Parrhesia

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For the moth genus, see Parrhesia (moth). For the region of Ancient Greece, see Parrhasia (Arcadia). For the journal, see Parrhesia: A Journal of Critical Philosophy .

In rhetoric, parrhesia is a figure of speech described as: to speak candidly or to ask forgiveness for so speaking.[1] The term is borrowed from the Greek παρρησία (πᾶν "all" and ῥῆσις "utterance, speech") meaning literally "to speak everything" and by extension "to speak freely," "to speak boldly," or "boldness." It implies not only freedom of speech, but the obligation to speak the truth for the common good, even at personal risk.

An example of this is the quote "I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat" by Winston Churchill.[1]

Usage in Ancient Greece[edit]

Parrhesia was a fundamental component of the democracy of Classical Athens. In assemblies and the courts Athenians were free to say almost anything, and in the theatre, playwrights such as Aristophanes made full use of the right to ridicule whomever they chose.[2] Elsewhere there were limits to what might be said; freedom to discuss politics, morals, religion, or to criticize people would depend on context: by whom it was made, and when, and how, and where.[3] If a man was seen as immoral, or his views went contrary to popular opinion, then there were great risks involved in making use of such an unbridled freedom of speech, as Socrates found out when he was sentenced to death for (supposedly) introducing new gods and corrupting the young.[2] Parrhesia was also a central concept for the Cynic philosophers, as epitomized in the shameless speech of Diogenes of Sinope.[4]

New Testament use[edit]

A related use of parrhesia is found in the Greek New Testament, where it means "bold speech," the ability of believers to hold their own in discourse before political and religious authorities (e.g. Acts 4:13: "Now when they saw the boldness [την παρρησίαν] of Peter and John and realized that they were uneducated and ordinary men, they were amazed and recognized them as companions of Jesus."). It is also used to describe the reply Jesus made to the Pharisees.[1][5][6]

Usage in rabbinic Jewish writings[edit]

The Greek intellectual concept of parrhesia appears in Midrashic literature as an essential attribute in the transmission of Torah. Connoting open and public communication, parrhesia appears often in combination with the term, wikt:demos demos (publicly). As a mode of communication it is repeatedly described in terms analogous to a Public Domain or Commons. Dimus Parrhesia is closely associated with an ownerless wilderness of primary mytho-geographic import, the Midbar Sinai in which the Torah was initially received. The dissemination of Torah thus depends on its teachers cultivating a nature which is as open, ownerless, and sharing as that wilderness. The term is important to advocates of Open Source Judaism.[7] Below are three sources where the term dimus parrhesia appears.

ויחנו במדבר - נתנה תורה דימוס פרהסיא במקום הפקר, שאלו נתנה בארץ ישראל, היו אומרים לאומות העולם אין להם חלק בה, לפיכך נתנה דימוס פרהסיא, במקום הפקר, וכל הרוצה לקבל יבא ויקבל.‏ Torah was given over dimus parrhesia in a makom hefker (an ownerless place). For had it been given in the Land of Israel, they would have had cause to say to the [other] nations, “you have no share in it.” Thus was it given dimus parrhesia, in an ownerless place: “Let all who wish receive it, come and receive it!”[8]

מפני מה לא ניתנה תורה בארץ ישראל? שלא ליתן פתחון פה לאומות העולם, לומר לפי שנתנה בארצו לפיכך לא קבלנו עלינו. דבר אחר: שלא להטיל מחלוקת בין השבטים, שלא יהא זה אומר בארצי נתנה תורה וזה אומר בארצי נתנה תורה, לפיכך נתנה במדבר, דימוס פרהסיא במקום הפקר.‏ Why was the Torah not given in the land of Israel? In order that the peoples of the world should not have the excuse for saying: `Because it was given in Israel's land, therefore we have not accepted it. Another reason: To avoid causing dissension among the tribes [of Israel]. Else one might have said: In my land the Torah was given. And the other might have said: In my land the Torah was given. Therefore, the Torah was given in the Midbar (wilderness), dimus parrhesia, in a place belonging to no one.

בשלושה דברים נמשלה תורה במדבר ובאש ובמים לומר לך מה אלו חנם לכל באי העולם אף דברי תורה חנם לכל באי העולם.‏ To three things the Torah is likened: to the Midbar (wilderness), to fire, and to water. This is to tell you that just as these three things are free to all who come into the world, so also are the words of the Torah free to all who come into the world.[9]

Modern scholarship[edit]

Michel Foucault developed the concept of parrhesia as a mode of discourse in which one speaks openly and truthfully about one's opinions and ideas without the use of rhetoric, manipulation, or generalization.[10] Foucault's use of parrhesia, he tells us, is troubled by our modern day Cartesian model of evidential necessity. For Descartes, truth is the same as the undeniable. Whatever can be doubted must be, and, thus, speech that is not examined or criticized does not necessarily have a valid relation to truth.

There are several conditions upon which the traditional Ancient Greek notion of parrhesia relies. One who uses parrhesia is only recognized as doing so if he (and it is "he" when we consider Greek teachings)[citation needed] holds a credible relationship to the truth, if he serves as critic to either himself or popular opinion or culture, if the revelation of this truth places him in a position of danger and he persists in speaking the truth, nevertheless, as he feels it is his moral, social, and/or political obligation. Further, in a public situation, a user of parrhesia must be in a social position less empowered than those to whom he is revealing.

Foucault (1983) sums up the Ancient Greek concept of parrhesia as such:

So you see, the parrhesiastes is someone who takes a risk. Of course, this risk is not always a risk of life. When, for example, you see a friend doing something wrong and you risk incurring his anger by telling him he is wrong, you are acting as a parrhesiastes. In such a case, you do not risk your life, but you may hurt him by your remarks, and your friendship may consequently suffer for it. If, in a political debate, an orator risks losing his popularity because his opinions are contrary to the majority's opinion, or his opinions may usher in a political scandal, he uses parrhesia. Parrhesia, then, is linked to courage in the face of danger: it demands the courage to speak the truth in spite of some danger. And in its extreme form, telling the truth takes place in the "game" of life or death.[11]

and

To summarize the foregoing, parrhesia is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people through criticism (self-criticism or criticism of other people), and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and duty. More precisely, parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well as himself). In parrhesia, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy.[12]

Foucault (1984) sums up that:

The Parrhesiastes is the person who says everything. Thus, as an example, in his discourse "On the Embassy," Demosthenes says: It is necessary to speak with parrhesia, without holding back at anything without concealing anything. Similarly, in the "First Philippic," he takes up exactly the same term and says: I will tell you what I think without concealing anything.[13]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b c Burton, Gideon O. "Parrhesia". Sylva Rhetoricae. Brigham Young University. Retrieved 2007-05-24. 
  2. ^ a b Wallace, Robert W (2002), "The Power to Speak — and not to listen – in Ancient Athens", in Sluiter, Ineke; Rosen, Ralph Mark, Free Speech in Classical Antiquity, Brill, pp. 222–3 .
  3. ^ Roberts, John Willoby (1984), City of Sokrates, Routledge, p. 148 
  4. ^ Navia, Luis E, Diogenes the Cynic, Humanity Books, p. 179 .
  5. ^ Long, William 'Bill' (12/01/2004), "Parrhesia and Earliest Christianity", Even more words  .
  6. ^ Schlier, Heinrich (1967), "παρρησία, παρρησιάζομαι", in Kittel, Gerhard; Friedrich, Gerhard, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament V, Ann Arbor: Eerdmans, pp. 871ff .
  7. ^ Varady, Aharon. "‘Make yourself into a Maqom Hefker’: Teachings on Open Source in Judaism" (sourcesheet). The Open Siddur Project. Retrieved 29 June 2014. 
  8. ^ "1", Mekhilta de Rabbi Ishmael, Tractate Baḥodesh, JHU, on Shemot 19:2, ISBN 978-0-82761003-3 .
  9. ^ "5", Mekhilta de Rabbi Ishmael, Tractate Baḥodesh, JHU, on Shemot 20:2, ISBN 978-0-82761003-3 .
  10. ^ Foucault, Michel (Oct–Nov 1983), Discourse and Truth: the Problematization of Parrhesia (six lectures), The University of California at Berkeley .
  11. ^ Foucault, Michel, Fearless Speech, pp. 15–16 .
  12. ^ Foucault, Michel, Fearless Speech, pp. 19–20 .
  13. ^ Foucault, Michel, The Concept of Truth, p. 9 .

External links[edit]