1942, and it was not until the Foreign Ministers' conference (Moscow Conference) in Moscow in October 1943 that the American delegation raised the issue formally with Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov.
At the Tehran Conference in late November 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt personally proposed the use of Soviet bases by American aircraft to Marshal Joseph Stalin. In this he was assisted by a personal appeal from his son, Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, also in attendance, who requested the bases for use of his reconnaissance aircraft then operating from Italy.
The position papers given to Stalin emphasized both reconnaissance and bombardment operations, and Stalin agreed to proceed with the plan "in principle." American heavy bombers stationed in Britain and Italy would fly strike missions deep into the heart of Nazi territory or occupied Eastern Europe. Afterwards, they would land at American air bases in newly recovered Soviet territory, re-arm and re-fuel, and then attack other targets on their return flights.
Operation Frantic, originally known as Operation Baseball, was intended to permanently establish three heavy bomber groups in Soviet territory, but only a small contingent, about 1,300 men, was eventually detached to the American bases in the USSR.
While the shuttle bombing technique complicated German air defenses, in practice most targets were already coming in reach of U.S. bomber streams from Italy and England. Soviet vetoing of some targets prevented more effective use of the bases.
The operations were reduced and finally discontinued due to 1) a catastrophic German air attack on the bases in June, 2) Soviet hostility and non-cooperation that began in August, and 3) the inability of the Americans to receive permission to use the bases for support of the Warsaw Uprising, which soured relations between the two countries.
The main operational difficulty encountered by the U.S. forces was inadequate force protection by the Soviets. The Soviets refused U.S. requests to introduce adequate radar-guided artillery and night fighter support, and U.S. aircraft were frequently fired upon by Soviet forces.
|Operation Bellicose map|
The three bases reached their peak in July and August 1944, with a firmly limited complement of 1300 U.S. officers and men. By October, operations were put on a "skeleton crew" basis, with a winter contingent at Poltava only of about 300. Americans remained there until evacuation after VE-day.
Operation Frantic has greater historical importance for the development of Soviet-American relations than for its effect on Germany's war effort. Starting out with high hopes, it eventually set a discordant note that foreshadowed the Cold War.
The ability to hit distant German targets was not the only, or even the primary, American objective for Operation Frantic. The political and military leadership wanted also to 1) set a precedent and practical basis for later bombing of Japan from Siberia, after the USSR opened the second front in the Pacific; 2) provide a model for developing trust and cooperation between the two powers, deemed essential for winning the approaching peace and establishing amicable post-war relations; and 3) develop close cooperation and exchanges in ancillary domains, including telecommunications and meteorology, air reconnaissance and air transport networks.
After approval was given by Moscow in February 1944, a rapid buildup followed. Staff exchanges were made; the first "echelons" of American personnel began to arrive; and a U.S. delegation flew to Moscow in an operational B-17, which was used to demonstrate American bombing tactics to the Russians. A USAAF Eastern Command (General Alfred Kessler) was established at Poltava, operating in parallel with the new American Military Mission to Moscow (General John R. Deane).
When a high-level U.S. delegation led by United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF) deputy chief of staff for operations, General Frederick Anderson (accompanied by Colonel Roosevelt), visited Moscow and the bases in May 1944, conditions were such that the go-ahead for actual operations could be given. At the same time, Anderson let his side know that the ultimate goal was the establishment of a numbered American air force in the USSR and a switch to Siberian operations. For diplomatic reasons, this could not be revealed to the Russians. As it was, the Americans had to make do with a much smaller presence in the Soviet Union than originally contemplated.
Frantic also tied in with other U.S. initiatives. At Teheran, General Henry Arnold (chief of the Air Forces) offered Stalin 300–400 B-24 bombers, but noted that they would require a large Soviet training program in the United States. Stalin did not take this offer; instead, American bombers making safety landings in Siberia were kept and copied by Soviet factories.
Soviet objectives in agreeing to the operation cannot be determined with certainty. Unlike the Americans, the USSR had no doctrine or "theology" of victory through aerial bombardment, and had only a rudimentary long-range air force. Furthermore, when the survival of the USSR was in doubt, Marshal Stalin refused offers of air support, demanding instead maximum lend-lease deliveries. By the time Stalin finally agreed to activate the plan, in a meeting with U.S. ambassador W. Averell Harriman on 2 February 1944, Soviet victory was assured. Indications are that Stalin wished to obtain all possible information about superior American technology, and assigned officers with the stated objectives of learning as much as they could about U.S. equipment and concepts of operation. For example, the USSR demanded and obtained the secret Norden bombsight, and also obtained wide photographic coverage of Europe from American aircraft. However, this objective cut both ways, for the USAAF also learned of the extreme vulnerability of the USSR to air attack, and of the primitive technical and infrastructure conditions prevailing on the Soviet side.
Measured against its objectives, after brief euphoria Frantic developed into a costly and resounding failure that included one of the worst losses ever suffered by an American air force. Instead of cementing the alliance, it exposed its fundamental weaknesses and ended in great American bitterness.However, worthwhile operations against the Axis were carried out, and both sides learned much about the other.
After meeting with Stalin on 2 February 1944, Harriman radioed back that "Stalin approves project limited to 200 bombers and six airfields." In the end only three bases were set up. In haste, the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe established a headquarters detachment at Poltava Airfield, in Poltava region in the Ukrainian SSR in late April, 1944. Poltava was designated as USAAF Station 559 for security purposes and was thus referred to in all messages and written correspondence. Poltava was one of three Ukrainian installations operated by Headquarters, Eastern Command USAAF. The others were Pyriatyn Airfield (AAF-560) and Myrhorod Airfield (AAF-561). All three bases were situated along the Kharkov-Kiev railway and were already far behind the front. Poltava and Mirgorod were to be used by heavy bombers (B-24 Liberators, B-17 Flying Fortresses), while Piriatyn would be used for long-range escort fighters (P-51 Mustangs, P-38 Lightnings).
The bases were farther away than the USAAF wanted, and despite the best efforts were barely adequate for heavy bombers. Soviet infrastructure was not up to Western standards; the spring season turned everything into a sea of mud; and the retreating Germans had destroyed whatever they could. At Poltava, the Germans left behind a large headquarters building, but it was booby-trapped with a radio-controlled bomb that was, however, discovered in time. Also, the American officers found themselves dealing with an unfriendly and suspicious Soviet bureaucracy. In general, U.S. officers agreed that the Red Air Force was cooperative and eager to assist, but the political structure was obstructionist and a source of interminable delays and problems. After August–September, the Soviet attitude became universally hostile, and by 1945 the small American detachments left in great bitterness. Winston Churchill had not been very enthusiastic about Frantic, believing that it was placing a lot more trust on Stalin than was wise, and events seemed to bear him out.
Heavy equipment and bulky supplies went by sea to the ports of Murmansk and Archangelsk in the Arctic, and then by train to the airfields in the Ukraine. Additional supplies and key personnel flew in on Air Transport Command planes from the ATC base at Mehrabad Airport, Iran. As there was no trans-Caucasian railway, additional shipping went across the Caspian to Baku. The logistical demands were enormous since almost everything had to brought from the United States, even the high-octane aviation fuel and the steel-plank runways. Delicate negotiations finally fixed a total of 42 round-trip ATC missions to make the bases operational for the AAF, and allowed an additional rate of two weekly support missions to sustain the U.S. contingent. The issue of flight communications eventually ended with a compromise, allowing U.S. crews to carry out navigation and radio duties with a Soviet observer resident at all related communications centers. In support of Operation Frantic, ATC delivered some 450 personnel and thirty-six thousand pounds of cargo by June 1944.
- 45th Combat Wing (at Poltava Airfield, ca 75 bombers)
- 96th Bombardment Group, RAF Snetterton Heath, B-17 Flying Fortress
- 388th Bombardment Group, RAF Knettishall, B-17 Flying Fortress
- 452d Bombardment Group, RAF Deopham Green, B-17 Flying Fortress
- 13th Combat Wing (at Myrhorod Airfield, ca 75 bombers)
- 95th Bombardment Group, RAF Horham, B-17 Flying Fortress
- 100th Bombardment Group, RAF Thorpe Abbotts, B-17 Flying Fortress
- 390th Bombardment Group, RAF Framlingham, B-17 Flying Fortress
- Escort Fighter (at Pyriatyn Airfield)
- 4th Fighter Group, RAF Debden, P-51 Mustang
- 352d Fighter Group, RAF Bodney, P-51 Mustang
- 355th Fighter Group, RAF Steeple Morden, P-51 Mustang
- 357th Fighter Group, RAF Leiston, P-51 Mustang
- 2d Bombardment Group, Amendola Airfield, B-17 Flying Fortress
- 97th Bombardment Group, Amendola Airfield, B-17 Flying Fortress
- 99th Bombardment Group, Tortorella Airfield, B-17 Flying Fortress
- 14th Fighter Group, Triolo Airfield, P-38 Lightning]]
- 31st Fighter Group, San Severo Airfield, P-51 Mustang
- 82nd Fighter Group, Vincenzo Airfield, P-38 Lightning
- 325th Fighter Group, Mondolfo Airfield, P-51 Mustang
- Attached from: Twelfth Air Force
A photographic reconnaissance detachment with a handful of F-5 Lightnings was sent to operate local flights from Poltava in late May, and a "triangular trade" in reconnaissance operations using Italy, Ukraine, and England preceded the bombing runs and also ran concurrently with them over the summer. These flights were conducted by units of the 325th Reconnaissance Wing, commanded by Colonel Elliott Roosevelt.
After much preparation at the three Ukrainian airfields by advance elements of Headquarters, Eastern Command USAAF and Air Transport Command, the first shuttle mission ("Frantic-Joe") was conducted by Fifteenth Air Force B-17 Flying Fortresses and their P-51 Mustang fighter escorts taking off from airfields around Foggia, Italy, raiding the railroad marshalling yards at Debrecen, Hungary, and then flying on to the Ukraine.
- First Shuttle Mission (Fifteenth Air Force)
- 2 June 1944
- 130 B-17s, escorted by 70 P-51 Mustangs, bombed the marshaling yard at Debrecen, Hungary and landed in the USSR, the B-17s at Poltava and Mirgorod and the P-51s at Piriatyn. One B-17F (42-30319, 97th BG, 414th BS) lost over the target; 27 other B-17s, forced off course en route to the Oradea, Romania marshaling yard, also hit Debrecen.
- 6 June 1944
- 11 June 1944
- Second Shuttle Mission (Eighth Air Force)
After the first shuttle mission, the consensus was that operations had been highly successful, and a joint atmosphere of celebration and high spirits reigned at Poltava. The second shuttle raid assigned Eighth Air Force B-17s to attack synthetic oil facilities near Berlin on the way to the Ukraine.
- 21 June 1944
- 145 of 163 B-17s opened shuttle bombing between the United Kingdom and the USSR. 72 P-38 Lightnings, 38 P-47 Thunderbolts and 57 P-51 Mustangs escorted the B-17s to the target ( synthetic oil plant at Ruhland, Germany ); 123 B-17s bombed the primary target, 21 bombed the marshaling yard at Elsterwerda and a lone B-17 bombed the marshaling yard at Riesa, Germany, owing to a bomb rack malfunction. 4th Fighter Group P-51s accompanied the B-17s to the USSR (including 486 Squadron "borrowed" from the 352nd FG). 20 to 30 Luftwaffe fighters attack the force; in the resulting battle a P-51B (43-6784, 4th FG, 335th FS) and six German fighters are destroyed; an F model B-17 42-3490, 385th Bombardment Group, 549th Bomb Squadron piloted by Matthew Totter was damaged by Flak and lost three engines. It flew to Sweden, was interned and later converted to SE-BAN, a Swedish airliner. 144 B-17s landed in the USSR, 73 at Poltava, and the rest at Mirgorod; the 64 remaining P-51s landed at Piriatyn.
- What was unknown at the time is that after the raid on Ruhland, the attacking B-17s were being shadowed from a distance by a Luftwaffe Heinkel He-111 bomber, which identified the Ukrainian airfields where they landed. Other sources indicate that the Germans were already aware of the locations and had assembled a strike force at Minsk in anticipation.
On the night of 21 June, the Combat Wing of B-17s which earlier landed at Poltava sustained severe losses in a German air attack. Hungarian planes also participated in the attack. Personnel were alerted at approximately 2330 hours when it was announced that German bombers had crossed the front lines in the general direction of Poltava. At 0030 hours, Pathfinder aircraft released flares directly above the airfield and ten minutes later the first bombs were dropped. For almost two hours, an estimated 75 Luftwaffe bombers attacked the base, exhibiting a very high degree of accuracy. Nearly all bombs were dropped in the dispersal area of the landing ground where only B-17s were parked, indicating without question that the B-17s constituted the specific objective of the raiders.
Of the 73 B-17s which had landed at Poltava, 47 were destroyed and most of the remainder severely damaged. One American B-17 copilot, Joseph Lukacek, was killed. His captain, Raymond Estele, was severely wounded and died later; several others suffered minor injuries. The stores of fuel and ammunition brought so laboriously from the United States were also destroyed. Three days after the attack, only nine of the 73 aircraft at Poltava were operational. The truck-mounted 50-caliber machine guns that the Soviet high command insisted would be adequate had no effect on the Luftwaffe, as no aircraft were shot down or disabled. Also, Russian and American fighter aircraft were not allowed to take off (by Soviet high-command) to engage the Luftwaffe during this attack; the reason for this is unclear.
American personnel losses were light due to adequate warning and the network of slit trenches distant from the aircraft parking area. Russian losses were much higher since work crews were ordered to fight fires and disable anti-personnel bombs while the raid was ongoing. Butterfly bombs continued to explode on the field for many weeks thereafter. Red Air Force losses included 15 Yak-9s, 6 Yak-7s, three trainers, a Hawker Hurricane, and a VIP DC-3. Soviet anti-aircraft fire was intense but random, and perversely served to outline the field for the German aircraft. There are conflicting reports about whether Soviet aircraft engaged the enemy, but since there was no radar intercept capability, even American fighters would have been ineffective.
The well-planned German attack was led by Oberstleutnant Wilhelm Antrup of KG 55 and carried out by He-111Hs and Ju-88s of KG 4, KG 53, KG 55, and KG 27 operating from bases at Minsk. The operation was nicknamed Zaunkoenig. After the He-111s left, the Ju-88s strafed the field at low altitude. He-177s from Night Reconnaissance Squadrons performed target reconnaissance, pathfinder duties and bomb damage assessment. There were no German losses.
- 22 June 1944
- Flyable B-17s at Mirgorod and P-51s at Piriatyn were flown to Soviet air bases farther east in anticipation of further attacks; they were to be returned and dispatched to bases in Italy as soon as the weather permitted. This saved many aircraft, as German bombers struck both Piriatyn and Mirgorod during the nights of 22 and 23 June. Piryatin had very short runways and had no fuel or munitions for the aircraft. The Germans missed Piryatin while fuel and ammunition stores at Mirgorod were hit. Air Transport Command ferried the now-excess aircrews back to the UK via Mehrabad Airport, Tehran, Iran.
- 26 June 1944
- Losses and damage sustained from the Luftwaffe bomber attack on Poltava and damage suffered en route to Russia had reduced the number of operational B-17s to a total of 73. All available aircraft were formed into one composite Combat Wing of three groups for the execution of the return mission to Italy. The aircraft at the dispersal airfields were flown back to Myrhorod and Poltava for servicing, rearming and refueling. This delayed the take-off times to mid-afternoon, which meant that the aircraft would not arrive in Italy until the early evening twilight. The B-17s rendezvous with 55 P-51s from Pyriatyn, bomb the oil refinery and marshaling yard at Drohobycz, Poland (one returns to the USSR because of mechanical trouble), and then proceed to Italy; Fifteenth Air Force P-51s meet the formation one hour after the attack and escort the B-17s to Foggia. It was planned for the Eighth Air Force aircraft to return to bases in England on 27 June or as soon thereafter as weather conditions permitted, but unfavorable forecasts persisted. During this period the B-17s participated in one Fifteenth Air Force mission and the P-51s in two missions.
- 2 July 1944
- The Eighth Air Force P-51 Group joined with other Fifteenth Air Force fighters in escorting 509 heavy bombers on a mission to three objectives in the Budapest, Hungary area; a marshaling yard (253 aircraft); Vecses Airfield (142 aircraft) and the Shell Oil Refinery (114 aircraft). The P-51s preceded the bombers and conducted a free-lance sweep in the target area. Aggressive enemy opposition was encountered and 4 P-51s were lost in combat and one other P-51 failed to return. USAAF bombers and fighters claim 50+ fighters shot down.
- 3 July 1944
- Fifty-Seven Eighth Air Force B-17s were dispatched, escorted by the P-51 Mustang group (38 aircraft) in conjunction with 44 Fifteenth Air Force heavy bombers, attacking a marshaling yard and railway shops Arad, Romania. at
- 5 July 1944
- 72 Eighth Air Force B-17s complete the shuttle mission (UK-USSR-Italy-UK) and attack a marshaling yard at Béziers, France (with Fifteenth Air Force B-24s) while on the last leg from Italy to the UK; 42 P-51s return to the UK with the B-17s (of the 11 P-51s remaining in Italy, ten return to the UK the following day and the last several days later)
After the Poltava disaster, the USAAF wanted to move the P-61 Black Widow-equipped 427th Night Fighter Squadron to Poltava to provide radar-enabled night air defense over the fields. However, the Soviets vetoed this plan, insisting that air defense was their responsibility. The P-61s were diverted to Italy. The shuttle bombing missions were not abandoned for the moment, but they were suspended until the mess on the ground could be cleaned up and the defenses of the airbases improved. Realizing that the Soviets could not adequately protect the heavy bombers from night raids, the Americans abandoned plans to permanently station three heavy bomber groups on Soviet airfields.
Because of the loss of fuel and the inability to protect the force, the next Frantic missions were composed of long-range fighters.
- Third Shuttle Mission (Fifteenth Air Force)
To keep the project alive, Fifteenth Air Force next shuttled P-38 and P-51 fighters to the Soviet Union in late July.
- 22 July 1944
- 25 July 1944
- 26 July 1944
- Fourth Shuttle Mission (Fifteenth Air Force)
- 4 August 1944
- 6 August 1944
After balancing losses and battle damage against the value of the targets, U.S. military leaders at the Soviet bases discontinue the fighter-bomber operations.
- Fifth Shuttle Mission (Eighth Air Force)
- 6 August 1944
- 75 B-17s hit Rahmel aircraft factories Gdynia), and proceed to the USSR. Escort is provided by 154 P-51s. at Gotenhafen (
- 7 August 1944
- 12 August 1944
- The second shuttle-bombing mission flown by Eighth Air Force from UK-USSR-Italy-UK is completed, with all aircraft flying to Fifteenth Air Force bases in Southern Italy.
- 13 August 1944
- 72 B-17s take off from Fifteenth Air Force bases in Italy; three have various problems, the others bomb Francazal Airfield, Toulouse, France and then proceed to the UK. 62 P-51 Mustangs (part of the shuttle-mission force) and 43 from the UK provide escort. No aircraft are lost; 70 B-17s and 58 P-51s land in the UK, five B-17s and six P-51s, either left in Italy or returning there during this mission, subsequently return to the UK. , just south of
During this period, the United States at the highest level urgently requested the use of the Soviet bases for air support and supply of the ongoing Polish Home Army uprising in Warsaw. However, until the Poles had already been substantially crushed, Stalin refused all assistance and vetoed these missions. This caused a crisis in Soviet-American relations and changed U.S. perceptions of Soviet war aims among both military officers and diplomats.
- Sixth Shuttle Mission (Eighth Air Force)
- 11 September 1944
- 13 September 1944
- 15 September 1944
- Eighth Air Force in England dispatches 110 B-17s to drop supplies to the Warsaw Uprising Polish Home Army and then proceed to bases in the USSR. However, a weather front is encountered over the North Sea and the bombers are recalled to England. Escort is provided by 149 P-51 Mustangs; two P-51s (42-106783, 43-24842, 363d FS) collide in a cloud and are lost.
- 17 September 1944
- Shuttle mission is completed as 72 US Eighth Air Force B-17s and 59 P-51s fly without bombs from Italy to the UK.
- Seventh Shuttle Mission (Eighth Air Force)
- 18 September 1944
- After turning back due to bad weather on 15 September, the last Eighth Air Force UK-USSR-Italy-UK mission sends 107 B-17s to supply the Polish Home Army in Warsaw with 1,248 para-dropped containers. Fewer than 250 are on target for pick-up by the remaining Polish pockets. One B-17 is lost (43-38175 390th BG 568th BS). Escort is provided by 137 P-51s; 64 P-51s continue to the USSR, two P-51s are lost (42-26386, 44-19735, 355th FG 386th/368th FS).
- 19 September 1944
The attack on the Szolnok rail yards would be the end of major Frantic operations, as the original targets had been taken by the rapidly advancing Soviet offensive. After the issues over Polish resupply, Foreign Commissar Molotov put the Americans on notice that they were no longer needed, and a very hostile climate, including orchestrated episodes of violence and theft, ensued at the bases. The USAAF, citing logistical problems and becoming weary of growing Soviet intransigence, announced a suspension of Frantic shuttle missions. Also, by this time air bases in the Marianas became available to the Americans, and there was no longer a perceived need for bases in the Russian Far East. The U.S. and Soviet advances by the spring of 1945 ended the need for shuttle missions and the ATC flew out the last U.S. contingent of personnel from its headquarters at Poltava in June 1945.
Major problems were associated with the failure of air defense, but also with the eagerness with which Soviet fighters and artillery targeted American aircraft. Several American aircraft were downed, but the crews survived. From the Soviet perspective this was caused by the inability of U.S. pilots to stick to the strictly limited corridors, altitudes, and time windows. On several occasions U.S. aircraft became dispersed all over the region, which severely complicated Soviet efforts to control and track all foreigners. Soviet officers who had been too helpful to the Americans fell in disfavor, and one, Chief Air Marshal Alexander Novikov, who had received the U.S. Legion of Merit, was tortured and jailed after the war. The problem of Soviet attacks on all aircraft in sight was deemed so serious that when President Roosevelt flew to Yalta in February 1945, the American insisted on placing observers at all nearby anti-aircraft sites.
Frantic was peripheral to the air war against Germany because most targets could have been reached from Italy. The Ukrainian bases were not used for two purposes for which they could have been decisive: air supply of the Polish Home Army and interruption of extermination camp operations at Auschwitz and other locations. Because U.S.-Soviet collaboration was perceived by the Americans to be entirely a one-way street, it caused bitterness and suspicion, thus influencing a generation of USAF officers.
In addition, the Soviets learned of their own vulnerability to air attack and the enormous U.S. technological advantage. The USAAF obtained insight into Soviet operations, and despite strict limitations obtained some additional photographic coverage which would become much in demand later.
Operation Frantic demonstrated the flexibility and reach of American logistics operating under trying conditions. It also demonstrated the political role of airlift logistics in terms of operational support that would have been impossible by conventional ground-based means. However, Frantic had not been a good use of Allied resources. The Germans judged it to be a propaganda exercise to impress the Soviets, but all it really accomplished was to make the strains in the Allied alliance more obvious.
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to Operation Frantic.|
- Russell, Edward T. (1999). "Leaping the Atlantic Wall: Army Air Forces Campaigns in Western Europe, 1942–1945". United States Air Force History and Museums Program. USAAF.net. pp. p27,28.
- Charles T. O'Reilly (2001). Forgotten Battles: Italy's War of Liberation, 1943–1945 Lexington Books, ISBN 0-7391-0195-1. p. 343
- William Howard (1995). From China Marine to Jap POW: My 1,364 Day Journey Through Hell, Turner Publishing Company ISBN 1-56311-238-8. p. 230-246
- Staff. Shuttle bombing McGraw-Hill's Access Science Encyclopedia of Science & Technology Online
- Anderson, Barry, (1985), United States Air Forces Stations, Air Force Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
- Bilstein, Roger E., (1998), Airlift and Airborne Operations In World War II, Air Force Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
- "45th Combat Wing". Esthervilledailynews.com. Retrieved 2012-09-25.
- 13th Combat Wing[dead link]
- Conversino, Mark J. (1997), Fighting With The Soviets: The Failure of Operation Frantic, 1944–1945. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0-7006-0808-7
- "The Second World War — A Day by Day Account, 2 June-19 September 1944". Homepage.ntlworld.com. Retrieved 2012-09-25.
- ArmyAirForces.com MACR Database[dead link]
- "Don Allen:His shuttle bombing mission story or, What a nose artist does in his spare time". Fourthfightergroup.com. Retrieved 2012-09-25.
- Images on this page are screen snaps from the film: Operation Titanic, United States War Department Film, Produced by the Army Pictorial Service (Signal Corps), in conjunction with the Army Air Forces, 1945
The USAAF prepared a secret, detailed report on Eastern Command operation in December 1944 and made it available to the State Department. It is preserved at the Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) at Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
Four published books provide detailed analyses of the Soviet operations.
- Conversino, Mark: Fighting with The Soviets: The Failure of Operation Frantic. University of Kansas Press, 1997.
- Deane, John: The Strange Alliance. Indiana University Press, 1946, 1973.
- Hansen, Chris: Enfant Terrible: The Times and Schemes of General Elliott Roosevelt. Able Baker, Tucson, 2012.
- Infield, Glenn: The Poltava Affair. McMillan, New York, 1973.