Radical behaviorism is "the established formal designation for B. F. Skinner's philosophy of the science of behavior". The term radical behaviorism is also used to refer to the school of psychology known as the experimental analysis of behavior. Radical behaviorism is distinguished by its intense emphasis on observable behaviors and its inclusion of thoughts, emotions, and other internal mental activity in the analysis and theorizing of human and animal psychology.
- 1 Natural science
- 2 The basics: operant psychology
- 3 Common misunderstandings
- 4 Explaining behavior and the importance of the environment
- 5 Radical Behaviorism: A Natural Science
- 6 Private events in a radical behaviorist account
- 7 Outgrowths
- 8 See also
- 9 Notes
- 10 References
- 11 Further reading
- 12 External links
Radical behaviorism inherits from behaviorism the position that the science of behavior is a natural science, a belief that animal behavior be studied profitably and compared with human behavior, a strong emphasis on the environment as cause of behavior, and a penchant for operationalizing. Its principal differences are an emphasis on operant conditioning, use of idiosyncratic terminology (jargon), a tendency to apply notions of reinforcement to philosophy and daily life and, particularly, an emphasis on private experience.
Radical behaviorism embraces the genetic and biological endowment and ultimately evolved nature of the organism, while simply asserting that behavior is a distinct field of study with its own value. From this two neglected points emerge: radical behaviorism is thoroughly compatible with biological and evolutionary approaches to psychology—in fact, as a proper part of biology—and radical behaviorism does not involve the claim that organisms are tabula rasa, without genetic or physiological endowment.
Skinner's psychological work focused on operant conditioning, with emphasis on the schedule of reinforcement as an independent variable, and the rate of responding as a dependent variable. Operant techniques are a venerable part of the toolbox of the psychobiologist, and many neurobiological theories—particularly regarding drug addiction—have made extensive use of reinforcement. Operant methodology and terminology have been used in much research on animal perception and concept formation—with the same topics, such as stimulus generalization, bearing importantly on operant conditioning. Skinner's emphasis on outcomes and response rates naturally lends itself to topics typically left to economics, as in behavioral economics. The field of operant conditioning can also be seen to interact with work on decision-making, and had influence on AI and cognitive science.
The basics: operant psychology
Skinner saw that classical conditioning didn't account for the behavior most of us are interested in, such as riding a bike or writing a book. His observations led him to propose a theory about how these and similar behaviors, called operants, come about.
Roughly speaking, in operant conditioning, an operant is actively emitted and produces changes in the world (i.e., produces consequences) that alter the likelihood that the behavior will occur again.
As represented in the table below, operant conditioning has two basic purposes (increasing or decreasing the probability that a specific behavior will occur in the future), which are accomplished by adding or removing one of two basic types of stimuli, positive/pleasant or negative/aversive.
|Stimulus Type||Effect: Increase Behavior||Effect: Decrease Behavior|
|Appetitive stimulus||Add appetitive stimulus: Positive reinforcer (R+)||Remove appetitive stimulus: Negative punisher or response cost punishment (P−)|
|Negative stimulus||Remove aversive stimulus: Negative reinforcer (R−)||Add aversive stimulus: Positive punisher (P+)|
In other words:
- If the probability of a behavior is increased as a consequence of the presentation of a stimulus, that stimulus is a positive reinforcer (R+).
- If the probability of a behavior is increased as a consequence of the withdrawal of a stimulus, that stimulus is a negative reinforcer (R−).
- If the probability of a behavior is decreased as a consequence of the presentation of a stimulus, that stimulus is a positive punisher (P+).
- If the probability of a behavior is decreased as a consequence of the withdrawal of a stimulus, that stimulus is a negative punisher or response cost punishment (P−).
Negative reinforcement and punishment are often confused. It is important to note that a reinforcer is anything that increases the likelihood that a behavior will happen again. A punisher will always decrease behavior.
Instrumental conditioning is another term for operant conditioning that is most closely associated with scientists who studied learning that occurred over discrete trials, such as runs through a maze. Skinner pioneered the free operant technique, where organisms could respond at any time during a protracted experimental session. Thus Skinner's dependent variable was usually the frequency or rate of responding, not the errors that were made or the speed of traversal of a maze.
Operant conditioning tells something about the future of the organism: That in the future, the reinforced behavior will be likely to occur more often.
Although there are many criticisms of Skinner's work, many textbooks and theorists like Noam Chomsky label Skinnerian or radical behaviorism as S–R (stimulus–response, or to use Skinner's term, "respondent"), or Pavlovian psychology, and argue that this limits the approach. Although contemporary psychology rejects many of Skinner's conclusions, his work into operant conditioning which emphasizes the importance of consequences in modifying discriminative responses is useful when combined with current understandings about the uniqueness of evolved human thought over other animals.
Many textbooks[by whom?] argue that radical behaviorism maintains the position that animals (including humans) are passive receivers of conditioning, failing to take into account that:
- operant behavior is titled operant because it operates on the environment
- operant behavior is emitted, not elicited: Animals act on the environment and the environment acts back on them, or
- the consequence of a behavior can itself be a stimulus; one needs not present anything for shaping to take place.
Radical behaviorism is often dismissed as logical positivism. Skinnerians maintain that Skinner was not a logical positivist and recognized the importance of thought as behavior. This position is made quite clear in About Behaviorism. A clearer position for radical behaviorism seems to be the movement known philosophically as American pragmatism.
For a current review and summary of his book Verbal Behavior see the article Verbal Behavior.
Explaining behavior and the importance of the environment
John B. Watson argued against the use of references to mental states and held that psychology should study behavior directly, holding private events as impossible to study scientifically. Skinner rejected this position conceding the importance of thinking, feelings and "inner behavior" in his analysis. Skinner did not hold to truth by agreement, as Watson did, so he was not limited by observation.
In Watson's days (and in Skinner's early days), it was held that psychology was at a disadvantage as a science because behavioral explanations should take physiology into account. Very little was known about physiology at the time. Skinner argued that behavioral explanations of psychological phenomena are "just as true" as physiological explanations. In arguing this, he took a non-reductionistic approach to psychology. Skinner, however, redefined behavior to include "everything that an organism does," including thinking, feeling and speaking and argued that these phenomena were valid subject matters. (The challenge was that objective observation and measurement was often impossible.) The term radical behaviorism refers to just this: that everything an organism does is a behavior.
However, Skinner ruled out thinking and feeling as valid explanations of behavior. The reasoning is this:
Thinking and feeling are not epiphenomena nor have they any other special status, and are just more behavior to explain. Explaining behavior by referring to thought or feelings are pseudo-explanations because they merely point to more behavior to be explained. Skinner proposed environmental factors as proper causes of behavior because:
- Environmental factors are at a different logical level than behavior and actions.
- One can manipulate behavior by manipulating the environment
This holds only for explaining the class of behaviors known as operant behaviors. This class of behavior Skinner held as the most interesting study matter.
Many textbooks, in noting the emphasis Skinner places on the environment, argue that Skinner held that the organism is a blank slate or a tabula rasa. Skinner wrote extensively on the limits and possibilities nature places on conditioning. Conditioning is implemented in the body as a physiological process and is subject to the current state, learning history, and history of the species. Skinner does not consider people a blank slate, or tabula rasa.
Many textbooks seem to confuse Skinner's rejection of physiology with Watson's rejection of private events. It is true to some extent that Skinner's psychology considers humans a black box, since Skinner maintains that behavior can be explained without taking into account what goes on in the organism. However, the black box is not private events, but physiology. Skinner considers physiology as useful, interesting, valid, etc., but not necessary for operant behavioral theory and research.
Radical Behaviorism: A Natural Science
The most precise way to describe radical behaviorism as ``radical`` is to understand that instances such as evolution and cell division are occurrences that just happen. There is no 3rd party that assists in this transformation, they can however be explained by other naturally occurring events. They should not try to be explained through objects that are not tangible ie. ghosts or inner entities. We therefore conclude that natural occurring events may be examined in relation to our past and present environments through the effect they have on human beings.
Private events in a radical behaviorist account
Radical behaviorism differs from other forms of behaviorism in that it treats everything we do as behavior, including private events such as thinking and feeling. Unlike John B. Watson's behaviorism, private events are not dismissed as "epiphenomena," but are seen as subject to the same principles of learning and modification as have been discovered to exist for overt behavior. Although private events are not publicly observable behaviors, radical behaviorism accepts that we are each observers of our own private behavior.
Many textbooks, in emphasizing that Skinner held behavior to be the proper subject matter of psychology, fail to clarify Skinner's position and implicitly or even explicitly posit that Skinner ruled out the study of private events as unscientific. This is Watson's position, not Skinner's.
There are radical behaviorist schools of animal training, management, clinical practice, and education. Skinner's political views have left their mark in small ways as principles adopted by a small handful of utopian communities such as Los Horcones, and in ongoing challenges to aversive techniques in control of human and animal behavior.
Radical behaviorism has generated numerous descendants. Examples of these include molar approaches associated with Richard Herrnstein and William Baum, Howard Rachlin's teleological behaviorism, William Timberlake's behavior systems approach, and John Staddon's theoretical behaviorism.
This content should be removed because it does not represent a theoretical or logical argument to the criticism of radical behaviorism. Noting that "some" psychologists view behavioristic practices as "cold" or "wrong" and citing a single study that is 50 years old does not contribute to an understanding of behaviorism.
Actual criticisms may take into account J.R. Kantor's interbehaviorism as a criticism of Skinner's use of metaphor. An account of comparative cognition or current neurobiological theories that explain behavior could also be useful.
- Holland, J.G.; Skinner, B.F. (1961). Analysis of behavior. McGraw-Hill.
- Huitt, W. & Hummel, J. (1997). "An Introduction to Operant (Instrumental) Conditioning". Valdosta State University, Valdosta, Georgia.
- Schneider, Susan M., and Morris, Edward K. (1987). "A History of the Term Radical Behaviorism: From Watson to Skinner". The Behavior Analyst, 10(1), p. 36.
- Chiesa, Mecca (1974). Radical Behaviorism: The Philosophy and the Science. Reprinted by Authors Cooperative (1994): Boston, Massachusetts. ISBN 0962331147, ISBN 978-0962331145.
- Huitt and Hummel (1997)
- Chomsky, N. (1959) "A Review of B.F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior". In Leon A. Jakobovits and Murray S. Miron (eds.), Readings in the Psychology of Language, Prentice-Hall, 1967, pp. 142–3.
- MacCorquodale, K. (1970). "On Chomsky's review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior". Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 13, 83–99.
- Skinner, B.F. (1974). About Behaviorism. New York: Knopf.
- Moxley, Roy (2003). "Pragmatic Selectionism: The Philosophy of Behavior Analysis". The Behavior Analyst Today, 4(3), 289–314. BAO
- Skinner, B.F. "On Having A Poem" in which he states: "I am not an S–R psychologist." also in About Behaviorism where he states this position again.
- Baum, William . "What is radical behaviorism? A review of Jay Moore's Conceptual foundations of radical behaviorism.." Radical Behaviorism 95.1 (2011): 119-126. ProQuest. Web. 12 Jan. 2011.
- Wyatt, W. Joseph (2001). "Some Myths about Behaviorism That Are Undone in B.F. Skinner's 'The Design of Cultures'". Behavior and Social Issues, (11)1, pp. 28–30.
- Gaynor, Scott T. (2004). "Skepticism of caricatures: B.F. Skinner turns 100". The Skeptical Inquirer, 28(1), pp. 26–29.