Proportionality for Solid Coalitions
|This article relies on references to primary sources. (August 2008)|
Tideman  defines this criterion as
This is the property that if there is a set of voters, V, who rank all candidates in some set, S, ahead of all other candidates, then the number of candidates in S who are elected will be at least as great as the proportion of the electorate who are in V multiplied by the number of candidates to be elected, rounded down to an integer (provided that S contains at least that many candidates).
Tideman  calls the equivalent criterion, but based on the Droop quota, (k+1)-proportionality for solid coalitions.
- Dummett, M., Voting procedures. Oxford Clarendon Press (1984)
- Tideman, N. and Richardson, D., "Better Voting Methods Through Technology: The Refinement-Manageability Trade-Off in the Single Transferable Vote", Public Choice, Volume 103, Numbers 1-2 / April, 2000
- Tideman N., Collective Decisions and Voting, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Aldershot, 2006
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