Putinism

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Putinism (Russian: путинизм) is a term used by Western and Russian analysts to describe the ideology of Vladimir Putin. The term is used, often with negative connotations,[1][2][3][4][5][6] to describe the political system of Russia under Putin Presidencies (2000–2004, 2004–2008, 2012–present) and Putin's Interim Prime Ministership (2008–12) where much of the political and financial powers are controlled by siloviki. Many of these people, with a state security background, in 22 governmental security and intelligence agencies, (eg the FSB, the Police and the Army.[7][8][9]) share their career background with Putin or are his personal friends.[10][11][12][13][14][15][16] (See also Political groups under Vladimir Putin's presidency)

The political system under Putin was primarily characterized by some elements of economic liberalism, a lack of transparency in governance, cronyism and pervasive corruption, which assumed in Putin's Russia “a systemic and institutionalized form”, according to a report by Boris Nemtsov as well as other sources.[17][18][19][20][21][22] Between 1999 and autumn 2008 Russia's economy grew at a steady pace,[23] which some experts attribute to the sharp rouble devaluation of 1998, Boris Yeltsin-era structural reforms, rising oil price and cheap credit from western banks.[24][25][26] In Michael McFaul’s opinion (June 2004), Russia’s “impressive” short-term economic growth “came simultaneously with the destruction of free media, threats to civil society and an unmitigated corruption of justice.”[27]

During his two terms as president, Putin signed into law a series of liberal economic reforms, such as the flat income tax of 13 percent, a reduced profits tax, a new Land Code and a new edition (2006) of the Civil Code.[28] Within this period, poverty in Russia was cut by more than half[29][30] and real GDP has grown rapidly.[31]

In foreign affairs, the regime sought allegedly to emulate the former Soviet Union’s grandeur, belligerence and expansionism.[32][33] In November 2007, Simon Tisdall of The Guardian pointed out that “just as Russia once exported Marxist revolution, it may now be creating an international market for Putinism”, as “more often than not, instinctively undemocratic, oligarchic and corrupt national elites find that an appearance of democracy, with parliamentary trappings and a pretense of pluralism, is much more attractive, and manageable, than the real thing.”[34]

The US economist Richard W. Rahn (September 2007) called Putinism “a Russian nationalistic authoritarian form of government that pretends to be a free market democracy”, which “owes more of its lineage to fascism than communism;”[8] noting that “Putinism depended on the Russian economy growing rapidly enough that most people had rising standards of living and, in exchange, were willing to put up with the existing soft repression”,[35] he predicted that “as Russia’s economic fortunes changed, Putinism was likely to become more repressive.”[35]

Russian historian Andranik Migranyan saw the Putin regime as restoring what he believed were the natural functions of a government after period of the 1990s, when Russia was allegedly ruled by oligopolies expressing only their narrow interests. He said, “If democracy is the rule by a majority and the protection of the rights and opportunities of a minority, the current political regime can be described as democratic, at least formally. A multiparty political system exists in Russia, while several parties, most of them representing the opposition, have seats in the State Duma.”[36]

Putin's campaign program[edit]

On December 31, 1999, President Boris Yeltsin resigned. Under the Constitution of Russia, the then Prime Minister of Russia Vladimir Putin became acting President.[37]

The day before, a program article signed by Putin "Russia at the turn of the millennium" was published on the government web site. The potential head of the state expressed his views on the past and problems of the country.[38] The first task in Putin's view was consolidation of Russia's society: "The fruitful and creative work, which our country needs so badly, is impossible in a divided and internally atomised society".[39] However, the author stressed that "There should be no forced civil accord in a democratic Russia. Social accord can only be voluntary."[39]

The author stressed the importance of strengthening the state: "The key to Russia’s recovery and growth today lies in the state-political sphere. Russia needs strong state power and must have it." Detailing on his view Putin emphasized: "Strong state power in Russia is a democratic, law-based, workable federal state."[39]

Regarding the economic problems, Putin pointed out the need to significantly improve the economy efficiency, the need of carrying out the coherent and result-based social policy aimed to battle the poverty and the need to provide the stable growth of people's well-being.[39]

The article stated the importance of government support of science, education, culture, health care, since "A country in which the people are not healthy physically and psychologically, are poorly educated and illiterate, will never rise to the peaks of world civilisation."[39]

The article concluded with an alarmist statement that Russia was in the midst of one of the most difficult periods in its history: "For the first time in the past 200–300 years, it is facing the real threat of slipping down to the second, and possibly even third, rank of world states."[39] To avoid that, there's a need of tremendous effort of all the intellectual, physical and moral forces of the nation. Because "Everything depends on us, and us alone, on our ability to recognise the scale of the threat, to unite and apply ourselves to lengthy and hard work."[39]

As stated in the history course by Russian Doctors of History Barsenkov and Vdovin, the basic ideas of the article were represented in the election platform of Vladimir Putin and supported by the majority of country's citizens, leading to the victory of Vladimir Putin in the first round of the 2000 election, with 52 per cent of the votes cast.[40]

The outline of Russia's foreign policy was presented by Vladimir Putin in his Address to Russia's Federal Assembly in April 2002: "We are building constructive, normal relations with all the world’s nations — I want to emphasise, with all the world’s nations. However, I want to note something else: the norm in the international community, in the world today, is also harsh competition — for markets, for investment, for political and economic influence. And in this fight, Russia needs to be strong and competitive." "I want to stress that Russian foreign policy will in the future be organized in a strictly pragmatic way, based on our capabilities and national interests: military and strategic, economic and political. And also taking into account the interests of our partners, above all in the CIS."[41]

In his 2008 book, the Russian political commentator, the retired KGB lieutenant-general Nikolai Leonov, noted that Putin's program article was barely noticed then and never revisited later – a fact that Leonov regretted, because "its content is most important for contrasting against his [Putin's] subsequent actions" and thus figuring out Putin's pattern, under which "words, more often than not, do not match his actions."[42]

Definition[edit]

Putinism is the ideology, priorities, and policies of the Putin system of government.[43] Sociologists, economists and political scientists emphasized different features of the system.

Sociological data[edit]

According to Dr. Mark Smith (March 2003), some of the main features of Putin's regime were: development of a corporatist system by pursuing close ties with business organizations, social stability and co-optation of opposition parties.[44] He determined three main groupings in Putin's early leadership: 1) the siloviki, 2) economic liberals and 3) supporters of "the Family", i.e. those who were close to Yeltsin.[44]

Olga Kryshtanovskaya, who carried out a sociological research in 2004, put the relative number of siloviki in the Russian political elite at 25%.[7] In Putin's "inner circle" which constitutes about 20 people, amount of siloviks rises to 58%, and fades to 18–20% in Parliament and 34% in the Government.[7] According to Kryshtanovskaya, there was no capture of power as Kremlin bureaucracy has called siloviks in order to "restore order". The process of siloviks coming into power has allegedly started since 1996, Boris Yeltsin's second term. "Not personally Yeltsin, but the whole elite wished to stop the revolutionary process and consolidate the power." When silovik Vladimir Putin was appointed Prime Minister in 1999, the process boosted. According to Olga, "Yes, Putin has brought siloviks with him. But that's not enough to understand the situation. Here's also an objective aspect: the whole political class wished them to come. They were called for service.... There was a need of a strong arm, capable from point of view of the elite to establish order in the country."[7]

Kryshtanovskaya noted that there were also people who had worked in structures believed to be "affiliated" with the KGB/FSB, such as the Soviet Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Governmental Communications Commission, Ministry of Foreign Trade, Press Agency News and others; the work per se in such agencies would not necessarily involve contacts with security services, but would make it likely."[45] Summing up the numbers of official and "affiliated" siloviki, she came up with an estimate of 77% of such in the power.[7]

According to Russian Public Opinion Foundation 2005 investigation, 34% of respondents think "there is a lack of democracy in Russia because democratic rights and freedoms are not observed", and also point on the lack of law and order. In the same time, 21% of respondents are sure there's too much of democracy in Russia; many of them point on the same drawbacks as the previous group: "the lack of law and order, irresponsibility and non-accountability of politicians". According to the Foundation, "As we can see, Russians' negative opinions about democracy are based on their dissatisfaction with contemporary conditions, while some respondents think the democratic model is not suitable in principal." Considering the modern regime, "It is interesting that most respondents think Putin's government marks the most democratic epoch in Russian history (29%), while second place goes to Brezhnev's times (14%). Some people mentioned Gorbachev and Yeltsin in this context (11% and 9%, respectively)"[46]

At the end of 2008, Lev Gudkov, based on the Levada Center polling data, pointed out the near-disappearance of public opinion as a socio-political institution in Putin's Russia and its replacement with the still-efficacious state propaganda.[47]

Liberal economic policies[edit]

July 9, 2000, in speaking to Parliament, Putin advocated liberal economy policies.[48] In 2001 Putin introduced flat tax rate of 13%;[49] the corporate rate of tax was also reduced from 35 percent to 24 percent;[49] Small businesses also get better treatment. The old system with high tax rates has been replaced by a new system where companies can choose either a 6 percent tax on gross revenue or a 15 percent tax on profits.[49]

In February 2009, Putin called for a single VAT rate to be "as low as possible" (at the time it stood at an average rate of 18 percent): it could be reduced to between 12 percent and 13 percent.[50] Overall tax burden was lower in Russia under Putin than in most European countries.[51]

Rising living standards[edit]

In 2005, Putin launched National Priority Projects in the fields of health care, education, housing and agriculture. In his May 2006 annual speech, Putin proposed increasing maternity benefits and prenatal care for women. Putin was strident about the need to reform the judiciary considering the present federal judiciary "Sovietesque", wherein many of the judges hand down the same verdicts as they would under the old Soviet judiciary structure, and preferring instead a judiciary that interpreted and implemented the code to the current situation. In 2005, responsibility for federal prisons was transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice.

The most high-profile change within the national priority project frameworks was probably the 2006 across-the-board increase in wages in healthcare and education, as well as the decision to modernise equipment in both sectors in 2006 and 2007.[52]

During Putin's government, poverty was cut more than half[29][30] and real GDP has grown rapidly.[31]

Andrew Somers, president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia in 2007 article has emphasized the influence of American private investments for Russian democracy, as well as the amount of local support for them: "In a nutshell, the booming Russian economy is transforming that nation's outlook, standard of living and opportunities for its people in ways that were unimaginable only five years ago. More than 10 million Russian citizens have traveled abroad. Private enterprise is thriving. Russians are happier, healthier and more optimistic than ever in their lives. And, contrary to what you might hear, surveys show that the Russian people are as pro-American, if not more so, than the populations of many a European country, and most hope for closer relations with the United States." He also said: "I would argue that the American business community has played a not insignificant role in fostering these developments. By their willingness to invest in Russia's future, American companies have become effective ambassadors for the United States and its values, while creating new jobs and benefiting the economies of both our countries. And the Putin government has been supportive of these efforts in ways that some might find surprising. Russian officials go to considerable lengths to be cooperative and accommodate the needs of American business, while at the same time revising their regulations to align them more closely with international standards."[53]

In 2006 chief of Business Week's Moscow bureau Jason Bush commented on the condition of Russian middle class: "This group has grown from just 8 million in 2000 to 55 million today and now accounts for some 37% of the population, estimates Expert, a market research firm in Moscow. That's giving a lift to the mood in the country. The share of Russians who think life is 'not bad' has risen to 23% from just 7% in 1999, while those who find living conditions 'unacceptable' has dropped to 29% from 53%, according to a recent poll." However, "Not everyone has shared in the prosperity. Far from it. The average Russian earns $330 a month, just 10% of the U.S. average. Only a third of households own a car, and many—particularly the elderly—have been left behind."[54]

At the end of Putin's second term Jonathan Steele has commented on Putin's legacy: "What, then, is Putin's legacy? Stability and growth, for starters. After the chaos of the 90s, highlighted by Yeltsin's attack on the Russian parliament with tanks in 1993 and the collapse of almost every bank in 1998, Putin has delivered political calm and a 7% annual rate of growth. Inequalities have increased and many of the new rich are grotesquely crass and cruel, but not all the Kremlin's vast revenues from oil and gas have gone into private pockets or are being hoarded in the government's "stabilisation fund". Enough has gone into modernising schools and hospitals so that people notice a difference. Overall living standards are up. The second Chechen war, the major blight on Putin's record, is almost over."[55]

Corporatism and state intervention in economy[edit]

According to Dr Mark Smith (March 2003), Putin's regime had developed a "corporatist system" in the sense, that under him the Kremlin was interested in close ties with business organizations such as the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Delovaya Rossiya, and the trade union federation (FNPR.)[44] This was a part of the regime's attempts to involve broad sectors of society in the making and implementation of policy.[44]

There is a school of thought, which says that a number of Putin's steps in the economy (notably the fate of Yukos) were signs of a shift toward a system normally described as state capitalism,[56][57][58] where "the entirety of state-owned and controlled enterprises are run by and for the benefit of the cabal around Putin — a collection of former KGB colleagues, Saint Petersburg lawyers, and other political cronies."[59]

According to Andrey Illarionov, advisor of Vladimir Putin until 2005, Putin's regime was a new socio-political order, "distinct from any seen in our country before": members of the Corporation of Intelligence Service Collaborators had taken over the entire body of state power, followed an omertà-like behavior code, and were "given instruments conferring power upon others – membership “perks”, such as the right to carry and use weapons". According to Illarionov, this "Corporation has seized key government agencies – the Tax Service, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Parliament, and the government-controlled mass media – which are now used to advance the interests of [Corporation] members. Through those agencies, every significant resource in the country – security/intelligence, political, economic, informational and financial – is being monopolized in the hands of Corporation members"[60]

Members of the Corporation formed an isolated caste. According to an anonymous former KGB general cited by The Economist, “A Chekist is a breed <…> A good KGB heritage—a father or grandfather, say, who worked for the service—is highly valued by today's siloviki. Marriages between siloviki clans are also encouraged.[61]

Jason Bush, chief of the Moscow bureau of the magazine Business Week has commented in December 2006 on troubling in his opinion growth of government's role: "The Kremlin has taken control of some two dozen Russian companies since 2004, including oil assets from Sibneft and Yukos, as well as banks, newspapers, and more. Despite his sporadic support for pro-market reforms, Putin has backed national champions such as energy concerns Gazprom and Rosneft. The private sector's share of output fell from 70% to 65% last year, while state-controlled companies now represent 38% of stock market capitalization, up from 22% a year ago."[54]

The Financial Times on 20 September 2008, when the late 2000s recession had started to hit the well-being of Russia's top tycoons, said: "Putinism was built on the understanding that if tycoons played by Kremlin rules they would prosper."[62]

Although Russia's state intervention in the economy had been usually criticized in the West, a study by Bank of Finland’s Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT) in 2008 showed that state intervention had had a positive impact on the corporate governance of many companies in Russia: the formal indications of the quality of corporate governance in Russia were higher in companies with state control or with a stake held by the government.[63]

Other economic developments and assessments[edit]

In June 2008, a group of Finnish economists wrote that the 2000s had so far been an economic boon for Russia, with GDP rising about 7% a year; by the beginning of 2008, Russia had become one of the ten largest economies in the world.[64]

In Putin's first term, many new economic reforms were implemented along the lines of the "Gref program." The multitude of reforms ranged from a flat income tax to bank reform, from land ownership to improvements in conditions for small businesses.[64]

In 1998, over 60% of industrial turnover in Russia was based on barter and various monetary surrogates. The use of such alternatives to money now today fallen out of favour, which has boosted economic productivity significantly. Besides raising wages and consumption, Putin's government has received broad praise also for eliminating this problem.[64]

In the opinion of the Finnish researchers, the most high-profile change within the national priority project frameworks was probably the 2006 across-the-board increase in wages in healthcare and education, as well as the decision to modernise equipment in both sectors in 2006 and 2007.[64]

The rise in the overall living standards further deepened Russia's social and geographical discrepancies. In July 2008, Edward Lucas of The Economist wrote: "The colossal bribe-collecting opportunities created by Putinism have heightened the divide between big cities (particularly Moscow) and the rest of the country."[65][66]

In November 2008, the retired KGB lieutenant-general Nikolai Leonov, in assessing the overall results of Putin's economic policies for the period of 8 years, said: "Within this period, there has only been one positive thing, if you leave aside the trivia. And that thing is the price of oil and natural gas."[67] In the closing paragraphs of his 2008 book, the retired general said: "Behind the gilded facade of Moscow and Saint Petersburg, there lies a demolished country that, under the current characteristics of those in power, has no chance to restore itself as one of the developed states of the world."[68][69]

On November 29, 2008, Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of Russian Federation (the largest opposition group within Russia with its 13% of seats in the national Parliament) in his speech before the 13th Party Congress made these remarks about the state that Russia under Putin was in: "Objectively, Russia’s position remains complicated, not to say dismal. The population is dying out. Thanks to the “heroic efforts” of the Yeltsinites the country has lost 5 out of the 22 million square kilometers of its historical territory. Russia has lost half of its production capacity and has yet to reach the 1990 level of output. Our country is facing three mortal dangers: de-industrialization, de-population and mental debilitation. The ruling group has neither notable successes to boast of, nor a clear plan of action. All its activities are geared to a single goal: to stay in power at all costs. Until recently it has been able to keep in power due to the “windfall” high world prices for energy. Its social support rests on the notorious “vertical power structure” which is another way of saying intimidation and blackmail of the broad social strata and the handouts that power chips off the oil and gas pie and throws out to the population in crumbs, especially on the eve of elections.[70]

To characterize the kind of state Putin had built in socio-economic terms, in early 2008, professor Marshall I. Goldman coined the term "petrostate":[dubious ] Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia,[71] where he inter alia argued that while Putin had followed the advice of economic advisers in implementing reforms such as a 13 percent flat tax and creating a stabilization fund to lessen inflationary pressure, his main personal contribution was the idea of creating "national champions" and the renationalization of major energy assets. In his June 2008 interview, Marshall Goldman said that, in his opinion, Putin had created a new class of oligarchs, whom some called "silogarchs", Russia having come in second in the Forbes magazine list of the world's billionaires after only the United States.[72]

In December 2008, Anders Åslund pointed out that Putin’s chief project had been "to develop huge, unmanageable state-owned mastodons, considered “national champions”", which had "stalemated large parts of the economy through their inertia and corruption while impeding diversification."[73]

Restoring functionality of government[edit]

The concept of "Putinism" was described in a positive sense by Russian political scientist Andranik Migranyan.[36] According to Migranyan, Putin came into office when the worst regime was established: the economy was "totally decentralized", and "the state had lost central authority, while the oligarchs robbed the country and controlled its power institutions." In two years, Putin has restored hierarchy of power, ending the omnipotence of regional elites as well as destroying political influence of "oligarchs and oligopolies in the federal center." The Family, Boris Yeltsin-era non-institutional center of power, was ruined, which, according to Migranyan, in turn undercut the positions of the actors, such as Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, who had sought to privatize the Russian state "with all of its resources and institutions".[36]

Migranyan said, Putin began establishing common rules of the game for all actors, and started with an attempt to restore the role of the government as the institution expressing combined interests of the citizens and "capable of controlling the state’s financial, administrative and media resources". According to Migranyan, "Naturally, in line with Russian traditions, any attempt to increase the state’s role causes an intense repulsion on the part of the liberal intellectuals, not to mention a segment of the business community that is not interested in the strengthening of state power until all of the most attractive state property has been seized." Migranyan claimed that oligopolies' view of democracy was set on a premise of whether they were close to the center of power, rather than "objective characteristics and estimates of the situation in the country". Migranyan said "free" media, owned by e.g. Berezovsky and Gusinsky, were nothing similar to free media as understood by the West, but served their only economic and political interests, while "all other politicians and analysts were denied the right to go on the air."[36]

Migranyan sees enhancement of the role of the law enforcement agencies as a trial to set barriers against criminals, "particularly those in big business".[36]

Migranyan sees in 2004 fruition of the social revolution initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, whose aims were to rebuild the social system: "the absolute dominance of private ownership in Russia, recognized by all political forces today, has been the greatest achievement and result of this social revolution."[36]

The major trouble of Russian democracy, according to Migranyan, is inability of civil society to rule the state, underdevelopment of public interests. He sees that as the consequence of Yeltsin's era family-ruled state being unable to pursue "a favorable environment for mid-sized and small businesses". Migranyan sees modern Russia as democracy, at least formally. While "the state, having restored its effectiveness and control over its own resources, has become the largest corporation responsible for establishing the rules of the game", Migranyan wonders how much might this influence extend in future. In 2004 he saw two possibilities for the Putin regime: either transformation into a consolidated democracy, either bureaucratic authoritarianism. However, "if Russia is lagging behind the developed capitalist nations in regard to the consolidation of democracy, it is not the quality of democracy, but rather its amount and the balance between civil society and the state."[36]

The Report by Andrew C. Kuchins in November 2007 said: "Russia today is a hybrid regime that might best be termed “illiberal internationalism,” although neither word is fully accurate and requires considerable qualification. From being a weakly institutionalized, fragile, and in many ways distorted proto-democracy in the 1990s, Russia under Vladimir Putin has moved back in the direction of a highly centralized authoritarianism, which has characterized the state for most of its 1,000-year history. But it is an authoritarian state where the consent of the governed is essential. Given the experience of the 1990s and the Kremlin’s propaganda emphasizing this period as one of chaos, economic collapse, and international humiliation, the Russian people have no great enthusiasm for democracy and remain politically apathetic in light of the extraordinary economic recovery and improvement in lifestyles for so many over the last eight years. The emergent, highly centralized government, combined with a weak and submissive society, is the hallmark of traditional Russian paternalism."[74]

In a 2007 interview with Der Spiegel, the Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn commented on the Putin regime: "Putin has inherited plundered and downtrodden country with demoralized and grown poor majority of the population. And he took on its possible — to be noted, gradual, slow — recovering. These efforts were not right at the moment noticed, not speaking about being appreciated. And can you point on examples in history when measures for recovering strength of governmental management would be benevolently met from beyond the country?"[75]

According to a 2007 article of Dimitri Simes, published in Foreign Affairs, "With high energy prices, sound fiscal policies, and tamed oligarchs, the Putin regime no longer needs international loans or economic assistance and has no trouble attracting major foreign investment despite growing tension with Western governments. Within Russia, relative stability, prosperity, and a new sense of dignity have tempered popular disillusionment with growing state control and the heavy-handed manipulation of the political process."[76]

BBC diplomatic correspondent Bridget Kendall in her 2007 article, after describing the "scarred decade" of 1990s with "rampant hyperinflation", harsh Yeltsin's policies, population decrease rate like that for a nation in a war, the country turning "from superpower into beggar", wonders: "So who can blame Russians for welcoming the relative stability Putin has presided over during the past seven years, even if other aspects of his rule have cast an authoritarian shadow? In the back-to-front world of Russian politics, it is not too little democracy that many people fear, but too much of it. This, I discovered, is why some are calling for Putin to stay on for a third term. Not because they admire him — privately, many say that he and his cronies are just as corrupt and disdainful of others as their communist predecessors were — but because they mistrust the idea of democracy, resent the west for pushing it, and fear what might happen as a result of next year's elections. Recent experience has taught them that change is usually for the worse and best avoided."[77]

Single-party bureaucratic state[edit]

Russian politician Boris Nemtsov and commentator Kara-Murza define Putinism in Russia as "a one party system, censorship, a puppet parliament, ending of an independent judiciary, firm centralization of power and finances, and hypertrophied role of special services and bureaucracy, in particular in relation to business"[78]

Russia's nascent middle class showed few signs of political activism under the regime, as Masha Lipman reported: "As with the majority overall, those in the middle-income group have accepted the paternalism of Vladimir Putin's government and remained apolitical and apathetic."[79]

In December 2007, the Russian sociologist Igor Eidman (VCIOM) categorized the Putin regime as "the power of bureaucratic oligarchy" which had "the traits of extreme right-wing dictatorship — the dominance of state-monopoly capital in the economy, silovoki structures in governance, clericalism and statism in ideology".[80]

In August 2008, The Economist wrote about the virtual demise of both Russian and Soviet intelligentsia in post-Soviet Russia and noted: "Putinism was made strong by the absence of resistance from the part of society that was meant to provide intellectual opposition."[81]

In early February 2009, Aleksander Auzan, an economist and board member at a research institute set up by Dmitry Medvedev, said that in the Putin system, "there is not a relationship between the authorities and the people through Parliament or through nonprofit organizations or other structures. The relationship to the people is basically through television. And under the conditions of the crisis, that can no longer work."[82]

About the same time, Vladimir Ryzhkov pointed out that a bill Medvedev had sent to the State Duma in late January 2009, when signed into law, will allow Kremlin-friendly regional legislatures to remove opposition mayors who were elected by popular vote: "It is no coincidence that Medvedev has taken aim at the country's mayors. Mayoral elections were the last bastion of direct elections after the Duma cancelled the popular vote for governors in 2005. Independent mayors were the only source of political competition against governors who were loyal to the Kremlin and United Russia. Now one of the few remaining checks and balances against the monopoly on executive power in the regions will be removed. After the law is signed by Medvedev, the power vertical will be extended one step further to reach every mayor in the country.[83]

Rehabilitation of the Soviet past/patriotism[edit]

The first politically controversial step made by Putin, then the FSB Director, was restoring in June 1999 a memorial plaque to Yuri Andropov on the facade of the building, where the KGB had been headquartered.[84]

In April, 2005, in his formal address to Russia's Parliament, President Putin famously said: "Above all, we should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and compatriots found themselves outside Russian territory. Moreover, the epidemic of disintegration infected Russia itself."[85]

In September 2003, Putin was quoted as saying, "The Soviet Union is a very complicated page in the history of our peoples. It was heroic and constructive, and it was also tragic. But it is a page that has been turned. It’s over, the boat has sailed. Now we need to think about the present and the future of our peoples."[86]

In February 2004, Putin said: "It is my deep conviction that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a national tragedy on a massive scale. I think the ordinary citizens of the former Soviet Union and the citizens in the post-Soviet space, the CIS countries, have gained nothing from it. On the contrary, people have been faced with a host of problems." He went on to say, "Incidentally, at that period, too, opinions varied, including among the leaders of the Union republics. For example, Nursultan Nazarbayev was categorically opposed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and he said so openly proposing various formulas for preserving the state within the common borders. But, I repeat, all that is in the past. Today we should look at the situation in which we live. One cannot keep looking back and fretting about it: we should look forward."[87] In December 2007, he said in the interview to the Time magazine: "Russia is an ancient country with historical, profound traditions and a very powerful moral foundation. And this foundation is a love for the Motherland and patriotism. Patriotism in the best sense of that word. Incidentally, I think that to a certain extent, to a significant extent, this is also attributable to the American people."[88]

In August 2008, The Economist claimed: "Russia today is ruled by the KGB elite, has a Soviet anthem, servile media, corrupt courts and a rubber-stamping parliament. A new history textbook proclaims that the Soviet Union, although not a democracy, was “an example for millions of people around the world of the best and fairest society”."[81]

Vladimir Putin has said that Stalin's legacy can't be judged in black and white in 2009.[89] Although Putin's policies have been likened to the Soviet era by many people,[citation needed] but he also has received a lukewarm response by Gennady Zyuganov,the leader of Communist Party of the Russian Federation(KPRF).[90][91][92] Roger Boyes, on the other hand, considers him more of a latter-day Brezhnev than a clone of Stalin.[93]

In November, 2008, International Herald Tribune stated:

"The Kremlin in the Putin era has often sought to maintain as much sway over the portrayal of history as over the governance of the country. In seeking to restore Russia's standing, Putin and other officials have stoked a nationalism that glorifies Soviet triumphs while playing down or even whitewashing the system's horrors. As a result, throughout Russia, many archives detailing killings, persecution and other such acts committed by the Soviet authorities have become increasingly off-limits. The role of the security services seems especially delicate, perhaps because Putin is a former KGB agent who headed the agency's successor, the FSB, in the late 1990s."[94]

State-sponsored global PR effort[edit]

Shortly after the Beslan terror act in September 2004, Putin enhanced a Kremlin-sponsored program aimed at "improving Russia's image" abroad;[95] according to an unnamed former Duma deputy, there existed a classified article in the RF federal budget that provided for financing measures to this purpose.[96]

One of the major projects of the program was the creation in 2005 of Russia Today – a rolling English-language TV news channel providing 24 hour news coverage, modeled on CNN. Towards its start-up budget, $30 million of public funds were allocated.[97][98] A CBS News story on the launch of Russia Today quoted Boris Kagarlitsky as saying it was "very much a continuation of the old Soviet propaganda services".[99] In 2007, Russia Today employed nearly 100 English-speaking special correspondents worldwide.[100]

Russia's deputy foreign minister Grigory Karasin said in August 2008, in the context of the Russia-Georgia conflict: "Western media is a well-organized machine, which is showing only those pictures that fit in well with their thoughts. We find it very difficult to squeeze our opinion into the pages of their newspapers."[101] Similar views were expressed by some Western commentators.[102][103]

William Dunbar, who was reporting then for Russia Today from Georgia, said he had not been on air since he mentioned Russian bombing of targets inside Georgia on 9 August 2008, and had to resign over what he claimed was biased coverage by the outlet.[101][104]

Variety magazine quoted an unnamed "senior journalist" with Russia Today as saying: "My view is that Russia Today is not particularly biased at all. When you look at the Western media, there is a lot of genuflection towards the powers that be. Russian news coverage is largely pro-Russia, but that is to be expected."[101]

The PR efforts notwithstanding, according to an opinion poll released in February 2009 by the BBC World Service, Russia's image around the world had taken a dramatic dive in 2008: forty-two percent of respondents said they had a "mainly negative" view of Russia, according to the poll, which surveyed more than 13,000 people in 21 countries in December and January.[105]

In June 2007, Vedomosti reported that the Kremlin had been intensifying its official lobbying activities in the United States since 2003, among other things hiring such companies as Hannaford Enterprises and Ketchum.[106]

However, the negative image of Russia might be at least partly due to an alleged anti-Russian bias in the West's perceptions. According to Dr. Vlad Sobell, an example of the anti-Russian bias in the West was the fact that President Putin was widely assumed to be guilty of the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, without any evidence being considered as necessary. The only proof the Western press needed for Putin's guilt was, that the victim said so himself on his deathbed.[102] Sobell furthermore asks, why is Russia portrayed as a "“resurgent" and "aggressive" power, when it merely reacts defensively to encirclement by NATO? Why is Gazprom, and consequently the Kremlin, accused of "gas blackmail," when it merely withholds supplies due to the non-payment of debts? Why is Russia deemed to have no independent media, when in fact it has a very thriving free press? (Regarding this point, Sobbell adds he might argue that the limitations indirectly imposed by Putin are in some ways comparable to limitations in the Western countries.) Why is Russia’s spectacular economic recovery constantly ridiculed as being the result of little else but high hydrocarbon prices?[107]

In April 2007 David Johnson, founder of the Johnson's Russia List, said in interview to the Moscow News: "I am sympathetic to the view that these days Putin and Russia are perhaps getting too dark a portrayal in most Western media. Or at least that critical views need to be supplemented with other kinds of information and analysis. An openness to different views is still warranted."[103]

Criticism[edit]

Illarionov's views were criticised by Justin Raimondo, journalist of AntiWar.Com in February 2009: "Illarionov seems to have slipped into an alternate timeline, a fantasy land in which Russia has reverted to the 1930s and a single party wields absolute power."[108]

Justin Raimondo wrote as well:

"Russia is emerging from the nightmare of Communism astonishingly intact. It's a miracle the country survived the Yeltsin years, when the nation was looted by "former" communist apparatchiks who seized control of the nation's resources in a series of rigged "privatizations." There is hardly any democratic tradition in Russia, and liberalism is a minority viewpoint rather than the majority mindset: long-standing habits die hard, particularly in a nation as mired in history and tragedy as Russia. Given all this, it's amazing they have elections – relatively free and open ones – in Russia at all. It wasn't so long ago that Stalin's gulags held millions. Now Illarionov wants us to go to war with the Kremlin over a grand total of 80 "political prisoners" of dubious provenance. What a joke – except nobody's laughing."[108]

Comparisons with Stalinism[edit]

In May 2000, The Guardian wrote: "When a band of former Soviet dissidents declared in February that Putinism was nothing short of modernised Stalinism, they were widely dismissed as hysterical prophets of doom. 'Authoritarianism is growing harsher, society is being militarised, the military budget is increasing,' they warned, before calling on the West to 're-examine its attitude towards the Kremlin leadership, to cease indulging it in its barbaric actions, its dismantlement of democracy and suppression of human rights.' In the light of Putin's actions during his first days in power, their warnings have gained an uneasy new resonance."[109]

In February 2007, Arnold Beichman, a conservative research fellow at the neo-conservative Hoover Institution, wrote in the Washington Times that “Putinism in the 21st century has become as significant a watchword as Stalinism was in the 20th”.[110]

Lionel Beehner, formerly a senior writer for the Council on Foreign Relations, also in 2007, maintained that on Putin’s watch, nostalgia for Stalin had grown, even among young Russians; Russians’ neo-Stalinism manifesting itself in several ways.[111]

In February 2007, responding to a listener's assertion that "Putin had steered the country to Stalinism" and "all entrepreneurs" were being jailed in Russia, the Russian opposition radio host Yevgeniya Albats said: "Come on, this is not true; there is no Stalinism, no concentration camps – thankfully <…>" She went on to say that if citizens of the country would not be critical of what was occurring around them, referring to the "orchestrated, or genuine," calls for the "tsar to stay on", that "could blaze the trail for very ugly things and a very tough regime in our country".[112]

Personality cult[edit]

Russia developed personality cult around Vladimir Putin.[113] In the course of his career, Putin has an inclusive form of Russian nationalism, become the model Russian man, brought the media to its knees, redeemed Joseph Stalin and reconciled the Soviet past.[113]

In June 2001, the BBC noted that a year after Putin took office, the Russian media had been reflecting on what some saw as a growing personality cult around him: Russia's TV-6 television had shown a vast choice of portraits of Putin on sale at a shopping mall in an underground passage near Moscow's Park of Culture.[114]

Simultaneously, human rights groups voiced concerns about what they saw as a revival of the personality cult of Stalin, who became the subject of an exhibition that opened at a Moscow museum in 2003 to celebrate the 50th anniversary of his death.[115]

On 22 August 2007, The International Herald Tribune, in connection with the host of gossip and speculation that ensued after Putin stripped off his shirt for the cameras while on holiday with Prince Albert II of Monaco in the Altai Mountains, quoted Sergey Markov, Kremlin-connected head of the Moscow-based Institute for Political Research/ as saying: "He's cool. That's been the image throughout the presidency, cool."[116]

Putin on a fishing trip to Tuva, August 2007. The photo was circulated by the Kremlin press-office[117]

In October 2007, the Russian weekly Obshchaya Gazeta reported that according to the polls there were an increasing number of people in Russia who either believed there existed Putin's personality cult, or saw the conditions for same; only 38% denied the existence of the personality cult in October, compared to 49% in April that year.[118]

In October 2007, some scenes at the United Russia congress caused Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, who was allied to Russia within the "Union State", to recall the Soviet times, complete with the official adoration towards the Communist Party leader; talking to Russia's regional press representatives he said that in Russia Putin's personality cult was being created.[119]

About the same time, AFP reported that ahead of the December parliamentary and March presidential elections, in which Putin, despite being required by the constitution to leave office, was widely expected to find some way to retain power, his personality cult was gathering pace.[120]

After Medvedev was elected President in March 2008, Radio Liberty reported that during his eight-year presidency, Putin had managed to build a personality cult around himself similar to those created by Soviet leaders; although there had not been giant statues of Putin put up across the country (like those of Joseph Stalin before), he had the honour of being the only Russian leader to have had a pop song written about him: "I want a man like Putin", which hit the charts in 2002.[121]

FSB influence[edit]

Putin and Nikolai Patrushev at a meeting of the board of the Federal Security Service

According to some scholars,[122][123] Russia under Putin had been transformed into the "FSB state".

Shortly after becoming Russian prime minister, Putin was reported to have joked to a group of his KGB associates: "A group of FSB colleagues dispatched to work undercover in the government has successfully completed its first mission."[124][125]

The Russian sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya believed in August 2004, that there had been no seizure of power on the part of the siloviki, but rather they had been called to "service" by Russia's political class, their rise to power having started in earnest in 1996, when Yeltsin was re-elected.[7]

The former Securitate Lieutenant General and defector Ion Mihai Pacepa said in his interview for conservative FrontPage Magazine in 2006 that "former KGB officers are running" Russia, and that FSB, which he called "the KGB successor" had the right to monitor the population electronically, control political process, search private property, cooperate with employees of the federal government, create front enterprises, investigate cases, and run its own prisons.[126][127]

Various 2006 estimates showed that Russia had above 200,000 members of FSB, or one FSB employee for every 700 citizens of Russia (the exact number of the overall FSB staff is classified).[128] The Russian Armed Forces General Staff, as well as its subordinate structures, such as the Russian Strategic Missile Troops headquarters, are not submitted to the Federal Security Service,[129] but the FSB might be interested in monitoring such structures, as they intrinsically involve state secrets and various degrees of admittance to them.[130] The Law on Federal Security Service[131] which defines its functions and establishes its structure does not involve such tasks as managing strategic branches of national industry, controlling political groups, or infiltrating the federal government.[131]

The political scientist Julie Anderson in 2006 wrote: "Under Russian Federation President and former career foreign intelligence officer Vladimir Putin, an 'FSB State' composed of chekists has been established and is consolidating its hold on the country. Its closest partners are organized criminals. In a world marked by a globalized economy and information infrastructure, and with transnational terrorism groups utilizing all available means to achieve their goals and further their interests, Russian intelligence collaboration with these elements is potentially disastrous."[122]

The Russian historian Yuri Felshtinsky compared the takeover of the Russian State by the siloviki to an imaginary scenario of the Gestapo coming to power in Germany after World War II. He pointed out a fundamental difference between the secret police and ordinary political parties, even totalitarian ones, such as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Russia's secret police organizations are wont to employ the so-called active measures and extrajudicial killings. Hence, they killed Alexander Litvinenko and directed Russian apartment bombings and other terrorism acts in Russia to frighten the civilian population and achieve their political objectives, according to Felstinsky.[132]

However, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in 2007 interview commented that "one should be surprised on how in few years which has passed since the times when the Church was totally submitted to the Communist state it has managed to gain sufficiently independent position".[75]

Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former Middle East specialist at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in April 2006, presented a list of those who had 'mysteriously' died during Putin's presidency and wrote: "Vladimir Putin's Russia is a new phenomenon in Europe: a state defined and dominated by former and active-duty security and intelligence officers. Not even fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, or the Soviet Union – all undoubtedly much worse creations than Russia – were as top-heavy with intelligence talent. <…> There is no historical precedent for a society so dominated by former and active-duty internal-security and intelligence officials – men who rose up in a professional culture in which murder could be an acceptable, even obligatory, business practice. <…> Those who operated within the Soviet sphere were the most malevolent in their practices. These men mentored and shaped Putin and his closest friends and allies. It is therefore unsurprising that Putin's Russia has become an assassination-happy state where detention, interrogation, and torture – all tried and true methods of the Soviet KGB – are used to silence the voices of untoward journalists and businessmen who annoy or threaten Putin's FSB state."[133]

One of the leading members of Putin's ruling elite, Nikolai Patrushev, Director of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (August 1999 – May 2008) and, subsequently, Secretary of the Security Council of Russia, was known for his propagation of the idea of 'Chekists' as "neo-aristocrats" (Russian: неодворяне).[134][135][136]

A Report by Andrew C. Kuchins in November 2007 said: "The predominance of the intelligence services and mentality is a core feature of Putin’s Russia that marks a major and critical discontinuity from not only the 1990s but all of Soviet and Russian history. During the Soviet period, the Communist Party provided the glue holding the system together. During the 1990s, there was no central organizing institution or ideology. Now, with Putin, it is “former” KGB professionals who dominate the Russian ruling elite. This is a special kind of brotherhood, a mafia-like culture in which only a few can be trusted. The working culture is secretive and nontransparent."[137]

Cronyism and corruption[edit]

In 2000, Russia's political analyst Andrei Piontkovsky called Putinism "the highest and culminating stage of bandit capitalism in Russia”.[138] He said: "Russia is not corrupt. Corruption is what happens in all countries when businessmen offer officials large bribes for favors. Today’s Russia is unique. The businessmen, the politicians, and the bureaucrats are the same people. They have privatized the country’s wealth and taken control of its financial flows."[139]

The Russian investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya, in concluding her book A Russian Diary (2007), said: "Our state authorities today are only interested in making money. That is literally all they are interested in".[140]

Such views were shared by politologist Julie Anderson who said the same person can be a Russian intelligence officer, an organized criminal, and a businessman,[122] who quoted the former CIA Director James Woolsey as saying: "I have been particularly concerned for some years, beginning during my tenure, with the interpenetration of Russian organized crime, Russian intelligence and law enforcement, and Russian business. I have often illustrated this point with the following hypothetical: If you should chance to strike up a conversation with an articulate, English-speaking Russian in, say, the restaurant of one of the luxury hotels along Lake Geneva, and he is wearing a $3,000 suit and a pair of Gucci loafers, and he tells you that he is an executive of a Russian trading company and wants to talk to you about a joint venture, then there are four possibilities. He may be what he says he is. He may be a Russian intelligence officer working under commercial cover. He may be part of a Russian organized crime group. But the really interesting possibility is that he may be all three and that none of those three institutions have any problem with the arrangement."[141]

According to the political scientist Dmitri Glinsky, "The idea of Russia, Inc. – or better, Russia, Ltd. – derives from the Russian brand of libertarian anarchism viewing the state as just another private armed gang claiming special rights on the basis of its unusual power"; "this is a state conceived as a stationary bandit imposing stability by eliminating the roving bandits of the previous era."[142]

In April 2006, Putin himself expressed extreme irritation about the de facto privatization of the customs sphere, where smart officials and entrepreneurs "merged in ecstasy" (Moscow News, April 21).[143]

According to the estimates published in "Putin and Gazprom" by Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov, Putin and his friends pilfered assets of $80 billion from Gazprom during his second term as president.[144][145]

On February 29, 2009, the Russian billionaire Alexander Lebedev claimed that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's strategy for economic recovery was based on cronyism and was fueling corruption; he also said: "We have two Putins. There are lots of words, but the system doesn't work."[146]

Ideology[edit]

Political scientist Irina Pavlova said that chekists were not merely a corporation of people united to expropriate financial assets; they had long-standing political objectives of transforming Moscow to the Third Rome and an ideology of "containing" the United States.[147] Columnist George Will emphasized in 2003 the nationalistic nature of Putinism: "Putinism is becoming a toxic brew of nationalism directed against neighboring nations, and populist envy, backed by assaults of state power, directed against private wealth. Putinism is a form of national socialism without the demonic element of its pioneer".[148] According to Illarionov, the ideology of chekists is Nashism (“ours-ism”), the selective application of rights".[60]

According to Dmitri Trenin (2004), Head of the Moscow Carnegie Center, the then Russia was one of the least ideological countries around the world: "Ideas hardly matter, whereas interests reign supreme. It is not surprising then that the worldview of Russian elites is focused on financial interests. Their practical deeds in fact declare In capital we trust." Trenin described Russia's elite involved in the process of policy-making as people who largely owned the country. Most of them were not public politicians, but the majority were bureaucratic capitalists. According to Trenin, "having survived in a ruthless domestic business and political environment, Russian leaders are well adjusted to rough competition and will take that mindset to the world stage." However, Trenin called Russian-Western relations, from Moscow’s perspective, "competitive, but not antagonistic". He said, "Russia does not crave world domination, and its leaders do not dream of restoring the Soviet Union. They plan to rebuild Russia as a great power with a global reach, organized as a supercorporation."[149]

According to Trenin, Russians "no longer recognize U.S. or European moral authority", i.e. values gap. He said, "from the Russian perspective, there is no absolute freedom anywhere in the world, no perfect democracy, and no government that does not lie to its people. In essence, all are equal by virtue of sharing the same imperfections. Some are more powerful than others, however, and that is what really counts."[149]

The Russian political scientist Gleb Pavlovsky believed (October 2007) that "Putin builds the world's Russia" as opposed to a nation state such as Alexander Lukashenko's Belarus. According to Pavlovsky, Russia's power had to be a model one, i.e. the power that would offer itself to others as a kind of a model to emulate (the USA being one such example).[150]

Transfer-of-power operation (2008-early 2009)[edit]

Background[edit]

In 2008 during Russian Presidential election Dmitry Medvedev was elected President (head of the executive branch) with 73% of votes. He had been nominated as a candidate by four Russian political parties and made a promise to appoint Putin for the position of Prime Minister during the campaign.[151][152]

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, while holding constitutionally less significant position, continues to be ranked as a somewhat more popular politician (83% of approval vote in January 2009) than President Dmitry Medvedev (75% of approval vote in January 2009).[153]

According to opinion polls conducted by the Levada Center, in January 2009, 11% of Russia's respondents believed it was Medvedev who had the real power in Russia, 32% believed it was Putin, 50% thought that both Medvedev and Putin had the real power, and 7% answered "did not know".[154]

At the end of February 2009, the Levada Center released its polling data, which demonstrated that the number of people who thought that Medvedev was the number one had halved since February 2008 to 12% (23% in 2008); and Putin's approval rating had dropped to 48% from 62% for the same period.[155] In February 2008, prior to the Presidential election, 23% people believed Medvedev had the real power in the country, 20% thought Putin had the real power, 41% thought Putin and Medvedev had equal shares of power, 16% did not answer.[156]

Opinion: Putin is in charge[edit]

Commentators, analysts and some politicians[157][158][159][160][161][162][163] concurred in 2008 and early 2009, that the transfer of presidential powers that took place on May 7, 2008, was in name only and Putin continued to retain the number one position in Russia's effective power hierarchy, with Dmitry Medvedev being "Russia’s notional president".[164]

Within the context of the ongoing Russia–Ukraine gas dispute in early January 2009, Nikolai Petrov, an analyst with the Carnegie Moscow Center said: "What we see right now is the dominant role of Putin. We see him as a real head of state (…) This is not surprising. We are still living in Putin's Russia."[165]

On February 1, 2009, an analytical piece in The International Herald Tribune said: "Putin is still considered Russia's paramount leader, but by taking the title of prime minister, he may have deprived himself of a fall-guy-in-waiting. That role traditionally has gone to Russia's prime ministers; Yeltsin repeatedly dismissed his during the 1998 default. So far, Putin has instead made a scapegoat of the United States, saying it was at the heart of Russia's crisis, rather than Moscow's over-reliance on the export of natural resources."[166]

Opinion: Medvedev and Putin share the power[edit]

Some Russian commentators and analysts spoke of "Medvedev-Putin Tandem", or "Medvedev-Putin Tandemocracy".[167][168]

Prior to the 2008 election, political scientists Gleb Pavlovsky and Stanislav Belkovsky discussed the future configuration of power. According to Mr. Pavlovsky, people would be very suited with the option of the union of Putin and Medvedev "alike two Consuls of Rome". Belkovsky called Medvedev "President of a dream", referring to the early 1990s when people ostensibly dreamed of the time they "would live without the stranglehold of ubiquitous ideology, and a usual person would become the head of the state".[169]

In August 2008 interview to Der Spiegel former Chancellor of Germany Gerhard Schröder expressed the view of Putin-Medvedev tandem: "There are enough internal problems in Russia that need to be solved. ... President (Dmitry) Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin are addressing these problems — together, by the way, in friendship and mutual respect, not in competition with one another, as journalistic fortune-tellers often imply."[170]

At the end of 2008, Nezavisimaya Gazeta in editorial "Tandem" expressed the view the country is led by the tandem. It's naive to guess who is a more important figure: because Medvedev and Putin are like-minded people. Both people are in tough position: Medvedev faced crisis and war, situation where it's hard to stay liberal; while Putin as head of Government is responsible for socially economical issues in the crisis, what is viewed to reduce his rating. Putin is yet the most experienced real politician in Russia with immense influence. None of the two people has to be afraid of future: Medvedev learns quickly, gathering a team around himself, with Constitution being immensely pro-Presidential; while nobody will push Putin from his position if he does not want to leave himself.

The newspaper pointed out this novelty in Russia's political life: the president is in no position to criticize the premier, the government, or ministers; the Duma, in turn, is in no position to criticize its leader's cabinet.[171]

Prognosis and aftermath: 2009 onwards[edit]

According to World Bank Russia Economic Report from November 2008, prudent fiscal management and substantial financial reserves have protected Russia from deeper consequences of this external shock. The government’s policy response so far—swift, comprehensive, and coordinated—has helped limit the impact.[23]

In mid-December 2008, Andrey Piontkovsky believed that due to the farcical nature of Putinism, lack of any underpinning ideological project, its exceedingly narrow social base, the dismantling thereof may well occur without much pain; the first psychological step in this direction being the destruction of Putin's mythical image of Russia's "national leader".[172] In late December, 2008, former Presidential aide Georgy Satarov said that, considering the crisis, the country was moving from the Putin era to a new phase – the collapse of the system.[173]

In late December 2008, The Moscow Times stated: "Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's reputation as a Teflon leader is showing scratches as some Russians start to see a growing disconnect between the realities of the financial crisis and Putin's public posture as the nation's savior. Posters openly insulting Putin were among those waved at a rally of thousands of motorists against a hike in import duties for used cars in Vladivostok for the past two weekends. Earlier, only radical members from the banned National Bolshevik Party had dared to attack Putin in public."[33] The newspaper also noted that Russia's political commentators who had earlier refrained from criticizing Putin were now openly attacking him in Russian print, radio and online media.[33] The latter fact was interpreted by political analyst Dmitry Oreshkin as an indication of an ongoing cracking in the consensus of the elite.[33]

On December 28, 2008, Catherine Belton of The Financial Times observed that the problems with Russia's economy, which had hitherto been largely fueled by the rising oil price, appeared to be denting the air of invincibility that Putin had taken on since 2000.[174][175]

In mid-January 2009, Russia's liberal magazine The New Times, citing unnamed Kremlin officials, maintained that there was a growing rift between Medvedev and Putin and that the former was seeking to distance himself from the latter.[176]

On February 1, 2009, Clifford J. Levy in The International Herald Tribune said: "Over the last eight years, as Vladimir Putin has amassed ever more power, Russians have often responded with a collective shrug, as if to say: Go ahead, control everything – as long as we can have our new cars and amply stocked supermarkets, our sturdy ruble and cheap vacations in the Turkish sun. But now the worldwide financial crisis is abruptly ending an oil-driven economic boom here, and the unspoken contract between Putin and his people is being thrown into doubt. In newspaper articles, among political analysts, even in corners of the Kremlin, questions can be heard. Will Russians admire Putin as much when oil is at $40 a barrel as they did when it was at $140 a barrel? And if Russia's economy seriously falters, will his system of hard, personal power prove to be a trap for him? Can it relieve public anger, and can he escape the blame?"[82]

In early February 2009, Russian politician Vladimir Ryzhkov, speaking of Russia's leadership's further anti-democracy steps, concluded: "Russia's near future is becoming increasingly unpredictable as the gap widens between reality and official rhetoric. As the federal budget deficit increases along with inflation, while the ruble falls to new levels against the dollar, the very existence of Putin's authoritarian power vertical is in danger of collapsing along with the economy."[83]

About the same time Jim Rogers, an international investor and co-founder, along with George Soros, of the Quantum Fund, as a member of a panel of experts at the Russia Forum 2009, ventured this forecast: "I am not optimistic about the continuous stability of Russia. There's a good chance Russia will continue to disintegrate into more than one country."[177]

On February 5, 2009, Russia's liberal democratic political movement (the movement comprises such opposition politicians as Garry Kasparov, Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Milov, Ilya Yashin), citing the regime's "total helplessness and flagrant incompetence",[178][179] maintained that "the dismantling of Putinism" and restoration of democracy in Russia were prerequisites for any successful anti-crisis measures and demanded that Putin's government resign.[178][179]

Some analysts construed Medvedev's dismissal of Russia's four regional governors in February 2009, amidst the onset of recession, as well as some other of his steps,[180] as signs of him "starting to stamp his authority on the presidential role".[181] Izvestia newspaper commented: "first, Medvedev makes it clear he is to be treated as a man of his word <…> Second, Medvedev demonstrates he is not going to 'freeze' the political elites and 'Putin's' regional staff may become more scarce in the future".[182]

On February 18, 2009, Andrey Piontkovsky said that the situation had drastically changed within the ruling elite: Putin's uselessness as a crisis manager and his exceeding attractiveness as a scapegoat had become evident to all the Kremlin clans, including his own one.[183]

At the end of February, 2009, the Russian weekly Sobesednik ran an article presenting some experts' views (such as Georgy Satarov, a former aide to Russia President Boris Yeltsin in 1994–1997) that Putin may well resign in the autumn that year.[184]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ One of the first recorded usage of the term: William Safire (December 31, 2000). "Putinism Looms". New York Times. Retrieved 2008-12-26. 
  2. ^ The Perils of Putinism, By Arnold Beichman, Washington Times, February 11, 2007
  3. ^ Putinism On the March, by George F. Will, Washington Post, November 30, 2004
  4. ^ The West must start to hit Russia where it hurts – in the roubles, Simon Heffer, Telegraph (U.K.): "Few in the outside world were enthused in an election that was stage-managed through the constructs of electoral machinery that thrived on exclusivism and partisan majoritarianism, to make sure that former President Putin's hand-picked successor was elected. And, it was. Medvedev was a vehicle for institutionalizing Putinism – a draconian authoritarianism and xenophobic foreign policy – in Russia. It worked for Putin. And, the question became: Who will be calling the shots after Putin engineered his way back to behind-the-scene power, when he took the position of the prime minister?", retrieved 18-Jan-2009
  5. ^ Europe is skeptical facing the Russian presidentials, euro|topics Spanish site, English language summary of Swedish press article in Expressen, quoting the article: "Whatever Putin is contemplating, Putinism will emerge as the victor in the upcoming transfer of power," writes the paper. "Well-staged events like the presidential election cannot belie the fact that it's been a while since Russia was a democracy. Yesterday, Amnesty International published a report that finds a dramatic drop in freedom of expression in Russia. Independent media have been silenced, the murder of journalists remains unexplained and police put down protests by the opposition. Today's Russia is led by gangs with close ties to the FSB security service.... The only pluralistic element in Russian politics is the conflict between these gangs. And the Russian people have no say in this power play.", retrieved 18-Jan-2009
  6. ^ "The Market Will Punish Putinism". The Wall Street Journal. 3 September 2009. Retrieved 2009-02-10. [dead link]
  7. ^ a b c d e f Mission "intrusion" is complete! by Olga Kryshtanovskaya, 2004, Novaya Gazeta (in Russian)
  8. ^ a b From Communism to Putinism, by Richard W. Rahn, The Brussels Journal, 19 September 2007.
  9. ^ Russia: Putin May Go, But Can 'Putinism' Survive?, By Brian Whitmore, RFE/RL, August 29, 2007
  10. ^ Friends in high places? By Catherine Belton and Neil Buckley, Financial Times, May 15, 2008
  11. ^ Former Russian Spies Are Now Prominent in Business by Andrew Kramer New York Times December 18, 2007.
  12. ^ Russia's New Oligarchy: For Putin and Friends, a Gusher of Questionable Deals by Anders Aslund December 12, 2007.
  13. ^ Миллиардер Тимченко, «друг Путина», стал одним из крупнейших в мире продавцов нефти. NEWSru.com Nov 1, 2007.
  14. ^ Путин остается премьером, чтобы сохранить контроль над бизнес-империей. NEWSru.com Dec 17, 2007.
  15. ^ За время президентства Путин «заработал» 40 миллиардов долларов?[dead link]
  16. ^ Путин под занавес президентства заключил мегасделки по раздаче госактивов "близким людям" NEWSru.com Mat 13, 2008.
  17. ^ Независимый экспертеый доклад «Путин. Итоги» Experts' report by Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov released in February 2008.
  18. ^ За четыре года мздоимство в России выросло почти в десять раз (Bribe-taking in Russia has increased by nearly ten times)[dead link] Финансовые известия July 21, 2005.
  19. ^ Energy Revenues and Corruption Increase in Russia[dead link] Voice of America 13 July 2006.
  20. ^ Чума-2005: коррупция Argumenty i Fakty № 29 (1290) July 2005
  21. ^ Russia: Bribery Thriving Under Putin, According To New Report Radio Liberty July 22, 2005
  22. ^ Putin, the Kremlin power struggle and the $40bn fortune The Guardian Dec 21, 2007
  23. ^ a b "Russian Economic Reports". Web.worldbank.org. Retrieved 2014-03-24. 
  24. ^ (Russian) Polukin, Alexey (10 January 2008). "К нефти легко примазаться". Novaya Gazeta. Retrieved 2008-12-29. 
  25. ^ "Trouble in the pipeline". The Economist. 8 May 2008. Retrieved 2008-11-26. 
  26. ^ "The flight from the rouble". The Economist. 20 November 2008. Retrieved 2008-11-26. 
  27. ^ The Putin Paradox by Michael McFaul June 24, 2004
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External links[edit]