|Industry||Oil and gas|
|Founded||10 December 1957|
|Key people||Karen Agustiawan, President & CEO|
|Products||Fuels, lubricants, petrochemicals|
|Revenue||US$ 70.9 billion (2012)|
|Net income||US$ 2.7 billion (2012)|
|Total assets||US$ 40.9 bill (2012)|
Pertamina (was Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara, lit. 'State Oil and Natural Gas Mining Company') is an Indonesian state-owned oil and natural gas corporation based in Jakarta. It was created in August 1968 by the merger of Pertamin (established 1961) and Permina (established 1957). The firm is currently (2013) the second-largest crude oil producer in Indonesia behind the US-based Chevron Pacific Indonesia. In 2013 for the first time, Pertamina ranked no. 122 in the Fortune Global 500 list of companies with revenues totalling to $70.9 billion , Pertamina is also the sole Indonesian company to be featured in the list.
- 1 History
- 2 Facilities
- 3 Subsidiaries
- 4 Products
- 5 Financial summary
- 6 References
- 7 External links
|This section needs additional citations for verification. (June 2008)|
In 1957, Dutch assets in petroleum were nationalized, from which Permina was founded as a state-owned oil monopoly, headed by Lieutenant-General Ibnu Sutowo. Ibnu Sutowo's position as the second deputy of Abdul Haris Nasution was the beginning of the army's involvement in the oil industry. Permina distributed oil for the entire archipelago.
Permina founded the Apprentice Technical School (Sekolah Kader Teknik) in Brandan to train and produce experts in the field. To meet this goal Permina established the Oil Academy in Bandung at 1962. Oil Academy's curriculum pertains to the technical aspects of the oil industry, and the graduates turned into the main forces in Pertamin (which later transformed to Pertamina).
In 1960, the Congress enacted a policy that the mining of Indonesian oil and ground gases are only permitted for the state, through a state-administered company. Pertamin, established in 1961, was responsible for the administration, management and controlling of the exploration and production. The policy was short lived. An agreement between the state and foreign companies was affirmed that gradually, oil refinement manufactures and other assets in marketing and distribution were to be sold to Indonesia within five to fifteen years.
In 1968, to consolidate oil and gas industry for its management, exploration, marketing and distribution, Permina and Pertamin merged and became PN. Pertamina. It continued to do little drilling itself, but made production-sharing agreements with foreign companies.
After the merge, Pertamina's production rose considerably (about 15% each in 1968 and 1969, and nearly 20% in 1973). By the end of 1973, it directly produced 28.2% of Indonesia's oil, with agreements of Caltex and Stanvac to produce the rest (67.8% and 3.6%, respectively). Its assets included seven refineries, oil terminals, 116 tankers, 102 other vessels and an airline. It was also active in cement, fertilizer, liquid natural gas, steel, hospitals, real estate, a rice estate, and telecommunications.
The 1974 oil price increases produced revenues of $4.2 billion in that year, equivalent to approximately one sixth of Indonesia's gross domestic product. Much of this revenue was used by Sutowo to expand Pertamina's interests far beyond oil production to include investments in oil tankers, steel and construction. Pertamina built the Bina Graha, the presidential executive office building in Jakarta. The global oil crisis of the 1970s greatly increased oil prices and profits. Pertamina initially provided a fiscal lift to the hopes of Indonesia's development planners.
For President Suharto and other members of the ruling elite revenue from Pertamina was "an ongoing source of funding" without accountability. "They ran this cash-cow into the ground, using it for both military and personal ends." Historian Adrian Vickers describes the endemic corruption at Pertamina:
At each stage of the transaction chain somebody was getting a percentage... If accidents occurred, as in 1972 when eighty impoverished people died... they could be covered up.
In 1973, the government's ability to borrow money from overseas was constrained, and Pertamina was no longer providing revenues to the state. Instead, the massive enterprise turned out not to be making money, but compiling exponentially large losses. In February 1975, Pertamina could no longer pay its American and Canadian creditors. An investigation followed, which revealed over US$10 billion in debts, mismanagement, and corruption within the company. This debt was equivalent to approximately thirty percent of Indonesia's GNP at the time. Others offer a figure of a $15 billion debt. A public investigation hurt the reputation of the national elite both among Indonesians and foreigners. The man most responsible for the collapse, Bruce Rappaport, was never charged. The charges against Ibnu Sutowo were dismissed. Ibnu Sutowo and his family were among the richest and most powerful in Indonesia, into the 21st century. The government took over the operation of the company and sought means by which to repay its debts. Pertamina's debt problems were eventually solved through a large government bail-out, which nearly doubled Indonesia's foreign debt.
Since the 1980s
Human rights observers have long expressed concerns about Indonesia's hostility to labor unions. According to the Multinational Monitor: "In 1985, the government ordered the firing of over 1,600 workers at Pertamina and foreign oil companies, charging that they had been members of the Indonesian Communist Party, which had been banned 19 years earlier when Suharto took power." 
In 2003 Pertamina legally became PT. Pertamina (Persero), as per the enactment of Government Regulation No.31/2003. Pertamina is now under the coordinator of the State Minister of State-owned Enterprises.
Like other contractors, Pertamina holds Cooperation Contract to Oil and Gas Regulatory Body. With its transformation into a limited liability company, Pertamina has become a business entity with the main target of making a profit.
Pertamina has not built any new refineries since the Balongan refinery was opened in West Java in the mid-1990s.
|No||Refinery Unit (RU)||Unit||Province||Capacity
|2||RU III||Plaju (Musi)||South Sumatra||127|
|3||RU IV||Cilacap||West Java||348|
|4||RU V||Balikpapan||East Kalimantan||260|
|5||RU VI||Balongan||West Java||125|
|6||RU VII||Kasim/Sorong||West Papua||10|
Source:Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Resources, 2012 Handbook of Energy and Economic Statistics of Indonesia.
(Note. By world standards, none of Indonesia's refineries are large. The world's largest refinery, at Jamnagar in India, has a production capacity of over 1,200,000 bopd. As a rule of thumb, refineries need to produce at least 200,000 bopd in order to reach reasonable international standards of efficiency.)
There are three other small refineries in Indonesia which Pertamina is responsible for operating.
|2||Pangkalan Brandan||North Sumatra||5|
Source:Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Resources, 2012 Handbook of Energy and Economic Statistics of Indonesia.
In addition to the refineries which Pertamina owns, Pertamina has two operating companies which manage output from LNG plants.
- PT Arun LNG operates a plant in Arun near Lhokseumawe, Aceh, with 6 trains having a total capacity of 12.5 million tons per annum.
- PT Badak LNG operates a plant in Bontang, East Kalimantan, with 8 trains having a total capacity of 22.5 million tons per annum.
During 2012 and early 2013 it was announced several times that there were plans to build two more large fuel refineries, each with a capacity of around 300,000 bopd, perhaps in Balongon, West Java (or, alternatively, in Bontang, East Kalimantan) and in Tuban, East Java. The first facility was planned to be build by Pertamina in partnership with Kuwait Petroleum, while the second was expected be built by Pertamina in cooperation with Saudi Aramco. Total investment was expected to be around $20 billion. One main problem holding up agreement to build the refineries was the issue of financial concessions to be provided for the foreign investors. Eventually, in September 2013 it was announced that the plans for the first refinery had been cancelled. At the same time, the government said that there were plans for yet a different refinery project which would be constructed solely by Pertamina and funded by the state. The crude oil for this alternative project was expected to be supplied from Iraq. Pending further progress on these large investment plans, Pertamina has announced (late 2014) plans to upgrade the existing refineries so as to add around 500,000 bopd to Pertamina's current refining capacity of around 1 million bopd.
Pertamina also has two gas reserves and a petrochemical company. Pertamina's products include a great variety of fuels, chemicals, additives, and retail products.
PT Pertamina EP (PEP) is engaged in managing the upstream oil and gas production through a more manageable exploration and exploitation activities. Adding to that, PEP has been undertaking other supporting businesses, which have been intended to back up the main business directly or indirectly.
Presently, Pertamina EP production level for oil is around 127,635 throusand barrel oil per day (BOPD) and around 1,054 million standard cubic feet per day (MMSCFD) for gas.
Pertamina EP Working Areas of 140.000 km2 were once largely PT Pertamina (Persero)’s Oil and Gas Mining Authority Zone. The working areas are managed through own operation and partnership cooperation.
Pertamina EP Working Areas consist of five assets. The operation of those assets comprise 19 Field Areas, namely Rantau, Pangkalan Susu, Lirik, Jambi and Ramba in Asset 1, Prabumulih, Adera, Limau and Pendopo in Asset 2, Tambun, Subang and Jatibarang in Asset 3, Cepu in Asset 4 as well as Sangatta, Sangasanga, Bunyu, Tarakan, Tanjung and Papua in Asset 5.
Beside the management of working areas as stated earlier, other business pattern is management through projects, such as Pondok Makmur Development Project in West Java, Paku Gajah Development Project in South Sumatera, Jawa Gas Development Project in Central Java, and Matindok Gas Development Project in Central Sulawesi.
Pertamina established PT Pertagas on 23 February 2007, and it became PT Pertamina Gas in 2008. The company undertakes gas transportation, trading and processing. In the gas transmission business, Pertamina owns a gas pipeline network with a total volume of 34,000 km-inches in Northern Sumatra, Central Sumatra, Southern Sumatra, Western Java, Eastern Java, and East Kalimantan
In January 2009, PT Pertamina Gas obtained a Transportation Permit and in February 2009, it received an exclusive right from BPH Migas for gas transportation along 43 transmission routes. These permit and exclusive rights complemented the business permit that had been issued previously (in September 2008). By obtaining a business license and special rights, PT Pertamina Gas now has a regulatory basis to play the principal role in the gas business in Indonesia.
Pertamina Geothermal Energy
PGE was founded on 12 December 2006. This Pertamina subsidiary carries out geothermal exploration and exploitation in 15 working areas (WKP) in Indonesia, namely: Sibayak-Sinabung, Sibual-buali–Sarulla, Sungai Penuh-Sumurup, Tambang Sawah-Hululais, Lumut Balai, Waypanas-Ulubelu, Cibereum-Parabakti, Pengalengan (Patuha-Wayang Windu), Kamojang-Darajat, Karaha-Telagabodas, Dieng, Iyang-Argopuro, Tabanan-Bali, Lahendong-Tompaso and Kotamobagu.
Pertamina EP Cepu
PEP Cepu, which was established on 14 September 2005, is a subsidiary of PT Pertamina (Persero) that focuses on the upstream oil and gas business. In the Cepu Block, Pertamina has a 45% interest in partnership with Mobil Cepu Ltd (as the operator) and the Regional Owned Enterprise (BUMD) that manages the KKS for the Cepu Block.
Pertamina Drilling Services Indonesia
PT PDSI was established on 13 June 2008 as a drilling service management business entity. The services provided comprise drilling, workover activities, and drilling services that use a Daily Rate and Integrated Drilling Management (MPT) system for oil, gas, and geothermal wells.
Presently, PT PDSI owns 34 drilling rigs (28 owned by PT PDSI and 6 transferred from PT Usayana)
Pertamina Hulu Energy
PHE is one of the Upstream Directorate subsidiaries working in the oil and gas upstream business, and is also an upstream business vehicle for managing the domestic and overseas cooperation portfolio in the form of: Production Sharing Contracts (PSC), Joint Operating Body-Production Sharing Contracts (JOB-PSC), Indonesian Participating / Pertamina Participating Interests (IP/PPI) and Badan Operasi Bersama (BOB). PHE’s overseas working areas covered: Western Desert Block 3,Iraq; Block 10&11.1, Offshore South Vietnam; Block SK-305, Offshore Sarawak, Malaysia; Sabratah 17-3 Block, Offshore Libya; Sirte 123-3 Block, Libya; Block 13, Red Sea, Offshore Sudan; Block-3, Offshore Qatar; and Basker Manta Gummy Block, Australia.
There are various PERTAMINA products consisting of fuel (BBM), non-fuel, gas, petrochemical products, and lubricants.
Special Fuel products :
Non Fuel Products :
Lube Base Oil
Provides information of PERTAMINA’s Lube Base Oil Products based on their function:
Gas products include
Various PERTAMINA petrochemical products.
Pertamina: Summary balance sheet as at 31 December 2012
|Assets||$ bill||Liabilities and equity||$ bill|
- Total sales: $70.9 billion
- Gross profit: $6.9 billion
- Net profit: $2.8 billion
Source: Pertamina Investor relations website.
- Useful details about the history of Pertamina are contained in the book about Pertamina by Rhenald Kasali, DNA mutation of powerhouse: Pertamina on the move, PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama Publisher, Jakarta, 2008 ISBN 978 979 22 3292 8.
- Amahl S. Azwar, 'Re-elected CEO to bring Pertamina to "number one"', The Jakarta Post, 7 June 2013.
- "Indonesia-Investments.com:Pertamina company profile". March 25, 2014.
- "Pertamina Masuk Daftar 500 Perusahaan Terbesar Dunia". July 16, 2013.
- Vickers (2005), p. 185.
- Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1300, 2nd ed., Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994, p. 262.
- Ricklefs, 296
- Schwarz (1994), p. 55
- Ricklefs, 301
- Vickers, Adrian. 2005. A History of Modern Indonesia, Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, p. 185.
- Vickers, Adrian. 2005. A History of Modern Indonesia, Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, p. 187.
- McCawley, Peter. 1978. "Some Consequences of the Pertamina Crisis in Indonesia," Jour of Southeast Asian Studies, IX(1), March.
- Schwarz, A. (1994). A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s. Westview Press. ISBN 1-86373-635-2.
- cf., Vickers, Adrian. 2005. A History of Modern Indonesia, Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, p. 185.
- Weissman 1990
- Hanun Nugroho, 'Consumption keeps growing as energy infrastructure worsens', The Jakarta Post, 14 July 2008. see also Tito Summa Siahaan & Dominic G. Diongson, 'Crude Hurdles in Getting New Oil Refiniries', The Jakarta Globe, 20 May 2013.
- "Thailand’s PTT delays Malaysia investment". Investvine.com. 2013-04-01. Retrieved 2013-04-06.
- Amahl S. Azwar, 'Top official urgest RI to offer incentives for refinery construction', The Jakarta Post, 7 January 2012. Further details (in Indonesian) are on the Pertamina refinery website.
- For a comparative list of oil refineries across the world, see this List of oil refineries.
- Amahl S. Azwar, 'RI's dream for more oil refineries hits govt intransigence', The Jakarta Post, 13 February 2013 and Amahl S. Azwar, 'Indonesia to woo Iraq to invest in oil refineries', The Jakarta Post, 4 May 2013.
- Amahl S. Azwar, 'Govt to rebuff incentive proposal for oil refineries', The Jakarta Post, 20 May 2013.
- Amahl S. Azwar, 'RI oil: From OPEC to net importer', The Jakarta Post, 20 September 2013.
- Raras Cahyafitri, 'Pertamina plans to upgrade oil refineries', The Jakarta Post, 3 October 2014.
- http://www.pertamina.com/index.php/detail/read/our_products Pertamina Products
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to Pertamina.|
- Official Pertamina website (Indonesian) (English)