Paul I of Russia
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Paul I (Russian: Па́вел I Петро́вич; Pavel Petrovich) (1 October [O.S. 20 September] 1754 – 23 March [O.S. 11 March] 1801) was the Emperor of Russia between 1796 and 1801. He was the only son of Peter III and Catherine the Great, and remained overshadowed by his mother for much of his life. Paul's reign lasted for only five years, until he was assassinated by conspirators. His most important achievement was the adoption of the laws of succession to the Russian throne that lasted until the end of Romanov dynasty and Russian Empire.
Paul was born in the Palace of Empress Elizabeth in St Petersburg. He was the son of the Grand Duchess Catherine, later Empress Catherine the Great, who was the wife of Elizabeth's heir and nephew, the Grand Duke Peter, later Emperor Peter III. His natal father was probably Sergei Saltykov, Catherine's lover. After seven years of virginal marriage to an anatomically deficient or uninterested husband, Catherine was encouraged to conceive with Saltykov by her senior governess Madame Choglokova, who, in Catherine's words told her, "...that there were sometimes situations in which a higher interest demanded an exception to these rules; where one's patriotic duty to one's country took precedence over duty to one's husband."
During his infancy, Paul was taken immediately from his mother by the Empress Elizabeth, whose overwhelming attention may have done him more harm than good. As a boy, he was reported to be intelligent and good-looking. His pug-nosed facial features in later life are attributed to an attack of typhus, from which he suffered in 1771. Some claim that his mother Catherine hated him, and was restrained from putting him to death. Massie is more compassionate towards Catherine; in his 2011 biography of her he claims that Paul was taken from his mother at birth and withheld from her presence except during very limited moments, that having done her duty in providing an heir to the throne, Elizabeth had no more use for Catherine, who was then forbidden from seeing the child. Paul was put in the charge of a trustworthy governor, Nikita Ivanovich Panin, and of competent tutors. It is interesting to note that Panin's nephew went on to become one of Paul's assassins.
The Russian Imperial court, first of Elizabeth and then of Catherine, was not an ideal home for a lonely, needy and often sickly boy. However, Catherine took great trouble to arrange his first marriage with Wilhelmina Louise (who acquired the Russian name "Natalia Alexeievna"), one of the daughters of Ludwig IX, Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, in 1773, and allowed him to attend the Council in order that he might be trained for his work as Emperor. His tutor, Poroshin, complained that he was "always in a hurry," acting and speaking without reflection.
Early life 
The use made of his name by the rebel Yemelyan Pugachev, who had impersonated his father Peter, tended no doubt to render Paul's position more difficult. On the birth of his first child in 1777 the Empress gave him an estate, Pavlovsk. Paul and his wife gained leave to travel through western Europe in 1781–1782. In 1783 the Empress granted him another estate at Gatchina, where he was allowed to maintain a brigade of soldiers whom he drilled on the Prussian model, still an unpopular stance at the time.
Relationship with Catherine the Great 
Catherine the Great and her son and heir, the future Paul I, maintained a distant relationship throughout the former’s reign. The aunt of Catherine's husband, Empress Elizabeth, took up the child as a passing fancy. Elizabeth proved an obsessive but incapable caretaker, as she had raised no children of her own. Paul was supervised by a variety of caregivers. Roderick McGrew briefly relates the neglect to which the infant heir was sometimes subject: "On one occasion he fell out of his crib and slept the night away unnoticed on the floor." Even after Elizabeth's death, relations with Catherine hardly improved. Paul was often jealous of the favors she would shower upon her lovers. In one instance the empress gave to one of her court favourites fifty-thousand rubles on her birthday, while Paul received a cheap watch. Paul’s early isolation from his mother created a distance between them which later events would reinforce. She never considered inviting him to share her power in governing Russia, as he must[original research?] have hoped. And once his son Alexander was born, it appeared that she had found a more suitable heir.
Catherine's absolute power and the delicate balance of courtier-status greatly influenced the relationship at Court with Paul, who openly disregarded his mother's opinions. Paul adamantly protested his mother’s policies, writing a veiled criticism in his Reflections, a dissertation on military reform. In it, he directly disparaged expansionist warfare in favour of a more defensive military policy. Unenthusiastically received by his mother, Reflections appeared a threat to her authority and added weight to her suspicion of an internal conspiracy with Paul at its center. For a courtier to have openly supported or shown intimacy towards Paul, especially following this publication, would have meant political suicide.
Paul spent the following years away from the Imperial Court, contented to remain at his private estates at Gatchina with his growing family and to perform Prussian drill-exercises. As Catherine II grew older she became less concerned that her son attend court functions; her attentions focused primarily on Paul's son, the future Alexander I.
It was not until 1787 that Catherine II may have in fact decided to exclude her son from succession. After Paul's sons Alexander and Constantine were born, she immediately had them placed under her charge, just as Elizabeth had done with Paul. That Catherine grew to favour Alexander as sovereign of Russia rather than Paul is unsurprising. She met secretly with Alexander’s tutor de La Harpe to discuss his pupil's ascension, and attempted to convince Maria, his mother, to sign a proposal authorizing her son's legitimacy. Both efforts proved fruitless, and though Alexander agreed to his grandmother's wishes, he remained respectful of his father's position as immediate successor to the Russian throne.
Accession to the throne 
Catherine suffered a stroke on 5 November 1796, and died without regaining consciousness. Paul's first act as Emperor was to inquire about and, if possible, destroy her testament, as he feared it would exclude him from succession and leave the throne to Alexander. These fears may have contributed to Paul's promulgation of the Pauline Laws, which established the strict principle of primogeniture in the House of Romanov, leaving the throne to the next male heir.
The army, then poised to attack Persia in accordance with Catherine's last design, was recalled to the capital within one month of Paul's accession. His father Peter was reburied with great pomp at the royal sepulchre in the Peter and Paul Cathedral. Paul responded to the rumour of his illegitimacy by parading his descent from Peter the Great. The inscription on the monument to the first Emperor of Russia near the St. Michael's Castle reads in Russian "To the Great-Grandfather from the Great-Grandson". This is an allusion to the Latin "PETRO PRIMO CATHARINA SECUNDA", the dedication by Catherine on the 'Bronze Horseman' of Peter the Great.
Purported eccentricities 
Emperor Paul was idealistic and capable of great generosity, but he was also mercurial and capable of vindictiveness. During the first year of his reign, Paul emphatically reversed many of the harsh policies of his mother. Although he accused many of Jacobinism, he allowed Catherine's best known critic, Radishchev, to return from Siberian exile. Along with Radishchev, he liberated Novikov from Schlüsselburg fortress, and also Tadeusz Kościuszko, yet after liberation both were confined to their own estates under police supervision. He viewed the Russian nobility as decadent and corrupt, and was determined to transform them into a disciplined, principled, loyal caste resembling a medieval chivalric order. To those few who conformed to his view of a modern-day knight (e.g., his favourites Kutuzov, Arakcheyev, Rostopchin) he granted more serfs during the five years of his reign than his mother had presented to her lovers during her thirty-four years. Those who did not share his chivalric views were dismissed or lost their places at court: seven field marshals and 333 generals fell into this category.
Paul made several idiosyncratic and deeply unpopular attempts to reform the army. Under Catherine's reign, Potemkin introduced new uniforms that were cheap, comfortable and practical, and designed in a distinctly Russian style. Paul decided to fulfill his predecessor Peter III's intention of introducing Prussian uniforms. Impractical for active duty, these were deeply unpopular with the men, as was the effort required to maintain them. His love of parades and ceremony was not well-liked either. He ordered that Wachtparad (Watch parades) took place early every morning in the parade ground of the palace, regardless of the weather conditions. He would personally sentence soldiers to be flogged if they made a mistake, and at one point literally ordered his guard regiment to march to Siberia when they became disordered during manoeuvers. He attempted to reform the organization of the army in 1796 by introducing The Infantry Codes; a series of guidelines that based the organization of the army largely upon show and glamour, but his greatest commander, Suvorov completely ignored them, believing them to be worthless.
At a great expense, he built three castles in or around the Russian capital. Much was made of his courtly love affair with Anna Lopukhina, but the relationship seems to have been platonic and was barely more than another detail in his ideal of chivalric manhood.
Foreign affairs 
Paul's his early foreign policy can largely be seen as reactions against his mother's. In foreign policy, this meant that he opposed the many expansionary wars she fought and instead preferred to pursue a more peaceful, diplomatic path. Immediately upon taking the throne, he recalled all troops outside Russian borders, including the struggling expedition Catherine II had sent to conquer Iran through the Caucasus and the 60,000 men she had promised to Britain and Austria to help them defeat the French. Paul hated the French before their revolution, and afterwards, with their republican and anti-religious views, he detested them even more. In addition to this, he knew French expansion hurt Russian interests, but he recalled his mother's troops primarily because he firmly opposed wars of expansion. He also believed that Russia needed substantial governmental and military reforms to avoid an economic collapse and a revolution, before Russia could wage war on foreign soil.
Paul offered to mediate between Austria and France through Prussia and pushed Austria to make peace, but the two countries made peace without his assistance, signing the Treaty of Campoformio in October 1797. This treaty, with its affirmation of French control over islands in the Mediterranean and the partitioning of the Republic of Venice, upset Paul, who saw it as creating more instability in the region and displaying France's ambitions in the Mediterranean. In response, he offered asylum to the Prince de Condé and his army, as well as Louis XVIII, both of whom had been forced out of Austria by the treaty. By this point, Napoleon had seized Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, establishing republics with constitutions in each, and Paul felt that Russia now needed to play an active role in Europe in order to overthrow what the republic had created and restore traditional authorities. In this goal he found a willing ally in the Austrian chancellor Baron Thugut, who hated the French and loudly criticized revolutionary principles. Britain and the Ottoman Empire joined Austria and Russia to stop French expansion, free territories under their control and re-establish the old monarchies. The only major power in Europe who did not join Paul in his anti-French campaign was Prussia, whose distrust of Austria and the security they got from their current relationship with France prevented them from joining the coalition. Despite the Prussians’ reluctance, Paul decided to move ahead with the war, promising 60,000 men to support Austria in Italy and 45,000 men to help England in North Germany and the Netherlands.
Another important factor in Paul's decision to go to war with France was the island of Malta, the home of the Knights Hospitaller. In addition to Malta, the Order had priories in the Catholic countries of Europe that held large estates and paid the revenue from them to the Order. In 1796, the Order approached Paul about the Priory of Poland, which had been in a state of neglect and paid no revenue for 100 years, and was now on Russian land. Paul as a child had read the histories of the Order and was impressed by their honor and connection to the old order it represented. He relocated the Priories of Poland to St. Petersburg in January 1797. The knights responded by making him a protector of the Order in August of that same year, an honor he had not expected but, in keeping with his chivalric ideals, he happily accepted.
In June 1798, Napoleon seized Malta; this greatly offended Paul. In September, the Priory of St. Petersburg declared that Grand Master Hompesch had betrayed the Order by selling Malta to Napoleon. A month later the Priory elected Paul Grand Master. This election resulted in the establishment of the Russian tradition of the Knights Hospitaller within the Imperial Orders of Russia. The election of the sovereign of an Orthodox nation as the head of a Catholic order was controversial, and it was some time before the Holy See or any of the other of the Order's priories approved it. This delay created political issues between Paul, who insisted on defending his legitimacy, and the priories’ respective countries. Though recognition of Paul’s election would become a more divisive issue later in his reign, the election immediately gave Paul, as Grand Master of the Order, another reason to fight the French Republic: to reclaim the Order’s ancestral home.
The Russian army in Italy played the role of an auxiliary force sent to support the Austrians, though the Austrians offered the position of chief commander over all the allied armies to Alexander Suvorov, a distinguished Russian general. Under Suvorov, the allies managed to push the French out of Italy, though they suffered heavy losses. However, by this point in time, cracks had started to appear in the Russo-Austrian alliance, due to their different goals in Italy. While Paul and Suvorov wanted the liberation and restoration of the Italian monarchies, the Austrians sought territorial acquisitions in Italy, and were willing to sacrifice later Russian support to acquire them. The Austrians, therefore, happily saw Suvorov and his army out of Italy in 1799 to go meet up with the army of Alexander Korsakov, at the time assisting the Austrian Archduke Charles expel the French armies currently occupying Switzerland. However, the campaign in Switzerland had become a stalemate, without much activity on either side until the Austrians withdrew. Because this happened before Korsakov and Suvorov could unite their forces, the French could attack their armies one at a time, destroying Korsakov's and forcing Suvorov to fight his way out of Switzerland, suffering heavy losses. Suvorov, shamed, blamed the Austrians for the terrible defeat in Switzerland, as did his furious sovereign. This defeat, combined with refusal to reinstate the old monarchies in Italy and their disrespect of the Russian flag during the taking of Ancona, led to the formal cessation of the alliance in October 1799.
Although by the fall of 1799 the Russo-Austrian alliance had more or less fallen apart, Paul still cooperated willingly with the British. Together, they planned to invade the Netherlands, and through that country attack France proper. Unlike Austria, neither Russia nor Britain appeared to have any secret territorial ambitions: they both simply sought the removal of Napoleon. The Anglo-Russian invasion of Holland started well, with a British victory - the Battle of Callantsoog (27 August 1799) - in the north, but when the Russian army arrived in September, the allies found themselves faced with bad weather, poor coordination, and unexpectedly fierce resistance from the Dutch and the French, and their success evaporated. As the month wore on, the weather worsened and the allies suffered more and more losses, eventually signing an armistice in October 1799. The Russians suffered three-quarters of allied losses and the British left their troops on an island in the Channel after the retreat, as Britain did not want them on the mainland. This defeat and subsequent maltreating of Russian troops strained Russo-British relations, but a definite break did not occur until later. The reasons for this break are less clear and simple than those of the split with Austria, but there several key events occurred over the winter of 1799–1800 that helped: Bonaparte released 7,000 captive Russian troops that Britain had refused to pay the ransom for; Paul grew closer to the Scandinavian countries of Denmark and Sweden, whose claim to neutral shipping rights offended Britain; Paul had the British ambassador in St. Petersburg (Whitworth) recalled (1800) and Britain did not replace him, with no clear reason given as to why; and Britain, needing to choose between their two allies, chose Austria, who had certainly committed to fighting Napoleon to the end. Finally, two events occurred in rapid succession that destroyed the alliance completely: first, in July 1800, the British seized a Danish frigate, prompting Paul to close the British trading factories in St. Petersburg as well as impound British ships and cargo; second, even though the allies resolved this crisis, Paul could not forgive the British for Admiral Nelson's refusal to return Malta to the Order of St. John, and therefore to Paul, when the British captured it from the French in September 1800. In a drastic response, Paul seized all British vessels in Russian ports, sent their crews to detention camps and took British traders hostage until he received satisfaction. Over the next winter, he went further, using his new Armed Neutrality coalition with Sweden, Denmark and Prussia to prepare the Baltic against possible British attack, prevent the British from searching neutral merchant vessels, and freeze all British trade in Northern Europe. As Napoleon had already closed all of Western and Southern Europe to British trade, Britain, which relied heavily upon imports (especially for timber, naval products, and grain) felt seriously threatened by Paul's move and reacted fast. In March 1801, Britain sent a fleet to Denmark, bombarding Copenhagen and forcing the Danes to surrender in the beginning of April. Nelson then sailed towards St. Petersburg, reaching Reval (14 May 1801), but after the conspiracy assassinated Paul (23 March 1801), the new Tsar Alexander had opened peace-negotiations shortly after taking the throne.
The oddest part of Paul I’s foreign policy seems to be his rapprochement with Napoleon after the coalition fell apart. Recently, however, several scholars have argued that this change in position, radical though it seemed, made sense, as Bonaparte became First Consul, moved away from Jacobinism, and made France a more conservative state, consistent with Paul’s view of the world. Even Paul's decision to send a Cossack army to take British India, bizarre as it may seem, makes a certain amount of sense: Britain itself was almost impervious to direct attack, being an island nation with a formidable navy, but the British had left India largely unguarded and would have great difficulty staving off a force that came over land to attack it. The British themselves considered this enough of a problem that they signed three treaties with Persia, in 1801, 1809 and 1812, to guard against an army attacking India through Central Asia. Paul sought to attack the British where they were weakest: through their commerce and their colonies. Throughout his reign, his policies focused reestablishing peace and the balance of power in Europe, while supporting autocracy and old monarchies, without seeking to expand Russia's borders.
Paul's premonitions of assassination were well-founded. His attempts to force the nobility to adopt a code of chivalry alienated many of his trusted advisors. The Emperor also discovered outrageous machinations and corruption in the Russian treasury. Although he repealed Catherine's law which allowed the corporal punishment of the free classes and directed reforms which resulted in greater rights for the peasantry, and better treatment for serfs on agricultural estates, most of his policies were viewed as a great annoyance to the noble class and induced his enemies to work out a plan of action.
A conspiracy was organized, some months before it was executed, by Counts Peter Ludwig von der Pahlen, Nikita Petrovich Panin, and the half-Spanish, half-Neapolitan adventurer Admiral Ribas. The death of Ribas delayed the execution. On the night of 12 March [O.S. 11 March] 1801, Paul was murdered in his bedroom in the newly built St Michael's Castle by a band of dismissed officers headed by General Bennigsen, a Hanoverian in the Russian service, and General Yashvil, a Georgian. They charged into his bedroom, flushed with drink after supping together, and found Paul hiding behind some drapes in the corner. The conspirators pulled him out, forced him to the table, and tried to compel him to sign his abdication. Paul offered some resistance, and one of the assassins struck him with a sword, after which he was strangled and trampled to death. He was succeeded by his son, the 23-year-old Alexander I, who was actually in the palace, and to whom General Nikolay Zubov, one of the assassins, announced his accession, accompanied by the admonition, "Time to grow up! Go and rule!"
As Dr Michael Foster points out: The popular view of Paul I has long been that he was mad, had a mistress, and accepted the office of Grand Master of the Order of St John, which furthered his delusions. These eccentricities and his unpredictability in other areas naturally led, this view goes, to his assassination. This portrait of Paul was promoted by his assassins and their supporters.
There is some evidence that Paul I was venerated as a saint among the Russian Orthodox populace, even though he was never officially canonized by any of the Orthodox Churches.
Portrayals in literature, theatre and film 
In 1906 Dmitry Merezhkovsky published his tragedy "Paul I". Its most prominent performance was made on the Soviet Army Theatre's stage (1989), with Oleg Borisov as Paul.
A film on the rule of Paul I was produced by Lenfilm in 2003. Poor, Poor Paul (Бедный бедный Павел) is directed by Vitaliy Mel'nikov and stars Viktor Sukhorukov as Paul and Oleg Yankovsky as Count Pahlen, who headed a conspiracy against him. The film portrays Paul I more compassionately than the long-existing stories about him. The movie won the Michael Tariverdiev Prize for best music to a film at the Open Russian Film Festival "Kinotavr" in 2003.
Paul and Sophie had ten children; nine survived to adulthood (and from whom can be traced 19 grandchildren):
|Alexander I, Emperor of Russia||12 December 1777||19 November 1825||m. Luise Auguste, Princess of Baden (Elizabeth Alexeiyevna) (1779–1826), and had two daughters (both died in childhood).|
|Grand Duke Constantin Pavlovich||27 April 1779||15 June 1831||married first Juliane, Princess of Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld (Anna Feodorovna), married second Countess Joanna Grudzińska morganatically. He had with Joanna one child, Charles (b. 1821) and 3 illegitimate children: Paul Alexandrov from first relationship; Constantine Constantinovich and Constance Constantinovna from second relationship.|
|Grand Duchess Alexandra Pavlovna||9 August 1783||16 March 1801||m. Joseph, Archduke of Austria, Count Palatine of Hungary (1776–1847), and had one daughter (both mother and infant died in childbirth).|
|Grand Duchess Elena Pavlovna||13 December 1784||24 September 1803||m. Friedrich Ludwig, Hereditary Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin (1778–1819), and had two children.|
|Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna||4 February 1786||23 June 1859||m. Karl Friedrich, Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach (1783–1853), and had four children.|
|Grand Duchess Catherine Pavlovna||21 May 1788||9 January 1819||married Georg, Duke of Oldenburg (1784–1812), had two sons; married Wilhelm I, King of Württemberg (1781–1864), and had two daughters.|
|Grand Duchess Olga Pavlovna||22 July 1792||26 January 1795|
|Grand Duchess Anna Pavlovna||7 January 1795||1 March 1865||m. Willem II, King of the Netherlands (1792–1849), and had five children.|
|Nicholas I, Emperor of Russia||25 June 1796||18 February 1855||m. Charlotte, Princess of Prussia (Alexandra Feodorovna) (1798–1860), and had ten children.|
|Grand Duke Michael Pavlovich||8 February 1798||9 September 1849||m. Charlotte, Princess of Württemberg (Elena Pavlovna) (1807–1873), and had five children.|
Family of Paul I of Russia, by Gerhard von Kügelgen
Pavel Petrovich as a Child (1761), by Fedor Rokotov
The rooms of Gatchina palace where Grand Duke Paul spent his youth
State Arms under Emperor Paul, incorporating the cross of the Order of Malta, 1799
See also 
- Chapter 27, "Saltykov" - Massie, Robert K., Catherine the Great: Portrait of a Woman, (Random House) New York, NY, 2011.
- McGrew (1992), 28.
- McGrew (1992), 30.
- Sorokin, 185.
- Sorokin, 185.
- McGrew (1992), 184.
- Digby Smith, 2006_ 0-7548-1571-4_ p157-187
- Laurence Spring, 2002, p56
- Farquhar, Michael (2001). A Treasure of Royal Scandals, p.192. Penguin Books, New York. ISBN 0-7394-2025-9.
- For the Iranian expedition, see Haukeil, 349. For the 60,000 troops to Europe, see McGrew (1992), 282.
- Haukeil, 351.
- McGrew (1992), 283.
- McGrew (1992), 286.
- McGrew (1992), 288–289.
- McGrew (1992), 289–290.
- McGrew (1992), 286–287.
- Haukeil, 351.
- McGrew (1979), 46–48.
- McGrew (1979), 48.
- McGrew (1979), 49–50.
- McGrew (1979), 51.
- McGrew (1979), 55–58.
- The 79 Grand Masters – official website of the Sovereign Order of Malta
- McGrew (1979), 59.
- Haukei, 355-57.
- McGrew (1992), 299.
- Haukeil, 358.
- For Archduke Charles withdrawing early, see McGrew (1992), 301. For more information on the battles Korsakov and Suvorov fought, see Haukeil, 361–62.
- For a summary of the taking of Ancona, see McGrew (1992), 306. For a quick summary of all the issues involved, see Hugh Ragsdale, "A Continental System in 1801: Paul I and Bonaparte," The Journal of Modern History, 42 (1970), 70–71.
- McGrew (1992), 309.
- For a summary of the Netherlands campaign, see McGrew (1992), 309. For a more detailed look at the events, with a slight British bias, see Haukeil, 364.
- Haukeil, 364.
- McGrew (1992), 309–310.
- McGrew (1992), 311.
- For a summary, with more information on Paul growing closer to the Baltic states, see McGrew (1992), 311–12. For information on the British ambassador and their choice of Austria over Russia, see Ragsdale, "A Continental System in 1801: Paul I and Bonaparte," The Journal of Modern History, 71–72. For Napoleon's actions and Paul's feelings towards him, see Haukeil, 365.
- For information on the Danish frigate, see Hugh Ragsdale, "Was Paul Bonaparte's Fool?: The Evidence of Neglected Archives," in Paul I: A Reassessment of His Life and Reign, ed. Hugh Ragsdale (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1979), 80. For Paul's reaction to the seizure and then the events at Malta, see McGrew (1992), 313–14. For the date of the Maltese events, and a more English view of them, see Haukeil, 366.
- For a summary of Paul's reaction, see McGrew (1992), 314. For more details, see Haukeil, 366.
- For information on the military side of these measures, see McGrew (1992), 314. For information on the economic side and how Paul interacted with the Armed Neutrality, see Ragsdale, "Was Paul Bonaparte's Fool?" in Paul I: A Reassessment of His Life and Reign, 81.
- Ragsdale, "A Continental System in 1801: Paul I and Bonaparte," The Journal of Modern History, 81–82.
- Haukeil, 366.
- McGrew (1992), 314.
- For arguments about consistency and Paul's reasons to fight, see McGrew (1992), 318. For the arguments as to why Paul was willing to reach an agreement with Bonaparte, see Muriel Atkin, "The Pragmatic Diplomacy of Paul I: Russia's Relations with Asia, 1796–1801," Slavic Review, 38 (1979), 68.
- Atkin, "The Pragmatic Diplomacy of Paul I," 68.
- Atkin, "The Pragmatic Diplomacy of Paul I," 69.
- Ragsdale, "Was Paul Bonaparte's Fool?" in Paul I: A Reassessment of His Life and Reign, 88.
- Alexander II, The last great tsar, by Edvard Radzinsky. Page 16–17. Freepress, 2005.
- The Reverend Michael Foster (2001) Emperor Paul I of Russia, and his Russian Grand Priory of the Order of Saint John of Jerusalem.
- Zhevakhov, Prince N. D. (1993) Reminiscences, V.2, p.273. Moscow.
- Haukeil, Henry A. and Tyrrell, H., The History of Russia from the foundation of the Empire to the War with Turkey in 1877–78, Volume 1 (London: The London Printing and Publishing Company, Limited, 1854)
- Bernhard A. Macek (2012) Haydn, Mozart und die Großfürstin: Eine Studie zur Uraufführung der "Russischen Quartette" op. 33 in den Kaiserappartements der Wiener Hofburg. (Wien: Schloß Schönbrunn Kultur- und Betriebsges.m.b.H.) ISBN 3-901568-72-7.
- Massie, Robert K., Catherine the Great: Portrait of a Woman, (Random House) New York, NY, 2011.
- McGrew, Roderick E. (1979) "Paul I and the Knights of Malta," in Paul I: A Reassessment of His Life and Reign, ed. Hugh Ragsdale (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh ISBN 0-916002-28-4, pp. 44 ff.
- McGrew, Roderick E. (1992), Paul I of Russia. (Oxford: Clarendon Press) ISBN 0-19-822567-9
- Sorokin, Iurii Alekseevich (1996). "Emperor Paul I, 1796–1801" in The Emperors and Empresses of Russia: Rediscovering the Romanovs, ed. Donald J. Raleigh (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe) ISBN 1-56324-759-3.
Further reading 
- 1979 Reassessment of Paul: Hugh (Ed) Paul I: A reassessment of His Life and Reign, University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1979
- For Paul's early life: K. Waliszewski, Autour d'un trone (Paris, 1894), or the English translation, The Story of a Throne (London, 1895), and P. Morane, Paul I. de Russie avant l'avenement (Paris, 1907)
- For Paul's reign: T. Schiemann, Geschichte Russlands unter Nikolaus I (Berlin, 1904), vol. i. and Die Ermordung Pauls, by the same author (Berlin, 1902)
- Other readings: (in Russian) V.V.Uzdenikov. Monety Rossiyi XVIII-nachala XX veka (Russian coinage from 18th to the beginning of 20th century). Moscow – 1994. ISBN 5-87613-001-X
- Palmer, Elena."Peter III. Der Prinz von Holstein". Sutton, Germany, 2005 (ISBN 3-89702-788-7).
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Paul I of Russia|
|Wikisource has the text of the 1905 New International Encyclopedia article Paul I., Petrovitch.|
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Emperor Paul I of Russia
Cadet branch of the House of OldenburgBorn: 1 October 1754 Died: 23 March 1801
|Emperor of Russia
6 November 1796 – 23 March 1801
Karl Peter Ulrich
|Duke of Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorp
|Ceded to Denmark|
|Count of Oldenburg
Ferdinand von Hompesch zu Bolheim
|Grand Master of the Knights Hospitaller
Peter III of Russia
|Heir to the Russian Throne
Alexander I of Russia