R. Jay Wallace

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R. Jay Wallace is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. His area of specialization is moral philosophy. He is most noted for his work on practical reason, moral psychology, and meta-ethics.

Biography[edit]

Wallace received his B.A. degree in 1979 from Williams College. He earned the degree of B.Phil. from the University of Oxford in 1983. In 1988, he got his Ph.D. from Princeton University.

He has taught at several universities, including: Wesleyan University, the University of Pennsylvania, and the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. He has held visiting positions at the Universität Bielefeld, in the Research School of Social Sciences (RSSS) at the Australian National University, at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, and at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch (New Zealand). He was the department chair at UC Berkeley from 2005 to 2010. (Source: Wallace's home page at UC Berkeley.)

Work[edit]

Selected publications[edit]

Books[edit]

  • Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994; paperback edition 1998).
  • Normativity and the Will. Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006).

Edited books[edit]

  • Ethical Issues in Social Science Research, co-edited with Tom Beauchamp, Ruth Faden, and Leroy Walters (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).
  • Reason, Emotion and Will (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999).
  • The Practice of Value, by Joseph Raz, with commentaries by Christine Korsgaard, Robert Pippin, and Bernard Williams (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003).
  • Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, co-edited with Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004).

Articles[edit]

  • "Privacy and the Use of Data in Epidemiology," in Wallace et al., eds. Ethical Issues in Social Science Research (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). pp. 274–291.
  • "How to Argue about Practical Reason," Mind 99 (July 1990), pp. 355–385.
  • "Virtue, Reason, and Principle," The Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (December 1991), pp. 469–495.
  • "Reason and Responsibility," in Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut, eds., Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 321–344.
  • "Three Conceptions of Rational Agency," Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (1999), pp. 217–242.
  • "Addiction as Defect of the Will: Some Philosophical Reflections," Law and Philosophy 18 (1999), pp. 621–654.
  • "Moral Responsibility and the Practical Point of View," in Ton van den Beld, ed., Moral Responsibility and Ontology (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), pp. 25–47.
  • "Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason," Philosophers' Imprint 1, no. 3 (December 2001), URL = http://www.philosophersimprint.org/001003
  • "Promises and Practices Revisited," co-authored with Niko Kolodny, Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (Spring 2003), pp. 119–154.
  • "Practical Reason," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practical-reason/
  • "Explanation, Deliberation, and Reasons," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2003), pp. 429–435.
  • "The Rightness of Acts and the Goodness of Lives," in R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith, eds., Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), pp. 385–411.
  • "Normativity and the Will," in John Hyman and Helen Steward, eds., Agency and Action (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 195–216.
  • "Moral Motivation", in James Dreier, ed., Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005).
  • "Constructing Normativity", Philosophical Topics 32 (Spring and Fall 2004), pp. 451–476.

External links[edit]