Paris Peace Accords

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The Paris Peace Accords of 1973, intended to establish peace in Vietnam and an end to the Vietnam Conflict, ended direct U.S. military involvement and temporarily stopped the fighting between north and south. The governments of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), and the United States, as well as the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) that represented indigenous South Vietnamese revolutionaries signed the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam on January 27, 1973. The negotiations that led to the accord had begun in 1968 and had been subject to various lengthy delays. As a result of the accord, International Control Commission (ICC) was replaced by International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) to carry out the agreement.

The main negotiators of the agreement were United States National Security Advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger and Vietnamese politburo member Le Duc Tho; the two men were awarded the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts, although Tho refused to accept it.

Contents

[edit] Provisions of the accords

The document began with the statement that "the United States and all other countries respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam." The inclusion of this provision was a victory for the communist side of the negotiations by allowing that the war was not a foreign aggression against South Vietnam. The main military and political provisions of the agreement were:

  • Beginning on 27 January at midnight, Greenwich Mean Time — in Saigon time, 08:00 on 28 January — there would be an in-place ceasefire. North and South Vietnamese forces were to hold their locations. They were permitted to resupply military materials to the extent necessary to replace items consumed in the course of the truce.
  • As soon as the ceasefire is in effect, U.S. troops (along with other foreign soldiers) would begin to withdraw, with withdrawal to be complete within sixty days. Simultaneously, U.S. prisoners of war would be released and allowed to return home. The parties to the agreement agreed to assist in repatriating the remains of the dead.
  • There would be negotiations between the two South Vietnamese parties — Saigon and the Vietcong — towards a political settlement that would allow the South Vietnamese people to "decide themselves the political future of South Viet-Nam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision."
  • Reunification of Vietnam was to be "carried out step by step through peaceful means."

[edit] Paris peace talks

[edit] Early deadlocks

Shaken by the success of anti-war candidate Eugene McCarthy in the New Hampshire primary, in March 1968 U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson halted bombing operations over the northern portion of the North Vietnam (Operation Rolling Thunder), in order to encourage Hanoi to begin negotiations. Shortly thereafter Hanoi agreed to discuss a complete halt of the bombing, and a date was set for representatives of both parties to meet in Paris. The sides first met on 10 May, with the delegations headed by Xuan Thuy, who would remain the official leader of the North Vietnamese delegation throughout the process, and U.S. ambassador-at-large Averell Harriman.

For five months the negotiations stalled as North Vietnam demanded that all bombing of North Vietnam be stopped, while the U.S. side demanded that North Vietnam agree to a reciprocal de-escalation in South Vietnam; it was not until 31 October that Johnson agreed to end the air strikes and serious negotiations could begin.

One of the largest hurdles to effective negotiation was the fact that North Vietnam and its ally in South Vietnam, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF, or Viet Cong), refused to recognize the government of South Vietnam; with equal persistence, the government in Saigon refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the NLF. Harriman resolved this dispute by developing a system by which North Vietnam and U.S. would be the named parties; NLF officials could join North Vietnam team without being recognized by South Vietnam, while Saigon's representatives joined their U.S. allies.

A similar debate concerned the table to be used at the conference. The North favored a circular table, in which all parties, including NLF representatives, would appear to be 'equal' in importance. The South Vietnamese argued that only a rectangular table was acceptable, for only a rectangle could show two distinct sides to the conflict. Eventually a compromise was reached, in which representatives of the northern and southern governments would sit at a circular table, with members representing all other parties sitting on individual square tables around them.

[edit] Nixon campaign sabotage of negotiations

Prior to the 1968 U.S. presidential election, the Nixon campaign [1][2] “set out to sabotage the Paris peace negotiations on Vietnam.[3] (…) they privately assured the South Vietnamese military rulers that an incoming Republican regime would offer them a better deal than would a Democratic one. [4][5][6][7][8][9][10] (…) The tactic "worked", in that the South Vietnamese junta withdrew from the talks on the eve of the election, thereby destroying the peace initiative on which the Democrats had based their campaign.”[11] Before the elections President Johnson “suspected (…) Richard Nixon, of political sabotage[12] that he called treason”.[13] No one was ever prosecuted for this crime.[14][15][16]

[edit] Nixon government

In 1969, Richard Nixon succeeded to the U.S. presidency and replaced Harriman with Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., who was later replaced by David Bruce. Also that year, the NLF set up a 'Provisional Revolutionary Government', (PRG), to gain government status at the talks. However, the primary negotiations that led to the agreement did not occur at the Peace Conference at all but were carried out during secret negotiations between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, which began on 4 August 1969.

North Vietnam insisted for three years that the agreement could not be concluded unless the U.S. agreed to remove South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu from power and replace him with someone more acceptable to Hanoi. Nixon and Kissinger were unwilling to overthrow through an agreement a government the NLF had failed to overthrow by force of arms.

[edit] Breakthrough and agreement

The major breakthrough came on 8 October 1972. North Vietnam had been disappointed by the results of the its Nguyen Hue Offensive (known in the West as the Easter Offensive), and feared increased isolation if Nixon's efforts at détente significantly improved U.S relations with the chief communist powers, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, who were backing North Vietnamese military effort. In a meeting with Kissinger, Tho significantly modified his bargaining line, allowing that the Saigon regime could remain in power and that negotiations between the two South Vietnamese parties could develop a final settlement. Within ten days the secret talks drew up a final draft. Kissinger held a press conference in Washington during which he announced that "peace is at hand."

Signing the peace accords.

When Thieu, who had not even been informed of the secret negotiations, was presented with the draft of the new agreement, he was furious with Kissinger and Nixon (who were perfectly aware of South Vietnam's negotiating position) and refused to accept it without significant changes. He then made several public and radio addresses, claiming that the proposed agreement was worse than it actually was. Hanoi was flabbergasted, believing that it had been duped into a propaganda ploy by Kissinger. On 26 October Radio Hanoi broadcast key details of the draft agreement.

However, as U.S casualties mounted throughout the conflict, American domestic support for the war had deteriorated, and by 1973 there was major pressure on the Nixon administration to withdraw. Consequently, the U.S. brought great diplomatic pressure upon their South Vietnamese ally to sign the peace treaty even if the concessions Thieu wanted could not be achieved. Nixon pledged continued substantial aid to South Vietnam, and given his recent landslide victory in the presidential election it seemed possible that he would be able to follow through on that pledge. To demonstrate his seriousness to Thieu, Nixon ordered the heavy Operation Linebacker II bombings of North Vietnam in December 1972. These operations were also designed to keep North Vietnam at the negotiating table and to prevent it from abandoning negotiations and seeking total victory. With the U.S. committed to disengagement (and after threats from Nixon that South Vietnam would be abandoned if he did not agree), Thieu had little choice but to accede.

On 15 January 1973, Nixon announced a suspension of offensive actions against North Vietnam. Kissinger and Tho met again on 23 January and signed off on a treaty that was basically identical to the draft of three months earlier. The agreement was signed by the leaders of the official delegations on 27 January at the Majestic Hotel in Paris.

Numerous violations of the Paris Peace Accords were committed by both sides. The North Vietnamese and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam continued their attempt to overthrow President Thieu in South Vietnam and remove the U.S. supported government. Thieu soon resigned, accusing the U.S. of betrayal. North Vietnamese military forces gradually moved through the southern provinces and two years later were in position to capture Saigon and form a government of national unity. In a TV and radio address before his resignation, President Nguyen Van Thieu said his forces had failed to stop the advance of the North Vietnamese because of a lack of funds promised to him by the Americans. The funds had been promised by Henry Kissinger acting on behalf of President Nixon, but the Congress, under intense pressure from public opinion, failed to appropriate the funds. By the time the end came on April 30, 1975, Nixon had been driven from office.

In a scathing attack on the US, Thieu suggested that Kissinger had tricked him into signing the Paris peace agreement two years before, promising military aid which then failed to materialize.

"At the time of the peace agreement the United States agreed to replace equipment on a one-by-one basis. But the United States did not keep its word. Is an American's word reliable these days? The United States did not keep its promise to help us fight for freedom and it was in the same fight that the United States lost 50,000 of its young men."[17]

The U.S. had promised Thieu that it would use airpower to support his government. On January 14, 1975 Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger stated that the U.S. was not living up to its promise that it would retaliate in the event North Vietnam tried to overwhelm South Vietnam.

The last phase of the Vietnam conflict occurred during Schlesinger's tenure. Some senators criticized Schlesinger and questioned him sharply during his confirmation hearings in June 1973 after he stated that he would recommend resumption of U.S. bombing in North Vietnam if North Vietnam launched a major offensive against South Vietnam. However, when the North Vietnamese did begin their final offensive early in 1975, the United States Congress refused to appropriate the funds needed by the South Vietnamese, who collapsed completely. The North Vietnamese entered Saigon on April 30. Schlesinger had announced early in the morning of 29 April 1975 the evacuation from Saigon by helicopter of the last U.S. diplomatic, military, and civilian personnel.

[edit] Signers

[edit] Other key figures in the negotiations

[edit] References

  1. ^ Robert “KC” Johnson. “Did Nixon Commit Treason in 1968? What The New LBJ Tapes Reveal”. History News Network, January 26, 2009. Transcript from audio recording of President Johnson: “We have found that our friend, the Republican nominee—our California friend [Richard Nixon] —has been playing on the outskirts with our enemies and our friends, both—our allies and the others. He’s been doing it through rather subterranean sources here.“
  2. ^ Jules Witcover. “The Making of an Ink-Stained Wretch: Half a Century Pounding the Political Beat”. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005, p131. “I tracked down Anna Chennault (…) she insisted she had acted under instructions from the Nixon campaign in contacting the Saigon regime. ‘The only people who knew about the whole operation,’ she told me, ‘were Nixon, John Mitchell [Nixon’s campaign manager] and John Tower [senator from Texas and Nixon campaign figure], and they're all dead. But they knew what I was doing. Anyone who knows about these thing knows I was getting orders to do these thing. I couldn’t do anything without instructions.’”.
  3. ^ Clark M. Clifford with Richard C. Holbrooke. Counsel to the President: A Memoir. Random House, 1991. p. 582. ”The activities of the Nixon team went far beyond the bounds of justifiable political combat. It constituted direct interference in the activities of the executive branch and the responsibilities of the Chief Executive, the only people with authority to negotiate on behalf of the nation. The activities of the Nixon campaign constituted a gross, even potentially illegal, interference in the security affairs of the nation by private individuals.”
  4. ^ Robert “KC” Johnson. “Did Nixon Commit Treason in 1968? What The New LBJ Tapes Reveal”. History News Network, January 26, 2009. Transcript from audio recording of President Johnson: “He (Richard Nixon) has been saying to the allies that ‘you’re going to get sold out. Watch Yalta, and Potsdam, and two Berlins, and everything. And they’re [the Johnson administration] going to recognize the NLF. I [Nixon] don’t have to do that. You better not give away your liberty just a few hours before I can preserve it for you.’”
  5. ^ Robert "KC" Johnson. “Did Nixon Commit Treason in 1968? What The New LBJ Tapes Reveal”. History News Network, January 26, 2009. Transcript from audio recording of President Johnson: “The next thing that we got our teeth in was one of his associates—a fellow named [John] Mitchell, who is running his campaign, who’s the real Sherman Adams (Eisenhower’s chief of staff) of the operation, in effect said to a businessman that ‘we’re going to handle this like we handled the Fortas matter, unquote. We’re going to frustrate the President by saying to the South Vietnamese, and the Koreans, and the Thailanders [sic], “Beware of Johnson.”’ ‘At the same time, we’re going to say to Hanoi, “I [Nixon] can make a better deal than he (Johnson) has, because I’m fresh and new, and I don’t have to demand as much as he does in the light of past positions.”’”
  6. ^ Anthony Summers. Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon”. Viking, 2000, p. 302. “On November 2, the wiretapping of Ambassador Bui Diem's phone finally paid off. (Anna) Chennault, the FBI's Washington field office reported (see p. 303): CONTACTED VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM, AND ADVISED HIM THAT SHE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM HER BOSS (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED), WHICH HER BOSS WANTED HER TO GIVE PERSONALLY TO THE AMBASSADOR. SHE SAID THE MESSAGE WAS THAT THE AMBASSADOR IS TO "HOLD ON, WE ARE GONNA WIN" AND THAT HER BOSS ALSO SAID "HOLD ON, HE UNDERSTANDS ALL OF IT. SHE REPEATED THAT THIS IS THE ONLY MESSAGE "HE SAID PLEASE TELL YOUR BOSS TO HOLD ON." SHE ADVISED THAT HER BOSS HAD JUST CALLED FROM NEW MEXICO.”.
  7. ^ Robert “KC” Johnson. “Did Nixon Commit Treason in 1968? What The New LBJ Tapes Reveal”. History News Network, January 26, 2009. Transcript from audio recording of President Johnson: “They’re going around and implying to some of the embassies that they might get a better deal out of somebody that was not involved in this—the “somebody not involved” is what they refer to as “their boss.”(…) “Their boss” is the code word for Mr. Nixon.”
  8. ^ Diem Bui with David Chanoff. In the Jaws of History. Indiana University Press, 1999, p. 244.“I began reviewing the cables I had written to (Nguyen Van) Thieu (…). Among them, I found a cable from October 23 (…) in which I had said, ‘Many Republican friends have contacted me and encouraged us to stand firm. They were alarmed by press reports to the effect that you had already softened your position.’ In another cable, from October 27, I wrote, ‘I am regularly in touch with the Nixon entourage,’ by which I meant Anna Chennault, John Mitchell, and Senator (John) Tower.”
  9. ^ Seymour M. Hersh. “The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House”. Summit Books, 1983, p. 21. “A few days before the election, she wrote, Mitchell telephoned with an urgent message. ‘Anna,’ (Chennault) she quotes him as saying. ‘I'm speaking on behalf of Mr. Nixon. It's very important that our Vietnamese friends understand our Republican position and I hope you have made that clear to them.’”.
  10. ^ Robert "KC" Johnson. “Did Nixon Commit Treason in 1968? What The New LBJ Tapes Reveal”. History News Network, January 26, 2009. Transcript from audio recording of President Johnson: “Mrs. [Anna] Chennault is contacting their [South Vietnamese] ambassador from time to time—seems to be kind of the go-between”
  11. ^ Christopher Hitchens. “The Trial of Henry Kissinger“. Verso, 2002, p. 6.
  12. ^ Thomas Powers. “The Man who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms & the CIA”. Alfred A. Knopf, 1979, p. 198. “during the week which ended Sunday, October 27 [1968], the National Security Agency intercepted a radio message from the South Vietnamese Embassy to Saigon explicitly urging (Nguyen Van) Thieu to stand fast against an agreement until after the election. As soon as Johnson learned of the cable he ordered the FBI to place Madame (Anna) Chennault under surveillance and to install a phone tap on the South Vietnamese Embassy”
  13. ^ Mark Lisheron. “In tapes, LBJ accuses Nixon of treason”. Austin American-Statesman. December 05, 2008. “Johnson tells Sen. Everett Dirksen, the Republican minority leader, that it will be Nixon's responsibility if the South Vietnamese don't participate in the peace talks. ‘This is treason,’ LBJ says to Dirksen.”
  14. ^ Robert “KC” Johnson. “Did Nixon Commit Treason in 1968? What The New LBJ Tapes Reveal”. History News Network, January 26, 2009. Transcript from audio recording of President Johnson: “Now, I can identify ‘em, because I know who’s doing this. I don’t want to identify it. I think it would shock America if a principal candidate was playing with a source like this on a matter this important. (…) I don’t want to do that.”
  15. ^ Jules Witcover. “The Making of an Ink-Stained Wretch: Half a Century Pounding the Political Beat”. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005, p131. “Johnson had turned over incriminating evidence about (Anna) Chennault’s activities to (Hubert) Humphrey's for use in the final days of the campaign. The idea was that such an act of treason would sink Nixon and elect Humphrey. But Humphrey declined to use it, partly because he felt he could not reveal the sources of the classified material (…) Later, in his memoir, Humphrey recounted a memo of his own at the time: "I wonder if I should have blown the whistle on Anna Chennault and Nixon. I wish [his italics] I could have been sure. Damn Thieu. Dragging his feet this past weekend hurt us. I wonder if that call did it. lf Nixon knew.”.
  16. ^ Mark Lisheron. “In tapes, LBJ accuses Nixon of treason”. Austin American-Statesman. December 05, 2008. “Confronting Nixon by telephone on Nov. 3, Johnson outlines what had been alleged and how important it was to the conduct of the war for Nixon's people not to meddle. ‘My God,’ Nixon says to Johnson, ‘I would never do anything to encourage the South Vietnamese not to come to that conference table.’”
  17. ^ "1975: Vietnam's President Thieu resigns". On this day (BBC News). April 21, 1975. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/21/newsid_2935000/2935347.stm. 

[edit] Further reading

  • Herrington, Stuart A. "Peace with Honor? An American Reports on Vietnam" Presidio Press (1983). Part II, "Life Under The Paris Agreement" pp. 16–40.

[edit] External links

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Peace_Accords"
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