Populism

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Populism is a political doctrine that appeals to the interests and conceptions (such as fears) of the general people, especially contrasting those interests with the interests of the elite.[1] Populist sentiment contributed to the American Revolutionary War, and continued to shape the young United States afterward.[2] While for much of the twentieth century populism was considered[by whom?] to be a political phenomenon mostly in Latin America,[citation needed] since the 1980s populist movements and parties have enjoyed degrees of success in First World democracies such as Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, and Scandinavian countries.

Political parties and politicians often use the terms populist and populism as pejoratives against their opponents. Such a view sees populism as merely empathising with the public, (usually through rhetoric or "unrealistic" proposals) in order to increase appeal across the political spectrum (cf. demagogy).[3]

Academic definitions[edit]

Academic definitions of populism have varied widely over the centuries, and the term has often been employed in loose and inconsistent ways to denote appeals to "the people", "demagogy" and "catch-all" politics or as a label for new types of parties whose classifications are unclear. A factor traditionally held to diminish the value of "populism" as a category has been that, as Margaret Canovan notes in her 1981 study Populism, unlike conservatives or socialists, populists rarely call themselves "populists" and usually reject the term when it is applied to them.[4]

Nonetheless, in recent years academic scholars have produced definitions of populism which enable populist identification and comparison. Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell define populism as an ideology that "pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who were together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity, and voice".[5]

Rather than viewing populism in terms of specific social bases, economic programs, issues, or electorates — as discussions of right-wing populism have tended to do[6] — this type of definition is in line with the approaches of scholars such as Ernesto Laclau,[7] Pierre-Andre Taguieff,[8] Yves Meny and Yves Surel,[9] who have all sought to focus on populism per se, rather than treating it simply as an appendage of other ideologies.

Although in the US and Europe, it currently tends to be associated with right-wing parties, the central tenet of populism that democracy should reflect the pure and undiluted will of the people, means it can sit easily with ideologies of both right and left. However, while leaders of populist movements in recent decades have claimed to be on either the left or the right of the political spectrum, there are also many populists who reject such classifications and claim not to be "left wing", "centrist" or "right wing."[10][11][12]

Although "populist" is often used pejoratively in the media and in political debate, exceptions to this do exist, notably in the United States. In this case, it appears likely that this is due to the memories and traditions of earlier democratic movements (for example, farmers' movements, New Deal reform movements, and the civil rights movement) that were often called populist, by supporters and outsiders alike.[13]

Styles and methods[edit]

Some scholars argue that populist organizing for empowerment represents the return of older "Aristotelian" politics of horizontal interactions among equals who are different, for the sake of public problem solving.[14][15] Populism has taken left-wing, right-wing, and even centrist[16] forms, as well as forms of politics that bring together groups and individuals of diverse partisan views.[17] The use of populist rhetoric in the United States has recently included references such as "the powerful trial lawyer lobby",[18][19] "the liberal elite", or "the Hollywood elite".[20] Examples of populist rhetoric on the other side of the political spectrum is the anti-corporate greed views of the Occupy Wall Street movement and the theme of "Two Americas" in the 2004 Presidential Democratic Party campaign of John Edwards.

Populists are seen by some politicians as a largely democratic and positive force in society, while a wing of scholarship in political science contends that populist mass movements are irrational and introduce instability into the political process. Margaret Canovan argues that both these polar views are faulty, and has defined two main branches of modern populism worldwide—agrarian and political—and mapped out seven disparate sub-categories:

Agrarian

Political

  • Populist democracy, including calls for more political participation through reforms such as the use of popular referendums.
  • Politicians' populism marked by non-ideological appeals for "the people" to build a unified coalition.
  • Reactionary populism, such as the white backlash harvested by George Wallace, or the black backlash harvested by the Black Panther Party.
  • Populist dictatorship, such as that established by Getúlio Vargas in Brazil.[21]

In addition to Canovan's list that only lists right-wing political populist reactions, leftist movements such as the Cultural Revolution and Cambodia's "Year Zero" campaign would also be examples of political populism.

Fascism and populism[edit]

Scholars have argued that populist elements have sometimes appeared in far-right authoritarian or fascist movements.[22][23][24][25][26][27] Conspiracist scapegoating employed by various populist movements can create "a seedbed for fascism."[28] National socialist populism interacted with and facilitated fascism in interwar Germany.[29] In this case, distressed middle–class populists during the pre-Nazi Weimar period mobilized their anger at government and big business. The Nazis "parasitized the forms and themes of the populists and moved their constituencies far to the right through ideological appeals involving demagoguery, scapegoating, and conspiracism."[30] According to Fritzsche:

The Nazis expressed the populist yearnings of middle–class constituents and at the same time advocated a strong and resolutely anti-Marxist mobilization....Against "unnaturally" divisive parties and querulous organized interest groups, National Socialists cast themselves as representatives of the commonwealth, of an allegedly betrayed and neglected German public....Breaking social barriers of status and caste, and celebrating at least rhetorically the populist ideal of the people's community...[31]

In Argentina in the 1940s, a local brand of fascist populism emerged known as Peronism, after its leader Juan Perón. It emerged from an intellectual fascist movement in the 1920s and 1930s that delegitimized democracy.[32]

History in Europe[edit]

Classical populism[edit]

The word populism is derived from the Latin word populus, which means people in English (in the sense of "folk", "nation", as in: "The Roman People" (populus Romanus), not in the sense of "multiple individual persons" as in: "There are people visiting us today"). Therefore, populism espouses government by the people as a whole (that is to say, the masses). This is in contrast to elitism, aristocracy, synarchy or plutocracy, each of which is an ideology that espouse government by a small, privileged group above the masses.

Populism has been a common political phenomenon throughout history. The Populares were an unofficial faction in the Roman senate whose supporters were known for their populist agenda. Some of the best known of these were Tiberius Gracchus, Gaius Marius, Julius Caesar and Caesar Augustus, all of whom eventually used referendums to bypass the Roman Senate and appeal to the people directly.

Early modern period[edit]

Populism rose during the Reformation; Protestant groups like the Anabaptists formed ideas about ideal theocratic societies, in which peasants would be able to read the Bible themselves. Attempts to establish these societies were made during the German Peasants' War (1524–1525) and the Münster Rebellion (1534–1535). The peasant movement ultimately failed as cities and nobles made their own peace with the princely armies, which restored the old order under the nominal overlordship of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, represented in German affairs by his younger brother Ferdinand.

The same conditions contributed to the outbreak of the English Revolution of 1642–1651, also known as the English Civil War. Conditions led to a proliferation of ideologies and political movements among peasants, self-employed artisans, and working-class people in England. Many of these groups had a dogmatic Protestant religious bent. They included Puritans and the Levellers.[citation needed]

Religious revival[edit]

Romanticism, the anxiety against rationalism, broadened after the beginnings of the European and Industrial Revolutions because of cultural, social, and political insecurity. Romanticism led directly to a strong popular desire to bring about religious revival, nationalism and populism. The ensuing religious revival eventually blended into political populism and nationalism, becoming at times a single entity and a powerful force of public will for change. This paradigm shift was marked by people looking for security and community because of a strong emotional need to escape from anxiety and to believe in something larger than themselves.[citation needed]

The revival of religiosity all over Europe played an important role in bringing people to populism and nationalism. In France, François-René de Chateaubriand provided the opening shots of Catholic revivalism as he opposed enlightenment's materialism with the "mystery of life", the human need for redemption.[33] In Germany, Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher promoted pietism by stating that religion was not the institution, but a mystical piety and sentiment with Christ as the mediating figure raising the human consciousness above the mundane to God's level.[34] In England, John Wesley's Methodism split with the Anglican church because of its emphasis on the salvation of the masses as a key to moral reform, which Wesley saw as the answer to the social problems of the day.[35]

Rejection of ultramontanism[edit]

Chateaubriand's beginning brought about two Catholic Revivals in France: first, a conservative revival led by Joseph de Maistre, which defended ultramontanism, which is a religious philosophy placing strong emphasis on the supremacy of the Pope, and a second populist revival led by Hugues Felicité Robert de Lamennais, an excommunicated priest. This religious populism opposed ultramontanism and emphasized a church community dependent upon all the people, not just the elite. It stressed that church authority should come from the bottom up and that the church should alleviate suffering, not merely accept it. Both of these religious principles are based on populism.[36]

Latin America[edit]

Populism has been an important force in Latin American political history, where many charismatic leaders have emerged since the beginning of the 20th century, as the paramountcy of agrarian oligarchies had been dislocated by the onset of industrial capitalism, allowing for the emergence of an industrial bourgeoisie and the activation of an urban working class,[37] causing the emergence of reformist and multi-class nationalist politics, centered on a charismatic leadership,[38] such as Aprismo in Peru, the MNR in Bolivia, and the political movements gravitating around Getúlio Vargas in Brazil, Perón in Argentina, Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico, Ecuador's Velasco Ibarra and others.[39] Ideologically, Latin American populism, with its emphasis on nation-building under an authoritarian leadership as a prerequisite for technological modernization, betrayed the earlier influence of Comtean positivism. Socially, for many authors—such as Brazil's Octavio Ianni—populism should be understood as the political alliance between an emerging industrial bourgeoisie and a newly organizing urban working class, in which the former accepts social reforming for the latter's sake as long as the working class remains politically subordinated to both a more or less authoritarian State and private enterprise,[40] in a process of controlled inclusion of the "masses" into the political system,[41] a co-opting process some Marxist authors like Brazil's Francisco Weffort ascertain was accepted by the newly urbanized working class given their lack of a previously developed class consciousness.[42]

Despite efforts to charter an ideological pedigree to Populism in Latin America, as has been attempted by some, working, e.g., with concepts taken from Perón's Third Position.,[43] Latin American countries have not always had a clear and consistent political ideology under populism. Populist practitioners and movements in Latin America usually adapt politically to the prevailing mood of the nation, moving within the ideological spectrum from left to right many times during their political lives. If populist movements in 1930s and 1940s Latin America had apparent fascist overtones and based themselves on authoritarian politics, as was the case of Vargas' Estado Novo dictatorship in Brazil (1937–1945),[44] or of some of Peron's openly expressed sympathies,[45] in the 1950s populism adapted—not without considerable unease from its political leadership[46]—to heightened levels of working-class mobilization. Therefore it is not surprising that 1960s populism was associated mainly with radical, left-leaning petty-bourgeois nationalism, which emptied the State of its function as a coercive class-rule apparatus and saw it instead as an organ of representation of the Nation as a whole.[47] Such was the case, for instance, of the Goulart government (1961–1964) in Brazil, Goulart being described as a fiery populist who identified—mainly rhetorically—with the dispossessed and tried to foster a reformist agenda through ties to the organized Left.[48] The fact that Goulart was eventually ousted by the military shows that, in the views of some authors, other populist leaders of the time faced a jeopardy: they were reformists who, in the pursuit of their agenda, had to encourage popular mobilization and class conflict they ultimately abhorred.[49] Consequently populism was eventually identified by the 1970s military dictatorships as "demagogery" and as a risk to the stability of the existing social order.[50]

If "left", reformist and nationalist populism never died out altogether during the 1970s Latin American military dictatorships—as offered proof by the prompt and successful return of a populist like Brazil's Leonel Brizola to electoral politics in the early 1980s[51]—a different streak of populism appeared in the post-military dictatorship era. This 1980s populism, in the persons of leaders like Argentina's Carlos Menem or Brazil's Fernando Collor, adapted itself to prevailing neoliberal policies of economic adjustment, setting aside nationalistic reforms and retaining the need for charismatic leadership policies, mass support and a concern for the plight of the "common people".[52] In the 1990s and 2000s, with the emergence of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela—albeit Chavez refuses himself to be labelled as "populist"[53]—reformist and nationalism Latin American populism has resurfaced with new patterns, as what is called by some authors socialist populism[54][55] that appeals to masses of poor by promising redistributive policies[55] and state control of the nation's energy resources.[56]—a blueprint that had already appeared, however—albeit with no openly "socialist" rhetoric, viz., in the nationalist policies—including the launch of the State-owned oil-company Petrobrás—that were the hallmark of Vargas' second term as Brazil's democratically elected president (1951–1954) and that led to his eventual suicide.[57]

In some countries, Populism has been fiscally supported in Latin America during periods of growth such as the 1950s and 1960s and during commodity price booms such as in oil and precious metals. Political leaders could gather followers among the popular classes with broad redistributive programs during these boom times. Conversely, in others countries, Populism has been historically associated with countering the relative decline of export agriculture with deficit spending and import-substitution policies aimed at developing an internal market for industrial consumer goods.[58] Populism in Latin America has been sometimes criticized for the fiscal policies of many of its leaders, but has also been defended for having allowed historically weak states to alleviate disorder and achieve a tolerable degree of stability while initiating large-scale industrialization. Though populist fiscal and monetary policies may be criticized by conservative economic historians and policy makers, who see in it the ultimately dysfunctional subordination of economic policy to political goals,[59] some authors acknowledge populism to have allowed non-radical leaders and parties to co-opt the radical ideas of the masses so as to redirect them in a non revolutionary direction.[60] It's generally regarded that populists hope "to reform the system, not to overthrow it".[61]

Often adapting a nationalist vocabulary and rhetorically convincing manner, populism was used to appeal to broad masses while remaining ideologically ambivalent. Notwithstanding, there have been notable exceptions. 21st-century Latin-American populist leaders have had a decidedly—even if mostly rhetorical[62]—socialist bent.[54][55]

When populists take strong positions on economic philosophies such as capitalism versus socialism, the position sparks strong emotional responses regarding how best to manage the nation's current and future social and economic position. Mexico's 2006 Presidential election was hotly debated among supporters and opponents of populist candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador.[63]

Inequality[edit]

Populism in Latin American countries has both an economic and an ideological edge. Populism in Latin America has mostly addressed the problem, not of capitalist economic development as such but its inclusiveness,[64] in the backdrop of highly unequal societies in which people are divided between a relative few wealthy groups and masses of poor, even in the case of societies such as Argentina, where strong and educated middle classes are a significant segment of the population.[65] Therefore the key role of the State in Latin American populism, as an institution, is to mediate between traditional elites and the "people" in general.[66] In appealing to the masses of poor people prior to gaining power, populists may promise widely-demanded food, housing, employment, basic social services, and income redistribution. Once in political power, they may not always be financially or politically able to fulfill all these promises. However, they are very often successful in providing many broad and basic services.[67][68]

US policy[edit]

Since one of the ideological hallmarks of Latin American populism was the empowerment of the national and its identification with the state,[69] including nationalization of the land, natural resources and key industries as common practice,[70] it was seen almost from the start by American policy makers to offer a challenge to US hegemony over the Americas. The US has intervened in Latin American governments on many occasions where populism was seen threatening its interests: the 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, when the populist Arbenz government was overthrown by a coup backed by the American company United Fruit and the American ambassador in 1954, and the support given by the US to the 1964 Brazilian coup d'état[71] are just two cases of American intervention. Another example of US intervention has been seen in Colombia, particularly since the assassination of the populist leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in April 1948. Gaitán supported land reform and other populist initiatives, and his murder is assumed to have foreclosed subsequent development of populism in mainstream Colombian politics.[72]

Populist socialism[edit]

Hugo Chavez, founder of the PSUV and former President of Venezuela.

Populism has remained a significant force in Latin America. Populism has recently been reappearing on the left with promises of far-reaching socialist changes as seen in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez, and in Bolivia under Evo Morales- a process, however, seen by some as contradictory as it tries to meld the populist traditional celebration of folk wisdom and charismatic leadership with doctrinaire socialism.[73] And, in fact, "socialist" changes in today's Venezuela have mostly included the expenditure of oil revenue to benefit the working poor as a form of social welfare to help enable an eventual (and imprecise) socialist transformation. For some authors, as far as ideology is concerned, Chávez's political blueprint is more of a "throwback" to traditional populist nationalism and redistributivism.[74] The Venezuelan government often spars verbally with the United States and accuses it of attempting to overthrow Chavez after supporting a failed coup against him. Chavez had been one of the most outspoken and blunt critics of U.S. foreign policy. Nevertheless, a large commodity trade continues between Venezuela and the U.S. because of the economic constraints of oil delivery and the proximity of the two countries.[75]

As populist tradition ascertains the paramountcy of the "people" (instead of class) as a political subject,[76] it suffices to say that, in the 21st century, the large numbers of voters living in extreme poverty in Latin America has remained a bastion of support for new populist candidates. By early 2008 governments with varying forms of populism and with some form of left leaning (albeit vague)social democratic or democratic socialist platform had come to dominate virtually all Latin American nations with the exceptions of Colombia, El Salvador and Mexico.[77] This political shift includes both more developed nations such as Argentina's Front for Victory and Chile's Socialist Party, and smaller income countries like Bolívia with its Movement towards Socialism and Paraguay with the Patriotic Alliance for Change. Even in middle-income Mexico, a populist candidate like López Obrador, albeit defeated, nevertheless appeared as part of a strong neopopulist reaction.[78] Nevertheless, populist candidates have been more successful in poorer Latin American countries such as Bolivia (under Morales), Ecuador (under Rafael Correa) and Nicaragua (under Daniel Ortega). By the use of broad grassroots movements populist groups have managed to gain power from better organized, funded and entrenched groups such as the Bolivian Nationalist Democratic Action and the Paraguayan Colorado Party.[79]

Countries in Latin America with high rates of poverty, whose governments maintain and support unpopular privatizations and more orthodox economic policies that don't deliver general societal gains, will be under pressure from populist politicians and movements[80] accusing them of benefiting the upper and upper-middle classes[81][82] and of being allied to foreign and business interests.[83][84]

Mexico[edit]

In Mexico, Andres Manuel López Obrador's candidacy sparked very emotional debates throughout the country regarding policies that affect ideology, class, equality, wealth, and society. Andres Manuel López Obrador's most controversial economic policies included his promise to expand monthly stipends to the poor and elderly from Mexico City to the rest of the country and to re-negotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement to protect the Mexican poor.

The ruling party in Mexico, the National Action Party (PAN), portrayed him as a danger to Mexico's hard-earned economic stability. In criticizing his redistributive promises that would create new entitlement programs somewhat similar to social security in the US (though not as broad in scope) and his trade policies that would not fully uphold prior agreements (such as NAFTA), the economic debate between capitalists and socialists became a major part of the debate. Felipe Calderón, the PAN candidate, portrayed himself as not just a standard-bearer for recent economic policy, but as a more proactive candidate, to distance himself from the main criticisms of his predecessor Vicente Fox regarding inaction. He labeled himself the "jobs president" and promised greater national wealth for all through steady future growth, fiscal prudence, international trade, and balanced government spending.[citation needed]

During the immediate aftermath of the tight elections in which the country's electoral court was hearing challenges to the vote tally that had Calderon winning, López Obrador showed the considerable influence over the masses that are a trademark of populist politicians. He effectively led huge demonstrations, filling the central plaza with masses of sympathizers who supported his challenge. The demonstrations lasted for several months and eventually dissipated after the electoral court did not find sufficient cause from the challenges presented to overturn the results.[85][86]

Canada[edit]

For the populist movement in Canada, see Populism in Canada.

In Canada, there are such popular political parties which have populism features.

United States[edit]

There have been several versions of a populist party in the United States, some inspired by the Populist Party of the 1890s. This was the party of the early U.S. populist movement in which millions of farmers and other working people successfully enacted their anti-trust agenda.[citation needed]

Other early populist political parties in the United States included the Greenback Party, the Progressive Party of 1912 led by Theodore Roosevelt, the Progressive Party of 1924 led by Robert M. La Follette, Sr., and the Share Our Wealth movement of Huey Long in 1933–35[citation needed].

George Wallace, Four-Term Governor of Alabama, led a populist movement that carried five states and won 13.5% of the popular vote in the 1968 presidential election. Campaigning against intellectuals and liberal reformers, Wallace gained a large share of the white working class vote in Democratic primaries in 1972.[87][88]

Populism continues to be a force in modern U.S. politics, especially in the 1992 and 1996 elections. The third-party presidential campaigns of billionaire Ross Perot[citation needed]. The 1996, 2000, 2004, and the 2008 presidential campaigns of Ralph Nader had a strong populist cast[citation needed]. The 2004 campaigns of Dennis Kucinich[89][90][91] and Al Sharpton also had populist elements. The 2004 and 2008 Democratic presidential candidate John Edwards has been described by many[92] (and by himself) as a "one economic community, one commonwealth"[92] populist.

Comparison between earlier surges of populism and those of today are complicated by shifts in what are thought to be the interests of the common people.

In 1984, the Populist Party name was revived by Willis Carto, and was used in 1988 as a vehicle for the presidential campaign of former Ku Klux Klan leader, and later member of both the Republican Party and the Democratic Party, David Duke. Right-wing Patriot movement organizer Bo Gritz was briefly Duke's running mate. This incarnation of populism was widely regarded as a vehicle for white supremacist recruitment. In this instance, populism was maligned by the use of a definition of "the people" that was not the prevailing definition.[citation needed]

Another populist mechanism was the initiative and referendum driven term limits movement of the early 1990s. In every state where term limits were on the ballot, the measure to limit incumbency in Congress passed. The average vote was 67% in favor. However, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down term limits in 1995 in the court case U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.[93]

In 1995, the Reform Party of the United States of America (RPUSA) was organized after the populist presidential campaign of Ross Perot in 1992. In the year 2000, an intense fight for the presidential nomination made Patrick J. Buchanan the RPUSA standard bearer. As result of his nomination as party candidate there were many party splits, not only from Buchanan supporters after he left the party, but also moderates, progressivists and libertarians around Jesse Ventura who refused to collaborate with the Buchanan candidacy. Since then the party's fortunes have markedly declined.

In the 2000s, new populist parties were formed in America. One was the Populist Party of America in 2002; another was the Populist Party of Maryland formed to support Ralph Nader in 2004, which ran candidates for governor, lieutenant governor, U.S. Senate and state delegate in the 2006 elections. Other examples are the American Populist Party, founded in 2009, and the American Populist Renaissance, founded in 2005.[94][95] The American Moderation Party, also formed in 2005, adopted several populist ideals, chief among them working against multinational neo-corporatism.

Much of the Tea Party movement has used populist rhetoric, particularly in areas and states where Democrats are in power. For instance, in New York, Carl Paladino and his conservative-populist Taxpayers Party of New York have used the motto "Paladino for the People" and have attempted to woo common people to vote for them by pitting them against the state government and the special interests that have influence in it.

In the most recent example of populist movements, participants of the Occupy movement chose the slogan "We are the 99%". The Occupy leadership used the phrase "the 1%" to refer to the 1% of Americans who are most wealthy. The Occupy movement believed that the 1% was creating economic instability and undermining the social safety nets implemented during the New Deal. Political science professors Joe Lowndes and Dorian Warren were among those to pose the question, "Is Occupy Wall Street a Populist Movement?". They both concluded that it was the "first major populist movement on the U.S. left since the 1930s."[96]

Germany[edit]

Further information: Völkisch movement

Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, a Lutheran Minister, a professor at the University of Berlin and the "father of gymnastics", introduced the concept of Volkstum, a racial notion that draws on the essence of a people that was lost in the Industrial Revolution. Adam Mueller went a step further by positing the state as a bigger totality than the government institution. This paternalistic vision of aristocracy concerned with social orders had a dark side in that the opposite force of modernity was represented by the Jews, who were said to be eating away at the state.[97] Populism also played a role in mobilizing middle class support for the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany.[98] In this case, distressed middle–class populists during the pre-Nazi Weimar period mobilized their anger at government and big business. According to Fritzsche:

The Nazis expressed the populist yearnings of middle–class constituents and at the same time advocated a strong and resolutely anti-Marxist mobilization.... Against "unnaturally" divisive parties and querulous organized interest groups, National Socialists cast themselves as representatives of the commonwealth, of an allegedly betrayed and neglected German public....[b]reaking social barriers of status and caste, and celebrating at least rhetorically the populist ideal of the people's community...[31]

France[edit]

In the late 18th century, the French Revolution, though led by wealthy intellectuals, could also be described as a manifestation of populist sentiment against the elitist excesses and privileges of the Ancien Régime.[99]

In France, the populist and nationalist picture was more mystical, metaphysical and literarian in nature.[100] Historian Jules Michelet (sometimes called a populist[101]) fused nationalism and populism by positing the people as a mystical unity who are the driving force of history in which the divinity finds its purpose.[99] Michelet viewed history as a representation of the struggle between spirit and matter; he claims France has a special place because the French became a people through equality, liberty, and fraternity. Because of this, he believed, the French people can never be wrong. Michelet's ideas are not socialism or rational politics, and his populism always minimizes, or even masks, social class differences.

In the 1950s, Pierre Poujade was the leader of the right-wing populist movement Union de Defense Commercants et Artisans (UDCA).[102] Jean Marie Le Pen (who was UDCA's youngest deputy in the 1950s)[103] can be characterized as right-wing populist[104] or extreme-right populist.[103] National Front is one of the successful populist party in Europe.

Italy[edit]

Silvio Berlusconi, leader of Forza Italia and Prime Minister of Italy for almost ten years.

An example of modern populism can be studied in current Italian politics. When Silvio Berlusconi entered in politics in 1994 with his new party Forza Italia, he created a new kind of populism focused on media control.[105] Berlusconi and his allies won three elections, in 1994, 2001 and, with his new right-wing People of Freedom party, in 2008; he was Prime Minister of Italy for almost ten years.[106]

Another Italian populist party is the Lega Nord,[107] founded in 1991 as a federation of several regional parties of northern (and central-northern) Italy, most of which had sprung up and expanded their share of the electorate during the 1980s. Lega Nord was the principal ally of Berlusconi's parties including, most recently, People of Freedom. The Lega Nord's political program advocates the transformation of Italy into a federal state, fiscal federalism and greater regional autonomy, especially for the Northern regions. At times it has advocated the secession of the North, which it calls Padania. The Lega Nord also fights for the implementation of stricter rules and laws in order to contrast the expansion of Islam into Europe. It is opposed to Turkish membership of the European Union and is considered one of the eurosceptic movements. It also emphasizes the fight against illegal immigration. Lega Nord's best electoral result has been in 1996 general election, where it gained the 10.8% of votes. In the 2008 election Lega supported Berlusconi's right-wing coalition, helping him win, having gained 8.3% of votes, 60 deputies and 26 senators.[108]

In 2009 Beppe Grillo, a former comedian, blogger and activist, founded the Five Star Movement. It advocates direct democracy, free access to the Internet, and condemns corruption. The M5S's programme also contains elements of right-wing populism and American-style libertarianism. The party is considered populist, ecologist, and partially Eurosceptic.[109] Grillo himself described the Five Star Movement as being populist in nature during a political meeting he held in Rome on October 30, 2013.[110] In 2013 Italian election the Five Star Movement gained 25.5% of votes, with 109 deputies and 54 senators, becoming the main populist and Eurosceptic party in the European Union.[111]

Hungary[edit]

In Hungary, the right-wing Fidesz has its political figures of right-wing populism, which won the 2010 elections with supermajority.

See also[edit]

Footnotes[edit]

  1. ^ Princeton University http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=populism
  2. ^ For the People: American Populist Movements from the Revolution to the 1850s. Formisano, Robert P. http://books.google.com/books?id=HzHorlMiLpMC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false
  3. ^ The Irish Times. O'Halloran, Marie. http://www.irishtimes.com/news/ff-education-bill-a-populist-stunt-says-government-1.963336 January 21, 2013
  4. ^ Canovan, Margaret, 1981,Populism, New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, p.5
  5. ^ Albertazzi, Daniele and Duncan McDonnell, 2008, Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy, New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, p.3
  6. ^ Kitschelt, Herbert (with McGann, Anthony), 1995, The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis, Ann Arbor: University of Michighan Press
  7. ^ Laclau, Ernesto, 2005, On Populist Reason, London: Verso
  8. ^ Taguieff, Pierre-Andre, 2002, L'illusion populiste, Paris: Berg International
  9. ^ Meny, Yves and Surel, Yves, 2002, Democracies and the Populist Challenge, London: Palgrave Macmillan
  10. ^ Canovan, Margaret. 1981. Populism.
  11. ^ Betz, Hans-Georg. 1994. Radical Right-wing Populism in Western Europe.
  12. ^ Kazin, Michael. 1995.The Populist Persuasion: An American History.
  13. ^ Boyte, Populism and John Dewey
  14. ^ Harry C. Boyte. "Introduction: Reclaiming Populism as a Different Kind of Politics." The Good Society 21.2 (2012): 173-176. Project MUSE. Web. 21 Oct. 2013. <http://muse.jhu.edu/>(login needed to view journal)
  15. ^ Harry C. Boyte, "A Different Kind of Politics", Dewey Lecture, University of Michigan, 2002. Online at Project MUSE (login needed to see PDF file)
  16. ^ "The basic ideology of the middle class is populism.... Their ideal was an independent small property owning class consisting of merchants, mechanics, and farmers. This element...now designated as middle class, sponsored a system of private property, profit, and competition on an entirely different basis from that conceived by capitalism....From its very inception it opposed "big business" or what has now become known capitalism." David J. Saposs, quoted in "Political Man", Lipset
  17. ^ Richard L. Wood, Faith in Action: Religion, Race, and Democratic Organizing in America, 2002
  18. ^ [1] Bob Dole, Column Right: Ignore the Lawyers, Help the People – The powerful trial lawyers lobby must not be allowed to stymie tort reform. Los Angeles Times, April 27, 1995
  19. ^ Trial Lawyer Lobby Scores Several Big Victories — But Signs Of Hope In A Tough Election Year
  20. ^ And The Winner Is…The Hollywood Elite, January 27, 2009
  21. ^ Canovan, Populism, pp. 13, 128–138
  22. ^ Ferkiss 1957.
  23. ^ Dobratz and Shanks–Meile 1988
  24. ^ Berlet and Lyons, 2000
  25. ^ Peter Fritzsche (1990). Rehearsals for fascism: populism and political mobilization in Weimar Germany. Oxford University Press. 
  26. ^ Catherine Fieschi (2004). Fascism, Populism and the French Fifth Republic: In the Shadow of Democracy. Manchester U.P. 
  27. ^ Gino Germani (1978). Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism. Transaction Publishers. 
  28. ^ Mary Rupert 1997: 96.
  29. ^ Fritzsche 1990: 149–150.
  30. ^ Berlet 2005.
  31. ^ a b Fritzsche 1990: 233–235
  32. ^ Cyprian Blamires (2006). World Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. p. 56. 
  33. ^ Three Minute Declamations for College Men, H. C. Davis,J. C. Bridgeman, The Mysteries of Life, Chateaubriand
  34. ^ "THE ROOTS AND FRUITS OF PIETISM", Ronald R. Feuerhahn, Concordia Historical Institute & the Luther Academy, September 17–18, 1998, PIEPER LECTURES 1998
  35. ^ Methodism and the Mob – what it really takes to change a culture, Lex Loizides' Blog, November 30, 2009
  36. ^ Origins of liberal dominance: state, church, and party in nineteenth-century Europe, Andrew Gould
  37. ^ Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Bureaucratic authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966–1973, in comparative perspective. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, ISBN 0-520-04260-3, pages 9/10
  38. ^ John D. French, The Brazilian workers' ABC: class conflict and alliances in modern São Paulo. University of North Carolina Press, 1992, ISBN 0-8078-4368-7, page 4.
  39. ^ Walter Laqueur,ed. Fascism: A Readers' Guide : Analysis, Interpretations, Bibliography. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, ISBN 0-520-03642-5, page 255
  40. ^ Rafael Torres Quintero & Rafael Quintero López, El mito del populismo: análisis de los fundamentos del Estado ecuatoriano.Quito: Universidad Central del Ecuador, 1980, page 27
  41. ^ Mehmet Uğur & Nergis Canefe, eds., Turkey and European integration: accession prospects and issues. London, Routledge, 2005, ISBN 0-415-32656-7, page 51
  42. ^ Alberto Aggio, Agnaldo de Sousa Barbosa, Hercídia Mara Facuri Coelho Lambert, Política e sociedade no Brasil, 1930–1964. São Paulo: Anna Blume, 2002, ISBN 85-7419-242-2, page 74
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  45. ^ Íñigo Bolinaga, Breve historia del fascismo. Madrid: Nowtilus, 2008, ISBN 978-84-9763-452-6, page 242
  46. ^ In 1952, viz., Vargas' Labor Minister in Brazil saw his tasks in fervently anticommunist terms: to battle ideologies opposed to "traditions" of social peace—John D. French, Drowning in laws: labor law and Brazilian political culture. University of North Carolina Press, 2004, ISBN 0-8078-5527-8, page 81
  47. ^ Francisco Weffort, O populismo na política brasileira. Rio de Janeiro:Paz e Terra, 1978, page 43.
  48. ^ Stephen G. Rabe, The most dangerous area in the world: John F. Kennedy confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999, ISBN 0-8078-4764-X, page 66
  49. ^ John D. French, The Brazilian workers' ABC: class conflict and alliances in modern São Paulo, page 262
  50. ^ Mary P. Lassiter,ed., Economics, politics and social issues in Latin America. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2007, ISBN 978-1-60021-182-9, page 25
  51. ^ Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–1985. New York: Oxford University Press US, 1989, ISBN 0-19-506316-3, page 265
  52. ^ Jolle Demmers, Alex E. Fernández Jilberto, Barbara Hogenboom, eds. Miraculous metamorphoses: the neoliberalization of Latin American populism. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001, ISBN 1-85649-887-5, page 11
  53. ^ Kirk Andrew Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-76503-9, page 51
  54. ^ a b Héctor E. Schamis – Populism, socialism and democratic institutions
  55. ^ a b c ARTICLE: Populism and Anti-Americanism in Modern Latin America, by Justin Lance
  56. ^ Populist Left in South America, The Big Question: Should We Be Worried by the Rise of the Populist Left in South America?, By David Usborne, The Independent UK, Thursday 04 May 2006
  57. ^ Thomas F. O'Brien, The century of U.S. capitalism in Latin America. University of New Mexico Press, 2002, ISBN 0-8263-1996-3, page 101
  58. ^ Luiz Renato Vieira, Consagrados e malditos: os intelectuais e a Editora Civilização Brasileira. Brasília: Thsaurus, 1998, ISBN 85-7062-139-6, page 41
  59. ^ Rüdiger Dornbusch & Sebastian Edwards, eds. The Macroeconomics of populism in Latin America. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991, ISBN 0-226-15844-6, page 16
  60. ^ Populist Policies In The Transition To Democracy, Daniel Mejía and Carlos Esteban Posada
  61. ^ Rüdiger Dornbusch & Sebastian Edwards, eds. The Macroeconomics of populism in Latin America, 47.
  62. ^ Jeffery R Webber,"Venezuela under Chávez: The Prospects and Limitations of Twenty-First Century Socialism, 1999–2009", Études socialistes, Vol 6, No 1 (2010)
  63. ^ January 24, 2007: Mexican Political Polarization Limited to Elites Despite Contested Election, APSA Press Release
  64. ^ Dornbusch & Edwards, The Macroeconomics of populism in Latin America, page 1
  65. ^ CURRENT ECONOMIC ISSUES IN ARGENTINA A TEACHING MODULE, Z. Edward O'Relley, November, 2001
  66. ^ Elizabeth Montes Garcés, ed., Relocating identities in Latin American cultures. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2007, ISBN 1-55238-209-7, page 74
  67. ^ DEALING WITH POLITICAL FERMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: THE POPULIST REVIVAL, THE EMERGENCE OF THE CENTER, AND IMPLICATIONS OR U.S. POLICY
  68. ^ The Impact of "Populism" on Social, Political, and Economic Development in the Hemisphere, Vladimir Torres
  69. ^ James M. Malloy, ed. Authoritarianism and corporatism in Latin America. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977, ISBN 0-8229-5275-0, page 11
  70. ^ Víctor Alba, Historia del movimiento obrero en America latina. Eng. trans., Stanford: University of Stanford Press, 1968, page 31
  71. ^ Brian Loveman, For la Patria: politics and the armed forces in Latin America. Wilmington: Scholary Resources, Inc., 1999, ISBN 0-8420-2773-4, page 186
  72. ^ Robert C. Neville, ed., The human condition. Albany: SUNY Press, 2002, ISBN 0-7914-5346-4, page 25
  73. ^ Kirk Andrew Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, ISBN 978-0-521-76503-9, page 84
  74. ^ Steve Ellner & Daniel Hellinger, eds., Venezuelan politics in the Chávez era: class, polarization, and conflict. Boulder: Lyne Rienner, 2003, ISBN 1-58826-297-9, page 67
  75. ^ Venezuela-US trade under the microscope, By Greg Morsbach
  76. ^ Carlos De La Torre, Populist Seduction in Latin America, 2nd. Edition. Ohio University, 2010, ISBN 978-0-89680-279-7, page xii
  77. ^ More leftist leaders in Latin America – Americas – MSNBC.com
  78. ^ Scott Mainwaring &Timothy Scully, eds., Democratic Governance in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010, ISBN 978-0-8047-6084-3, page 254
  79. ^ Latin America gets another leftist leader Fernando Lugo's victory in Paraguay adds to the leftward tilt
  80. ^ Patricio Navia and Ignacio Walker, Chapter 8, Political Institutions, Populism, and Democracy in Latin America, in Scott and Timothy R. Scully (ed), Democratic Governance in Latin America, Stanford University Press, 2008, pg. 2 – 3
  81. ^ En 16 años, los gobiernos neoliberales democratizaron el hambre. Discurso de Daniel Ortega en Estelí, Radio La Primerísima, 7 julio de 2007
  82. ^ Pemex y los GOBIERNOS NEOLIBERALES, ALBERTO TORRENTERA
  83. ^ Bolivia y el mandato progresista en Latinoamérica, Mark Engler and Benjamin Dangl, 13 de abril de 2006
  84. ^ La Reforma del Estado desde la perspectiva neoliberal, Roberto ESCAMILLA PÉREZ, jueves 3 de abril de 2008, ¡Babor!
  85. ^ Dog Brothers Public Forum, Mexico
  86. ^ The Challenge of Closely Fought Elections, Whitehead, Laurence Project MUSE – Journal of Democracy, Volume 18, Number 2, April 2007
  87. ^ Behind the backlash: white working-class politics in Baltimore, 1940–1980 Por Kenneth D. Durr, pg 183
  88. ^ America's Forgotten Majority, June 2000, by Joel Rogers and Ruy Teixeira
  89. ^ Willie Nelson's populist beliefs lead him to underdog Kucinich., Star-Telegraf
  90. ^ Gore Vidal for Dennis Kucinich: A farsighted populist and pacifist., The Nation November 8, 2007 01:44 PM
  91. ^ Kucinich Took On Powerful Interests in Mayoral Race, by Cheryl Corley, September 26, 2007
  92. ^ a b February 7, 2007, three forms of populism in the 2008 campaign (scroll down)
  93. ^ Congressional Term Limits Struck Down; Supreme Court's 5–4 Ruling Upsets Laws in 23 States, Joan Biskupic, The Washington Post, May 23, 1995
  94. ^ American Populist Renaissance on MySpace, MySpace Groups
  95. ^ American Populist Renaissance official website
  96. ^ Joe Lowndes and Dorian Warren, Occupy Wall Street: A Twenty-First Century Populist Movement? Dissent October 21, 2011
  97. ^ Vokabular des Nationalsozialismus, Cornelia Schmitz-Berning
  98. ^ Fritzsche 1990: 149–150, 1998
  99. ^ a b SYNTHÈSE : LE PEUPLE ! QUEL PEUPLE ? HISTOIRE D'UN MOT
  100. ^ Le mythe du peuple et la société française du XIXe siècle, JSTOR
  101. ^ Le populisme, voilà l’ennemi !, April 1996, Le Monde diplomatique
  102. ^ Fascism, populism and the French Fifth Republic: in the shadow of democracy, Catherine Fieschi
  103. ^ a b French shopkeepers on the march, Mary Dejevsky, Sunday, 5 November 1995, The Independent
  104. ^ Europeanized Nationalism? – European Right-Wing Populist Parties and the Notion of European Identity
  105. ^ Biorcio, Roberto (2003), "The Lega Nord and the Italian Media System", The Media and Neo-Populism (Praeger Publishers): 85 
  106. ^ Ruzza, Carlo; Fella, Stefano (2009), Re-inventing the Italian Right: Territorial politics, populism and 'post-fascism', Routledge, p. 227 
  107. ^ Der Spiegel
  108. ^ "Europe | Italy returns Berlusconi to power". BBC News. 2008-04-15. Retrieved 2014-05-20. 
  109. ^ [2][dead link]
  110. ^ "We appeal to the instincts of people. We are populists for real. There is nothing to be ashamed of" Grillo, confessione a eletti M5S: ‘Finzione politica l’impeachment di Napolitano’ Il Fatto Quotidiano, October 30, 2013
  111. ^ "Riepilogo Nazionale - Camera - Elezioni Politiche 24-25 febbraio 2013 - la". Repubblica.it. 2013-01-25. Retrieved 2014-05-20. 

References[edit]

  • Albertazzi, Daniele and Duncan McDonnell. 2008. Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 0-230-01349-X ISBN 978-0230013490
  • Berlet, Chip. 2005. "When Alienation Turns Right: Populist Conspiracism, the Apocalyptic Style, and Neofascist Movements." In Lauren Langman & Devorah Kalekin Fishman, (eds.), Trauma, Promise, and the Millennium: The Evolution of Alienation. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
  • Boggs, Carl. 1982."The New Populism and the Limits of Structural Reform", Theory and Society Vol. 12:3 (May)
  • Boggs, Carl. 1986. Social Movements and Political Power: Emerging Forms of Radicalism in the West. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
  • Boyte, Harry. C. and Frank Riessman, Eds. 1986. The New Populism: The Politics of Empowerment. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
  • Boyte, Harry C. 1989. CommonWealth: A Return to Citizen Politics. New York: Free Press.
  • Boyte, Harry C. 2004. Everyday Politics: Reconnecting Citizens and Public Life. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
  • Boyte, Harry C. 2007. "Populism and John Dewey: Convergences and Contradictions", Seventh Annual University of Michigan Dewey Lecture.
  • Brass, Tom. 2000. Peasants, Populism and Postmodernism: The Return of the Agrarian Myth London: Frank Cass Publishers.
  • Coles, Rom. 2006. "Of Tensions and Tricksters: Grassroots Democracy Between Theory and Practice", Perspectives on Politics Vol. 4:3 (Fall), pp. 547–561
  • Canovan, Margaret. 1981. Populism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. ISBN 0-15-173078-4
  • Denning, Michael.1997. The Cultural Front: The Laboring of American Culture in the Twentieth Century. London: Verso.
  • Emibayer, Mustafa and Ann Mishe. 1998."What is Agency?" American Journal of Sociology Vol. 103:4, pp. 962–1023
  • Grieder, William. 1993. Who Will Tell the People: The Betrayal of American Democracy. Simon % Schuster.
  • Hedges, Chris. 2010. Death of the Liberal Class. New York: Nation Books.
  • Khoros, Vladim1r. 1984. Populism: Its Past, Present and Future. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
  • Kling, Joseph M. and Prudence S. Posner. 1990. Dilemmas of Activism. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
  • Laclau, Ernesto. 1977. Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism. London: NLB/Atlantic Highlands Humanities Press.
  • Laclau, Ernesto. 2005. On Populist Reason. London: Verso
  • Miscoiu, Sergiu, Craciun, Oana, Colopelnic, Nicoleta. 2008. Radicalism, Populism, Interventionism. Three Approaches Based on Discourse Theory. Cluj-Napoca: Efes
  • Mișcoiu, Sergiu. Au pouvoir par le Peuple! Le populisme saisi par la théorie du discours. L'Harmattan. 2012
  • Rupert, Mark. 1997. "Globalization and the Reconstruction of Common Sense in the US." In Innovation and Transformation in International Studies, S. Gill and J. Mittelman, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Taggart, Paul. 2000. Populism. Buckingham: Open University Press. ISBN 0-335-20045-1.

Europe[edit]

United States[edit]

  • Berlet, Chip and Matthew N. Lyons. 2000. Right-Wing Populism in America: Too Close for Comfort. New York: Guilford Press. ISBN 1-57230-568-1, ISBN 1-57230-562-2
  • Dobratz, Betty A, and Stephanie L. Shanks–Meile. 1988. "The Contemporary Ku Klux Klan and the American Nazi Party: A Comparison to American Populism at the Turn of the Century." Humanity and Society, 20–50.
  • Evans, Sara M. and Harry C. Boyte. 1986. Free Spaces: The Sources of Democratic Change in America. New York: Harper & Row.
  • Ferkiss, Victor C. 1957. "Populist Influences on American Fascism." Western Political Quarterly 10(2):350–73.
  • Fink, Leon. 1983. Workingmen's Democracy: The Knights of Labor and American Politics. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
  • Goodwyn, Lawrence. 1976. Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America. New York and London: Oxford University Press.
  • Goodwyn, Lawrence. 1978. The Populist Moment: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in America. New York and London: Oxford University Press.
  • Hahn, Steven. 1983. Roots of Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation of the Georgia Upcountry, 1850–1890. New York and London: Oxford University Pres
  • Hofstadter, Richard. 1955. The Age of Reform: from Bryan to F.D.R. New York: Knopf.
  • Hofstadter, Richard. 1965. The Paranoid Style in American Politics, and Other Essays. New York: Knopf.
  • Jeffrey, Julie Roy.1975. "Women in the Southern Farmers Alliance: A Reconsideration of the Role and Status of Women in the Late 19th Century South." Feminist Studies 3.
  • Kazin, Michael. 1995. The Populist Persuasion: An American History. New York: Basic Books. ISBN 0-465-03793-3, ISBN 0-8014-8558-4
  • Marable, Manning. 1986. "Black History and the Vision of Democracy", in Harry Boyte and Frank Riessman, Eds., The New Populism: The Politics of Empowerment. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
  • Palmer, Bruce. 1980. Man Over Money: The Southern Populist Critique of American Capitalism. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
  • Rupert, Mary. 1997. "The Patriot Movement and the Roots of Fascism." Pp. 81–101 in Windows to Conflict Analysis and Resolution: Framing our Field, Susan Allen Nan, et al., eds. Fairfax, Virginia: Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution.
  • Stock, Catherine McNicol. 1996. Rural Radicals: Righteous Rage in the American Grain. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. ISBN 0-8014-3294-4
  • Miscoiu, Sergiu, Craciun, Oana, Colopelnic, Nicoleta. 2008. Radicalism, Populism, Interventionism. Three Approaches Based on Discourse Theory. Cluj-Napoca: Efes.
  • Mișcoiu, Sergiu. Au pouvoir par le Peuple! Le populisme saisi par la théorie du discours. L'Harmattan. 2012

External links[edit]