|Part of Indo-Pakistani War of 1965|
|Commanders and leaders|
| Gen J.N Chaudhurie
|Maj Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik|
|100,000 – 200,000||5,000 – 40,000|
|Casualties and losses|
Operation Gibraltar was the codename given to the strategy of Pakistan to infiltrate Jammu and Kashmir, a disputed territory between India and Pakistan, and start a rebellion against Indian rule. Launched in August 1965, Pakistan Army's 50th Airborne paratroopers and Pakistan Army's guerrillas, disguised as locals, entered Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan with the intention of fomenting an insurgency among Kashmiri Muslims. However, the strategy went awry from the outset as it was not well-coordinated and the infiltrators were soon found.
The operation was a significant one as it sparked a large scale military engagement between the two neighbours, the first since the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947. Its success, as envisaged by its Pakistani planners, could have given Pakistan control over a unified Kashmir; something that Pakistan desired to achieve at the earliest opportunity.
Following the First Kashmir War which saw India claiming two-third of Kashmir, Pakistan sought an opportunity to win remaining Kashmir areas. The opening came after the Sino-Indian War in 1962 after India's war with the China and as a result the Indian Military was undergoing massive changes both in personnel and equipment. During this period, despite being numerically smaller than the Indian Military, Pakistan's armed forces had a qualitative edge in air power and armour over India, which Pakistan sought to utilise before India completed its defence build-up. The Rann of Kutch episode in the summer of 1965, where Indian and Pakistani forces clashed, resulted in some positives for Pakistan. Moreover, in December 1963, the disappearance of a holy relic from the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar, created turmoil and intense Islamic feeling among Muslims in the valley, which was viewed by Pakistan as ideal for revolt. These factors bolstered the Pakistani command's thinking: that the use of covert methods followed by the threat of an all out war would force a resolution in Kashmir. Assuming that a weakened Indian military would not respond, Pakistan chose to send in "mujahideens" and Pakistan Army regulars into Jammu and Kashmir.
The original plan for the operation, codenamed Gibraltar, was prepared as early as the 1950s; however it seemed appropriate to push this plan forward given the scenario. Backed by then foreign minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and others, the aim was an "attack by infiltration" by a specially trained irregular force of some 40,000 men, highly motivated and well armed. It was reasoned that the conflict could be confined only to Kashmir. In the words of retired Pakistani General Akhtar Hussain Malik, the aims were "to defreeze the Kashmir problem, weaken Indian resolve, and bring India to the conference table without provoking general war." As a result, groundwork and intelligence gathering for execution of the plan was laid by launching "Operation Nusrat", the purpose of which was to locate gaps in the Cease Fire Line (CFL) that were to serve as entry points for the mujahideen, and to gauge the response of the Indian army and the local population.
Execution of plan 
|Name of Force||Area of operation|
|Tariq||Kargil – Drass|
Despite initial reservations by the President of Pakistan Ayub Khan, the operation was set in motion. In the first week of August 1965, (some sources put it at 24 July) Pakistani troops who were members of Azad Kashmir Regimental Force (Now Azad Kashmir Regiment) began to cross the Cease Fire Line dividing Indian- and Pakistani-held Kashmir. Several columns were to occupy key heights around the Kashmir valley and encourage a general revolt, which would be followed by direct combat by Pakistani troops. According to Indian sources as many as 30,000 – 40,000 men had crossed the line, while Pakistani sources put it at 5,000 -7,000 only. These troops known as the "Gibraltar Force" were organized and commanded by Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, GoC 12 Division The troops were divided into 10 forces (5 companies each). The 10 forces were given different code names, mostly after historically significant Muslim rulers. The operation's name, Gibraltar, itself was chosen for the Islamic connotations. The 8th century Umayyad conquest of Hispania was launched from Gibraltar, a situation not unlike that Pakistan envisaged for Indian Kashmir, i.e. conquest of Kashmir from Operation Gibraltar. The areas chosen were mainly on the de facto Cease Fire line as well as in the populous Kashmir Valley.
The plan was multi-pronged. Infiltrators would mingle with the local populace and incite them to rebellion. Meanwhile guerrilla warfare would commence, destroying bridges, tunnels and highways, harassing enemy communications, logistic installations and headquarters as well as attacking airfields, with a view to create the conditions of an "armed insurrection" in Kashmir — leading to a national uprising against Indian rule. It was assumed that India would neither counter-attack, nor involve itself in another full-scale war, and the liberation of Kashmir would rapidly follow.
Despite the operational planning, the intruders were detected by Indian forces in Kashmir. Gibraltar Force initially gained success and overran many Indian positions, destroyed bridges and carried out Ambushes over Indian Conveys killing number of Indian troops, Indian Army in Kashmir which was suffering from Lack of Morale was immediately reinforced by Number of Divisions from India and Gibraltar Force soon faced attacks from the Indian Army who moved in immediately to secure the border. The majority of the infiltrators did not reach their objectives and withdrew back to the Border. Ghaznavi Force Commanded by Major Malik Munawar Khan Awan SJ was the only force out of the Ten Assigned Forces which Accomplished it's task and Captured Indian Garrison of Rajouri. Ghaznavi Force only left the Assigned Objective once Pakistan decided an overall withdrawal of Infiltrating Force. Major Malik Munawar Khan Awan was awarded Sitara E Jurat and the title "King of Rajouri In recognition to the act of extreme devotion to duty, feat of valour in the face of danger and exemplary Courage.
India swiftly launched counter attacks across the cease fire line, attacking the Pakistan divisions in AJK that had provided cover for the infiltrators. As a result, many of these posts fell to Indian attacks resulting in territorial gains for India. On August 15, India scored a major victory after a prolonged artillery barrage. Their success in countering Pakistani plans proved to be a morale booster However Pakistani Troops from the mainland were rushed to reinforce the key Pakistani Posts, and repulsed several Indian attacks. After the Complete withdrawal of Infiltrators from Indian Held Kashmir Pakistan Army launched Operation Grandslam and recovered all the lost territory and pushed Indian troops back to the border, One of the objectives of this operation was to seize major peaks along the Pir Panjal overlooking Pakistani Kashmir inside Indian Kashmir, the objective was successfully accomplished with few casualties and forced Indian troops to retreat from their border positions. Fighting continued until the end of the month, as vital pockets like Haji Pir pass — which was the logistical supply route of the infiltrators.
Reasons for failure 
While the covert infiltration was a complete failure that ultimately led to the Second Kashmir War, military analysts have differed on whether the plan itself was flawed. Some have held that the plan was well-conceived but was let down by poor execution, but almost all Pakistani and neutral analysts have maintained that the entire operation was "a clumsy attempt" and doomed to collapse. According to then Chief of the Pakistan Air Force, Air Marshal Nur Khan, there was little coordination amongst the military services on the impending operation. Pakistani author Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema notes that Muhammad Musa, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff, was reportedly so confident that the plan would succeed and conflict would be localized to Kashmir that he did not inform the Air Force, as he believed the operation would not require any major air action. Many senior Pakistani military officers and political leaders were unaware of the impending crisis, thus surprising not only India, but also Pakistan itself. Furthermore, few people in Kashmir were really interested in revolting against India, a fact largely ignored while planning. Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff General Muhammad Musa opposed Gibraltar on the grounds that if the operation was a non-starter, then Pakistan would not be able to defeat India in the ensuing war. Many senior officials also were against the plan, as a failure could lead to an all-out war with India, which many wanted to avoid.
See also 
- Schofield, Victoria. Kashmir in conflict: India, Pakistan and the unending war. I.T. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2003. ISBN 1-86064-898-3.
- Dossani, Rafiq. Prospects for peace in South Asia. Stanford University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-8047-5085-8.
- Wirsing, Robert. India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir dispute: on regional conflict and its resolution. St. Martins Press, 1998. ISBN 0-312-17562-0.
- Rao, K. V. Krishna (1991). Prepare or perish: a study of national security. Lancer Publishers. p. 123. ISBN 978-81-7212-001-6.
- Ahmad, Mustasad (1997). Living up to heritage: history of the Rajput Regiment 1947-1970. Lancer Publishers,. p. 245.
- Singh, Sukhwant. India's Wars Since Independence. p. 416.
- "Kashmiris didn’t back Pakistan in 1965: Gohar". The Tribune. 6 June 2005. Retrieved 2007-07-08.
- "Opinion: The Way it was 4: extracts from Brig (retd) ZA Khan's book". Defence Journal. Dynavis (Pvt) Ltd. May 1998. Retrieved 2007-07-08.
- "India and the United States estranged democracies", 1941–1991, ISBN 1-4289-8189-6, DIANE Publishing, pp 235, 238
- It is believed to be the hair of Islamic prophet Muhammad, the founder of Islam
- Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War By Victoria Schofield Published by I.B.Tauris, pp 108, ISBN 1-86064-898-3, 2003
- The Jammu and Kashmir conflict Overview by Meredith Weiss 25 June 2002 – Hosted on Yale University
- The Fate of Kashmir International Law or Lawlessness? By Vikas Kapur and Vipin Narang Stanford Journal of International Relations, Stanford University
- Pak Radio's claim of India starting 1965 war falls flat Malaysia Sun 21 September 2007
- Hassan Abbas (2004). Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 0-7656-1497-9., pp 49
- Matinuddin, Kamal. "Operation Gibraltar revisited". Opinion archive. The News International Pakistan. Archived from the original on 2007-09-30. Retrieved 2007-07-08.
- Pervaiz Iqbal (2004). The Armed Forces of Pakistan. Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1-86508-119-1.
- Karim, Major General Afsir (retd) (19 September 2005). "The 1965 War: Lessons yet to be learnt". The Rediff Special. Rediff.com India Ltd. Retrieved 2007-07-08.
- Grand Slam — A Battle of Lost Opportunities by Major (Retd.) Agha Humayun Amin, Defence Journal (Pakistan), September 2000
- Sehgal, Ikram. "GIBRALTAR-2". Defence Journal (reproduced from The Nation newspaper). Dynavis (Pvt) Ltd. Retrieved 2007-07-08.
- My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir (7th Edition), pp 409
- Faruqui, Ahmad. "Remembering 6th of September 1965". Pakistan Link. Archived from the original on 2007-09-30. Retrieved 2007-07-08.
- South Asia in World Politics By Devin T. Hagerty, 2005 Rowman & Littlefield, ISBN 0-7425-2587-2, pp 26
- "Nur Khan reminisces ’65 war". Pakistan's Dawn (newspaper). 6 September 2005. Retrieved 2006-07-08.
- Kashmir in the Shadow of War: regional rivalries in a nuclear age By Robert G. Wirsing Pg 158
- "Is a Kashmir solution in the offing?". Centre for Aerospace Power Studies. Retrieved 2007-07-08.
- "Brig (Retd) Saeed Ismat, SJ in a Q&A session ("What do you have to say about 1965 war?")". Defence Journal. November 2001. Retrieved 2007-07-08.
- Refer to the main article Second Kashmir War for a detailed referenced analysis on the post-war fallout.
- Brigadier Shaukat Qadir of PAF on Operation Gibraltar: Battle that never was – Hosted on Rediff.com
- Grand Slam — A Battle of Lost Opportunities by Major (Retd.) Agha Humayun Amin, Defence Journal (Pakistan), September 2000
- Hassan Abbas (2004). Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, The Army, And America's War On Terror. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 0-7656-1497-9.
- Muhammad Musa (1983). My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965. Wajidalis.