Pseudoskepticism

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The term pseudoskepticism (or pseudoscepticism) denotes thinking that appears to be skeptical but is not. The term is most commonly encountered in the form popularised by Marcello Truzzi, where he defined pseudoskeptics as those who take "the negative rather than an agnostic position but still call themselves 'skeptics'".^[1] University of Washington electrical research engineer William J. Beaty describes pseudo-skepticism as;

"a variety of pseudoscience: the behavior of highly biased 'sneering scoffers' who try to legitimize their prejudice by donning the mantle of science and proper skepticism. They claim to support reason/logic while in fact filling their arguments with plenty of ad-hominems, straw-man, poisoning-the-well, and numerous other emotion-enflaming fallacies and debating tactics."^[2]

Arizona State University instructor Rochus Boerner describes pseudoskeptics as disbelievers, rather than nonbelievers, "characterized by an a priori belief that a certain idea is wrong",^[3] a view shared by Princeton physicist Gregory N. Derry describing Creation Scientists' skepticism of science as ".. selected pseudoskepticism directed towards any ideas that disagree with their preconceived conclusions.^[4]

Contents 1 Truzzi's characterisation of pseudoskeptics 2 Pseudo-skepticism and scientific method 3 Contemporary usage 4 Other usages 5 See also 6 Notes and references 7 External links

[edit] Truzzi's characterisation of pseudoskeptics

The term pseudoskepticism was popularised and characterised by Truzzi, in response to the skeptic groups who applied the label of "pseudoscientists" to fields which Truzzi preferred to describe as protoscience.^[1]

While a Professor of Sociology at Eastern Michigan University in 1987, Truzzi gave the following description of pseudoskeptics in the journal Zetetic Scholar which he founded:

Over the years, I have decried the misuse of the term "skeptic" when used to refer to all critics of anomaly claims. Alas, the label has been thus misapplied by both proponents and critics of the paranormal. Sometimes users of the term have distinguished between so-called "soft" versus "hard" skeptics, and I in part revived the term "zetetic" because of the term's misuse. But I now think the problems created go beyond mere terminology and matters need to be set right. Since "skepticism" properly refers to doubt rather than denial—nonbelief rather than belief—critics who take the negative rather than an agnostic position but still call themselves "skeptics" are actually pseudo-skeptics and have, I believed, gained a false advantage by usurping that label."^[1]

Truzzi attributed the following characteristics to pseudoskeptics:^[1]

The tendency to deny, rather than doubt Double standards in the application of criticism The making of judgments without full inquiry Tendency to discredit, rather than investigate Use of ridicule or ad hominem attacks in lieu of arguments Pejorative labeling of proponents as 'promoters', 'pseudoscientists' or practitioners of 'pathological science.'

Presenting insufficient evidence or proof Assuming criticism requires no burden of proof Making unsubstantiated counter-claims Counter-claims based on plausibility rather than empirical evidence Suggesting that unconvincing evidence is grounds for dismissing it

[edit] Pseudo-skepticism and scientific method

Truzzi's argument begins with the premise that if a phenomenon has not been proven, this does not imply that it has been disproven. But Truzzi went further, holding that if a phenomenon had not been disproven, this implies that it is plausible, and that anyone who does not consider both options equally, is a pseudoskeptic. Truzzi wrote:^[1]

In science, the burden of proof falls upon the claimant; and the more extraordinary a claim, the heavier is the burden of proof demanded. The true skeptic takes an agnostic position, one that says the claim is not proved rather than disproved. He asserts that the claimant has not borne the burden of proof and that science must continue to build its cognitive map of reality without incorporating the extraordinary claim as a new "fact." Since the true skeptic does not assert a claim, he has no burden to prove anything. He just goes on using the established theories of "conventional science" as usual. But if a critic asserts that there is evidence for disproof, that he has a negative hypothesis—saying, for instance, that a seeming psi result was actually due to an artifact—he is making a claim and therefore also has to bear a burden of proof.

Sometimes, such negative claims by critics are also quite extraordinary—for example, that a UFO was actually a giant plasma, or that someone in a psi experiment was cued via an abnormal ability to hear a high pitch others with normal ears would fail to notice. In such cases the negative claimant also may have to bear a heavier burden of proof than might normally be expected.

It is common for fringe theorists and practitioners to apply the label pseudoskeptic to anyone who is prepared neither to investigate a claim nor to accept its conclusion. This is a misunderstanding of the scientific method. Consider, for example, a test that is performed showing apparent evidence for extrasensory perception (ESP). Based on experience of similar 'results', most scientists will suspect a flaw in the test. Scientific practice does not require every scientist to fully vet every experiment performed by every other scientist. Rather, scientific reports are reviewed by a number of peers, and where an experiment has produced interesting results, other scientists will try to reproduce it. If their results match, the evidence is accepted. If not, the original result is agreed to be an anomaly and it does not affect the acceptance of the dominant theory. To state that there must be a flaw in a test without relying on other tests would be pseudoskepticism; taking a position on the validity of the test does require accepting a burden of proof. But simply choosing to ignore the test or declaring it to be an anomalous result due to a contradiction to other tests is not pseudoskepticism, however frustrating it can be to those who welcome the apparent result of a test.

[edit] Contemporary usage

A Spring 2006 course at the University of Colorado, "Edges of Science", promised to examine "the evidence for paranormal phenomena, [and] reasons for skepticism", including a section which shows "how a healthy skepticism can see through unsupported assertions, and how pathological skepticism can work against honest scientific inquiry."

Pennsylvania State University Folklorist David J. Hufford^[5] uses the term "radical skepticism" to describe the unexamined prejudices and preconceptions which he argues are embraced by many — perhaps most — academic scientists. After reading and analysing the works of many skeptics and debunkers, Hufford argues that one can readily find:

appeals to authority, post hoc fallacies, ad hominem arguments and a whole host of other informal errors. Nonetheless, because this inductive dimension of scholarship is often less implicitly presented for scrutiny, and because so much of the work of framing questions and establishing boundaries of scholarly discourse about 'the supernatural' were largely set anywhere from several generations ago … to a number of centuries ago ... the systematic bias of this tradition operates almost invisibly today.

L. David Leiter, a member of the fringe Society for Scientific Exploration, uses the terms 'pseudo-skepticism' and 'pathological skepticism' to refer to "organized skepticism", specifically the "Philadelphia Association for Critical Thinking" (PhACT),^[6] "[i]nstead of becoming scientifically minded, they become adherents of scientism, the belief system in which science and only science has all the answers to everything" and that even many pseudoskeptics are unwilling to spend the time to "read significantly into the literature on the subjects about which they are most skeptical".

Prof. Hugo Meynell from Department of Religious Studies at the University of Calgary, labels as 'pseudo-skepticism' the "extreme position that all significant evidence supporting paranormal phenomena is a result of deception or lies".^[7] Psychiatrist Dr. Richard Kluft, MD has noted that:^[8]

".. today genuine skepticism of the benign sort that looks evenly in all directions and encourages the advancement of knowledge seems vanishingly rare. Instead, we find a prevalence of pseudo-skepticism consisting of harsh and invidious skepticism toward one's opponents' points of view and observations, and egregious self-congratulatory confirmatory bias toward one's own stances and findings misrepresented as the earnest and dispassionate pursuit of clinical, scholarly, and scientific truth."

Parapsychologist Susan Blackmore described the "worst kind of pseudoskepticism":^[9]

"There are some members of the skeptics’ groups who clearly believe they know the right answer prior to inquiry. They appear not to be interested in weighing alternatives, investigating strange claims, or trying out psychic experiences or altered states for themselves (heaven forbid!), but only in promoting their own particular belief structure and cohesion . . . I have to say it—most of these people are men. Indeed, I have not met a single woman of this type."

Commenting on the labels "dogmatic" and "pathological" that the "Association for Skeptical Investigation"^[10] puts on critics of paranormal investigations, Robert Todd Carroll of the Skeptic's Dictionary^[11] argues that that association "is a group of pseudo-skeptical paranormal investigators and supporters who do not appreciate criticism of paranormal studies by truly genuine skeptics and critical thinkers. The only skepticism this group promotes is skepticism of critics and [their] criticisms of paranormal studies."^[12]

[edit] Other usages

Prior to Truzzi, the term "pseudo-skepticism" had occasionally been used in 19th and early 20th century philosophy.

On 31 August 1869, Swiss philosopher Henri-Frédéric Amiel wrote in his diary:

My instinct is in harmony with the pessimism of Buddha and of Schopenhauer. It is a doubt which never leaves me, even in my moments of religious fervor. Nature is indeed for me a Maïa; and I look at her, as it were, with the eyes of an artist. My intelligence remains skeptical. What, then, do I believe in? I do not know. And what is it I hope for? It would be difficult to say. Folly! I believe in goodness, and I hope that good will prevail. Deep within this ironical and disappointed being of mine there is a child hidden — a frank, sad, simple creature, who believes in the ideal, in love, in holiness, and all heavenly superstitions. A whole millennium of idyls sleeps in my heart; I am a pseudo-skeptic, a pseudo-scoffer.^[13]

In 1908 Henry Louis Mencken wrote on Friedrich Nietzsche's criticism of philosopher David Strauss that:

Strauss had been a preacher but had renounced the cloth and set up shop as a critic of Christianity. He had labored with good intentions, no doubt, but the net result of all his smug agnosticism was that his disciplines were as self-satisfied, bigoted, and prejudiced in the garb of agnostics as they had been before Christians. Nietzsche's eye saw this and in the first of his little pamphlets "David Strauss, der Bekenner und der Schriftsteller" ("David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer"), he bore down on Strauss's bourgeoise pseudo-skepticism most savagely. This was 1873.^[14]

Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois, Frederick L. Will used the term "pseudo-skepticism" in 1942. Alasdair MacIntyre writes:

[Frederick] Will was no exception. He began as an analytical philosopher, distinguishing different uses of language with the aim of showing that certain traditional philosophical problems need no longer trouble us, once we have understood how to make the relevant linguistic distinctions. The enemies were two: the philosophical skeptic who poses these false problems and the philosopher who thinks that the skeptic needs to be answered. So in "Is there a Problem of Induction?" (Journal of Philosophy, 1942) it is two senses of "know" that are to be distinguished: "All the uneasiness, the pseudo-skepticism and the pseudo-problem of induction, would never appear if it were possible to keep clear that 'know' in the statement that we do not know statements about the future is employed in a very special sense, not at all its ordinary one.^[15]

Notre Dame Professor of English, John E. Sitter used the term in 1977 in a discussion of Alexander Pope: "Pope's intent, I believe, is to chasten the reader's skepticism — the pseudo-skepticism of the overly confident 'you' ... "^[16]

Science writer C. Eugene Emery, Jr. compared the degrees of skepticism of CD-ROM-based encyclopedias of articles on pseudoscientific subjects. He called such articles "pseudoskeptical" if they only suggested or stated that the subject was "controversial, but the author may not have a clue as to why".^[17]

[edit] See also

• Anomalistics The study of Anomalous phenomena
• Debunkers
• Denialism
• Scientific skepticism
• Scientism
• Skepticism
• Agnosticism
• Robert Anton Wilson

[edit] Notes and references

[edit] External links

• Skeptic's pages - Quotes and links to articles about skepticism and pseudoskepticism.

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