Article 111 of the Indian constitution stipulates that the President shall give assent to the passed bill by both houses of the parliament or return the bill as soon as possible for reconsideration with his recommendation. The Indian Constitution does not give specific time limit for presidential action on a bill sent by the Parliament. Thus, by indefinitely postponing action on a bill, the president effectively vetoes it. However, if a president receives a bill they had previously vetoed and sent back to Parliament, where such a veto has been overruled by another Parliamentary vote, then such a bill becomes an act within fourteen days of the President's receiving it - regardless of their subsequent action/inaction. Zail Singh exercised a pocket veto to prevent the "Indian Post Office (Amendment) Bill" coming into force when President of India from 1982-1987. However, Supreme Court has not upheld till now the right of president to hold a bill from becoming law.
A pocket veto is a particular type of presidential veto. The U.S. Constitution limits the President's period for decision on whether to sign or veto any legislation to ten days (not including Sundays) while the United States Congress is in session. The Constitution provides for two types of vetoes: a return or regular veto and a pocket veto. A return veto happens when the president sends a bill, along with his objections, back to the houses of Congress. Congress can override the veto by 2/3 vote of both houses, whereupon the bill becomes law. A pocket veto happens if Congress adjourns during the 10-day period, then the bill does not become law. Congress can adjourn and designate an agent to receive veto messages and other communications so that a pocket veto doesn't happen, an action Congresses have taken routinely for decades. If the president neither signs nor vetoes a bill when Congress is in session, the bill becomes law without his signature after 10 days. Article 1, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution states:
If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a Law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a Law.
Courts have never fully clarified when an adjournment by Congress would "prevent" the President from returning a vetoed bill. Some Presidents have interpreted the Constitution to restrict the pocket veto to the adjournment sine die of Congress at the end of the second session of the two-year Congressional term, while others interpreted it to allow intersession and intrasession pocket vetoes. In 1929, the United States Supreme Court ruled in the Pocket Veto Case that a bill had to be returned to the chamber while it is in session and capable of work. While upholding President Calvin Coolidge's pocket veto, the court said that the "determinative question is not whether it is a final adjournment of Congress or an interim adjournment but whether it is one that 'prevents' the President from returning the bill." In 1938, the Supreme Court reversed itself in part in Wright v. U.S., ruling that Congress could designate agents on its behalf to receive veto messages when it was not in session, saying that "the Constitution does not define what shall constitute a return of a bill or deny the use of appropriate agencies in effecting the return." A three-day recess of the Senate was considered a short enough time that the Senate could still act with "reasonable promptitude" on the veto. However, a five-month adjournment would be a long enough period to enable a pocket veto. Within those constraints, there still exists some ambiguity. Presidents have been reluctant to pursue disputed pocket vetoes to the Supreme Court for fear of an adverse ruling that would serve as a precedent in future cases.
George W. Bush
In December 2007, President George W. Bush claimed that he had pocket vetoed H.R. 1585, the "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008", even though the House of Representatives had designated agents to receive presidential messages before adjourning. The bill had been previously passed by veto-proof majorities in both the House and the Senate. If the President had chosen to veto the bill, he would have been required to return it to the chamber whence it originated, which, in this case, was the House of Representatives. The House then could have voted to override the veto, and the Senate could then do likewise. In the event that each house had voted by at least two-thirds majority to override the veto, the bill would have become law.
Then House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) stated: "Congress vigorously rejects any claim that the president has the authority to pocket veto this legislation and will treat any bill returned to the Congress as open to an override vote." On January 1, 2008, Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Press Secretary Scott Stanzel stated: "A pocket veto, as you know, is essentially putting it in your pocket and not taking any action whatsoever. And when Congress — the House is out of session — in this case it's our view that bill then would not become law."
Louis Fisher, a constitutional scholar at the Library of Congress indicated: "The administration would be on weak grounds in court because they would be insisting on what the Framers decidedly rejected: an absolute veto." By "absolute veto" Fisher was referring to the fact that a bill that has been pocket vetoed cannot be overridden. Instead, the bill must be reintroduced into both houses of Congress, and again passed by both houses, an effort which can be very difficult to achieve.
In the end, the House of Representatives did not attempt to override the veto. Instead, in January 2008, the House effectively killed H.R. 1585 by referring it to the Armed Services Committee and passing H.R. 4986, a bill nearly identical to H.R. 1585 but slightly modified to meet the President's objection, which subsequently became law.
This was not the first time that a President has attempted to pocket veto a bill despite the presence of agents to receive his veto message. Both George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton made similar attempts, and Abraham Lincoln used it against the Wade-Davis Bill in 1864.
Because a pocket veto cannot be overridden, it is sometimes used to describe situations where either one person, or a small group, can override the will of a much larger group without consequence. For example, when the California Supreme Court was answering the certified question of intervenor standing in the case of Perry v. Brown, one of the justices expressed concern that affording appellate standing to intervenors would mean that the state would "essentially get a 'pocket veto.'"
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- The U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Clause 2 reads "Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States: If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law."
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