ROKS Cheonan sinking
Four photos show damage to the ROKS Cheonan — clockwise from upper left: (1) a damaged stack; (2) front portion (port side) showing the break point; (3) a large fragment is lifted from the sea; (4) water pressure marks on the hull bottom.
|Date||26 March 2010|
|Time||21:22 Korea Standard Time|
|Location||Near Baengnyeong Island, Yellow Sea|
|Participants|| Republic of Korea Navy (ROK)
Korean People's Navy (DPRK)
|Property damage||1 ROK corvette sunk,
46 personnel killed
56 personnel wounded
|Inquiries||International investigation convened by ROK government.
Russian Navy Investigation
|Charges||ROK-convened (JIG) Investigation concludes that PRK sank the corvette using a midget submarine-launched torpedo.
Investigation results are disputed
North Korea denies involvement.
|ROKS Cheonan sinking|
|Revised Romanization||Cheonanham Chimmol Sageon|
|McCune–Reischauer||Ch'ŏnanham Ch'immol Sagŏn|
The ROKS Cheonan sinking occurred on 26 March 2010, when the Cheonan, a Republic of Korea Navy ship carrying 104 personnel, sank off the country's west coast near Baengnyeong Island in the Yellow Sea, killing 46 seamen. A South Korean-led official investigation carried out by a team of international experts from South Korea, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Sweden presented a summary of its investigation on 20 May 2010, concluding that the warship had been sunk by a North Korean torpedo fired by a midget submarine.
North Korea denied that it was responsible for the sinking. North Korea's further offer to aid an open investigation was disregarded. The People's Republic of China dismissed the official scenario presented by South Korea and the United States as not credible. An investigation by the Russian Navy also did not concur with the report. The United Nations Security Council made a Presidential Statement condemning the attack but without identifying the attacker.
Baengnyeong Island is a South Korean island in the Yellow Sea, off the Ongjin peninsula in North Korea. It lies less than 10 miles (16 km) from the North Korean coast, and is over 100 miles (160 km) from the South Korean mainland. The island is to the south and west of the Northern Limit Line, the de facto maritime boundary dividing South Korea (ROK) from North Korea (DPRK).
The area is the site of considerable tension between the two states; although it was provided in the armistice agreement for the stalemate of the Korean war that the islands themselves belonged to the South, the sea boundary was not covered by the armistice, and the sea is claimed by the North.
The situation is further complicated by the presence of a rich fishing ground used by DPRK and Chinese fishing vessels, and there have been numerous clashes over the years between naval vessels from both sides attempting to police what both sides regard as their territorial waters. These have been referred to as "crab wars".
History of ship sinkings on both sides 
In late May 2010, Bruce Cumings, Distinguished Service Professor in History at the University of Chicago and an expert on Korean affairs, commented that the sinking should be regarded as part of a two-sided tense situation in a "no-man's land" which has led to previous incidents. He noted a confrontation in November 2009, in which several North Korean sailors died, and an additional incident in 1999, when 30 North Koreans were killed and 70 wounded when their ship sank. In both incidents, the North Koreans were the first to open fire, though in the 1999 incident the South Koreans escalated matters by initiating a campaign of boat 'bumping' in order to stop what the South saw as a violation of its maritime borders. Considering these previous incidents, Cumings said that the Cheonan sinking was "ripped out of context, the context of a continuing war that has never ended.
Military concerns 
General Walter Sharp, Commander of the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command at the time, had on 24 March (US Eastern time), testified before the US House Appropriations Committee, in part, on the need to strengthen the ROK-US alliance, the need for on-site advanced training of the Air Force, the need to improve the quality of life and provide tour normalization for troops serving one-year tours, planned relocation of bases, and the scheduled 2012 transition of Operational Control (OPCON) to ROK hands. He also warned of the possibility that North Korea could "even launch an attack on the ROK."
Sinking of Cheonan 
On the night of the sinking the U.S. and South Korea Navies were engaged in joint anti-submarine warfare exercises 75 miles away from the site of the sinking. This exercise was part of the annual Key Resolve/Foal Eagle war exercise, described as "one of the world's largest simulated exercises", and involved many modern U.S. and South Korean warships.
On Friday, 26 March 2010, an explosion was reported to have occurred near the Cheonan, a Pohang-class corvette, near the stern of the ship at 9:22 pm local time. (12:22 pmGMT/UTC) This caused the ship to break in half five minutes afterward, sinking at approximately 9:30 pm(2130 hrs) local time about 1 nautical mile (1.9 km) off the south-west coast of Baengnyeong Island.
Some initial reports suggested that the ship was hit by a North Korean torpedo, and that a South Korean vessel had returned fire, however the South Korean Ministry of Defense stressed in the first press briefings after the sinking that there was "no indication of North Korean involvement". Several theories have subsequently been put forth by various agencies as to the cause of the sinking. Early reports also suggested that South Korean Navy units had shot at an unidentified ship heading towards North Korea, however a defense official later said that this target may have been a flock of birds that were misidentified on radar.
The stern of the Cheonan settled on its left side in 130 metres (430 ft) deep water close to the site of the sinking, but the bow section took longer to sink and settled overturned in 20 metres (66 ft) of water 6.4 kilometres (3.5 nmi) away with a small part of the hull visible above the water.
Rescue efforts 
Initially six South Korean Navy and two South Korean Coastguard ships assisted in the rescue as well as aircraft from the Republic of Korea Air Force. It was reported on March 27 that hopes of finding the 46 missing crew alive were fading. Survival time in the water was estimated at about two hours and large waves were hampering rescue attempts. After the sinking, President Lee said that recovery of any survivors was the main priority. Air was pumped into the ship to keep any survivors alive.
During the course of the search and rescue effort over 24 military vessels were involved, including at least four US Navy vessels, the USNS Salvor, the USS Harpers Ferry, the USS Curtis Wilbur, and the USS Shiloh.
On 30 March 2010 it was reported that one South Korean naval diver had died after losing consciousness whilst searching for survivors and another had been hospitalised.
On 3 April 2010, South Korean officials said that a private fishing boat involved in the rescue operations had collided with a Cambodian freighter, sinking the fishing boat and killing at least two people, with seven reported missing. The same day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of South Korea said that one body of the 46 missing sailors had been found.
Later on 3 April 2010 South Korea called off the rescue operation for the missing sailors, after families of the sailors asked for the operation to be suspended for fear of further casualties among the rescue divers. The military's focus then shifted towards salvage operations, which were predicted to take up to a month to complete.
On 15 April 2010, the stern section of the ship was winched from the seabed by a large floating crane, drained of water and placed on a barge for transportation to the Pyongtaek navy base. On 23 April 2010, the stack was recovered. The same crane raised the bow portion of the Cheonan on 24 April 2010. The salvaged parts of the ship were taken to Pyongtaek navy base for an investigation into the cause of the sinking by both South Korean and foreign experts.
The bodies of 40 personnel out of 46 who went down with the ship were recovered.
Cause of sinking 
Early speculation 
South Korean officials initially downplayed suggestions that North Korea was responsible for the sinking. On 29 March 2010, following an underwater examination of the wreck, Defense Minister Kim Tae-Young stated that the explosion may have been caused by a North Korean mine, possibly left over from the Korean War. On 2 April Kim said it was a "likely possibility" that a torpedo had sunk the Cheonan.
The South Korean newspaper The Chosun Ilbo reported on 31 March 2010 that a North Korean submarine was observed near the site of the sinking by South Korean and American intelligence agencies. Another report from the same newspaper said that Captain Choi Won-il of the Cheonan made a call on his mobile phone right after the explosion in which he said "We are being attacked by the enemy."
On 30 March 2010, Defense ministry spokesman Won Tae-jae, dismissed speculation that a submarine could have torpedoed the ship, stating that no "extraordinary activities" had been confirmed. On 2 April 2010, The Chosun Ilbo cited unnamed defense agency officers as speculating that a torpedo from a North Korean two-man submersible could have sunk the ship, as there was so far no evidence of an internal explosion.
In a separate statement later the same day, the Defense Ministry said that its investigation had ruled out the possibility of an internal explosion, as testimony from survivors had not supported such a conclusion. The ministry reiterated that it would not speculate on the cause until its investigation was complete.
Director of the Pusan National University Ship Structural Mechanics Laboratory, Jeom Kee Paik, suggested Cheonan may have grounded in the area's shallow water, which is not usually navigated, and took in water from the damaged bottom before breaking in two. South Korean media reports had stated that the hull was found to have split cleanly, suggesting a non-explosive cause.
On 7 April 2010, the chairman of the South Korean National Assembly's Defense Committee, Kim Hak-song, stated that damage to the ship was of a type that is "inevitably the result of a torpedo or mine attack." The same day, National Intelligence Service Director Won Sei-hoon stated that according to their intelligence, and that obtained from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, there was no unusual North Korean activity on the day of the sinking, confirming an earlier similar statement by General Walter Sharp, Commander of the ROK-US Combined Forces.
On 25 April 2010, Defense Minister Kim said that the most likely cause of the explosion that sank the Cheonan was a torpedo; his statements were the first time that a South Korean official publicly cited such a cause. Kim said that "A bubble jet caused by a heavy torpedo is thought to be the most likely thing to be blamed, but various other possibilities are also under review." A bubble jet is caused by an underwater explosion which changes the pressure of water, and whose force can cause a ship to break apart. The bubble jet theory was supported by one of the investigators into the incident, who had said that there was no evidence that an explosion had occurred in contact with a ship, and that a non-contact explosion had most likely broken the ship in half.
The Hankyoreh newspaper and other sources have questioned how an anti-submarine corvette such as the Cheonan in the middle of a joint South Korean-U.S. naval exercise could have failed to detect an attacking submarine or at least its torpedo.
After raising the ship, South Korea and the United States formed a joint investigative team to discover the cause of the sinking. Later South Korea announced that it intended to form an international group to investigate the sinking including Canada, Britain, Sweden and Australia.
On 16 April 2010, Yoon Duk-yong, co-chairman of the investigation team, said "In an initial examination of the Cheonan's stern, South Korean and U.S. investigators found no traces showing that the hull had been hit directly by a torpedo. Instead, we've found traces proving that a powerful explosion caused possibly by a torpedo had occurred underwater. The explosion might have created a bubble jet that eventually generated an enormous shock wave and caused the ship to break in two." Traces of an explosive chemical substance used in torpedoes, RDX, were later found in May 2010.
The Washington Post reported on 19 May 2010, that a team of investigators from Sweden, Australia, Britain, and the United States had concluded that a North Korean torpedo sank the ship. The team found that the torpedo used was identical to a North Korean torpedo previously captured by South Korea. On 25 April 2010, the investigative team announced that the cause of the sinking was a non-contact underwater explosion.
On 7 May 2010, a government official said that a team of South Korean civilian and military experts had found traces of RDX, a high explosive more powerful than TNT and used in torpedoes. On 19 May 2010, the discovery of a fragment of metal containing a serial number similar to one on a North Korean torpedo salvaged by South Korea in 2003 was announced.
In their summary for the United Nations Security Council, the investigation group was described as the "Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group of the Republic of Korea with the participation of international experts from Australia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States, and the Multinational Combined Intelligence Task Force, comprising the Republic of Korea, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States," which consisted of "25 experts from 10 top Korean expert agencies, 22 military experts, 3 experts recommended by the National Assembly, and 24 foreign experts constituting 4 support teams".
Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group (JIG) report 
On 20 May the South Korean-led investigation group released a summary of their report in which they concluded that the sinking of the warship was the result of a North Korean torpedo attack, commenting that "The evidence points overwhelmingly to the conclusion that the torpedo was fired by a North Korean submarine." The inquiry also alleged that a group of small submarines, escorted by a support ship, departed from a North Korean naval base a few days before the sinking. The specific weapon used was alleged to be a North Korean manufactured CHT-02D torpedo, of which substantial parts were recovered.
According to the Chosun Ilbo, South Korean investigators told their journalists that they believe that one or two North Korean submarines, a Yono class submarine and the other a Sang-O class submarine, departed a naval base at Cape Bipagot accompanied by a support ship on 23 March 2010. One of the subs, according to the report, detoured around to the west side of Baengnyeong Island, arriving on 25 March 2010. There, it waited about 30 meters under the ocean's surface in waters 40 to 50 meters deep for the Cheonan to pass by. Investigators believe that the submarine fired the torpedo from about 3 km away. The attack appears to have been timed for a period when tidal forces in the area were slow. The North Korean vessels returned to port on 28 March 2010. Such detailed information on the North Korean submarine movements, and attack position, was not in the official summary or final report.
The torpedo parts recovered at the site of the explosion by a dredging ship on 15 May which include the 5×5 bladed contra-rotating propellers, propulsion motor and a steering section, was claimed to match the schematics of the CHT-02D torpedo included in introductory brochures provided to foreign countries by North Korea for export purposes. An incorrect, though similar, torpedo schematic had by mistake been shown at the televised RIG briefing for comparison with the recovered parts. The correct schematic has never been made public. The markings in Hangul, which reads "1번" (or No. 1 in English), found inside the end of the propulsion section, is consistent with the marking of a previously obtained North Korean torpedo, but inconsistent with one found seven years ago, which is marked "4호." Critics have pointed out that '호" is the term used most often in the North, rather than "번." Russian and Chinese torpedoes are marked in their respective languages. The CHT-02D torpedo manufactured by North Korea utilizes acoustic/wake homing and passive acoustic tracking methods.
The North Korean Central News Agency released a response to the investigation on 28 May 2010, asserting, among other things, that it is unbelievable that part of a torpedo doing so much damage to a ship would survive:
"the assertion that the screw shaft and engine remained undamaged and unchanged in shape is also a laughing shock. Even U.S. and British members of the international investigation team, which had blindly backed the south Korean regime in its "investigation", were perplexed at the exhibit in a glass box."
Full report 
A draft copy of the report was obtained by Time magazine in early August 2010, before the final report was released, which also obtained information about the final copy. According to Time, the report presents evidence for a total of eleven different reasons why the ship sank, all of which were dismissed except for that of North Korean involvement, which is considered a "high possibility."
In support of this conclusion, the report says that witnesses had reported seeing flashes of light or sounds of an explosion, as well as that the US Navy analysis of the wreck concluded that a torpedo containing 250 kilograms of explosives had collided with Cheonan six to nine meters below the waterline. Damage to the hull supported this conclusion, while inconsistent with what would be expected if the ship had run aground or had been hit with a missile.
On 13 September 2010, the full report was released. It concluded that Cheonan had been sunk due to a torpedo explosion, which, while not having contacted the ship, exploded several meters from the hull of the ship and caused a shockwave and bubble effect of sufficient strength to severely damage and sink the ship.
South Korea skepticism 
According to a survey conducted by Seoul National University's Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, less than one third of South Koreans trust the findings of the multinational panel. A later survey by the JoongAng Ilbo newspaper in 2011 found that 68 percent of South Koreans trusted the government's report that the Cheonan was sunk by a North Korean submersible. Lee Jung Hee, a lawmaker with the opposition Democratic Labor Party, was sued for defamation by seven people at South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff. Lee said during a speech in parliament that while the Defense Ministry had said there was no feed from a thermal observation device showing the moment the warship's stern and bow split apart, such a video did exist. Prosecutors then questioned Shin Sang-cheol, who served on the panel that investigated the incident and also runs Seoprise, over his assertion that the Cheonan sank in an accident and that the evidence linking the North to the torpedo was tampered with. The Defense Ministry asked the National Assembly to eject Shin from the panel for "arousing public mistrust." Shin stated that he doubted the official conclusion on the sinking, saying that when he looked at the dead sailors' bodies, they bore no signs of an explosion. Shin wrote a letter addressed to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton showing the evidence for his contention that the ship ran aground and then collided with another vessel.
Near the end of May a team of Russian Navy submarine and torpedo experts visited South Korea to conduct an assessment of the South Korean led investigation. The team returned to Russia with samples for further physical-chemical analysis. No official statement on the assessment has been made. It was claimed that the assessment concluded Cheonan was not sunk by a North Korean bubble jet torpedo, but did not come to any firm conclusion about the cause of the sinking. The Hindu quoted a Russian Navy source stating that "after examining the available evidence and the ship wreckage Russian experts came to the conclusion that a number of arguments produced by the international investigation in favour of the DPRK's involvement in the corvette sinking were not weighty enough”.
On 27 July 2010, The Hankyoreh published what it claimed was a detailed summary of the Russian Navy expert team's analysis. According to The Hankyoreh, the Russian investigators concluded that Cheonan touched the sea floor and damaged one of its propellers prior to a non-contact explosion, possibly caused by setting off a mine while the ship was trying to maneuver into deeper water. Visual examination of the torpedo parts South Korea found purportedly indicated that it had been in the water for more than 6 months. On the following day South Korean officials responded with "a full-scale refutation".
On 3 August 2010 Russian UN ambassador Vitaly Churkin stated that his country's investigative report's conclusions into the sinking would not be made public. Withholding the investigation results was seen as insensitive by South Korea, but avoided political damage to a number of states.
Chinese claims 
During talks between the American and Chinese governments in late May 2010, Chinese officials are reported by Yoichi Shimatsu, a commentator for the Chinese state-run CCTV-9 to have claimed that the sinking of the Cheonan had been as a result of an American rising mine, which is moored to the seabed and propels itself into a ship detected by sound or magnetics, planted during anti-submarine exercises that were conducted by the South Korean and US navies shortly before the sinking. To back up their claims, the Chinese said that North Korean submarines such as the one believed to have sunk the Cheonan were incapable of moving undetected within South Korean waters, and a rising mine would have damaged the ship by splitting the hull, as was done to the Cheonan, rather than simply holing the vessel as a conventional torpedo does. A conventional torpedo traveling at 40–50 knots would also be completely destroyed upon impact, which was claimed to contradict the torpedo parts found later.
The Daily Telegraph journalist Peter Foster in a blog post noted that while not everyone (including Russia and China) was convinced of the truth of the international inquiry into the ROKS Cheonan Sinking, some conspiracy theories and unanswered questions on the sinking, including one ascribing responsibility of the sinking to a rising mine deployed during a joint US-South Korean Foal Eagle anti-submarine exercises, ought to be read "with a large pinch of salt."
Other international research 
A separate investigation conducted by scientists at the University of Manitoba yielded results that conflict with the official investigation's findings. According to the leader of the investigation, residue on the hull of the ship that was claimed to have been aluminum oxide, which is a byproduct of explosions such as that of a torpedo, had a far higher ratio of oxygen to aluminum, leading the researchers to conclude that "we cannot say that the substance adhering to the Cheonan was the explosion byproduct of aluminum oxide." The South Korean Ministry of Defense issued a rebuttal to the findings, saying, "“The detonation of explosives containing aluminum occurs within hundreds of thousandths of a second under high temperatures of more than 3,000 degrees Celsius and high pressures of more than 200,000 atm, and most of it becomes noncrystalline aluminum oxide.”
A report published online by Nature on 8 July 2010 noted several instances of groups or individuals disagreeing with the official report. The article also notes the rebuttal of those disagreements by analysts and government officials, with one analyst arguing that the sinking was "consistent with North Korea's behaviour in the past."
South Korea 
South Korean President Lee Myung-bak convened an emergency meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Orders were given to the military to concentrate on rescuing the survivors. In Seoul, police were put on alert. At the time, a spokesman for the South Korean military stated that there was no evidence that North Korea had been involved in the incident. A large group of relatives of the missing sailors protested outside the navy base at Pyeongtaek over the lack of information provided to them. On 28 March relatives were taken to the site of the sunken vessel. Some relatives stated that survivors had claimed that the Cheonan had been in a poor state of repair. The Korean media have raised the issue of why the sister ship Sokcho, which was operating nearby, did not come to the rescue of the sinking ship but instead fired shots at radar images which were later confirmed to be migratory birds.
On 5 April 2010, President Lee Myung-bak visited Baengnyeong Island. He reiterated that it was risky to speculate over the cause, and the joint military and civilian investigation team would determine the cause. He said, "We have to find the cause in a way that satisfies not only our people but also the international community". The president of South Korea has mourned the victims and said that he will respond "resolutely" to the sinking without yet laying blame for its cause.
On 24 May Lee Myung-bak said the South would "resort to measures of self-defense in case of further military provocation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." He also supported readopting the official description of the North as the "main enemy."
South Korea pursued measures from the United Nations Security Council after the incident, although the language used in the country's statements towards such measures became progressively weaker. In announcements made soon after the sinking, the government said that any draft presented by South Korea would explicitly state that North Korea was responsible for the incident, but by early July, the language had been reduced to only referring to "those responsible," in response to concerns from Russia.
Since the incident, the South Korean government has been reluctant to engage in further diplomacy with North Korea over disputes such as North Korea's nuclear weapons program. In response to a request by China, in April 2011 South Korea agreed to talks, but South Korean government officials commented that an apology from North Korea for the sinking would probably be necessary to facilitate any significant progress in the dialogues.
On 2 May it was reported that South Korea's naval minister vowed "retaliation" against those responsible. Admiral Kim Sung-chan, at a publicly televised funeral for the Cheonan's dead crew members in Pyeongtaek, stated that, "We will not sit back and watch whoever caused this pain for our people. We will hunt them down and make them pay a bigger price."
On 4 May President Lee proposed "extensive reformations" for the South Korean military regarding the sinking incident. After the official report was released South Korea has said that it will take strong countermeasures against the North.
On 24 May 2010, South Korea announced it would stop nearly all its trade with North Korea as a result of the official report blaming North Korea for the sinking. South Korea also announced it would prohibit North Korean vessels from using its shipping channels. According to the New York Times, the trade embargoes were "the most serious action" South Korea could take short of military action. The United States openly supported South Korea's decision. The embargo is expected to cost the North Korean economy roughly $200 million a year. The decision to cease trade was followed up with the United States and South Korea announcing they would conduct joint naval exercises in response to the sinking.
Psychological warfare 
The South Korean military announced that it would resume psychological warfare directed at North Korea. This would include both loudspeaker and FM radio propaganda broadcasts across the DMZ. Meanwhile, a commander in the North Korean People's Army stated, “If South Korea establishes new psychological warfare services, we will fire against them in order to eliminate them,” according to a report carried by the Chosun Central News Agency (KCNA).
South Korea began propaganda broadcasts into North Korea by radio on 25 May. North Korea responded by putting its troops on high alert, and severed most remaining ties and communications with South Korea in response to what it called a "smear campaign" by Seoul. South Korean military propaganda FM broadcasts were resumed at 18:00 (local time) starting with the song "HuH" by K-pop band 4minute.
As part of the propaganda broadcasts, South Korea reinstalled loudspeakers at eleven places along the DMZ. There was originally a plan to also use electronic signs, although due to cost, the plan was reportedly being reconsidered. On 13 June, South Korean media announced that the South Korean Defense Minister, Kim Tae-young, had said that anti-North Korea broadcasts were planned to resume after the UN Security Council took action against North Korea in response to the sinking of the Cheonan.
Suppressing internal dissent 
Discourse over the events leading to the sinking of the Cheonan was tightly controlled by the South Korean government in the months after the incident. On 8 May 2010, a former senior presidential secretary who served under Roh Moo-hyun, Park Seon-won, was charged with libel by South Korea's Defense Minister, Kim Tae-young, over comments he made during a 22 April interview on MBC radio asking for greater disclosure from the military and government. Park Seon-won's response to the charge was: "I asked for the disclosure of information for a transparent and impartial investigation into the cause of the Cheonan sinking;" he added that "the libel suit seeks to silence public suspicion over the incident." South Korea's Minister of Public Administration and Security, Maeng Hyung-kyu, announced on 20 May 2010 that the government was stepping up efforts to prosecute people who spread "groundless rumors" over the internet: "Anyone who makes false reports or articles about the incident could seriously damage national security. We will not let these be the basis of any risks the nation faces." Moreover, he announced the government would step up efforts to prevent "illegal gatherings" regarding the sinking of the Cheonan.
A South Korean military oversight board, the Board of Inspection and Audit, has accused senior South Korean naval leaders of lying and hiding information. Said the board, "Military officers deliberately left out or distorted key information in their report to senior officials and the public because they wanted to avoid being held to account for being unprepared."
North Korea 
The North Korean Central News Agency released an official response to the investigation on 28 May 2010, asserting, amongst other things, that it is unbelievable that part of a torpedo doing so much damage to a ship would survive:
"Besides, the assertion that the screw shaft and engine remained undamaged and unchanged in shape is also a laughing shock. Even U.S. and British members of the international investigation team, which had blindly backed the south Korean regime in its 'investigation', were perplexed at the exhibit in a glass box."
On 17 April 2010, it was reported that North Korea officially denied having had anything to do with the sinking, responding to what it referred to as "The puppet military warmongers, right-wing conservative politicians and the group of other traitors in South Korea". An article from the official (North) Korean Central News Agency entitled "Military Commentator Denies Involvement in Ship Sinking" stated that the event was an accident.
... we have so far regarded the accident as a regretful accident that should not happen in the light of the fact that many missing persons and most of rescued members of the crew are fellow countrymen forced to live a tiresome life in the puppet army.
On 21 May 2010, North Korea offered to send their own investigative team to review the evidence compiled by South Korea, and the Hankyoreh quoted Kim Yeon-chul, professor of unification studies at Inje University, commenting on the offer: "It is unprecedented in the history of inter-Korean relations for North Korea to propose sending an investigation team in response to an issue that has been deemed a 'military provocation by North Korea,'"and thus "The Cheonan situation has entered a new phase."
The North also warned of a wide range of hostile reactions to any move by the South to hold it accountable for the sinking.
If the South puppet group comes out with 'response' and 'retaliation', we will respond strongly with ruthless punishment including the total shutdown of North-South ties, abrogation of the North-South agreement on non-aggression and abolition of all North-South cooperation projects.
On 24 May, new reports indicated Kim Jong-Il had ordered the North's forces to be ready for combat a week before. The next day, North Korea released a list of measures that it will take in response to South Korea's sanctions. This would include the cutting of all ties and communications, except for the Kaesong industrial complex. They would revert back to a wartime footing in regard to South Korea and disallow any South Korean ships or aircraft to enter the territory of North Korea.
On 27 May, North Korea announced that it would scrap an agreement aimed at preventing accidental naval clashes with South Korea. It also announced that any South Korean vessel found crossing the disputed maritime border would be immediately attacked.
On 28 May, the official (North) KCNA stated that "it is the United States that is behind the case of Cheonan. The investigation was steered by the U.S. from its very outset." It also accused the United States of manipulating the investigation and named the administration of US President Barack Obama directly of using the case for "escalating instability in the Asia-Pacific region, containing big powers and emerging unchallenged in the region."
On 29 May, North Korea warned the United Nations to be wary of evidence presented in the international investigation, likening the case to the claims of weapons of mass destruction that the U.S. used to justify its war against Iraq in 2003 and stated that "the U.S. is seriously mistaken if it thinks it can occupy the Korean Peninsula just as it did Iraq with sheer lies." The North Korea foreign minister warned the United Nations Security Council of risks of being "misused". It also accused the U.S. of joining South Korea in putting "China into an awkward position and keep hold on Japan and South Korea as its servants." High ranking North Korean military officials denounced the international investigation and said the North does not have the type of submarines that supposedly carried out the attack. They also dismissed claims regarding writings on the torpedo and clarified that "when we put serial numbers on weapons, we engrave them with machines." South Korea's Yonhap News quoted South Korean officials as saying the North has about 10 of the Yeono class submarines.
When the official report on the sinking was released on 20 May there was widespread international condemnation of the North's actions. China was one of few exceptions, simply terming the incident "unfortunate" and "urged stability on the peninsula". This was speculated to be China's concern for instability in the Korean peninsula.
On 14 June 2010, South Korea presented the results of its investigation to United Nations Security Council members. In a subsequent meeting with council members North Korea stated that it had nothing to do with the incident. On 9 July 2010 the United Nations Security Council made a Presidential Statement condemning the attack but without identifying the attacker. China had resisted U.S. calls for a tougher line against North Korea.
Later reports 
A member of the North Korean cabinet who defected to the south in 2011, said on 7 December 2012 that the crew of the North Korean submarine which sank Cheonan had been honored by the North Korean military and government. The defector, known by the alias "Ahn Cheol-nam", stated that the captain, co-captain, engineer, and boatswain of the mini-sub which sank the Cheonan had been awarded "Hero of the DPRK" in October 2010.
See also 
- Korean Air Flight 858
- Korean War
- Shelling of Yeonpyeong
- List of border incidents involving North Korea
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Further reading 
- Van Dyke, Jon M., Mark J. Valencia and Jenny Miller Garmendia. "The North/South Korea Boundary Dispute in the Yellow (West) Sea," . Marine Policy 27 (2003), 143–158.
|Wikinews has related news:|
- Joint Investigation Report On the Attack Against the ROKS Ship Cheonan, Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, September 2010, ISBN 978-89-7677-711-9
- Investigation Result on the Sinking of ROKS Cheonan, Press Summary by The Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group
- South Korean Ministry of Defense "Smoking Gun" Briefing Slides
- Investigation MND briefing slides
- Briefing – the Cheonan Situation, Ambassador Han Duk-soo, 25 May 2010
|Territorial disputes in East, South, and Southeast Asia|
|Type||Territory||Currently administered by||Claimants|
|Land||Aksai Chin||People's Republic of China||People's Republic of China, Republic of China¹, India|
|Baekdu Mountain||North Korea, People's Republic of China||North Korea, South Korea¹, People's Republic of China, Republic of China¹|
|Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island¹||People's Republic of China, Russia||Republic of China¹|
|Indo-Bangladesh enclaves²||Bangladesh, India||Bangladesh, India|
|Jiandao¹||People's Republic of China||People's Republic of China, Republic of China¹, North Korea¹, South Korea¹|
|Kachin State||Burma||Burma, Republic of China¹|
|Kashmir²||India, Pakistan||India, Pakistan|
|Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands||South Korea, North Korea||South Korea, North Korea|
|Mainland China¹||People's Republic of China||People's Republic of China, Republic of China|
|North Borneo (Sabah)¹||Malaysia||Malaysia, Philippines|
|Pamir Mountains²||Afghanistan, Tajikistan||Afghanistan, Republic of China¹, Tajikistan|
|Sixty-Four Villages East of the River¹||Russia||Republic of China¹, Russia|
|South Tibet / Arunachal Pradesh||India||People's Republic of China, Republic of China¹, India|
|Trans-Karakoram Tract||People's Republic of China||People's Republic of China, Republic of China¹, India|
|Sir Creek¹||India, Pakistan||India, Pakistan|
|Liancourt Rocks||South Korea||South Korea, North Korea¹, Japan|
|Macclesfield Bank||People's Republic of China||People's Republic of China , Republic of China|
|Paracel Islands||People's Republic of China||People's Republic of China, Republic of China, Vietnam|
|Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge||Singapore||Malaysia, Singapore|
|Pratas Islands||Republic of China||People's Republic of China, Republic of China|
|Ryukyu Islands||Japan||People's Republic of China, Republic of China, Japan|
|Scarborough Shoal||People's Republic of China||People's Republic of China, Republic of China, Philippines|
|Senkaku Islands||Japan||People's Republic of China, Republic of China, Japan|
|Socotra Rock||South Korea||South Korea, People's Republic of China¹|
|Southern Kuril Islands||Russia||Russia, Japan|
|Spratly Islands²||People's Republic of China, Republic of China, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam||Brunei, People's Republic of China, Republic of China, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam|
|Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu¹||Republic of China||People's Republic of China, Republic of China|
|Tsushima Island||Japan||Japan, South Korea¹, North Korea¹|
|Notes: 1: Inactive dispute. 2: Divided among multiple claimants.|