Perfect information
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In game theory, a game is said to have perfect information if all players know all moves that have taken place.[1]
Chess is an example of a game with perfect information as each player can see all of the pieces on the board at all times. Other examples of perfect games include tic tac toe, irensei and go. Games with perfect information represent a small subset of games. Card games where each player's cards are hidden from other players are examples of games of imperfect information.[1]
In microeconomics, a state of perfect information is assumed in some models of perfect competition. That is, assuming that all agents are rational and have perfect information, they will choose the best products, and the market will reward those who make the best products with higher sales. Perfect information would practically mean that all consumers know all things, about all products, at all times, and therefore always make the best decision regarding purchase. In competitive markets, unlike game-theoretic models, perfect competition does not require that agents have complete knowledge about the actions of others; all relevant information is reflected in prices.[citation needed]
The concept of perfect information has often been criticized by the various schools of heterodox economics.[citation needed]
[edit] References
- ^ a b Thomas, L. C. (2003). Games, Theory and Applications. Mineola N.Y.: Dover Publications. pp. 19. ISBN 0-486-43237-8.
[edit] See also
- Complete information
- Extensive form game
- The Economics of Groundhog Day by economist D.W. MacKenzie, using the 1993 film Groundhog Day to argue that perfect information, and therefore perfect competition, is impossible.
[edit] Further reading
- Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. (1993) Game Theory, MIT Press. (see Chapter 3, sect 2.2)
- Gibbons, R. (1992) A primer in game theory, Harvester-Wheatsheaf. (see Chapter 2)
- Luce, R.D. and Raiffa, H. (1957) Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey, Wiley & Sons (see Chapter 3, section 2)
