Russian Armed Forces
The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (Russian: Вооружённые Си́лы Росси́йской Федера́ции, tr. Vooruzhonnije Síly Rossíyskoj Federátsii) are the military services of Russia, established after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On 7 May 1992, Boris Yeltsin signed a presidential decree establishing the Russian Ministry of Defence and placing all Soviet Armed Forces troops on the territory of the RSFSR under Russian control. The commander-in-chief of the armed forces is the president of Russia. Although the Russian armed forces were formed in 1992, the Russian military dates its roots back to the times of the Kievan Rus'.
The number of troops is specified by decree of the President of Russia. On 1 January 2008, a number of 2,019,629 units, including military of 1,134,800 units, was set. In 2010 the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated that the Russian Armed Forces numbered about 1,040,000 active troops and in the region of 2,035,000 reserves, (largely ex-conscripts) but a significant military reform is underway which will cut the number of active troops.
According to SIPRI, Russia spent nearly $72 billion on arms in 2011. Russia is planning further increases in its military spending, with draft budgets showing a 53% rise in real terms up to 2014. However, SIPRI adds that many analysts are doubtful whether the industry will be able to deliver on such ambitious plans after decades of stagnation following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
As the Soviet Union officially dissolved on 31 December 1991, the Soviet military was left in limbo. For the next year and a half various attempts to keep its unity and transform it into the military of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) failed. Over time, the units stationed in the newly independent republics swore loyalty to their new national governments, while a series of treaties between the newly independent states divided up the military's assets.
Apart from assuming control of the bulk of the former Soviet Internal Troops and KGB Border Troops, seemingly the only independent defence move the new Russian leadership made before March 1992 was to announce the creation of a 'National Guard', Until 1995, it was planned to form at least 11 brigades numbering 3-5,000 each, a total of no more than 100,000. National Guard military units were to be deployed in 10 regions, including in Moscow (three brigades), Leningrad (two brigades), and a number of other important cities and regions . By the end of September 1991 in Moscow the National Guard was about 15,000 strong, mostly ex Soviet Armed Forces servicemen. In the end, Yeltsin tabled a decree "On the temporary position of the Russian Guard," but it was not put into practice.
After signing the Belavezha Accords on 21 December 1991, the new CIS countries signed a protocol on the temporary appointment of Marshal of Aviation Yevgeny Shaposhnikov as Minister of Defence and commander of the armed forces in their territory, including strategic nuclear forces. On 14 February 1992, he formally became Supreme Commander of the CIS Armed Forces. On 16 March 1992 a decree by Boris Yeltsin created The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the operational control of Allied High Command and the Ministry of Defense, which was headed by President. Finally, on 7 May 1992 Yelsin signed a decree establishing the armed forces and Yeltsin assumed the duties of the Supreme Commander. Pavel Grachev became the first Minister of Defence, and was made Russia's first Army General on assuming the post.
On 7 May 1992, Yeltsin appointed himself as the new Russian Minister of Defence, marking a crucial step in the creation of the new Armed Forces. By December 1993 CIS military structures had become CIS military cooperation structures with all real influence lost.
In the next few years, Russian forces withdrew from central and eastern Europe, as well as from some newly independent post-Soviet republics. While in most places the withdrawal took place without any problems, the Russian Armed Forces remained in some disputed areas such as the Sevastopol Naval Base in the Crimea as well as in Abkhazia and Transnistria. The Armed Forces have several bases in foreign countries, especially on territory of the former Soviet Republics.
A new military doctrine, promulgated in November 1993, implicitly acknowledged the contraction of the old Soviet military into a regional military power without global ambitions. In keeping with its emphasis on the threat of regional conflicts, the doctrine called for a Russian military that is smaller, lighter, and more mobile, with a higher degree of professionalism and with greater rapid deployment capability. Such change proved extremely difficult to achieve. Under Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, little military reform took place, though there was a plan to create more deployable Mobile Forces. Later Defence Minister Rodionov had good qualifications but did not manage to institute lasting change. Only under Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev did a certain amount of limited reform begin, though attention was focused upon the Strategic Rocket Forces. Significant reforms were announced in late 2008 under Defence Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov, and major structural reorganisation began in 2009.
Key elements of the reforms announced in October 2008 include reducing the armed forces to a strength of one million by 2012 (planned end-date was 2016 ); reducing the number of officers; centralising officer training from 65 military schools into 10 'systemic' military training centres; reducing the size of the central command; introducing more civilian logistics and auxiliary staff; elimination of cadre-strength formations; reorganising the reserves; reorganising the army into a brigade system; and reorganising air forces into an air base system instead of regiments. On 17 October 2012 the head of the State Duma’s Defense Committee told RIA Novosti that Russia plans to boost annual defense spending by 59 percent to almost 3 trillion rubles ($97 billion) in 2015 up from $61 billion in 2012. “Targeted national defense spending as a percentage of GDP will amount to 3.2 percent in 2013, 3.4 percent in 2014 and 3.7 percent in 2015,” Defense Committee chairman Vladimir Komoedov is quoted as saying in the committee’s conclusion on the draft budget for 2013-2015.
The number of military units is to be reduced in accordance with the table:
|Arms and branches||2008||2012||Reduction|
|Ground Forces||1,890||172||-90 %|
|Air Force||340||180||-48 %|
|Strategic Rocket Forces||12||8||-33 %|
|Space Forces||7||6||-15 %|
|Airborne Troops||6||5||-17 %|
An essential part of the military reform is its down-sizing. By the beginning of the reform, there were about 1,200,000 active personnel in the Russian army. Largely, the reductions falls within the officers. Personnel are to be reduced according to the table:
|Category of military men||1 September 2008||1 December 2009||Planned for 2012||Reduction|
|Colonel/Captain 1st Rank||25,665||9,114||−64.5 %|
|Lieutenant Colonel/Captain 2nd Rank||19,300||7,500||−61 %|
|Major/Captain 3rd Rank||99,550||25,000||−75 %|
|Captain/Captain Lieutenant||90,000||40,000||−56 %|
|First Lieutenant/Senior Lieutenant||30,000||35,000||+17 %|
|Officers in total||365,000||220,000||−40 %|
|Praporshchik/Warrant Officer||90,000||0||0||−100 %|
|Warrant officer||50,000||0||0||−100 %|
The total number of the officer corps scheduled to reduce from 335 thousand to 150 thousand, but in early February 2011 Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov announced the decision to increase officers by 70 000 - to 220 thousand to counteract this.
Another aspect of the modernization is that by the end of 2013 a series of comfort improvements are planned for all troops, for example showers in all army quarters.
The Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation serves as the administrative body of the Armed Forces. Since Soviet times, the General Staff has acted as the main commanding and supervising body of the Russian armed forces: U.S. expert William Odom said in 1998, that 'the Soviet General Staff without the MoD is conceivable, but the MoD without the General Staff is not.' However, currently the General Staff's role is being reduced to that of the Ministry's department of strategic planning, the Minister himself, currently Sergey Shoygu may now be gaining further executive authority over the troops. Other departments include the personnel directorate as well as the Rear Services, railway troops, Signal Troops and construction troops. The Chief of the General Staff is currently General of the Army Valery Gerasimov.
The Russian military is divided into the following services: the Russian Ground Forces, the Russian Navy, and the Russian Air Force. There are also three independent arms of service: Strategic Missile Troops, Russian Aerospace Defense Forces, and the Russian Airborne Troops. The Air Defence Troops, the former Soviet Air Defence Forces, have been subordinated into the Air Force since 1998. The Armed Forces as a whole are traditionally referred to as the Army (armiya), except in some cases, the Navy is specifically singled out.
Since late 2010 the Ground Forces as well as the Air Forces and Navy are distributed among four military districts: Western Military District, Southern Military District, Central Military District, and the Eastern Military District which also constitute four Joint Strategic Commands - West, South, Central, and East. Previously from 1992 to 2010, the Ground Forces were divided into six military districts: Moscow, Leningrad, North Caucausian, Privolzhsk-Ural, Siberian and Far Eastern and Russia's four fleets and one flotilla were organizations on par with the Ground Forces' Military Districts. These six MDs were merged into the four new MDs, which now also incorporate the air forces and naval forces.
The Navy consists of four fleets and one flotilla:
- Northern Fleet (HQ at Severomorsk) subordinated to Joint Strategic Command West.
- Baltic Fleet (HQ at Kaliningrad in the exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast) subordinated to Joint Strategic Command West.
- Black Sea Fleet (HQ at Sevastopol, Ukraine subordinated to Joint Strategic Command South. (In 1997, the Ukrainian government agreed that Russia would be allowed to lease several base areas around Sevastopol until 2017.) This lease has been extended by 25 years through 2042 with an option for an additional five years through 2047.
- Caspian Flotilla (HQ at Astrakhan) subordinated to Joint Strategic Command South.
- Pacific Fleet (HQ at Vladivostok) subordinated to Joint Strategic Command East.
The Kaliningrad Special Region, under the command of the Commander Baltic Fleet, comprises Ground & Coastal Forces, formerly the 11th Guards Army, with a motor rifle division and a motor rifle brigade, and a fighter aviation regiment of Sukhoi Su-27 'Flanker', as well as other forces.
Similarly, the Northeast Group of Troops and Forces, headquartered at Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, comprises all Russian Armed Forces components in the Kamchatka Oblast and the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug [district] and is subordinate to the Commander Pacific Fleet headquartered in Vladivostok.
In mid-2010 a reorganisation was announced which consolidated military districts and the navy's fleets into four Joint Strategic Commands (OSC). Geographically divided, the four commands are:
- Joint Strategic Command West - Western Military District (HQ in St. Petersburg), includes the Northern and Baltic Fleets;
- Joint Strategic Command South - Southern Military District (HQ in Rostov-on-Don) includes the Black Sea Fleet and Caspian Flotilla;
- Joint Strategic Command Center - Central Military District (HQ in Yekaterinburg);
- Joint Strategic Command East - Eastern Military District (HQ in Khabarovsk), includes the Pacific Fleet.
The plan, was put in place on 1 December 2010, and mirrors a proposed reorganisation by former Chief of the General Staff Army General Yuri Baluyevsky for a Regional Command East which was not in fact implemented. The four commands were set up by a decree of President Medvedev on 14 July 2010. In July 2011, an Operational-Strategic Command of Missile-Space Defence has also been established on the basis of the former Special Purpose Command of the Russian Air Force. It is expected to be operational on 1 December 2011. A decision whether the VKO will be subordinated to the Air Force or the Space Forces has yet to be taken. Commander of the VKO is General-Lieutenant Valery Ivanov. A Presidential decree of January 2011 named commanders for several of the new organisational structures.
Russian military command posts, according to globalsecurity.org, include Chekhov/Sharapovo about 80 kilometres (50 mi) south of Moscow, for the General Staff and President,() Chaadayevka near Penza, Voronovo in Moscow, and a facility at Lipetsk all for the national leadership, Yamantau in the Urals, and command posts for the Strategic Rocket Forces at Kuntsevo in Moscow (primary) and Kosvinsky Mountain in the Urals (alternate). It is speculated that many of the Moscow bunkers are linked by the special underground Moscow Metro 2 line.
Russian security bodies not under the control of the Ministry of Defence include the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Border Guard Service of Russia (part of the Federal Security Service), the Kremlin Regiment and the rest of the Federal Protective Service (Russia), and the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the country's civil defense service since 1995 and successor to earlier civil defense units.
Deferments are provided to undergraduate and graduate students, men solely supporting disabled relatives, parents of at least two children and - upon Presidential proclamation - to some employees of military-oriented enterprises. Men holding Ph.D. as well as sons and brothers of servicemen killed or disabled during their military service are released of conscription.
There are widespread problems with hazing in the Army, known as dedovshchina, where first-year draftees are bullied by second-year draftees, a practice that appeared in its current form after the change to a two-year service term in 1967. To combat this problem, a new decree was signed in March 2007, which cut the conscription service term from 24 to 18 months. The term was cut further to one year on 1 January 2008.
Thirty percent of Russian Armed Forces' personnel were contract servicemen at the end of 2005. For the foreseeable future, the Armed Forces will be a mixed contract/conscript force. The Russian Armed Forces need to maintain a mobilization reserve to have manning resources capable of reinforcing the permanent readiness forces if the permanent readiness forces cannot deter or suppress an armed conflict on their own.
The ranks of the Russian military are also open to non-Russian citizens of the Commonwealth of Independent States, of which Russia is the largest member. By December 2003, the Russian parliament had approved a law in principle to permit the Armed Forces to employ foreign nationals on contract by offering them Russian citizenship after several years service. Yet up to 2010, foreigners could only serve in Russia's armed forces after getting a Russian passport. Under a 2010 Defence Ministry plan, foreigners without dual citizenship would be able to sign up for five-year contracts and will be eligible for Russian citizenship after serving three years. The change could open the way for CIS citizens to get fast-track Russian citizenship, and counter the effects of Russia's demographic crisis on its army recruitment.
Awards and decorations of the Armed Forces are covered at Awards and Emblems of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation.
On 17 November 2011, General Nikolai Makarov said that Russia had reached a crisis in the conscript service where there simply were not sufficient able bodied men to draft and was forced to halve its conscription.
Each soldier in duty receives Identity Card of the Russian Armed Forces.
In 1988 military spending was a single line item in the Soviet state budget, totaling 21 billion rubles (68.777.100 million U.S. dollars). Given the size of the military establishment, however, the actual figure was considered to be far higher. However, between 1991 and 1997 newly independent Russia's defence spending fell by a factor of eight in real prices. Between 1988 and 1993 weapons production in Russia fell by at least 50% for virtually every major weapons system.
In 1998, when Russia experienced a severe financial crisis, its military expenditure in real terms reached its lowest point— barely one-quarter of the USSR's in 1991, and two-fifths of the level of 1992, the first year of Russia's independent existence.
Defence spending is consistently increasing by at least a minimum of one-third year-on-year, leading to overall defence expenditure almost quadrupling over the past six years, and according to Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, this rate is to be sustained through 2010. Official government military spending for 2005 was US $32.4 billion, though various sources, have estimated Russia's military expenditures to be considerably higher than the reported amount. Estimating Russian military expenditure is beset with difficulty; the annual IISS Military Balance has underscored the problem numerous times within its section on Russia. The IISS Military Balance comments - 'By simple observation..[the military budget] would appear to be lower than is suggested by the size of the armed forces or the structure of the military-industrial complex, and thus neither of the figures is particularly useful for comparative analysis'. By some estimates, overall Russian defence expenditure is now at the second highest in the world after the USA. According to Alexander Kanshin, Chairman of the Public Chamber of Russia on affairs of veterans, military personnel, and their families, the Russian military is losing up to US$13 billion to corruption every year.
On 16 February 2009 Russia's deputy defence minister said state defence contracts would not be subject to cuts this year despite the ongoing financial crisis, and that there would be no decrease in 2009. The budget would still be 1,376 billion roubles and in the current exchange rates this would amount to $41.5 billion.
However, later that month, due to the world financial crisis, the Russian Parliament's Defence Committee stated that the Russian defence budget would instead be slashed by 15 percent, from $40 billion to $34 billion, with further cuts to come. On 5 May 2009, First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said that the defence budget for 2009 will be 1.3 trillion rubles (US$39.4 billion). 322 billion rubles are allocated to purchase weapons, and the rest of the fund will be spent on construction, fuel storage and food supply. According to the head of the Defense Committee of the State Duma Vladimir Komoyedov Russia plans to spend 101.15 billion rubles on nuclear weapons in 2013-2015."The budget provisions under "The Nuclear Weapons Complex" section in 2013-2015 will amount to 29.28 billion rubles, 33.3 billion rubles and 38.57 billion rubles respectively," Komoyedov said, Vechernaya Moskva reports.
Komoyedov added that in 2012 the spending on nuclear weapons made up 27.4 billion rubles. The draft law "On the Federal Budget for 2013 and for the planning period of 2014 and 2015" will be discussed in the first reading on 19 October 2012, The Voice of Russia reports. In a meeting in Sochi on November 2013, President Putin said the country's defense budget will reach 2.3 trillion roubles, stressing the huge amount in comparison to the 2003 budget, which stood on 600 billion rubles.
About 70% of the former Soviet Union's defense industries are located in the Russian Federation. Many defense firms have been privatized; some have developed significant partnerships with firms in other countries.
The structure of the state defense order under President Putin changed. Priority was given to the acquisition of sophisticated modern weapons, in light of the events in Chechnya. Previously, financing of strategic nuclear deterrence forces had been a priority, and up to 80% of assignments for the state defense order were spent on their needs. It was planned that beginning from 2000 the state defense order would comprise two priority directions: assignments for the nuclear deterrence forces, and assignments for purchase of conventional arms including the precision guided weapons.
The recent steps towards modernization of the Armed Forces have been made possible by Russia's economic resurgence based on oil and gas revenues as well a strengthening of its own domestic market. Currently, the military is in the middle of a major equipment upgrade, with the government in the process of spending about $200 billion (what equals to about $400 billion in PPP dollars) on development and production of military equipment between 2006-2015 under the State Armament Programme for 2007-2015 (GPV - госпрограмма вооружения). Mainly as a result of lessons learned during the August War, the State Armament Programme for 2011-2020 was launched in December 2010. Prime Minister Putin announced that 20-21.5 trillion rubles (over $650 billion) will be allocated to purchase new hardware in the next 10 years. The aim is to have a growth of 30% of modern equipment in the army, navy and air force by 2015, and of 70% by 2020. In some categories, the proportion of new weapon systems will reach 80% or even 100%. At this point, the Russian MoD plans to purchase, among others, up to 250 ICBMs, 800 aircraft, 1,200 helicopters, 44 submarines, 36 frigates, 28 corvettes, 18 cruisers, 24 destroyers, 6 aircraft carriers, and 62 air defense battalions. Several existing types will be upgraded.
As of 2011, Russia's chief military prosecutor said that 20% of the defense budget was being stolen or defrauded yearly..
As of November 2012, the Federation of American Scientists estimated that Russia has approximately 1,499 deployed strategic warheads, and another 1,022 nondeployed strategic warheads and approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear warheads. Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces controls its land-based nuclear warheads, while the Navy controls the submarine based missiles and the Air Force the air-launched warheads. Russia's nuclear warheads are deployed in four areas:
- Land-based immobile (silos), like R-36.
- Land-based mobile, like RT-2UTTKh Topol-M and new RS-24 Yars.
- Submarine based, like RSM-56 Bulava.
- Air-launched warheads of the Russian Air Forces' Long Range Aviation Command
Russian military doctrine sees NATO expansion as one of the threats for the Russian Federation and reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional aggression that can endanger the existence of the state. In keeping with this, the country's nuclear forces received adequate funding throughout the late 1990s. The number of intercontinental ballistic missiles and warheads on active duty has declined over the years, in part in keeping with arms limitation agreements with the U.S. and in part due to insufficient spending on maintenance, but this is balanced by the deployment of new missiles as proof against missile defences. Russia has developed the new RT-2UTTKh Topol-M (SS-27) missiles that are stated to be able to penetrate any missile defence, including the planned U.S. National Missile Defence. The missile can change course in both air and space to avoid countermeasures. It is designed to be launched from land-based, mobile TEL units. Russian nuclear forces are confident that they can carry out a successful retaliation strike if attacked.
Because of international awareness of the danger that Russian nuclear technology might fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue officers who it was feared might want to use nuclear weapons to threaten or attack other countries, the Federal government of the United States and many other countries provided considerable financial assistance to the Russian nuclear forces in early 1990s. Many friendly countries gave huge amounts of money in lieu for Russian Arms purchase deals which kept Russian Agencies functioning. This money went in part to finance decommissioning of warheads under international agreements, such the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, but also to improve security and personnel training in Russian nuclear facilities.
In the late evening of 11 September 2007 the fuel-air explosive AVBPM or "Father of all bombs" was successfully field-tested. According to the Russian military, the new weapon will replace several smaller types of nuclear bombs in its arsenal.
- RIA Novosti via 
- IISS Military Balance 2010, p. 222
- Greg Austin & Alexey Muraviev, The Armed Forces of Russia in Asia, Tauris, 2000, p.130
- For an account of this period, see Odom, William E. (1998). The Collapse of the Soviet Military. Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-07469-7.
- For some early discussion on this period, see Richard Woff, 'A Russian Army,' Jane's Intelligence Review, May 1992, 198-200. See also Voenniy vestnik, No 12, 1991.
- / short life of the new Russian Guard
- Министерство обороны Российской Федерации
- Parchomenko, Walter (Winter 1999–2000). "The State of Russia's Armed Forces and Military Reform". Parameters: the U.S. Army's senior professional journal: 98–110. ISSN 0031-1723.
- Russia's top brass gather in Moscow to discuss military reform
- Moscow Defence Brief, 20 (2), 2010
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- History of Russian Armed Forces started with biggest military redeployment ever. Pravda Online. The Conflict Studies Research Centre's Keir Giles' paper on the subject, 'Where have all the soldiers gone: Russia's military plans versus demographic reality', accessible via here explores some of the challenges of this transition.
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- Keir Giles, Military Service in Russia: No New Model Army, Conflict Studies Research Centre, May 2007
- BBC, (Russian) Corruption "takes a third of the military budget of Russia", 3 July 2008
- http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-09-19-Russia-defense_N.htm and http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=115073
- Leander Schaerlaeckens, "Russian budget cuts could impact EU defense market", UPI (23 February 2009).
- "Russian defence ministry’s budget in 2013 to reach 2 trl and 300 bln roubles". ITAR-TASS. Retrieved 30 November 2013.
- CHAPTER 2 - INVESTING IN RUSSIAN DEFENSE CONVERSION: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES Federation of American Scientists, fas.org
- Big rise in Russian military spending raises fears of new challenge to west. Guardian Unlimited
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- Илья Kрамник (12 September 2007). "Кузькин отец" (in Russian). Lenta.ru. Retrieved 2007-09-12.
- "How are the mighty fallen" The Economist. 2–8 July 2005. pp. 45–46
- Galeotti, Mark, 'Organised crime and Russian security forces: mafiya, militia and military', Journal of Conflict, Security and Development, issue 1:2, 2001.
- Ivanov, Henry, 'Country Briefing: Russia—Austere deterrence', Jane's Defence Weekly, 28 April 2006
- Lehrke, Jesse Paul. "The Transition to National Armies in the Former Soviet Republics, 1988-2005.” Oxfordshire, UK: Routledge (2013). (see http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415688369/ )
- Pynnöniemi, K., 'Russia's Defence Reform: Assessing the real "Serdyukov heritage"', FIIA Briefing Paper 126, 26 March 2013, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs.
- Turbiville, G., 'Organized crime and the Russian armed forces', Transnational Organized Crime, vol. 1, issue 4, 1995, pp. 55–73;
- Waters, T., 'Crime in the Russian military', CSRC Paper C90, (Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 1996).
- Austin, Greg; Alexey Muraviev (2000). The Armed Forces of Russia in Asia. London, New York: I.B. Tauris. ISBN 1-86064-485-6.
- Keir Giles, Military Service in Russia: No New Model Army, Conflict Studies Research Centre, May 2007
- International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, various editions
- Odom, William E. (1998). The Collapse of the Soviet Military. Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-07469-7.
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to Military of Russia.|
- Russian Ministry of Defense (in English)
- Russia's Military Analysis A very comprehensive online database of modern Russian arms and military technologies. Website also has discussion forums, videos and more.
- Russia Military Guide Includes satellite photos of bases.
- British Conflict Studies Research Centre papers on Russian armed forces
- kamouflage.net Camouflage uniforms used by Russian Federation armed forces
- "Что такое современная армия России". Kommersant (in Russian). 2005. Retrieved 2008-09-20.
- Boy with reattached legs joins Russian army (RT article)
- Authoritative Russian Defence Policy blog
- Authoritative Russian Military Reform blog